Document created: 31 December 03
Air University Review,
May-June
1972
Lieutenant Colonel
Horace E. Wood, Jr.
In recent years, mobility has occupied a unique position among the priorities set by military tacticians. In fact, the quest for continually improved mobility has become the driving philosophy behind modern tactical warfare. Within the broad general area of mobility, few subjects have stimulated the imagination and emotions of our planners more than airlift, particularly tactical airlift. The intense interest that now surrounds this function has not occurred without good reason but has developed as a natural and logical outgrowth of the current conflict in Southeast Asia. This interest has been influenced further by a continuing competition for tactical airlift roles and missions as well as periodic proposals that all airlift resources should be consolidated into a single “master” airlift command.
Advocates of airlift consolidation generally have relied on two basic premises to support their proposals for a single force. First, they have fostered the notion that strategic airlift aircraft with special equipment could be operated in a multipurpose role and perform the entire airlift mission. Second, they have advanced the theory that a single organization for airlift would provide improved management of the force. A related consideration involved a proposal which in effect would impinge on the tactical mission by modifying theater aeromedical evacuation responsibilities.
An examination of tactical airlift’s background, past performance, and probable future employment may be helpful before we consider the validity of these proposals. A quick backward glance shows that tactical airlift, like many other functions, has experienced its share of change over the years. Priorities and tasks have been reoriented, and tactics and techniques have been improved, but the basic mission has remained unchanged.
Viewed in its simplest terms, this mission is preparation for and participation in theater combat operations. The U.S. use of theater airlift in a combat role received its first tests as early as World War II, when, in 1942, elements of Twelfth Air Force flew from England to Algeria to airdrop troops in support of the North African invasion. The encouraging results led to similar airborne operations in the Italian campaign at Sicily and Salerno and ultimately to the massive Normandy airdrops. Joint airborne operations were not confined to Europe, however. Ten thousand troops from Wingate’s Raiders were dropped into Burmese jungles to weaken the Japanese position. These troops were subsequently resupplied by air, giving rise to another important task for theater airlift—logistic support and maintenance of an airline of communication.
The Korean conflict confirmed tactical airlift as a vital instrument of theater warfare. In fact, Korea served to synthesize the many tactical tasks of theater mobility, airline of communication, and aeromedical evacuation. The outstanding potential of tactical airlift as an integral part of the theater combat force in Korea did much to encourage the push for improved aircraft that culminated in our present-day airlift inventory.
In the post-Korea period of the mid-fifties, peacetime tactical airlift (or troop carrier units as they were called in those days) lapsed into a role that concentrated almost exclusively on joint airdrop training with the Army, generally at one of the airborne centers. During the late fifties and early sixties, a shift in emphasis appeared. In addition to joint operations, a major portion of the tactical airlift effort was dedicated to the Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) concept. Still, training was the driving factor, either in support of TAC CASF or Army airborne units and exercises.
Concurrent with the massive buildup of U.S. troops in Vietnam, the seeds of change were sown, and it became apparent that tactical airlift was destined for vastly expanded responsibilities. The most significant of these responsibilities was assumption of the role as primary instrument of mobility for theater combat forces. A second and equally important mission was the requirement for establishing and maintaining an airline of communication to deployed U.S. forces.
In keeping with these responsibilities, many innovations and new tactics emerged for battlefield delivery of personnel and cargo. Assault landing techniques were perfected, and the tactical repertoire was expanded to include such techniques as Ground Proximity Extraction System (GPES), Parachute Low-Altitude Delivery System (PLADS), and Low-Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES). Gradually, as a result of these and similar capabilities, tactical airlift forces became firmly enmeshed in the theater structure as a bona fide combat arm of the joint air-ground effort.
As U.S. involvement in Vietnam continued to mount, the impact of tactical airlift’s contribution to the combat effort became increasingly obvious. Indeed, there is evidence to support the belief that without this capability the Allied effort would have been paralyzed completely or at least stalemated along the coastal areas and around the major cities already possessing large, established airfield facilities.
Perhaps at this point it would be useful to re-examine a few of the underlying conditions that thrust tactical airlift into its sustaining role. First, the basic topography of the country left very little choice but to make extensive use of the air for purposes of mobility and resupply. The mountains of the central highlands, the paddies of the delta, and the jungle regions posed formidable obstacles to conventional wheeled and motorized traffic. Then and even now, roads into many of these areas consist of little more than well-beaten trails, suitable only for passage by foot or cart. Even in the more densely populated districts, road and highway systems were in generally poor repair and unsuitable for sustained military use as surface lines of communication. Almost everywhere seasonal weather, particularly during the monsoon period, transformed existing facilities into quagmires incapable of supporting heavy vehicular traffic.
A second major consideration that demanded broad exploitation of intratheater airlift was the unusual security problem in South Vietnam. Even if acceptable highway systems had been available, it is doubtful that the nature of the guerrilla-type situation would have permitted any appreciable use of surface transportation. Certainly, the number of men required to secure and guard Vietnamese ground transportation arteries would have been prohibitive, principally in diverting an unacceptable portion of resources away from battlefield duty. These conditions left little alternative but tactical airlift as a primary means of resupplying the rapidly increasing number of dispersed bases and outposts. As an example, when the first permanently assigned wing of C-130s arrived in the Philippines as augmentation for the Vietnamese operation, a backlog of approximately 15,000 tons of cargo had accumulated on the marshaling ramps at Saigon’s Tan Son Nhut Air Base. This cargo ranged from priority food and ammunition to barbed wire and office furniture. Deposited by a combination of strategic airlift and sealift at the port of Saigon, this flood of material would have encountered a veritable dead end without the availability of a tactical airlift force equipped and trained for highly specialized short-field operations within the battle sector.
Currently, of course, instead of a single port such as Saigon receiving the bulk of combat materiel, several bases and ports are serving as interface points between tactical airlift and strategic air/sealift. The basic principle remains in effect, however: that in most wartime situations, whether of high or low intensity, operational requirements will dictate a point of interface between the two systems.
This question of interface has become somewhat controversial of late, especially with the advent of larger airlift vehicles that possess a limited capability to operate into airfields with runways in the 4000-foot category. The emergence of this capability has been greeted with understandable enthusiasm in many quarters. This has raised the questions of whether it is necessary to maintain two separate airlift systems or would it be better to merge all airlift, both tactical and strategic, under a single-manager concept.
In view of the probable nature and location of future U.S. military confrontations, these proposals deserve particular circumspection, especially regarding the direction our airlift forces should take in order to provide the maximum service for the least cost. An honest appraisal of the future demands likely to be levied on airlift indicates that the maintenance of our two separate and distinct airlift systems, tactical and strategic, appears to offer the greatest versatility and the best potential for getting the airlift job accomplished most effectively.
There are many logical reasons for this. First and most important, the realities of combat demand such an arrangement. Few commanders would consider injecting the new and extremely expensive hardware of our strategic airlift force into areas that might prove nonpermissive. Cost and vulnerability factors obviously must weigh heavily in consideration of whether to operate these aircraft under conditions that would expose them to any appreciable threat from hostile ground or air action. As an illustration, the loss of a multimillion-dollar C-5 performing tactical tasks in a Khe Sanh type of situation would be totally unacceptable from a cost/risk point of view.
Another element bearing on the problem is aircraft size. Even the largest of our present and programmed” jumbo” series aircraft can be designed for relatively short runway operation, so the problem is not confined simply to the area of takeoff and landing. For example, the constant short-field operations, which may be routinely expected in forward areas, are notoriously severe on aircraft in terms of wear and tear. This problem tends to compound itself and increase proportionately with aircraft size. In addition, once safely on the ground, the aircraft must still maneuver to and from unloading or marshaling zones; and as aircraft size increases, so does the requirement for taxiways, cleared areas to accommodate wing and tail swing, parking areas, etc.
Here we begin to enter an often-overlooked aspect of the total cost-effectiveness picture, that of airfield construction costs. Construction expenditures may logically be expected to increase proportionately with airfield size, with corresponding demands on engineering and construction manpower. Conversely, the more compact tactical airlift aircraft require considerably smaller and thus cheaper fields, with shorter runways and less sophisticated ground support systems. Introduction of TAC’S future-generation medium STOL transport (MST), with its short takeoff and landing (STOL) characteristics, will permit reductions in airfield construction costs. In hostile areas, size factors take on added importance. Extremely large aircraft, with visual signatures in the C-5 category, probably will be much more easily detected and hit by enemy ground weapons than smaller tactical craft such as the C-7 or C-130.
Paradoxically, smaller aircraft can also be more advantageous from a load-carrying point of view. Especially in a non-FEBA, limited-war type of engagement, the airlift requirement is usually for rather modest amounts of materiel to be delivered to small, dispersed sites or to outfits on the move. The keynote here is responsiveness, that is, rapid reaction to a stated need for mobility or airlift support. Excessive amounts of cargo in this kind of operation often pose the disadvantages of hobbling mobile units with the storing and transporting of bulk quantities of combat consumables, thereby impairing freedom of maneuver and actually increasing unit vulnerability. By the same token, operating large aircraft at less than the maximum allowable cabin load (ACL) would be a waste of airlift. A similar wasteful condition would exist on the return trip, with more backhaul capability than could be used effectively.
These observations should in no way be interpreted as minimizing the necessity for strategic airlift. There is a vital need for this function, and the present strength of our modernized strategic force should be maintained or increased. The danger lies in putting too many of our airlift apples in one barrel, in what could amount to an operational straightjacket that would degrade flexibility and responsiveness on a tailored-to-need basis. Strategic airlift has certainly validated its position as the primary long-distance air mover. Without this capability, an important part of the lifeline to our overseas forces would be in jeopardy. Likewise, tactical airlift, with its kinship to theater operations, also has proved its worth. There is no need to confuse or minimize the contribution of either to our military effort.
What, then, should be the tack for today’s planners to follow in posturing our future airlift forces? Hopefully, consideration of the factors just mentioned will provide some insight into the problem and assist in reaching a logical solution.
As a beginning, we must recognize the requirement for two separate and distinct airlift missions, fundamentally oriented to different operational tasks. The first, a long-range, high-volume system to provide massive airlift capability from the CONUS to secure rear areas in a theater of operations. The second, a system especially structured for extremely rapid intratheater mobility and selective delivery from rear areas directly into forward areas, either to the ultimate user or to an interface with ground transportation systems.
There has been a tendency in some circles to minimize or oversimplify the latter requirement. This philosophy has survived despite oft-validated guidance from high echelons that a distinction should be maintained between strategic or long-haul airlift and rapid-response tactical airlift. Opposition to the complementary two-system doctrine has stemmed chiefly from elements within the military advocating the centralization of all U.S. airlift resources under single management. This line of thinking entails far-reaching consequences for the concept of balanced theater forces, of which tactical airlift is an integral part. It could also result in a serious degradation of the theater air component commander’s ability to provide tactical airlift in accordance with his responsibilities to the joint theater commander.
Centralization certainly has its place. Properly placed and managed, it can contribute substantially toward increased efficiency and improved economy. Improperly placed, with respect to either level or mission, it complicates, confuses, and delays. In this case, centralization of all airlift under a single command is not the answer. Single management of airlift is no more logical than single management of the bullet or the bomb. Management of airlift resources should be based upon the same principles governing any efficient and disciplined military establishment or operation.
To give a specific example, theater air commanders who are responsible for the conduct of air operations within the confines of a particular geographical area should not have to go outside their area for command and control authority over any element necessary for the prosecution of an operation or campaign. Absence of this command authority inhibits flexibility of the force and degrades responsiveness. This on-the-scene commander, familiar with all aspects of his operation and aware of limitations, is best qualified to decide how an individual component of his command should be employed or how the total force should mesh in common effort. Tactical or theater airlift as an integral part of theater air operations should not be exempted from this mode of operation. To remove from his command any portion of those forces necessary for accomplishment of his mission is an invitation to operational inefficiency and confusion of command authority.
Current Air Force doctrine supports this thesis by pointing out that command arrangements should not segment aerospace forces among different controlling interests. Control, and any centralization necessary, must be vested at the proper level of command in order to permit exploitation, timely execution, and coordination of participating forces.
Why, then, have there been rather persistent efforts to weld all USAF airlift resources into a single massive organization? The arguments deserve examination.
Trends on the domestic front offer a possible explanation behind some of the recent rumblings for consolidation of airlift under a single manager. Civilian airlines view the modernized strategic airlift force as a possible source of potent competition to be reckoned with in a rapidly expanding airlift market. This comes at a particularly inopportune time for the civil carriers, which are already struggling with serious problems generated by rising costs, payment for new equipment, etc. While in no way contributing toward a solution to this dilemma, the absorption of tactical airlift roles and missions into a single airlift organization could then be used to impart more of a “combat character” to strategic airlift, which is a function beyond competitive concern and clearly outside the province of the civil airlines.
Another argument for consolidation is based on nothing more than semantics. This approach holds that tactical airlift, along with the entire USAF airlift mission, should be merged into a single organization simply because it is an airlift function. With reasoning like this, one could argue that the management of all fighter operations should be vested in a single fighter command, with reconnaissance, bombing, and other functions similarly organized. This, of course, would completely wreck the concept of a balanced theater force. The same approach contends that a single “super” airlift organization, populated by airlift people, is the only way to deal with airlift problems. Such attitudes appear to disregard the basic principles of sound military management.
Still another argument is that the present system encourages duplication of airlift resources and missions. Duplication does exist. In fact, some duplication and overlap in mission capability is desirable. Excessive duplication is not inherent in the system, however, but in the “players.” Probably the best and most recent example may be seen in the introduction of the much publicized C-5 into the Air Force inventory. Many millions of dollars went into the developing and equipping of the C-5 with costly, sophisticated electronic gear for purely tactical tasks such as low-level contour flying, airdrop, and semi-prepared airfield operations. This is duplication, expensive duplication. These capabilities may never be used except for demonstrations and exercises. This type of aircraft may never be employed in a combat situation requiring such tactics or equipment. The reason is clear: it is simply too expensive.
Yet, despite the duplication, the expense, and the doctrine, there are those who have continued to press for more and more tactical capability in our strategic airlift force. We have almost reached the point of putting the cart before the horse in the area of tactical airlift tasks and systems development. What we need at this point is to balance our overall airlift capability. The C-5 and C-141 have brought much-needed modernization to our strategic airlift force. We should now apply our efforts toward a comparable modernization of the tactical air fleet. The workhorse of the present tactical force, the C-130, is a product of 1950 technology. The scientific and industrial community is currently well prepared to provide a replacement for this reliable old veteran within a comparatively few years. Aggressive action is needed to insure acquisition of this replacement before another contingency catches us short.
These considerations are but a few of the complex factors bearing on an increasingly critical mission. Objectively evaluated, they suggest the direction we should take in our future airlift planning. Specifically, we must continue to plan for and support two separate and distinct but complementary modern airlift systems. Further, it must be recognized that the two systems are basically oriented to essentially different operational demands and require separate command and management structures to extract the maximum potential from each.
A constructive first step, calculated to aid in establishing a more balanced view of the airlift mission, is full recognition and appreciation by the entire military community of the unique contributions of the tactical and strategic airlift forces to our total defense posture. Both systems are specialized; both are essential. There is no need for confusion or competition. There is abundant work for all.
Hq Tactical Air Command
Lieutenant Colonel Horace E. Wood, Jr. (B.A., Emory University) is assigned to the Concepts Division, DCS/Plans, Hq Tactical Air Command. He has flown the B-29, B-57, and C-130, accumulating over 5000 hours in the latter. During 1965-66 he served with the 463d Tactical Airlift Wing in support of Southeast Asia operations. He has been selected twice for Tactical Air Command’s Operational Achievement Award. Colonel Wood has completed Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College.
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