Document created: 24 March 04
Air University Review, September-October 1972

Defense Dollars for Deterrence

A Matter of Priorities

Lieutenant Colonel Edward Stellini

Deterrence now means something as a strategic policy only when we are fairly confident that the retaliatory instrument upon which it relies will not be called upon to function at all. Nevertheless, that instrument has to be maintained at a high Pitch of efficiency and readiness and constantly improved, which can be done only at high cost to the community and great dedication on the part of the personnel directly involved. In short, we expect the system to be always ready to spring while going permanently unused.¹

Bernard Brodie, 1959

In the past decade the “retaliatory instrument” of strategic policy that provided a high level of deterrence and security for this nation has somewhat eroded. Whereas in 1960 we spent about 10 percent of the gross national product for defense, the fiscal year 1972 budget represents only 6.8 percent of the GNP, the lowest percentage since 1951. At the same time that we are spending proportionally less on defense, the balance of military power is “shifting from the West to the East, and the world order sustained by dominant American power is fading away.”²

During this period there have been many changes in the world environment that have altered the free world versus Communist balance of power.

The Communists have made some significant gains. The Soviets have moved their naval squadron into the Mediterranean and Caribbean seas and the Indian Ocean and have gained footholds in Africa, the Middle East, and North and South America, primarily by providing military and economic aid. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has gained increased stature throughout the world and has replaced the Republic of China (ROC) in the United Nations.

The free world, on the other hand, has managed to avoid World War III and has held the line in Europe, Korea, and the Taiwan Strait. In Southeast Asia and the Middle East, however, the situation is less certain. Although U.S. military forces have not been directly involved in the Middle East, the outcome of the situation there will have a lasting impact on the world balance of power.

In regard to technology and military capability, the Communists have been moving forward at an ever increasing rate with respect to the free world. For example, the Soviets, although they have not landed a man on the moon, have proven that they are not out of the space competition. They have landed a robot vehicle on the moon, developed a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), and orbited a space laboratory around the earth. This latter accomplishment is probably most important from the military standpoint, since the lab’s orbit took it over the U.S. 15 times a day. In defense-and space-related research and development funding, the Soviets now are spending more than the U.S.—$16-17 billion compared to $13-14 billion in 1970.³

In spite of this potentially ominous trend, a large segment of the American public has been led to believe that peace will prevail if only we would withdraw our forces from foreign soil, if only we would unilaterally disarm, and if only we would divert more federal expenditures to improving the “quality of life.”

Our current national security strategy called “realistic deterrence” is designed so that we will be as strong as is necessary to meet our military commitments and protect our national interests. Given the realities of today’s world and the fact that our national strategy has always been one form of deterrence or another, the term “realistic deterrence” seems quite appropriate. But where should we put our dwindling defense dollars, and on what defense programs?

In our future planning, it will become more important than ever to relate our analysis and planning of our force structure to our national strategy of deterrence. Thus, this article will try to establish a useful and understandable basis for thinking about this problem. First we will discuss the nature of deterrence. Then, we will relate deterrence to decisions on defense programs. And finally, we will establish some general criteria for measuring the deterrent capability of defense programs and discuss the relative deterrence of some of these programs.

The Nature of Deterrence

Over the past 18 years, since the advent of the thermonuclear bomb, much thought has been given to the nature of deterrence by national leaders, military planners, and intellectuals in the academic community and in defense research organizations such as the Hudson Institute, the RAND Corporation, and the Institute for Defense Analysis. Numerous books and articles have been written on this subject, which has permeated the thinking of officials at all levels of government, and it has in fact become our national strategy to look upon deterrence as the main goal of our military establishment.

When one begins to consider seriously the nature of deterrence, he quickly realizes that the formulation of a policy for deterrence is fraught with intangibles and uncertainties. The nature of these unknowns is well stated by Dr. Thomas C. Schelling. Writing on assumptions about enemy behavior as a prerequisite for doing analysis on alternative weapon systems, he says that we must face uncertainty and that one of the many sources of uncertainty is the enemy himself. We do not know, for example, the state of the enemy’s technology, the cohesiveness of his alliances, or how he might perform in combat. Among these uncertainties, Schelling says, are some that are particularly intriguing because they involve decisions the enemy is going to make, what he knows or guesses about what we can do, and the decisions that we are going to make.

There are. . . certain decisions that we and the enemy make in which we are trying to outguess each other and to avoid being outguessed, and trying to adapt to the decisions and choices that each of us has already made and to forecast the choices or decisions that each of us is going to be led to.

Schelling goes on to warn the analyst that because of these uncertainties, he must deal with intangibles. He must deal not only with the enemy’s capabilities but also with his expectations—not just regarding future events but also regarding what the enemy expects about what we are expecting of him.

This may be an uncomfortable kind of analysis to get engaged in, but there is no comfortable alternative. If we make the optimistic assumption that we can guess what the enemy is actually going to do, or that whatever we do he will be caught doing exactly what we want him to do, we shall be resting our whole strategy on the precarious assumption that our enemy is foolish. If we go to the other extreme and make the conservative assumption that whatever we choose to do the enemy will always have outguessed us in advance, we are not only being pessimistic and perhaps missing some opportunities, but we are supposing that the enemy knows what decisions we are going to reach before we have reached them. Either of these two extremes is so unsatisfactory that, whether we enjoy it or not, we have to devise some means for coping with the intangibles.⁴

ingredients of deterrence

After further thinking about the nature of deterrence, one usually realizes that four basic, interrelated ingredients are involved. In general, these are the capabilities and intentions of the side doing the deterring and the capabilities and intentions of the other side. For the sake of simplicity, let’s assume that the side doing the deterring consists of the free world nations (U.S. and its allies) and the other side is the Communist bloc (U.S.S.R., China, and other Communist countries that are potential aggressors). Further, let’s refer to these two sides as Blue and Red, respectively.

Now let’s define what we mean by capabilities and intentions:

• Capabilities are measured by

—the forces (weapon systems, munitions, manpower, command and control systems, etc.) available in active and reserve status;

—the war-fighting capability inherent in those forces (readiness, firepower, mobility, etc.);

—the degree to which these forces can be made less susceptible to damage or destruction (dispersal, hardness, etc.);

—the geographic deployment of forces with respect to the other side (based forward or in rear areas);

—the logistics base, including length of supply routes, location of war reserve stocks, and the capability to move forces and supplies;

—the research and development effort and state of military technology;

—the industrial capacity and ability to convert to wartime production.

• Intentions are conditioned by

—short- and long-term national and international goals and vital interests;

—acceptability by one’s own populace of the above goals and interests;

—assessment of the other side’s capabilities and intentions with respect to one’s own capabilities and intentions;

—expectation of what the other side’s short- and long-term goals and interests are;

—expectation of what political and military actions the other side may take to achieve its goals and the reaction one might expect as a result of one’s own actions.

The capabilities described above would be measured in terms of how many and how effective. If answers can be found to the first question, they certainly are less evident with respect to the second question. The best each side can do is guess on the basis of information made available by overt as well as covert means. Even if one could tally up all the capabilities the other side possesses, he would be hard pressed to find a single common denominator that would be useful. He would have to make all conversions in terms of two potentials: war-fighting capability and deterrence against a first strike; they are not necessarily the same thing.

The intentions of one side with respect to the other side quite obviously defy accurate measurement. Unlike capabilities, intentions cannot be thought of in terms of how many and how effective. It is the combination of Red’s capabilities and intentions and his assessment of Blue’s capabilities and intentions that will lead Red to risk an attack on Blue. On the other hand, it is Blue’s assessment of Red’s capabilities and intentions that will cause Blue to acquire the capability he feels is necessary to deter Red from attacking.

In general, we can say that Red’s intentions are based on his own capabilities and Blue’s capabilities and intentions. Conversely, Blue’s capability is based on his own intentions and Red’s capabilities and intentions. In other words, the situation of Red versus Blue is not symmetric. The goals of the two sides are not the same, and their respective foreign policies have borne this out.

During the past decade there have been many examples that must have imbedded in the minds of the leaders on each side the true nature of the other side’s intentions. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 has certainly convinced the free world that the Soviets are not particularly concerned about world opinion when they feel that the achievement their goals is at stake. The U.S., on the other hand, has often reacted to world opinion in halting the bombing of North Vietnam March 1968, for example.

In terms of intentions being based on acceptability of one side’s foreign policy to its own citizenry, there is also a lack of symmetry in the deterrence equation.

The fact that we have little to go on in assessing the acceptance by Communist citizens of their government’s foreign policies tests to the tight controls placed on these people. Because of censorship and control of media in Communist nations, we know little about how much support Communist leaders would have for a pre-emptive attack on the free world. As for the Communist countries’ knowledge of our intentions, their information is at least as good as our own. They have only to read our newspapers and watch our television programs. What must they think when they learn that, in a recent nationwide poll, 46 percent of Americans interviewed feel that war is an outmoded way of settling differences between nations, and only 43 percent feel that wars are sometimes necessary to settle differences (with a significant proportion specifying “when our survival is at stake”)?⁵ Do they interpret this to mean that most of the population of the U.S. would support our involvement in the defense of Europe?

Now that we have defined the ingredients of deterrence as the interaction of Red’s and Blue’s capabilities and intentions and have discussed the uncertainty involved in the enemy’s intentions, let us now relate deterrence to defense program decision-making.

Deterrence and Dollars 
for Defense Programs

The overriding concern of the defense decision-maker at all levels—service, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Office of the Secretary of defense (OSD), National Security Council (NSC), and Congress—in making choices regarding the expenditure of defense dollars should be that each dollar buys the most military worth possible. To make these choices, each decision-maker must have in mind some concept of military worth—some idea of what utility is to be derived from the expenditure of money for defense. More often than not, one person’s concept will be different from another’s, and often this concept will be colored by the individual’s position in the Defense hierarchy. The services have frequently been accused of making decisions on the basis of vested, or parochial, interests. And there have been suspicions that some so-called “purple suiters” in JCS and OSD have drifted toward specific programs or concepts of force employment reflecting personally held philosophies.

Until recent years, decisions regarding defense programs were often made with little doubt that the money would be forthcoming. As a result, some duplication was accepted as desirable, to an extent, and high-risk programs were common. But now the situation has changed, and we can no longer expect to begin many new development programs merely because we feel there may be some useful fallout from a few of them. Now, before development of a new program begins, certain guidelines must be met: (i) there must be a definite, logical need in terms of increasing military worth; (ii) the program must be economically feasible; (iii) it must represent the best possible way of filling the need; and (iv) the program must be timely. Critical questions then include “What do we mean by military worth?” and “How do we translate the concept of military worth into defense programs?”

concept of military worth

To address the question of military worth, we must establish the national policy goals and strategy that our defense establishment must support. For the answer to the policy question, we can go to President Nixon’s 1970 foreign policy statement to the Congress:

The overriding purpose of our strategic posture is political and defensive: to deny other countries the ability to impose their will on the United States and its allies under the weight of strategic military superiority. We must insure that all potential aggressors see unacceptable risks in contemplating a nuclear attack, or nuclear blackmail, or acts which could escalate to strategic nuclear war, such as a Soviet conventional attack in Europe.⁶

In an effort to harmonize “doctrine and capability,” the President, with the NSC, has chosen the “1 1/2 war” strategy as the basis for our conventional posture. This means that “adequate peacetime general purpose forces will be maintained for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere.”⁷

Also, in his February 1970 statement to Congress, the President enunciated a policy of peace and what is needed to achieve it. Based on the principles of partnership with friendly nations, strength in relation to the strength of others, and willingness to negotiate with the Communist countries, this policy “underlies and guides our new National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence.”⁸

In his statement before the House Armed Services Committee on the fiscal year 1972-76 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense budget, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird further elaborated on this strategy:

The Strategy of Realistic Deterrence seeks to further the goal of peace by deterrence of armed conflict at all levels. I have always tried to be a realist in fulfilling my responsibilities, whether as a Member of Congress or as Secretary of Defense. I believe the strategy we are advancing is realistic for three reasons:

First, it is based on a sober and clear view of the multiple threats to peace which exist in today’s world. It neither exaggerates nor underestimates those threats.

Second, it provides for the maintenance of a strong Free World military capability as the essential foundation of deterrence. It rejects the view that peace is well served if our military power is unilaterally weakened.

Third, it takes account of the strategic, fiscal, manpower and political realities while steering a prudent middle course between two policy extremes—world policeman or new isolationism.

The Strategy of Realistic Deterrence is new. Those who would dismiss it as a mere continuation of past policies in new packaging would be quite mistaken. Past policy was responsive and reactive. Our new Strategy is positive and active. Past policy focused on containment and accommodation. The new Strategy emphasizes measured, meaningful involvement and vigorous negotiation from a position of strength.

The Strategy of Realistic Deterrence will provide through sufficient strength and full partnership the indispensable and realistic basis for effective Free World negotiation. Most importantly, it is designed not to manage crises but to prevent wars.⁹

The above declarations give us a clear, though broad, indication of what our national policy and military strategy are. The strategy is to deter nuclear and conventional war and, if deterrence fails, to be prepared to retaliate.

On the basis of policy and strategy, then, the concept of military worth emerges with the dual meaning of maximizing our deterrent posture while at the same time insuring our war-fighting capability, both limited by resource constraints imposed by the budget. Hence, the military worth of securing a military item must be judged according to these two objectives.

translating military worth into defense programs

Unfortunately, the two objectives—deterrence and war-fighting capability—are not necessarily the same in terms of what decisions to make regarding research development, procurement, and deployment of forces and weapons.
     According to Brodie:

. . . deterrence philosophies and win-the-war philosophies may diverge in important respects. We can say in advance that they are likely to diverge in terms of priority. The objective of erecting a high degree of deterrence takes a higher priority than the objective of assuring ourselves of a win-the-war capability, if for no other reason than the first is likely also to be a good deal more feasible to attain, especially for a country which has rejected preventive war. We are also likely to feel a divergence between the two philosophies when it comes to considering alternative military policies in terms of comparative degrees of provocativeness. For the sake of deterrence we ant usually to choose the less provocative of the two security policies, even where it might mean some sacrifice of efficiency. But if we were in fact interested primarily in winning and only secondarily in deterrence, we should be extremely loath to make any such sacrifices.¹⁰

As an example in this divergence between deterrent and war-fighting capabilities, suppose that we decide, in the budgetary process, to cut expenditures for air munitions to point that our tactical fighter forces could be supplied with only enough ordnance to fight for a few weeks. If instead we spent money earmarked for munitions on additional aircraft, we would improve our deterrent capability. Since aircraft parked on the ramp are visible and imply war-fighting capability, deterrence is explicit. In this example we would improve our deterrent capability by degrading our war-fighting capability.

The reverse may also be true. Consider the decision to spend more on design, development, procurement, and peacetime stockpile of conventional weapons with improved effectiveness, at the expense of aircraft procurement. The fact that we could have weapons in the theater stockpiles whose accuracy and destructiveness improved our overall war-fighting capability would probably have little if any effect on any decision by the Warsaw Pact to attack NATO. The implied value of increased weapons effectiveness is in the reduced sortie effort and aircraft losses that might result from the use of improved weapons. In this sense, we would consider an improved weapon stockpile to be an implied, rather than a visible, deterrent.

In his concept of military worth, the decision-maker must decide which is a more appropriate goal-maximizing deterrent capability or maximizing war-fighting capability. In most decisions regarding choice of forces or weapon systems, we would probably find that both, or all, competing programs will add some measure of improvement to both capabilities.

In view of the fact that our primary military strategy is deterrence, it is reasonable to expect that when alternative programs (forces or weapon systems) are being considered, the decision should be in favor of the program that will provide the most deterrence while hopefully improving or at least not degrading our war-fighting capability.

But how does the decision-maker know which program provides more deterrence than another competing for the same dollars? Logically, he should have some basis for making his decision, some criteria against which to evaluate alternatives.

In the remainder of this article, we will propose a general framework for assisting in making defense decisions in terms of achieving improved deterrence capabilities. As an illustrative application of these criteria, we will then discuss the relative deterrent capability of two programs—fighter wings and aircraft carriers—in terms of a European scenario.

The framework is not intended to provide the answer to all questions regarding decisions of choice. Instead, it is proposed only as a basic set of criteria for illuminating the attributes of a specific program or complementary programs (e.g., forces and ordnance stockpiles) that improve deterrent capability.

Obviously, there are many other factors involved in making defense decisions which the stated set of criteria cannot address. For instance, most decisions on defense programs are constrained by the inertia of previous years’ decisions. Consequently, most changes in force structure are made only at the margin, and the defense posture is changed only on an incremental (year-to-year) basis. Furthermore, many decisions are made on the basis of political or economic considerations (e.g., closing bases and letting contracts.)

Criteria for Deterrence

Before discussing criteria, we should have a clear understanding of what we are evaluating against the criteria. So far we have referred to making decisions on programs—forces and weapon systems. By “forces” we mean major mission forces such as tactical fighter wings, carrier task forces, and armored divisions. By “weapon systems” we mean items such as tactical fighters, aircraft carriers, and tanks.

Each of the above programs involves many subelements which are acquired in some ratio to the program through the expenditure of defense dollars. For example, for each tactical fighter wing a specific number of each type of ordnance must be bought and stockpiled. There must also be some quantity of spare fuel pumps, tires, etc., and some ratio of aircrews assigned. The actual amount of each of these subelements is based on past experience and projected activity rates.

The mix of weapon systems in a force is generally standardized; however, the optimum mix of various forces in a theater has been the subject of numerous service and joint studies. For example, the number of wings, divisions, and naval task forces required to implement contingency plans will vary from one theater to another and from one type of operation to another within a theater. A vast amount of analysis and judgment is involved and accomplished at all applicable levels, from theater level through the service, JCS, and OSD levels. In the strategic area, the number of weapon systems and forces necessary to meet the damage limiting and assured destruction criteria and the interservice combination of these are generally agreed upon. In the tactical area, however, because of the uncertainty and complexity of theater conflict situations, the force mix problem is vastly more complicated, especially when defense dollars are in short supply. There is often much heated debate among the services, between the services and OSD, and in Congress. For this reason it is imperative that decisions on the choice of programs be made wisely and in such a manner that our primary military strategy—deterrence—is achieved at the lowest cost.

the criteria

Now let us consider our proposed set of criteria for evaluating the deterrent capability of a program—a force or a single weapon system. Figure 1 shows four separate criteria against which the attributes of the Blue forces may be evaluated. Each of the criteria is a continuous scale on which the top attribute describes the most deterrence and the bottom describes the least. One should keep in mind that the attributes shown have meaning only in terms of Red’s assessment of the proposed program’s military worth. Consequently, the adjectives “significant,” “extensive,” “minimal,” etc., are subjective judgments which we think the Red strategist would make with respect to Blue’s force posture and capabilities vis-à-vis his own. The term “unknown” means that Red intelligence is unable to satisfactorily make either a qualitative or a quantitative estimate. On this point it should be noted that opposing forces often take strong measures to keep information from each other, especially concerning deficiencies in capability or readiness. On the other hand, each side also through design, publicizes or “leaks” information to the other side for its deterrent effect. For example, in the last five years the Soviet armed forces have carried out four major military exercises. Two of these exercises (Dnieper in 1967 and Dvina in 1969) involved land forces, and two others (Sever in 1968 an Okeana in 1970) involved sea forces. These exercises were well publicized in the Soviet press, television, and theaters.¹¹ We learned something about Soviet operations from these exercises, and we also became aware of their increasing capabilities.

Figure 1. Criteria for evaluating deterrent capability of Blue forces or weapon systems

The main object of the set of criteria shown in Figure 1 is to provide some visibility on the attributes of various programs that improve their deterrent capability. Since most competing programs are not perfect substitutes, it may not be appropriate to make direct comparisons using the criteria shown. In some instances, however, two programs competing for the same dollars may be considered in terms of these criteria for the purpose of making judgments as to which program is inherently superior, or inferior, in deterrent capability.

If one agrees that in spending limited funds “first things should come first,” he might use these criteria to help decide what “things” should be considered “first.” For example, in our discussion of deterrence versus war-fighting capability, we looked at two programs that are complementary and that also compete for the same dollars. Ideally, we would want to strike the proper balance between forces and ordnance; but an acceptable definition of what we mean by “proper” is not easy to come by. It has been suggested, however, that we could reduce the present fighter force, put the dollar savings into improved ordnance, and at the same time have the proper balance and increase our war-fighting potential. A reduced force means decreased “visible” deterrence as well as decreased mobility and flexibility of firepower; and while an improved ordnance stockpile may provide more target-kill potential, it only “implies” added deterrent capability. The point is that a “reduced force level” operates against deterrence to a greater degree than an “improved ordnance stockpile” operates for deterrence.

deterring the Warsaw Pact: where to put our money

To understand the illustrative application of the proposed criteria, let’s compare two programs that overlap to a certain extent and therefore compete for some of the same general purpose forces dollars. These programs are tactical fighter wings and aircraft carriers.

Over the past few years, numerous studies within the Air Force, Navy, and OSD have attempted to solve the land-based versus sea-based tactical air problem, i.e., to determine which is the more cost-effective to operate, an Air Force fighter wing or a carrier task force. These studies generally imply that the war-fighting effectiveness of both is about the same in a given conflict theater. Consequently, the question to be decided has been which force would cost less. The fact that these two forces are not entirely comparable, plus the lack of agreement on what subsystems and support should be included in the cost of each force, has resulted in a wide range of cost ratios. For example, Air Force studies showed sea-based tactical aviation to be 4 to 7 times as costly as land-based; a Navy study showed costs to be about even; and an OSD-requested USN/USAF ad hoc study showed that for the period 1962-69 land-based tactical air had cost, on the average, 1.2 times as much per wing as sea-based.¹²

We will not be so heroic as to try to develop a convincing argument in favor of land-based forces on the basis of costs, because our files are full of studies that have traveled that ground. Nor will we try to “prove conclusively” that we should buy more fighter wings at the expense of carriers. Instead, we will try to point up one aspect of the problem which may have been neglected in the many analyses on this subject—i.e., the relative deterrent capability inherent in fighter wings and carriers.

Since these programs relate for the most part to general purpose forces, let’s begin with the President’s Foreign Policy report to Congress in February 1971, as it pertains to theater conventional forces for deterrence.

The primary role of our general purpose forces is to deter and, if necessary, cope with external aggression. If aggression occurs, the use of our forces will be determined by our interests, the needs of our allies, and their defense capabilities, which we are seeking to improve. It is clear, however, that the Soviet Union’s strong and balanced conventional capability enables it to project its military power to areas heretofore beyond its reach. This requires us to maintain balanced and mobile ground, sea, and air forces capable of meeting challenges to our worldwide interests.¹³

Elaborating on the President’s remarks, Secretary Laird made the following statement before the House Armed Services Committee:

We plan our general purpose forces in peacetime to be adequate for simultaneous meeting together with our allies a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a minor contingency elsewhere. In planning our capabilities we maintain the full range of air, sea, all ground forces needed to meet our planning goals.

The situation which is most demanding, of course, is in NATO. Our general purpose theater force requirements are largely determine by planning for U.S. and allied conventional forces, which, after a period of warning and of mobilization will be able to defend NATO Europe against a conventional Warsaw Pact attack. We and our allies also must insure our ability to sustain our deployed forces and those of our allies through control of the air and sea lanes. (Emphasis added.)¹⁴

Speaking on the deployment capabilities of fiscal year 1972 tactical air power, Secretary Laird noted that in the European area some 600 U.S. fighter and attack aircraft are currently deployed and that this level could be increased substantially as reinforcements, including both active and reserve aircraft, arrived from the U.S. The total aircraft available “would include deployments of an aircraft carrier and their tactical aircraft for the primary task of protecting the essential sea lines of communication and for the support of land forces if required.”¹⁵

We do not know if the Warsaw Pact will ever attack in NATO Europe, nor do we know whether our present deployment of forces has served as a credible deterrent and, if it has, to what degree. If it has served to some degree, we do not know what our deterrent capability will be in the future vis-à-vis Red capability and intentions. Of equal importance, we do not know if we will have strategic or only tactical warning if deterrence fails and the Pact does attack. Although our planning assumption is that there will be a period of warning and mobilization, we must not forget that in 1968 Czechoslovakia was invaded by 20 East bloc divisions that were supposedly on large-scale maneuvers.¹⁶

When defense program decisions are being made, some questions must be considered explicitly: ۰ Are the forces and logistics support presently in place sufficient to counter a no-notice attack should deterrence fail? ۰ Even more important, are in-place forces and support sufficient to provide an effective war-fighting capability after an intensive and massive surprise attack? ۰ If the Pact does in fact use its highly mobile land forces and large air forces to try for extensive territorial gains in the initial days of conflict, how much can we depend on forces we plan to deploy after D-day and supplies we plan to sealift?

An assumption of strategic warning would dictate the need for fewer forces and support deployed forward and greater reliance on the deployment of forces and on air and sealift of support. On the other hand, an assumption of only tactical warning would require sufficient forces and support in place (i) to be able to mass enough force to blunt the enemy attack and (ii) to have adequate residual force and support to compensate for losses accruing from a potential massive air attack on NATO bases and logistics storage sites.

Deploying greater forces and support forward would require increased expenditures on programs such as tactical fighter wings and air munitions and on measures that can be taken to protect these assets, e.g., sheltering and dispersing aircraft, hardening and dispersing munitions storage, and increasing air base defenses.

It is apparent from Figure 1 that by putting our money into the kinds of programs mentioned we could move up the scale for all four criteria. By adding a fighter wing to NATO, we move to a higher position on criterion 1, and after buying more ordnance we move higher on criterion 2, i.e., greater flexibility and increased firepower potential within striking range. By sheltering and dispersing aircraft, by hardening and dispersing ordnance stockpiles, and by increasing air base defenses, we move up on criteria 3 and 4.

Now let’s consider the potential for increasing our deterrent capability by putting our money instead in an additional carrier (refer again to Figure 1). Playing the role of Red strategist, we would have to relate an additional aircraft carrier to the lower portion of at least two criterion scales, i.e., indirect threat (due to reaction/closure time) and minimal acquisition problem (as has been demonstrated by Soviet flyover of our carriers). Additional expenditures of money can do little to improve these factors. However, additional expenditures on carrier defenses could decrease its vulnerability, and we could move up on criterion 4.

But fighter wings and aircraft carriers are not like items, and additional factors must be considered. The primary purpose of the fighter wing is to deter war by providing a visible show of force and, if deterrence fails, to respond to an immediate threat. The carrier’s primary purpose is to maintain the necessary flow of supplies across exposed sea lanes so that NATO can survive long enough to be reinforced; or, put another way, to insure that convoys can deliver the material needed for an initial defense of Europe. According to Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, the threat to our sea lanes is the country’s “most serious threat,” and the next priority for the carrier is to project air power ashore, in a subsidiary role in Europe.¹⁷

Whether the aircraft carrier—prepared to protect our convoys in the event of a war in Europe—can also be considered a credible deterrent to war, and whether the threat to our sea lanes is in fact the country’s “most serious threat,” are questions for each decision-maker to decide for himself.

If we assume that a Pact attack would come after “a period of warning and of mobilization,” we would have some amount of time (depending on the period of warning) to deploy forces and begin sealift of logistics support. If hostilities should begin after adequate forces are deployed (adequate in the sense that we have sufficient fighters in theater to conduct a meaningful counterair campaign, which studies conducted by the Air Staff indicate is the first order of business for our tactical air forces), we are still faced with the possibility of losing a large portion of our air forces and ordnance stockpiles as a result of attacks on our airfields (especially if we have an inadequate shelter level) and munition storage sites. Furthermore, if the attack is conducted in blitzkrieg fashion, there is some doubt whether our sealift pipeline (being protected by carriers on the high seas) would be filled before the conflict either escalated to tactical nuclear warfare or ended with an unfavorable political settlement. This is to say that if the war is extended, Pact submarine strength would indeed be a menace to sealift. However, if the war is short, then naval action is unlikely to be dominant; the outcome will be decided in the air and on land.

As we said earlier, we do not know if our present force deployment is a credible deterrent to a Pact attack on NATO and, if it is not, whether the Pact would attack after some period of warning. Only the Pact strategists and planners know the answers to these questions. Furthermore, if deterrence fails, we do not know, nor does the Pact, whether the war will be extended or short.

Since our national military strategy is to deter war along the entire spectrum of conflict, we should put our defense dollars, which are getting harder and harder to come by, into those programs that will buy us the most deterrence. If in the process we buy more war-fighting capability (or more war-sustaining capability), so much the better.

Of course, we need both tactical fighter wings and aircraft carriers—the question is one of “balanced forces” in terms of meeting our national strategy. If we feel that our deterrent strategy is best served by convincing the enemy that our sea lanes are well protected, then we should spend more dollars on carriers and carrier support. If, on the other hand, we are convinced that a larger and more lethal, hardened, and dispersed fighter force would provide a more credible and visible deterrent, then more dollars should go toward achieving that goal.

The addition to our land-based air forces in theater would certainly provide a more credible and visible deterrent than the addition of sea-based air forces on the high seas, out of range of the likely area of conflict. Air forces based in Europe deter best because they deter the blitzkrieg, against which carrier-based air forces offer little deterrence. When we consider the size of the Red air force and past Red policy (Czechoslovakia 1968), we cannot discount the blitzkrieg.

The point is that any lack of capability on the part of the deterrent force that operates to lessen the risks to the potential aggressor tends to degrade the credibility of the deterrent force in the mind of the aggressor and operates against deterrence. Conversely, any capability that increases the risk to the aggressor increases the credibility of the deterrent force and operates for deterrence.

In this article we have discussed what we call the ingredients of deterrence—the capabilities and intentions of blocs of nations whose political ideologies conflict. We have tried to show that the concept of military worth should mean maximizing our deterrent posture while insuring our war-fighting capability, and that these objectives are not necessarily the same. We then proposed some criteria against which decisions regarding alternative defense programs might be evaluated. And finally, we discussed the relative deterrent capability of tactical fighter wings and aircraft carriers in a European scenario. In this example we posed some serious questions regarding the warning time that might be available in the event deterrence failed and the possible conflict duration.

In conclusion, we believe that balanced forces are necessary to meet our national strategy. And when trying to decide where to put our defense dollars, we must constantly remind ourselves that our strategy is to deter war the best we can—by buying forces and weapon systems that provide the highest level of explicit deterrence.

Hq United States Air Force

Notes

1. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 272-73.

2. See The Shifting Balance of Military Power, a “Supplemental Statement to Report of Blue Ribbon Defense Panel,” submitted to the President and the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 7-8.

3. James D. Hessman, “Countdown to Crises,” Armed Forces Journal, July 4, 1970, p. 18.

4. E. S. Quade, ed., Analysis for Military Decisions (Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally and Co., 1966), pp. 199-200.

5. George Gallup, “War Seen Outmoded by 43% [sic] of U.S. Public,” Washington Post, July 25, 1971, p. A4.

6. U.S. President, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s, A New Strategy for Peace, a report to the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 1970), p. 122.

7. Ibid., p. 129.

8. Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY 1972-1976 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 9, 1971), p. 11. Hereafter referred to as Laird Report.

9. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

10. Brodie, pp. 278-79.

11. “Soviet Exercises: Publicity Plays a Part,” Armed Forces Journal, May 3, 1971, pp. 20-21.

12. “CVAN-70: ‘Don’t Assume It’s in the Bag,’” Armed Forces Journal, July 4, 1970, p. 7.

13. U.S. President, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s, Building for Peace, a report to the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 1971), p. 181.

14. Laird Report, pp. 76-77.

15. Ibid., p. 83.

16. Hessman, p. 18.

17. The Journal Staff, “CNO Zumwalt Presses to Retain 15 Carriers,” Armed Forces Journal, December 7, 1970, pp. 26-27.