Document created: 13 January 04
Air University Review,
March-April 1972
The challenge that will dominate the seventies is the challenge of revolutionary change. The major changes that will occur during this decade will be revolutionary in themselves and will have revolutionary effects in the nation and on the U.S. Air Force. This subject of revolutionary change, then, is one that must be faced squarely by the Air Force and its ramifications considered for long-range application. We are concerned primarily, of course, not with revolution in the streets but rather with revolutionary changes in thinking and technology and their seemingly limitless potential for the future.
As far as possible, we of the Air Force want to be in control of our response to these changes, rather than be controlled by them. We do not want to be buffeted back and forth at the hands of others but rather wish to set our course and to change it on a reasonable basis, within the duly constituted limits of national policy.
If we are to achieve any measure of control over our destiny, we must understand the changes in the larger world in which we operate. A popular song, “The Age of Aquarius,” notes the dawning of an age of change and of peace. In a real sense this is the nature of the challenge which we face—the necessity of accommodation to change and to peace. I think we all recognize that, as the war in Vietnam winds down, a certain kind of peace will prevail. However, contrary to the popular view, this is not likely to result in some utopia of worldwide brotherly love. Instead it will be a peace based on the realities of the world power situation.
It may be noted from history that the periods of real peace in the world have not been those when military power was absent. Instead, the great periods of peace have occurred precisely when military power was dominant. Pax Romana was supported by the strength of the Roman legions, and peace collapsed when those legions became weak. Pax Britannica was possible when Britain ruled the waves.
One may postulate that a third world war would already have occurred were it not for the awesome power of nuclear weapons. Peace exists as a result of power, not in the absence of it.
The armies of Europe were not strong at the beginning of World War I, and Hitler started his excursions with a minimum of real strength, impressive only in contrast to the weakness of French and British forces. Certainly the 100,000-man U.S. Army of the 1930s did not lead us to peaceful neutrality in World War II.
Therefore, in writing about a change from war to peace, I am not doing it with a view toward a less powerful Air Force but rather toward the accommodations that must be made to maintain and strengthen our peacekeeping potential.
These accommodations must be made in the face of probable defense budget reductions and the lessened buying power of the defense dollar. It is popular but pointless to argue whether these reductions result from public disillusionment with the war or from winding it down. The important issue for the seventies is how to provide more effective defense with lessened spending power and how to hold together those government and industrial organizations that are vital to defense needs. Living on a reduced budget may be difficult, but certainly there must be room for reducing costs in a system where investment and operating expenditures are usually estimated on a per-pound-of-gross-weight basis and where most such estimates are either borne out or exceeded. Somehow we must get a handle on the “should cost” equation, so that a thousand pounds added to the gross weight of an aircraft design does not automatically add a proportionate amount to all expenditures.
Budget pressures and all-volunteer defense forces will bring changes in the Air Force which we can only speculate about today. These changes will not be easy to take, but, like bitter medicine, they may ultimately make us feel better.
The draft, by providing a ready source of apparently cheap manpower, led us to a labor-intensive work force. With all-volunteer forces we will be looking much more closely at the real cost of Air Force manpower, since the costs will approach “free market” conditions and be paid directly. There should be little doubt that we will move toward more automation and become more capital-intensive in our operations, just as industry and agriculture have done when faced with rising labor costs. The move from labor-intensive operations in industry and agriculture created severe dislocations and brought about widespread social changes. We should not expect the impact to be any less in defense operations, and it would be well to reread the history of the changes in industry and agriculture for lessons in societal change which might help us as we move to a smaller work force with machines replacing men in many jobs.
Another change that comes with the end of every war is the change from combat to training. The Air Force now faces this kind of change as the war in Vietnam is brought to a conclusion. Since we are more accustomed to wars that end abruptly, the gradual phasing down of the war in Southeast Asia may mask this transition from active combat to training. Nevertheless, it will be one of the most pervasive influences in molding the Air Force of the seventies.
The routine of training always seems dull in comparison with the action of combat, and it is difficult to sustain the public’s interest in a training Air Force. The difficulty of sustaining public interest is intensified by the fact that the citizens of the U.S. have been concerned with war continuously for the last thirty years—World War II, the cold war, Korea, and Vietnam. Now we must consider that this concern may shift to peace, in the same way that the U.S. was preoccupied with peace and internal concerns in the twenties and thirties.
An equally great danger lies in the fact that the veterans of the last war usually provide the training for the next, and at least sometimes they fall into the trap of being well prepared to refight the last war but poorly prepared to cope with the next.
We must be sure that Air Force training in the seventies prepares us to defend the national interest in all foreseeable contingencies and is not oriented solely to the type of combat which we know best from recent involvements.
Of great importance in this training will be the use of simulators. The need for simulators in training is not new, but the capability for adequate simulation is. Combat commanders of the past used sand tables to plan and develop battle tactics, and the lack of a three-dimensional simulation capability and scales suitable for air war has hampered the development of air combat strategy and tactics. The combat commanders of this decade will train on computer-based simulators realistically encompassing a wide variety of combat situations and environments.
Training is a prime task for the Air Force when not engaged in combat, and the capabilities for simulation developed during the last decade will provide the basis for the Air Force of this decade. It is significant that 75 T-29s have been replaced by 52 ground simulators and only 19 aircraft in the Air Force undergraduate navigator training system. This pattern seems likely to be repeated in different degrees and in different ways—but always emphasizing the use of computer-based simulators—in all the many areas where training is necessary.
The next ten years will see the phase-out of the World War II generation. Endless statistics can be cited to document the magnitude of this change in numbers of people retiring, proportions of various age groups, and so forth. These statistics, although useful in measuring the extent of change, are far less important than the nature of the change.
As one example, not since the first part of World War II have our ground forces operated without the advantage of air superiority. Few of our Korean and none of our Vietnam ground troops have ever seen an enemy airplane. Naturally our planning and preparation for future conflicts will be affected when the last memory of enemy air power is gone.
Also, not since World War II have we experienced conditions of decisive victory on a large scale. Perhaps the experience of total victory is not necessary or relevant to the future, but certainly such experience has guided our thinking and attitudes during the last twenty-five years. When this experience is gone, it is difficult to predict the changes in viewpoints and concepts about the need for, and meaning of, winning victory in combat.
Furthermore, with the passing of the World War II generation will go the personal knowledge of the trials and difficulties encountered in creating the Air Force. Already, in fact, the 1930s’ struggle to wrest control of air power away from the ground forces is fading from memory. A strong and separate Air Force is taken for granted as a result of the experiences of the last quarter-century.
I am not suggesting that all the experiences of the past are useful or applicable to the future but rather that we may expect significant changes as the post-World War II class takes over. We may anticipate these changes to some degree by taking a closer look at differences between the experiences of the World War II generation and its successors.
All these changes, and others that will come during the seventies, will bring about corresponding changes in our institutional structures. Indeed, the more revolutionary the change, the more sweeping will be the change in organizational structure. The longer we live with any organizational pattern, the more comfortable we feel with that particular structure, and often we reach the point of feeling that the existent structures are the best or the only possible institutional patterns to achieve our objectives.
Increasingly in the seventies we may expect that these comfortable patterns will be exposed to the test of relevancy. Unless we provide valid evidence that our present organizations serve the changing needs or lead in modifying these organizations or in creating new ones, we will find others forcing unpalatable changes down our throats.
Let me review briefly some of these comfortable institutions, without suggesting in any way that they need to be changed, but only that they are being or will be challenged by others.
First, we have the set of institutions whose basic posture was derived from the lessons learned in World War I, namely, the National Guard, the Reserve Forces, and the ROTC. We should not let current attacks upon these institutions force us into the position of defending concepts based on World Wars I and II mobilization needs; rather, we should insure that the functional concepts for these organizations meet the needs of the future.
Next, we have those institutions and concepts created by the men who molded the Air Force following World War II. Through the genius of General Henry “Hap” Arnold, we have the basic Air Force operating command structure of Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, Aerospace Defense Command, and Military Airlift Command, which with only minor modifications has served so well for the past quarter-century. Additionally, General Arnold created the Scientific Advisory Board and enlisted the academic community in wholehearted support of the Air Force. Again as a result of General Arnold’s initiative, the great complex of facilities of the Arnold Engineering Development Center was built at Tullahoma, Tennessee.
Our debt to General Arnold includes his concept and support for the “X” series of aircraft—a concept which gave us supersonic flight and which might have provided many further aeronautical advances had it not been abandoned after the brilliant successes of the X-15.
General Curtis LeMay, as a result of his World War II experiences, fostered the use of operations analysis to improve strategic bombing capabilities. The concept and reality of SAC serving as the strategic deterrent throughout the cold war period also must be credited primarily to General LeMay.
To General Bernard Schriever and his military-industrial team we owe the reality of the Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman. The Air Force Systems Command developed as a logical extension of the total systems concept used in these ballistic missile programs. This concept is so basic to the Air Force way of life today that it is difficult to realize that AFSC’s tenth birthday was celebrated just a year ago.
The Air Force has been well served by these institutions and their creators. The future will not permit us to rest on the laurels of these men—indeed, the seventies will drive us hard to refresh the organizational structure where possible and come up with new ideas where the old no longer serve well. Much of the organizational structure within the industrial half of the military-industrial complex has a similar background and also will be subject to change in the seventies.
The greatest forcing factor for change will be new technologies. The Air Force will not be able to cope with other changes without a strong foundation of technology. These changes have been left until last for two reasons: first, partly because they are usually our first concern and we become so engrossed in the marvels of new machines that we do not find time for the other concerns; and second, partly also because any one article can touch on only a few of the technical changes and hint at their effects. However, it is possible to identify a few examples of the major changes.
What will terminal homing weapons do to the Air Force? Enemy surface-to-air infrared homing missiles already have created the need for infrared suppression in aircraft and engine design. Air-to-air terminal homing weapons are causing a reappraisal of air combat tactics and will have even greater impact as we develop simulators and techniques for effective training in their use.
We are just beginning to assess the effects of our own air-to-ground terminal homing bombs and missiles. As we look at all the targets which the Maverick and other homing weapons can kill, we will be forced to consider the impact of this capability on our aircraft payload requirements, on combat tactics and force structure, and on the training required for effective use of this capability.
Much has been written about concepts for remotely piloted aircraft weapon systems, but little has been said about the effects which these weapons may have on the Air Force. We may start with the premise that remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) will work nicely in those situations where the loss rates of manned aircraft would be prohibitive. As someone has said, “Remotely piloted vehicles are utterly fearless.” Fortunately, RPV’s will be assigned to some jobs that are now done by manned aircraft.
In 1954 we counted our strategic bombers in the thousands, and we had no intercontinental ballistic missiles. Now we count such missiles at more than a thousand, and our bombers in the hundreds. Although RPV’s may not produce such a marked change, some observations may be drawn from this experience with ICBM’s.
First, manned aircraft will have to do their jobs better in order to stay competitive with RPV’s. Manned aircraft will have to have better survivability, more effective weapon delivery, and reduced costs. Paralleling strategic deterrence, planning will need to consider a force structure mix including both RPV’s and manned aircraft. Within any given budget level, it is axiomatic that this means fewer manned aircraft than would be the case without RPV’s. Battle strategy, tactics, and planning will change and become more complicated, to accommodate the differences between RPV and manned aircraft roles and capabilities. Air Force training for RPV’s may rely much more upon the growing capabilities of simulators, since RPV operations do not involve a seat-of-the-pants feel for flying.
Possibly more important than any of these tangible changes will be the effect of RPV’s on Air Force morale, traditions, and institutions. This problem cannot be swept under the rug but must be defined and solved just as carefully as the technical difficulties.
To exemplify this problem, several questions may be asked. What if all heavily defended targets are assigned to RPV’s? Will real pilots be happy flying “model airplanes”? What will happen to the traditions of bravery, self-sacrifice, and teamwork when the “hard jobs” are assigned to the RPV’s? Will the conflict between RPV operations and manned aircraft resemble the Navy conflict over battleships versus aircraft carriers?
Terminal homing weapons and remotely piloted vehicles offer only two examples of the effects which technological change may have on the Air Force.
Each technological advance will force some change upon the Air Force, and in most cases the change will be greater than expected. To meet the challenge of the seventies, we must anticipate the changes which will occur, prepare our plans in advance, and control situations by acting before the problems have time to develop.
Hq Aeronautical Systems Division, AFSC
Ralph C. Lenz, Jr., (M.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology) is Assistant Deputy for Development Planning, Aeronautical Systems Division, AFSC, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, where he plays a major role in projecting future Air Force aeronautical systems. In 1970 he attended the Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia. Lenz, who has been associated with the Air Force since 1945, is a lecturer and author of articles on trend extrapolation methods of technological forecasting.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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