Document created: 13 January 04
Air University Review,
March-April 1972
Lieutenant Colonel Laun C. Smith, Jr.
After the Civil War, General William Tecumseh Sherman said in a speech at West Point that he had often been asked which books had taught him the secret of leading vast armies. He told the cadets that he was not aware that he had been influenced by any books. Then he went on to explain that he had had knowledge of the terrain of his battlefields, gained from earlier experiences in the areas, and therefore he felt no need to look back to the great strategists of the past for examples.
Professional military men fully recognize the need to study the strategies of the past. So did Sherman. In addition to being one of the great military leaders in American history, he was an educator. Further, as an ardent historian he constantly admonished his subordinates that the lessons of the past could be applied to the present and future.
Sherman had most of the innate prerequisites for outstanding leadership, including intelligence, tenacity, compassion, loyalty, fierce personal pride, a burning patriotism, the professionalism of the dedicated soldier, the ability to plan well, personal integrity, and almost unbounded energy and ambition. In spite of these traits plus his early recognition of the total nature of the Civil War, historians have tended to relegate him to a subordinate level in the ghostly military hierarchy—beneath such leaders as Ulysses S. Grant, Robert E. Lee, John J. Pershing, and Douglas MacArthur. Apparently the historians cannot overlook his inadequacies as General of the Army after the Civil War, when his apolitical attitude permitted politicians to run roughshod, over him in reducing the military to a skeleton force barely capable of containing Indian uprisings in the West.
Professor T. Harry Williams, in delivering the Harmon Memorial Lecture at the Air Force Academy in 1960, said, “In the last analysis, the only Civil War generals who deserve to be ranked as great are Lee for the South and Grant and Sherman for the North.” Sherman was not a great leader at the beginning of the war, although he possessed the ability. But he grew in leadership and command much more rapidly than any other commander on either side.
When Sherman said what he did to the cadets at West Point, he was trying to impress upon them not the idea that books have no value but that one must study, learn, adapt, and progress on the battlefield as well. That he did this himself there is no doubt, and Professor James M. Merrill has written a new biography that does an outstanding job of substantiating Sherman’s growth as a leader in combat.*
*James M. Merrill, William Tecumseh Sherman (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1971, $10.00), 444 pages.
Merrill’s primary source materials included some previously undiscovered family papers, which he has used to shed a different light on Sherman in a thoroughly engrossing portrait. While making no startling claims in Sherman’s behalf, the author has shown him to be a considerably more compassionate, strong, and fair leader than the harsh, ruthless, unappealing man that history has made of him. In fact, Merrill hints that much of Grant’s strategy up to the time he assumed command in the East was really Sherman’s thinking.
A West Pointer, Sherman graduated sixth in the class of 1840; excessive demerits prevented his holding the third-place position he had earned for scholarship and leadership ability. His early career was for the most part uneventful. He fought in the war with Mexico but afterward resigned from the service because he could not support his family on the pay of a lieutenant.
His talents proved unsuited to civilian leadership and enterprise, although he did have some success as manager of a banking establishment in San Francisco. While there, during the banking crisis of 1854, his sense of responsibility to former army acquaintances nearly bankrupted him. He had invested more than $100,000 for friends still in the service, and many of these investments became worthless when some of the banks failed. It was a point of honor with Sherman to repay in full those who had trusted him. He drained his own savings to do it, but as a lifelong result his integrity was unquestionable, particularly by military superiors or subordinates.
After a succession of jobs around the country, Sherman moved to New Orleans in 1859 as superintendent of a new military institute (which later became Louisiana State University). While there he began to demonstrate the qualities that were to lead him to military greatness.
With the Presidential election at hand, tempers were short, and the Southern leaders were making preparations for war—at least they were talking about it. Sherman wanted it well known where he stood on the issues of the day, for he had already been approached by Southern friends about the possibility of his assuming command of some Southern troops. In 1860 he wrote to one of these Southerners: “I think Southern politicians are almost as much to blame as mere theoretical abolitionists. . . . The true position for every gentleman North and South is to frown down even a mention of Disunion. . . . The laws of the States and Congress must be obeyed, if wrong or oppressive they will be repealed.” (p. 137) This is an early expression of the tremendous importance Sherman placed on loyalty to one’s country—a loyalty that he also extended in great measure to his superiors and subordinates later.
Sherman tried to warn his associates, in both North and South, of the terrible consequences if civil war should erupt. To one he wrote, “Disunion and Civil War are synonymous terms. . . . It would be war eternal, till one or the other were conquered.” (p. 137) A short time later (December 1860), in a discussion with one of his faculty, Professor David J. Boyd, Sherman said, “Boyd, you people of the South don’t know what you are doing! You think you can tear to pieces this great Union without war! But, I tell you there will be bloodshed, and plenty of it!” (p. 150)
Then, on Christmas 1860, he wrote to his superiors in Louisiana, “I will do no act, breathe no word, think no thought hostile to the government of the United States.” (p. 150) And he made it clear that as soon as the State of Louisiana should secede from the Union his association with the institute would be terminated. Through all of this can be seen another attribute of leadership—the ability and the will to express one’s opinions openly, succinctly, and unwaveringly. No one ever doubted Sherman’s motives or misunderstood his intent.
That Sherman was recognized by the Louisiana cadets for his leadership is evident in the words of one of them: “He was fluent and eloquent when he spoke. . . . Upon one and others he made the impression of an ardent, powerful man, governed by duty and a sense of devotion to his country and humanity.” This is not the Sherman that many historians have depicted. It is also significant that many of his students and friends from Louisiana remained his friends for life, even after his part in the Union’s defeat of the South.
When Sherman returned to the North in 1861, he was appalled at the lack of preparation for war. Northern optimism that the war would be of short duration disturbed him, for he knew that the South was united and already recruiting the best officers available. He told his brother John, “The North just don’t care a damn, you politicians have got things in a hell of a fix, and you may get them out as best you can.” (p. 155)
He was further upset by Lincoln’s initial call for 75,000 volunteers, knowing it would never be enough. He wrote, “The first movements of our government will fail and the leaders will be cast aside. A second or third set will arise, and amongst them I will be, but at present I will not volunteer as a soldier or anything else. If Congress must, or if a national convention be called, and the Regular Army be put on a footing with the wants of the country, if I am offered a place that suits me I may accept. . . . The time will come when Professional knowledge will be appreciated, when men that can be trusted will be wanted, and I will bide my time.” (p. 156)
To him, then, military leadership was a professional thing, and only professionals should be permitted to lead troops. General Henry W. Halleck did, however, convince him to take a command soon after the war started.
As the Civil War was joined, then, Sherman had already demonstrated most of the qualities of a good leader. He had not yet been tried in combat, however, as the commander of a force of any size, and this combat inexperience caused him much grief in the early stages of the war. He committed the same mistakes as others—he was too cautious and tended to overstate his needs while overrating the ability of the enemy.
In November 1861 Sherman so overestimated the military posture of the enemy in Kentucky that even General Halleck began to question whether he was ready for such a large command. Sherman asked to be relieved of his command, stating, “If anybody can do better than I for God’s sake let him. I prefer to follow not to lead, as I confess I have not the confidence of a leader in this war.” (p. 180)
This early inadequacy left Sherman a highly distraught man. He had a keen mind, and he permitted what he foresaw could happen in the long run to temper his decisions of the moment. The result was natural—caution and overestimation—and for a while his confusion was interpreted as insanity by the newspapers. But what Lincoln, Grant, and Halleck saw in Sherman to a higher degree than in others was a fighting, conscientious general.
Halleck gave him some subordinate staff jobs and watched him carefully until certain that he was ready for command. When the time came, he was assigned to command the District of Cairo (Illinois), a part of Grant’s rear zone in the West. Sherman fully realized the confidence his superiors had in him, and as he helped them plan the strategy of new campaigns, his own confidence was restored.
He really began to demonstrate military leadership at Shiloh in April 1862, where his attention to detail kept his scattered troops in some semblance of order. His bravery and outstanding leadership saved the day for the Union forces, and Grant, who had always respected Sherman’s capacity to think and plan clearly and directly, began to see in him the trusted leader that he was rapidly becoming.
As Sherman gained confidence, his men reflected it, and when the war ended his army was probably the finest fighting force of the entire war. His troops were well trained and always well provisioned, and their morale was nearly always good. He delegated responsibility and authority and never lost sight of the need for logistical security and central control. As a result, discipline was never a real problem for him. After Shiloh, Grant held few planning sessions without Sherman, and the two of them planned the final campaigns of the war. When Sherman detailed his plan for a march from Chattanooga to Atlanta, Grant objected at first but finally consented and submitted the plan to the President for approval. (p. 244)
By this time Sherman was a supremely confident commander. He was cheered by his men, not because he was a flamboyant individual—physically, he was one of the least impressive generals of the war—but because he had led them successfully through Mississippi and Tennessee. They respected him for his professionalism, which included an ever present regard for the welfare of his troops and a sincere concern for the people who lived in areas conquered by his army.
One thing his men learned above all: when he established an objective, he planned his maneuver so well that he never lost sight of the ultimate goal. In short, his men were confident that, once started, they would arrive. And after the Tennessee and Mississippi campaigns, they had no doubt that they would arrive at their destination victorious. This was much in evidence and certainly was a contributing factor to his successful marches to Atlanta, Savannah, and then through South and North Carolina. Sherman was probably as close to being the complete leader during these marches as any commander has ever been.
Military leadership stems from many sources, including the handling of civilians in combat areas. During the campaign in Tennessee Sherman wrote to Grant that the people of the South “cannot be made to love us, [but] they can be made to fear us.” (p. 207) At Memphis, for example, he worked tirelessly to rehabilitate and care for the people. But when guerrillas operated against his troops with the tacit support of the people, he did not hesitate to use harsh measures. He wrote to Grant: “It is about time the North understand the truth. That the entire South, man, woman, and child is against us, armed and determined.” (p. 206) He then ordered the town of Randolph burned and also decreed that for every gunboat fired on by Confederate guerrillas ten families were to be expelled from Memphis. Thus was revealed the basic leadership attributes that impress friend and foe alike: recognize the situation for what it is, be fair, but act in the interests of the war objective at all times. This was Sherman to the end.
According to Merrill, Sherman was ahead of his time as a military strategist. He clearly understood that the resisting power of a democracy depends more on the strength of the people’s will than on the strength of its armies. And although his concept of collective responsibility violated all the accepted rules of warfare at the time, he very effectively sapped Confederate morale by destroying the enemy’s ability to supply its armies and by terrorizing civilians when it suited the purpose of his objective and they would not otherwise cooperate.
Sherman’s marches through Georgia are so well known that little new can be written about them. As noted, by this time he had established himself as a great leader with both his superiors and his men. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles wrote in February 1865 that Sherman was proving himself a great general who undoubtedly had greater resourcefulness and a more prolific mind than Grant and perhaps as much tenacity if less cunning and selfishness. (p. 287)
In response to critics who cast Sherman as cruel and ruthless, Professor Merrill makes an excellent point: in offering surrender terms to the South’s General Joseph Eggleston Johnston, Sherman restored to the South a large measure of the status quo of the prewar days. (p. 291) This clearly demonstrated that Sherman’s concept of war was purely strategic, not vindictive. The fact that the terms of surrender were not acceptable to the Union had no bearing on Sherman’s attitude. To him, “The South is broken and ruined and appeals to our pity. . . . To ride the people down with persecution and military exactions would be like slashing away at the crew of a sinking ship.” (p. 335)
A good leader is able to lead the opposition. The South after the war, while always mindful of the destruction Sherman’s forces wrought, nevertheless did recognize the man for what he was. In considering Sherman as a Presidential candidate after the war, the Montgomery (Alabama) Mail carried the following lines: “The South will gladly meet him on half-way ground. . . . We can see in him and his well developed character a moral force that. . . will bear down on all opposition and rescue the people from the untold difficulties and dangers that surround them.” (p. 339)
So, Sherman did grow as a leader. Ineffectual at the start, he was acclaimed by almost everyone at the end—his own men and those of the other side as well.
He did have his problems, though, and not all of them were strictly military. Civilian newspapermen had been permitted into the battlefield area over his protests. Thomas A. Knox, a New York Herald correspondent, actually revealed some of Sherman’s strategy, and Sherman was upset that he had been able to ferret it out in the first place, let alone release it to his newspaper. Sherman brought charges against Knox and finally won in a War Department action to have Knox removed from the battle area. Lincoln left the matter to Grant’s decision. Grant backed Sherman, and Knox was removed. This is a clear demonstration of recognition by a civilian President that the battlefield is the command of the general, whose decisions should prevail. The leadership lesson in this case, of course, lies in the determination of the commander to assume his responsibility and fight for it, which Sherman did. The problem of the integrity of the press and press censorship still, however, badgers military commanders today.
The remainder of Merrill’s book does not show Sherman as the strong commander he was during wartime. For example, he considered Indians inferior to whites, and this affected his actions during the postwar campaigns against the Indians. His greatest problem, however, was his inability to work successfully with politicians, and he steadfastly refused to become involved in politics. At a time when the Army needed a General of the Army who would fight to maintain the stature of the military forces, Sherman only grumbled and failed to act competently.
Merrill’s book should be on the shelves of professional military men. Not only does it read like a novel but it is well researched and loaded with tips on military leadership that apply today as they did during Sherman’s time.
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Lieutenant Colonel Laun C. Smith, Jr. (M.A., University of Pennsylvania) is Associate Editor, Air University Review. He served as Information Officer in Morocco and at Richards-Gebaur AFB, Missouri; Assistant Professor of History USAFA; Deputy Assistant for Policy and Programs, SAF-OII; and Regional Desk Officer for Central America, Public Affairs Office, U.S. Southern Command.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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