Document created: 6 January 04
Air University Review, July-August
1972
On 25 August 1970 Brigadier General Robert N. Ginsburgh, in an address to the Air War College, squarely posed one of the more salient issues that military planners must face in the post-Vietnam war period when he said of the Nixon Doctrine:
The doctrine, of course, is still
open to interpretation. If we will no longer undertake all the defense of the
free world, how much will we undertake? How will it actually be implemented?
How do our allies suddenly gain the strength to carry their share of the
defense burden and what is their share? Because these questions have yet to be
answered and the Nixon Doctrine actually put to the test, there is also a
question of whether or not it will really work.l
This statement should create an emotion running from anxiety to near panic. For, if the Nixon Doctrine will not “really work,” then what are the alternatives? The purpose of this article is not to examine possible alternatives but to concentrate on the military equations of the Nixon Doctrine and suggest ways in which the Air Force can assist in assuring that no alternative is necessary.
The Nixon Doctrine lays down in some detail the basic pattern of U.S. foreign policy and the tenor of relationships with foreign governments in the years ahead. These relationships as articulated by the President on Guam in November 1969 have three basic elements.
The first of these, that “the United States will keep all treaty commitments,” represents an end or goal.
The second element states that “we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we considered vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.”
The third element presents a formula for intergovernmental relations—and also contains a strong military obligation: it states that “in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.”2 It is in this area that the USAF may find its greatest challenge and its greatest opportunity to contribute to the fulfillment of the Nixon Doctrine in the years ahead. Therefore, this article addresses the “other types of aggression” and, more specifically, the problem of subversive insurgency—whether primarily internal in nature or externally stimulated and supported.
One of the most popular theses adopted by today’s writers and political philosophers is the “No more Vietnams.” Briefly stated, this thesis holds that the United States has found the Vietnam war so painful in terms of casualties, cost, and internal political turbulence that in the foreseeable future no American political leader will dare hazard another involvement of this kind.
Candidly recognizing the widespread unpopularity in which the present conflict is held by the American public, one is prompted to muse over the question of just what conditions must be satisfied before an armed conflict involving U.S. forces will be at least accepted by the American people.
From our experiences in the four major wars of this century (World War I, World War II, Korea, and Indochina) and our exposure to several near-war involvements (Lebanon, Cuba, Dominican Republic), it appears that at least one (and preferably more) of three general conditions must be fairly obvious to the, American public before it indorses or even tacitly accepts its government’s military involvement in a foreign conflict:
(1) The vital interest of the United States must be at stake.
(2) The conflict permits a clear-cut military victory; or
(3) If the conflict does not involve a vital U.S. interest and its nature indicates that it will be protracted and its outcome uncertain or nebulous, it must be conducted as a counterinsurgency operation with the U.S. participation confined to truly low-profile activities.
World War II is an example of a conflict satisfying the first condition. Our actions in regard to the Berlin and Cuban crises meet both the first and second conditions. U.S. action regarding Lebanon in 1958 and President Kennedy’s deployment of the U.S. Marines into Thailand in response to a threat to Laos in 1962 also loosely fit the second criterion. Vietnam circa 1961-63 and our extensive assistance to numerous Latin American nations are plausible examples where the third condition prevailed. Unfortunately, Vietnam-like the man who came to dinner—did not remain transient in nature, nor did U.S. involvement remain low-profile. Neither did the general U.S. population sustain a conviction that our vital interests were at stake or that victory, in the accepted sense, was attainable.
Rather, as the conflict continued, Defense costs rose, and the opportunity for a clear military victory in the generally accepted sense continued to fade. Also, national frustration increased, and our initial disillusionment gradually changed to dissatisfaction. Finally, dissatisfaction gave way to outright dissent.
This, then, is the background against which the Nixon Doctrine was promulgated. The Doctrine represents a reinstilled hope that the U.S. will eventually find the key to a method of fulfilling its responsibilities as leader of the Free World—especially regarding the insurgency-vulnerable emerging nations—but will do so in a manner that will not strain the fabric of our own society. Failing this, we must accept the equally undesirable alternatives of reverting either to a pre-World War II policy of military isolationism or to the post-World War II policy of international brinkmanship through reliance on nuclear deterrence. The former alternative is highly impracticable, for World War II and events thereafter have thrust the U.S., willing or unwilling, into the position of singular leadership of the Free World. The latter alternative has been erased by the entry of the U.S.S.R. and Communist China into the nuclear club.
implementation problems of the Nixon Doctrine
To develop and explain a concept is one thing; to implement it is something else. The basic logic of the Nixon Doctrine cannot be attacked. Its conceptual tenet has been voiced by other Presidents in earlier times. President Kennedy also was obviously well aware of this concept and the frustrations associated with attempts to implement it. In a 1963 comment on the Vietnam situation he said:
They want a force of American troops. They say it’s necessary in order to restore confidence and maintain morale. But it will be just like Berlin. The troops will march in; the band will play; the crowds will cheer; and in four days everyone will have forgotten. Then we will be told that we will have to send in more troops. It’s like taking a drink. The effect wears off and you have to take another.
He also emphasized that the war in Vietnam can be won only as long as it is
a South Vietnam war: “If it is converted to a white man’s war, the United
States will lose as the French have lost.”3
President Nixon was obviously aware of the problems of implementation when he commented that “certainly the objective of any American administration would be to avoid another war like Vietnam any place in the world. . . .” Mr. Nixon said it was very easy to say that but to develop the policies to avoid it was taking an enormous amount of his own time and that of his associates.4
Implementation of the military assistance aspects of the Nixon Doctrine will require at least three basic executive judgments. First, a judgment must be made as to which of the many insurgency-vulnerable nations are sufficiently vital to U.S. interests to warrant initial or increased U.S. military assistance.
After determination is made as to which insurgency-vulnerable countries, individually or collectively, hold a high U.S. interest index, a second judgment is called for. If the degree of military support rendered by the U.S. is contingent on the effort of the subject country (and the President has stated that “America cannot and will not conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations”),5 then how do we make an accurate judgment regarding the true extent of a given country’s ability and potential to conduct the military aspects of counterinsurgency?
Later another decision must be made: whether to continue, increase, or phase out our military assistance. Of course, this will depend on whether the insurgency is arrested or escalated; and, if escalated, what will be the cost and impact of our continued involvement, chance for success, etc. One can expect that .the accuracy of these decisions will be no better than the information upon which they are based.
In the past, information on a friendly foreign nation’s military potential has been compiled from reports submitted through the attaché and Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) systems. However, these sources may not be adequate to support the fine-focus decisions required by the Nixon Doctrine in the future. In many cases, attaché and MAAG data also reflect the prevailing viewpoint of the host country’s military and governmental leaders. Occasionally these assessments tend to be influenced by the fact that the MAAG is also charged with the responsibility of developing adequate host country military capabilities.
Even with the best of precommitment information available to a President,
the decision to actually assist an insurgency-beleaguered nation cannot always
be expected to be infallible. Further, the conditions existing at the moment of
decision will oftentimes undergo change. Therefore, in the event that increased
U.S. aid does not subdue or at least arrest the insurgency condition, another
clear “‘go-no-go” judgment must be made somewhere down the line. This decision
point should allow the U.S. to withdraw from its involvement without loss of
prestige or, alternatively, provide a base for significantly increasing our
commitment, depending on the vitalness of the issue to U.S. security. In the
event of such an escalation on our part, it should be a conscious, readily
recognized step. The total risk should be examined in detail, restrictions on
military operations that may stem from political realities should be
identified, and professional military opinions on their effects should be
sought. If after such a political/military examination we decide to deepen our
commitment, this step will not have been the result of an obscured process in
which the full extent of our involvement was not immediately obvious. President
Nixon recognized the importance of this planning when he stated that we must “avoid
that creeping involvement that eventually simply submerges you.”6
The ultimate success of the Nixon Doctrine depends not only on its conceptual ingredients but also on the adequacy and accuracy of the military information available to high-level decision-makers.
The answer to these problems can be partially provided through a revitalization and expansion of the Mobile Training Team (MTT) concept employed by the USAF Special Operations Forces (SOF). However, before directly applying the SOF potential to the above, let us pause and examine the recent history of USAF efforts in counterinsurgency (COIN).
recent USAF special warfare history
The movement by the USAF into the insurgency spectrum of warfare was not a random whim to preserve for itself a novel scarf-and-goggles role of the World War II type of flying. The action was a result of National Security Council policy, which in 1961 was promulgated to all agencies of the federal government as U .S; national policy vis-à-vis the counterinsurgency threat existing in the vast underdeveloped countries of the world. This policy was, of course, our counterthrust to the U.S.S.R. foreign policy challenge embodied in the now famous “wars of liberation” dictum proclaimed by Khrushchev. The specific missions of the original USAF COIN unit, the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (later enlarged and designated the Special Air Warfare Center, eventually becoming the Special Operations Forces), were not immediately obvious even to the original cadre. Unfortunately, shortly after its formation and long before it had an opportunity to fully develop and test sound doctrine and concepts, this original COIN unit was immersed in the Vietnam war. From that point on, its entire modus operandi within Southeast Asia (SEA) was tailored to general purpose force use.
Perhaps a valid contrast can be drawn between the evolution of Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the Special Air Warfare (SAW) Center. One may ponder what would be the nature of SAC today if, say, six months after its initial formation it had been totally committed to either a strategic or protracted limited war. Would it ever have developed the concepts and doctrine, procedures and tactics that characterize SAC as being one of the finest, most efficient military organizations in existence? Those who were part of SAC in its youth remember the trials and the errors and the retrials that led to its present status. It took years to develop and refine such sub-elements as crew selection, training and quality control procedures, its flight formation and penetration tactics, customized supply and maintenance procedures, and highly responsive command and control and management systems. To achieve its present pinnacle of professionalism, SAC was blessed with more than just the genius of General Kenney, General LeMay, and their staffs. It also enjoyed the indispensable element of time.
On the other hand, the SAW forces were barely formed and equipped with “first guess” aircraft when they were thrust into an environment that became the dominant influence in their further development. Unfortunately, the major characteristic of this influence has been a sharp tendency towards orthodoxy: the constant attempt to fight wars in a manner in which we feel comfortable and which has proven successful in the past. This tendency has continued until, in the later years in Southeast Asia, about the only difference between SAW and conventional forces was the age of the aircraft assigned to each. Although some consider Vietnam as a limited war and others as a counterinsurgency war, our tactics and strategy have been by and large conventional, utilizing both general purpose and SAW forces. Therefore, when we speak of the role and contribution of Special Air Warfare vis-à-vis the Nixon Doctrine, we refer not to the contemporary role of SAW in South Vietnam but rather to what it has done in Latin America, Thailand, Ethiopia, and other places.
Examples of SOF accomplishments are manifold. Early in the troubles in Southeast Asia, SOF forces (then called air commandos) established an intense and austere training program in Thailand to train the pilots of the almost defunct Royal Lao Air Force. As an immediate result of this training, the RLAF fully supported the Royal Lao Army in blunting a major Pathet Lao offensive and allowed the government forces to successfully launch a counterattack, now known as Operation Triangle. This was a classic example of transferring the knowledge and expertise of USAF tactical air operations to a friendly air force without exposing a single American to combat, thereby minimizing the chances of U.S. involvement. This SOF accomplishment was singled out by high U.S. and Lao governmental dignitaries as being a significant major step in preserving Laotian independence at a most critical time.
In Latin America, accomplishments of the Special Operations Forces in civic action are notable. One instance, Operation Pista, occurred in 1963. In this demonstration the natives of a jungle village that was isolated from land lines of communication were enlisted through the medium of airborne loud-speakers to construct a lightplane strip, thereby opening their village to commercial air travel. An extension of this technique was carried out under the guidance of Brigadier General Gilbert L. Pritchard, first commander of the USAF Special Air Warfare Center. In this project the USAF Special Forces paradropped a small tractor, together with a U.S. Army Special Forces civic action expert, into a large but completely isolated village in central Panama. In one week the Special Forces NCO had three men checked out on operating the tractor, though the indigenous people had never operated any mechanical engine. On this occasion a strip suitable for the C-123 was molded out of the jungle. The plan was then to fly the tractor out, but so many other small construction jobs were proposed by the villagers that the tractor was passed from village to village over the next several years and maintained by airdropped logistical support.
On many occasions these Special Operations programs were applauded and personally observed by the presidents of Panama, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador, although the programs were given little local area publicity. In fact the sine qua non of combined U.S./host country civic action programs is to subdue the U.S. profile and magnify the participation of the host country military personnel. On the other hand, discreet, properly oriented local publicity pro-operation of the indigenous population. In grams are most effective in gaining the company respects, these episodes are concrete examples of the Nixon Doctrine in action before the Nixon Doctrine era.
the anatomy of an SOP COIN MTT
The concept followed by the SOF in these examples, and one that can provide the greatest complement to the Nixon Doctrine, is that of the Mobile Training Team.
The first step in fielding an MTT is to conduct a joint survey, usually accomplished by a USAFSOF officer and a U.S. Army Special Forces officer. The survey is conducted in-country and examines all aspects of the host country military’s ability to conduct joint counterinsurgency operations. Operation, maintenance, supply, communications, and command and control procedures are all examined in depth. Based on this survey and in conjunction with host country military personnel, a customized training program is structured. Normally this will consist of a six-to nine-week program involving both uniservice and—most important—joint training. A host country civic action program will normally be part of each exercise. It is from this pretraining survey that the first in-depth and accurate appraisal of a specific country’s actual COIN capability begins to emerge.
Concurrent with and following the survey, the local military conducts a well-planned, low-toned public relations program to convince the people that the project will benefit them and improve their standard of living. The people become more receptive to the idea, and the program becomes more successful and better remembered by the recipients.
Then an MTT team is formed and deployed to an operational site within the host country. Unlike the MAAG’S, which must of necessity operate close to the indigenous air force headquarters (and the large cities), the MTT site is usually located in a more isolated portion of a country. The USAF element of the MTT is tailored to meet the specific requirements of the host country as identified by the survey. It may (or may not) contain a strike element, an airlift element, and several support instructors, e.g., forward air control (FAC), combat control, communications, maintenance. Even with this support package, the team is rather austere, seldom exceeding 10 to 15 people. The training is normally conducted in three phases. First, both the USA and USAF elements of the team provide uniservice training to raise the proficiency of the students. This is followed by a joint training phase. Finally, the MTT closes with graduation exercises including a 3-to5-day joint field exercise (FTX). This is the phase that usually attracts the attention and often the attendance of the highest governmental officials within the host government.
While many virtues of the MTT type of training are fairly obvious, some of the most important are not. Besides the intrinsic value of almost any training, there are four unique aspects of MTT’s that are more important than others:
This approach contrasts with a stateside-based tactical training program for foreign officers, in which foreign nationals would fly U.S. aircraft, maintained by the world’s best mechanics and supported by a very affluent and efficient logistical base, and train on highly sophisticated and instrumented training ranges. Furthermore, when training is conducted in the U.S., normally only the pilots benefit, and in most cases they are already the strongest element of the foreign air force. By contrast, when the training is conducted in the host country all members of the local air force benefit. Stated another way, a cardinal aspect of COIN training is the need to provide a realistic environment. It follows that, inasmuch as foreign military personnel will never conduct actual counterinsurgency in the U.S., stateside training holds less practical value.
One may logically ask, Are not these the normal functions and duties of the Air Force Section of the MAAG or Military Mission? The answer is yes, but only to a degree. First, the in-country duties of U.S. Military Mission and Military Group personnel are of such a nature that only a minor portion of their time can be allocated to the direct training function. Unfortunately, a considerable amount of their effort is spent administering a rather complicated Military Assistance Program (MAP), conducting visitors around the country, and responding to the legitimate but numerous requests from other elements of the country team. Additionally, MAAG advisers are normally on a two-or three-year tour (for good and meritorious reasons), which obviously involves continuous association with the host country air force personnel. As a result they sometimes become conditioned to accept attitudes and standards that have long prevailed in that country, thus dulling their objectivity and ability to examine situations critically. This is not unique to the military—the same situation is a problem in U.S. embassies.7 Further, the Air Missions and MAAG’s normally contain only a few operational types, and their backgrounds may include very little experience in countering low-order insurgency. Finally, as a result of the professional isolation inherent in their assignment, they cannot be expected to keep abreast of the successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency techniques employed in other parts of the world. From past experience there is little doubt that a well-conducted six- to eight-week COIN training program, administered by a joint SOF /SF MTT, provides a most useful tool for MAAG’s to gauge the effectiveness of their overall training and equipage programs.
characteristics of the Special Operations Force
If the USAFSOF has the potential to assist materially in the implementation phase of the Nixon Doctrine, what then are some of the most important characteristics that it should possess in order to maximize its contribution? First, it must not be considered as part of our general purpose combat forces, and this differentiation should be clearly recognized. This is important for two reasons:
(1) The involvement of SOF units should not carry with it the implication of commitment of U.S. combat units.
(2) This cleavage between Special Operations Forces and conventional forces should be great enough to preclude the tendency to augment the SOF effort by adding small elements of general purpose forces, which in our eyes may be doing no more than helping the counterinsurgency effort. Unless we do preclude this creeping involvement, we may suddenly find that, as President Nixon said, it is “submerging” us.
The second characteristic of the SOF, optimized to support the Nixon Doctrine, is that its primary mission should be to develop COIN’S tactics and doctrine and to train others in this skill. In effect, we should pick up and continue where we left off before the distorting effects of Vietnam set in. When SOF elements arrive in a country, they should not operate as a tactical unit intended to augment the host air force. Rather, their modus operandi should de-emphasize their operational combat role. President Nixon addressed this problem head on when he stated:
We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves and this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy. . . . When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, US policy should be to help them fight the war, but not to fight the war for them. . . . We shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. . . .8
To do this, of course, requires high selectivity in the assignment of personnel—people who can subdue their natural “do-it-yourself” instincts and still retain their dedication and enthusiasm.
The programmed aircraft equipment (both fixed and rotary wing) for the future Special Operations Forces should certainly be compatible with the environment in which they will operate and should be readily available via MAP allocation. In this regard, a kind of “instant MAP” concept could be employed. Recognizing that the cost of fully equipped indigenous COIN units is not within the realm of feasibility for many of these countries, SOF could retain an equipment pool within its own resources. Then when it was decided to assist a key country and to require equipment beyond the capabilities of the recipient nation, a special aid grant could transfer some of the SOF equipment to the affected country, together with a training package. Again, rigid controls would be required to assure that countries would not create emergencies in order to obtain a dose of “instant COIN MAP.” However, with a viable and hard-nosed MTT program, we would have the means to validate aid requests.
There are many possible postures for the post-Vietnam Special Operations Forces. We could create and maintain several SOF groups or squadrons stationed in the continental United States, each trained and oriented towards a particular geographic area of the world. Their training should include studies in the language and in the cultural, religious, economic, and political history of their respective areas of responsibilities. These squadrons would man the MTT units sent TDY to the various areas, and they could also provide a pool of individuals that could be tasked for assignments to MAAG’s, milgroups, missions, as air attaches, etc. This arrangement would have the bonus effect of providing the USAF with an in-depth pool of special area-oriented and cross-culturally trained individuals who would be retained in the field and thus reduce the cost of preparing new people for these special assignments.
Under such an arrangement, one could visualize the following sequence of assignments in the career of a young SOF officer: He would first be assigned to a CONUS SOF unit, for example, the Latin American SOF squadron. After his language and area training, he would probably serve on several MTT’S in Central or South America. Later he would be selected for a PCS assignment to a Latin American Military Group or MAAG. Upon completion of a two-or three-year tour (under this arrangement, shorter PCS tours could be accommodated), he would be replaced by another SOF officer, return to the CONUS SOF squadron, and perhaps serve as an MTT commander or SOF staff officer. Later, as he reached a higher grade, he might be selected for an assistant air attaché assignment. This pattern could continue throughout an officer’s career, with him moving alternately up in rank and back and forth between SOF and in-country PCS assignments.
The key to such a future SOF program is to keep it small and selective. It should never be placed in a position of competing with the conventional forces for large dollar allocation. It would have to be given at least parity consideration for the quality of assigned people. Most important, those selected for an SOF career must be recognized and enjoy advancement commensurate with non-SOF specialties.
Perhaps the most important characteristic of a postwar USAFSOF
would be a dispensation from orthodoxy and a granting, in its stead, of freedom
to develop both tactics and hardware in an atmosphere of no sacred cows and no
compulsion to adhere to parochial patterns. In this regard, candid
introspection concerning our overall experience in South Vietnam (as separate
from the bombing campaign in the North) tells us that we still have a lot to
learn about the use of air power in counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla
warfare. Nor are we the first to come to this realization. French General G. J.
M. Chassin, Air Officer Commanding, Far East, reflecting on his early Indochina
experiences (1951-54), listed as the first “eternal law” of counterinsurgency
warfare the belief that “when offensive weapons make a sudden advance in
efficiency, the reaction of the side which has none is to disperse, to thin
out, to fall back on medieval guerrilla tactics which would appear childish if
they did not rapidly prove to have excellent results.”9
Developments typified by the AC-47 gunship, low-cost mobile sensor systems, and unique applications of helicopters should be the SOF stock-in-trade. Contrary to some beliefs, this last item, if applied to SOF, is not in conflict with any roles and missions agreements we have with other services. Further, as most of the helicopters in less-developed nations are in their air forces (not in their armies), this aspect of future SOF operations is most important. In short, the USAFSOF can act as a focal point and clearinghouse for all Free World ideas and concepts on the application of air power to insurgency situations. These concepts can be transplanted to any area of the world, when they are needed and when our vital interest dictates some U.S. response.
The record of the Western World in arresting insurgencies without becoming deeply involved has been spotty. Our very first exposure to the Indochina affair in 1954, following the disastrous French experience, was a very cautious announcement by President Eisenhower that “some airplane mechanics. . . who would not be touched by combat” had been sent to Vietnam. 10 But as President Nixon said, somewhere along the line we became impatient. The patience, the controls, and a finer sense of appreciation of guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare are the stock-in-trade of special air warfare. The preservation and contribution of our USAF Special Operations Forces in the postwar era can be a key element in answering the question: Quo vadis, Nixon Doctrine?
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
Notes
1. Robert N. Ginsburgh. “U.S. Goals Priorities and Means,” in Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, SAFOII, March 1971, p. 19.
2. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, Ninety-first Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 243. Hereafter referred to as Hearings.
3. Robert F. Futrell, United States Policy Towards Southeast Asia (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Aerospace Studies 1nstitnte, 1968), p. 159.
4. Hearings, p. 249.
5. US Foreign Policy of the Future, Department of State Bulletin No. 1656, March 22, 1971.
6. Hearings, p. 247.
7. Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 225.
8. Hearings, p. 259.
9. G. J. M. Chassin, “Lessons of the War in Indochina,” Interavia, VII, 12 (1952), 670.
10. Futrell. p. 27.
Colonel Robert L. Gleason (M.P.A., Auburn University) is Chief, Corona Harvest Project Office, Air University. A graduate and former faculty member of Air War College, he was part of the original Jungle Jim organization and remained in special warfare operations, including tours in Vietnam and Latin America. Colonel Gleason was assigned to the Air Staff 1965-68, when he became Deputy Chief, MACSOG, Vietnam.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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