Document created: 6 January 04
Air University Review, July-August
1972
Stereotypes in international affairs are persistent and pervasive, in spite of their frequent inaccuracies. In no instance is this truer than among perceptions about the armed forces of Latin America. Some people outside of Latin America, especially in the United States, conjure up visions of a comic opera in which the cast parades ostentatiously, delivers endless and meaningless harangues, and engages in capricious games of “musical governments.” For other, including a few scholars, the Latin American military is the demonic political force incarnate, greedily and selfishly allying itself with other oligarchic elements to feather its own nest at the expense of the masses. Neither of these stereotypes is correct. They are incorrect because, on the other hand, the sheer diversity of Latin America dooms most stereotypes about it from the start; and on the other hand, because they grew out of conditions which have changes so much that the perception is now archaic.
These stereotypes probably reveal more about the people who preserve them than about the Latin Americans. They indicate a common bias in which Latin American political systems are regarded as inferior because they are not democratic copies of our own. Growth and development have been assumed to be coincidental with the example of civil-military relationships practiced in the United States. From this viewpoint any other condition becomes an aberration or a retrogression that has no value in the developmental process. This tendency to judge and prescribe for Latin Americans forms a long and persistent theme in our perceptions of and relationships with Latin American nations.
Governor Nelson Rockefeller, during his 1969 fact-finding mission to Latin
America for President Nixon, discovered a deep and bitter reaction to U.S.
paternalism. As a result, he recommended in his report to the President that
our approach to Latin American affairs become more pragmatic and less dogmatic,
that we understand that the Latin American context is not the U.S. context, and
that we recognize there may be functionally positive aspects of political
processes we do not like.1
In keeping with this spirit of new perspectives, this article re-examines the Latin American military to suggest positive roles it has played and is playing in the developmental process. Hopefully such an analysis will help dispel some of the old worn images still held about the armed forces in Latin America.
Before proceeding to the analysis, let us clarify what qualifies as positive. Professors Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., provide the criteria used in this investigation when they contend that all developing nations face four major challenges or crises: state-building, nation-building, participation, and distribution.2 State-building is the extension of central control and authority throughout the geographic territory, while nation-building consists of developing a national consciousness in which the people believe that their welfare is inextricably linked with that of the nation. The participation crisis arises from pressures by new and wider segments of society to influence national decision-making. It does not necessarily mean that a democratic solution must follow—a sensitive single-party system might serve the function well—but that a successful solution can only be one which satisfies or eases popular pressures. Finally, the challenge of distribution refers to the demands of the citizenry for a redistribution of national assets; in familiar terms, it is the challenge of rising expectations. Generally these challenges or crises occur simultaneously in varying degrees, and none of them is ever completely overcome; but by and large they must be tackled in the order described, since the ability to cope with each crisis depends on the success of efforts to resolve previous crises. For example, it is impossible to build a viable national loyalty if the central government is not visible and recognized in most parts of the country.
If a military activity meets one or more of these challenges, that role will be considered a positive one. Of course, some activities may detract from one challenge while assisting in another, so it will be necessary to note occasional caveats.
There are three major areas in which the Latin American military meets the criteria outlined above. The first is when the military participates as a political promoter of reform. This is an active role that must be consciously sought by the organization. The second area is less a conscious choice and more a result of the inherent functions of the military in developing societies. It concerns the military as a source of modernizing attitudes, especially for conscripts from backward environments. Finally, the military contributes to development as a unique repository of skills and services that can be exploited in essentially nonmilitary tasks for the good of the nation.
military as a political promoter of reform
The Latin American armed forces, like the societies they represent, are changing. It is no longer accurate to think of all the Latin American military as a partner of the church and wealthy landowners in favor of the status quo. There are several, good explanations for the change, which of course has not been of uniform importance throughout the continent. In the first place, recruiting for the officer corps has shifted from the upper to the middle and lower classes. These officers, mostly younger and of lower rank, reflect their background in their increased concern for the condition of the wider segments of their society.3 In addition, the armed forces of many nations have recognized a potential powder keg in social conditions that lend themselves to violent revolution. Revolutions of the explosive type experienced in Mexico in 1910-17 and Bolivia in 1952 destroy the established armed forces, so the military has a vested interest in satisfying pressures that threaten their existence. Also, and a related point, the armed forces recognize that national military power depends on the health of the national party as a whole; a strong economic system and a strong sense of national unity are prerequisites to a viable national defense. For several reasons, then, the military may take a political position in favor of meeting the challenges of development.
Achieving the conditions for change. The state cannot take measures against any of the pressures that beset it unless it operates in a reasonably stable situation. The military in Latin America is an important factor in achieving the required stability. While its participation may involve purely military tasks, such as counterinsurgency, it may also involve political action.
Venezuela provides an example of the military in this role. In 1958 the government of Perez Jimenez was being rocked by extensive civil disorder. The reaction of the government was to increase its repressive measures, and this, in turn, resulted in greater reaction and violence. In two days of fighting in January, over 300 people were killed and 1000 wounded. The military, fearing chaos, demanded and received the president’s resignation. That same year Romulo Betancourt was elected president in the first free election in ten years. The military had acted as a caretaker of the national interest and withdrew when stability was restored. In Latin America, where instability is frequently endemic, this role is particularly important.
The danger here, of course, is that military intervention may, in fact,
promote the very instability it seeks to control. The disruptive effects of
political interference, some of which may affect the political system long
after the event, are of such dimensions that the alternative must be dire
indeed. Obviously there are no standards that determine the relative payoffs of
passivity and action in conditions of internal conflict, but it is important to
note that in some circumstances the alternative to military pressure might be
monumental chaos.4
Extension of the national political power base. The challenge of
participation is a crucial one. If segments of the national entity seek
influence in decision-making but are frustrated, the conditions for an upheaval
exist. The military has, on various occasions, had a hand in expanding the
political power base and easing such pressures. In Argentina, for example, the
military, when led by Juan Domingo Peron, allied itself with labor, previously
a sizable force without significant influence. Whatever else Peron may have
done in Argentina, he and his uniformed colleagues brought the working classes
into the political system, and no political equation since has been complete
without them.5
There are also examples of the military’s cooperating to remove roadblocks
standing in the way of increased participation. These roadblocks have included
fellow officers as well as civilians. Professor Edwin Lieuwen has conceded that”.
. . they often played an anti-despotic political role, intervening to terminate
the impossible tyranny of one of their own errant colleagues or to supply a
corrective to the excesses of civilian politicians.”6
A potential problem in this role is that, once having associated itself with one aspiring group, the military might stick with it to the frustration of yet other groups. Some observers contend that this has already happened generally throughout Latin America, where the middle class is allied with the military against the lower classes.7 However, even if true, it is only fair to point out that this situation is vulnerable to change just as was the earlier alliance with the oligarchy. Some evidence, in fact, suggests that it is changing, and doing so rapidly, as military men become increasingly sensitive to pressures from the long-denied lower sectors.
The modernizing military. Of tremendous importance to Latin America has been the relatively recent emergence of socially conscious, politically aggressive armed forces referred to as the “modernizing military.” The modernizing military typically rides to power on a theme of virulent nationalism, believing itself to be the only force capable of implementing and directing a program of vast reform. Agrarian reform, more equitable tax structures, nationalization of basic industries, economic assistance to the underprivileged, and national job-training programs are some of the ideas espoused by the modernizing military.
The importance of nationalism to this kind of military regime cannot be overestimated. Nationalism provides basic motivation for the military and the whole population; it is the glue that holds together the previously separate sectors of the system. It is the rationale for almost everything the modernizing military does. The rising sense of national pride throughout Latin America may indicate that conditions conducive to the modernizing military are becoming widespread.
Although most Latin American armed forces, whether they are in political power or not, have modernizing elements, the most obvious recent example of this phenomenon is found in Peru. The revolution in 1968 brought to power what now appears to be a textbook case of the modernizing military. For whatever motives, the regime appears sincerely dedicated to meeting the crises of development in a forceful and, above all, independent fashion. This has created friction between Peru and the U.S. over expropriation and the limits of territorial water, but on the other hand some powerful changes have been made for the Peruvian people. One careful observer recently listed these accomplishments: “. . . the breaking of the oligarchy’s stranglehold on the economy; the distribution of hacienda lands to those who work them; the discrediting of the traditional, self-serving political system; the reform of the educational, judicial, and university systems; and the inculcation in the public of at least a degree of social consciousness. . . .”8 The military in this role is attempting to meet the challenges of nation-building, participation, and distribution simultaneously.
A most important reservation about this role concerns the ability of the military to see the job to completion. Historically, when reform-minded military men have assumed power, their worst enemies have been their colleagues in uniform. Different perceptions of military responsibilities and roles within the armed forces have led to reversals, iniquitous compromises, and countervailing pressures that dilute the value of the original program.
Before passing to the second general area of positive roles, we should note that the modernizing military, while it favors change, will not condone free-wheeling, cataclysmic change of a violently revolutionary nature. It believes firmly in controlled change at a pace the military can manipulate. Its faith in the necessity for stability shapes this requirement. Any attempt to bring on a violent revolution, even if the military shared some of its ultimate goals, would be met with force.
military as a source of modernizing attitudes
Some positive roles of the Latin American military are inherent in the business of running a defense establishment. They are spin-off benefits of the training that naturally comes with armed forces in a developing nation. For the most part these roles develop attitudes concerning the individual’s political competence and his obligation to the nation, attitudes which are essential to the processes of development.
National unity. The military by its very nature and mission is a strong national symbol. It possesses an effective set of emblems (uniforms, weapons, flags, etc.), which represents national authority. It frequently is the most nationally dedicated element in the society, claiming no parochial view within its ranks. It instills in its recruits an awareness of the nation which in many cases was not present before recruitment, and it exposes its members to other segments of society—men from other areas with different views and backgrounds—and contributes in this way to national integration.
The military in some cases is the only observable national symbol. In the jungles of Brazil, for instance, the Brazilian Air Force frequently provides the only contact the people there ever have with the national government. Both as a symbol and extension of state authority and as a unifying force with its conscripts, the military performs an important service.
Teaching pragmatism. For recruits, who enter military service from
traditional segments of society, their tour of duty provides exposure to
attitudes that are prerequisites to the problem-solving involved in
development. A recruit from a rural background brings with him a narrow view of
human capability. He is impressed by the power of the supernatural and
consequently accepts his lot with little question. The military exposes him,
under controlled conditions and with more security than is normally available
in this process, to secular, pragmatic thought and to man’s potential as a
result of it. The requirement for training in twentieth century military skills
promotes an objective and empirical approach, subordinating the mysticism and
fatalism of his upbringing. The military organization of today is by its very
nature, then, a source of socialization that inculcates the kinds of beliefs
that a developing nation must have in abundance. A broader and common cultural
experience of this type sets conditions that are necessary for nation-building
and for effective participation in the political process.9
Social mobility. The military in Latin America has for some years been an acceptable avenue of advancement for men of the middle and lower classes. In some societies, the armed forces constitute one of only a few such opportunities. An officer’s commission puts him in the middle or upper middle class economically regardless of his background and also introduces him to high social and political circles perhaps not previously open to him.
Social mobility in the military encourages the aggressive, problem-solving attitudes that are necessary in meeting the challenges of development. It promotes participation and acts as a safety valve for individuals who seek a part in the national commitment. Access to the respect, authority, and responsibility attendant to the profession induces otherwise lethargic members of society to become an active part of it. Further, status fluidity helps to get the best available talent with the best attitudes where they can be most effective.
The Mexican armed forces provide a good example of the military opportunity for mobility. The tradition of an open officer corps, which had its roots in the revolution of 1910-17, continues today; many Mexican officers are the products of families in the lower income levels. A more specific example is the recent president of Peru, General Juan Velasco Alvarado, who began his career as an enlisted man and advanced to the officer corps by appointment to the Peruvian military academy.
The biggest drawback to all three of these modernizing attitude roles is that they apply to so small a part of the population. The largest military establishments in Latin America hold no more than one percent of the total population. Consequently, although the military may perform a positive role for those who become a part of it, relatively few people are affected. In addition, as Latin American societies progress, other agencies assume a much greater share of the responsibility for modernizing attitudes; schools and communications media are prime examples. Many other avenues for mobility also open up as the nation becomes more diverse and fluid. On the whole, the more advanced economically and socially a nation is, the less significant is this set of roles.
military as a provider of skills and services
The first set of roles centered around activities of the military that are largely political. The second set dealt primarily with positive social or cultural roles. The third set will involve functions that are preponderantly economic. This category includes (1) skills that the military provides to its members by virtue of its inherent technological requirements, and (2) both skills and services furnished by the military to society beyond its military tasks.
Inherent skills. The modern military organization requires a vast number of specialties that have wide applicability in civilian life. This requires extensive training, and much of it is founded in educational fields of broad utility, e.g., reading, writing, mathematics, and basic physics. Because a recruit must be able to read before he can be expected to learn how to maintain an aircraft engine, most Latin American armed forces conduct literacy training for those recruits who need it. Next comes skill training for tasks vital to the military mission, such as accounting, administration, carpentry, metal work, food preparation, law enforcement, procurement, and sanitation. The training for all these jobs can be productive in meeting the requirements of an expanding economy. It also equips the member to achieve his goal of a better income after leaving the service.
Skills and services. There is another dimension to this set of roles
which is potentially much more significant than the first. It results when the
military devotes its manpower and resources to solving the problems of
development. This role is more commonly known as civic action.10
There are two compelling motivations for civic action. In the first, unfortunate social and economic conditions in parts of Latin America persuade civilian and military authorities that the military must join the developmental struggle, since all elements of the national life must be productive. Most armed forces in Latin America have no apparent serious international threat to prepare for. At the same time they do have equipment and manpower that can usefully be turned to programs that either cannot or will not be accomplished by the civilian sectors.
The second and more immediate motivation is the result of the existence or imminent threat of insurgency. In addition to their military activities, the armed forces engage in civic action in order to gain the allegiance and cooperation of the population in the area of dispute. Without the support of the local people an insurgent group is in serious danger. The military, as representatives of the national government, simply undertake tasks, usually short-range, that are designed to win loyalty in the area away from the insurgents and toward the government.
Whatever the motivation, the range of projects is impressive. Virtually all Latin American armed forces now participate in some form of civic action, and several had long and admirable histories of such activity well before civic action came to be emphasized in the 1960s.
A complete list of civic action projects in Latin America would be an enormous undertaking. However, several examples will serve to illustrate the kinds of things being done.
There are many examples, some spectacular, some not so spectacular, but
these few indicate the scope of the role. The economic fruits are important,
for they raise the general distributive capability of the nation. At the same
time the military demonstrates its interest in uniting the nation and in supporting
national goals. Civic action in one form or another addresses all four of the
challenges of development, but it contributes the most to meeting the crises of
nation-building and distribution.11
Not even members of the armed forces of Latin America would contend that all the efforts of their predecessors or contemporaries can be judged as positive. Nor is it the intention of this brief survey to contend that the military stands entirely pure and untarnished. What it does contend is that old notions about the negative nature of the armed forces in Latin America are inaccurate. Instead, the military, which after all is an integral factor in most Latin American countries, responds positively to the imperatives of national development. It can, in fact, be seen to perform a variety of roles which are beneficial in that process.
Sufficient objections to these roles have been raised so that it should be apparent that a very careful analysis must be made to determine the potential value of specific cases. Each situation must be weighed in terms of payoffs versus sacrifices, possible damage to other facets of the developmental effort, extent of national stability, availability and competence of civilian alternatives, the question of which challenges are most pressing, and the existence of international threats. What is more, these considerations must be weighed individually within each country on the basis of its specific context, independent of outside interference. Given these conditions, there is much for the military to do that can help to overcome the monumental difficulties most Latin American nations face.
Air Command and Staff College
Notes
1. Nelson A. Rockefeller. The Rockefeller Report on the Americas (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969).
2. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1966), pp. 35-37, 314-32.
3. John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 106-13.
4. See, for instance, the assessment of Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance of the Millions: Military Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia, 1930-1956 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957), pp. 316-17.
5. Frederick B. Pike, ed., Freedom and Reform in Latin America (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 57.
6. Edwin Lieuwen, “Militarism and Politics in Latin America,” in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed., John J. Johnson (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), p.149.
7. See José Nun, “The Middle Class Military Coup,” in The Politics of Conformity in Latin America, ed., Claudio Veliz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 66-118. Also Veliz in the same work, pp. 1-14.
8. Richard Lee Clinton, “The Modernizing Military: The Case of Peru,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, XXIV (Spring 1971), pp. 43-66.
9. See Lucian W. Pye, “Armies in the Process of Political Modernization,” in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, op. cit.
10. Two excellent and thorough works on civic action are Edward Bernard Glick, Peaceful Conflict: The Nonmilitary Use of the Military (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1967); and Hugh Hanning, The Peaceful Uses of Military Forces (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967).
11. Another appraisal of civic action can be found in Willard F. Barber and Neale Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966).
Major Michael A. Nelson (M.A., University of Arizona) is a student in the Air Command and Staff College. His previous experience has centered primarily in tactical fighters, including a combat tour in the F-105. On returning from SEA, Major Nelson attended graduate school under the AFIT program and specialized in Latin American politics. Subsequently he was assigned as an adviser to the Republic of Korea Air Force.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic
environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the
U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air
University.
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