Document created: 31 December 03
Air University Review, January-February 1972

Antithetic American Experiences
in China: Stilwell and Chennault

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon K. Pickler 

For the last three decades acrimonious controversy has raged between the adherents of Major General Claire L. Chennault and the supporters of Chennault’s implacable foe, General Joseph W. Stilwell. These two extraordinary military figures of World War II were the archetypes of contrasting attitudes engendered by American involvement with the Chinese Nationalists during the late 1940s. Since then, two factions have formed—not only in the military but in the academic community—to give vent to their respective biases.

On one side, General Stilwell’s view have been adopted by a host of critics. Their interpretation has been that the Kuomintang’s unwillingness to change the traditional way of conducting military affairs was the principal cause of the Nationalists’ defeat. The liberal wing of American academia has employed Stilwell’s condemnation of the Chiang Kai-sheks and has found no positive aspects in the husband and wife’s efforts to lead China out of its morass of problems. Those of the Stilwell persuasion denigrate Chennault as a notorious and unreasonable advocate of the use of air power in China.

On the other hand, the staunch partisans of Chennault (of whom there are still many to revere the memory of this air tactician and his efforts to build a modern Chinese air force) decry Stilwell’s obstructionism. They disparage the liberal wing’s criticism of the Chiangs and point out that Stilwell thwarted every attempt to give substantial air support to the Nationalist military command and its sporadic attempts to stave off the Japanese. Because of the last of experience in coordinating ground and air forces, the Nationalists were unable to use their air units effectively during the civil war.

A recent book has again stimulated serious dispute between the respective admirers of these two deceased military leaders. This stud by Barbara Tuchman, the prestigious author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning Guns of August (1963), is very readable.* Regrettably though, this latest book, unlike that other work, shows her as extremely partisan. Mrs. Tuchman conceives of Stilwell and his experience with the Chinese as representing the essence of American involvement in China between the Revolution of 1911 and the end of World War II. The elaboration of her thesis results in a totally inaccurate impression. The fact is that American concern with the Chinese army only commenced with the arrival of Stilwell in 1942, whereas the German influence has long been asserted and made a more lasting impression on the Chinese army. What was quintessentially American was not Stilwell or his attempts to reform the army, as Mrs. Tuchman claims, but American involvement in Chinese civil and military aviation. If one were to single out a military figure as representative of “the American experience in China,” Claire Chennault more than Joseph Stilwell would be that individual.

Mrs. Tuchman, with her skillful pen, has succeeded in presenting an absorbing but uncritical biography of Stilwell. In the process of using her main character’s unpublished material, covering the 1920s and 1930s when Stilwell was a military attaché in China, she has endeavored to present new insights on military events in China. However, these same insights can be gleaned from the published papers in the official Department of State series, United States Foreign Relations. For the wartime years, when Stilwell was the Commanding General of the China-Burma-India Theater and American lend-lease coordinator for China, new documentary material has not been presented. Rather, Mrs. Tuchman has drawn heavily on Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland’s admirable three-volume work in the series of official Army histories, The U.S. Army in World War II. Moreover, in the array of archival and manuscript collections which Mrs. Tuchman lists in the bibliography, there is a noticeable lack of new material. Essentially, this is a hero-worshipping biography of Stilwell, with a smattering of Chinese history.

Mrs. Tuchman has fallen into the trap that ensnares most authors writing on American wartime relations with China: she embroils herself in the controversy between Stilwell and Chennault. Moreover, in totally embracing her subject’s biases, she accurately depicts Stilwell’s weakness—a total disdain for air power—which limited his ability to function as a competent military attaché or wartime theater commander. In this regard it is possible to fault Mrs. Tuchman’s judgments, lack of insight, and misinformation on every page in which she discusses the emotional clashes that Stilwell had with his opponents. (To give a rejoinder in each case would entail a discussion of great length.) Although she claims to expose Stilwell “warts and all,” she provides little but venomous passages penned by Stilwell himself about other personages.

Stilwell’s limitations are evident in his early tours in China and presage his shortcomings as a theater commander in the 1940s. For instance, in 1938 the Soviet Union was providing substantial assistance to the Chinese Nationalists to help them ward off Japanese air power. The Russians sent volunteer pilots, who engaged the Japanese in combat, and ground personnel to assemble and maintain the Russian light bombers and pursuit aircraft that were sent in large numbers. The hub of this activity was located at Lanchow. Washington officials, extremely interested in determining the extent of Russian aid and influence, ordered their representatives in China to assess the developments. As an attaché, Stilwell was ordered to proceed to Lanchow but balked at the instruction, preferring instead to observe infantry engagements between the Japanese and Chinese. According to Mrs. Tuchman, he became so agitated about the order that he considered retiring. She defends Stilwell’s resentment and obstinacy in this instance, finding fault with the War Department for its failure to inform Stilwell of the vital nature of the mission. (p. 185) This was hardly the case, since attachés had been directed to report all the Russian air activity which they observed.

Stilwell’s total disregard for the contribution that air power could make to the ground war in China is discussed in the book, but it is placed in the context of Stilwell’s opposition to Chennault’s extravagant proposals. The problem is that the uninformed reader is left with the impression that Stilwell’s judgments and disdain for the use of air forces constituted essentially the correct stance. The fact that there were no channels for coordinating tactical air support for the ground forces is not brought out. When General Albert C. Wedemeyer took command of American forces in China, he found that there were no air specialists on his predecessor’s staff. Thus, it was impossible to carry out the coordination needed to help Stilwell’s Chinese ground troops hold up the Japanese advance. (Letter, Wedemeyer to Major General L. S. Kuter, November 20, 1944, 145.81-171, Air Force Archives)

Regrettably, Mrs. Tuchman’s concentration on Stilwell leads her to play down the role of other American military personnel in China who exerted great influence. She introduces briefly a Naval Attaché, Marine Colonel James McHugh, an unabashed air power advocate, who had first served there as an assistant attaché in 1937 and 1938. In this capacity he had worked unstintingly to gather intelligence information about Japanese aircraft. Madame Chiang had provided him with a special pass authorizing him to travel about the countryside to examine downed planes. Chennault, for whom he had high regard, gave him a mechanic to assist in gathering, dismantling, and examining fragments of aircraft parts such as bearings and crankshafts as well as bombsights and navigation equipment. McHugh also went about China taking pictures of the Russians’ aircraft and reported on their activities in vivid detail. His intelligence reports, now filed in the Air Force Archives at Maxwell, are well written and provide a rich source of information on the air war in China.

Stilwell had resented McHugh’s close relationship with the Chiangs in the 1930s. When the Marine returned to China in the early forties, he renewed his friendship with the Chiangs and tried to exert influence on Chennault’s behalf to the detriment of Stilwell. Stilwell’s attitude toward McHugh led General George C. Marshall to believe that McHugh had a strong pro-Nationalist orientation and an overly friendly relationship with the Chiangs. As a result, General Marshall obtained assurances from the Navy Department that it would prohibit McHugh, who was on his way to the United States, from ever returning to China. (pp. 338-39) It is unfortunate that Mrs. Tuchman, who had access to McHugh’s papers at Cornell University, did not see fit to focus more attention on this most interesting military representative.

In chronicling Stilwell’s innumerable grievances and relations with Chennault, Mountbatten, Wavell, Chiang Kai-shek, and others, Mrs. Tuchman sides with her subject. She allows Stilwell, always the aggrieved party, to levy accusations and charges, yet she does not present the other side.

Chennault was a close second to Chiang as the character whom Stilwell vilified most. Although he was Chiang’s Chief of Staff for Air, Chennault was subordinate to Stilwell, the commanding general of the theater. The two Americans incessantly vied for their projects: Stilwell to revamp the Chinese armies and retake Burma, Chennault to build up the Chinese and American air forces in China. To further their projects, each needed to gain the lion’s share of the supplies that were being flown over the Hump from bases in India and Burma. Eventually, the supply disputes had to be settled in Washington, where each had influential supporters and detractors. The presidential decision to emphasize air operations, in effect lowering the priority to reform and equip the Chinese armies, was a vital point in the controversy. In presidential briefings by the two rivals, Chennault was the more persuasive. Stilwell, Mrs. Tuchman concedes, did not argue effectively. But while Chennault is allowed a degree of professional skill, he comes off poorly in the book as a megalomaniac obsessed with the idea that he could bring about the defeat of the Japanese Empire with a relatively small air force based in China. Undoubtedly, Chennault’s enthusiastic plans were too grandiose and full of fallacies. Stilwell apparently was correct in opposing the use of bases in China against Japan, for if the Japanese thereby suffered losses, they would open an offensive to take the airfields, and the Chinese army would be unable to save them. Yet there is probably a measure of truth in Chennault’s allegation, made in his Way of a Fighter, that Stilwell deliberately withheld aid until he knew it was too late to save Kweilin Air Base. Stilwell was a man intent on insuring the correctness of his policy. (pp. 297-302)

Mrs. Tuchman uses Stilwell’s diary notations and innuendoes to insinuate that Chennault was profiteering from a prostitution ring in the system of hostels which the Chinese ran for the Fourteenth Air Force. Her method of footnoting makes it impossible to ascertain whether a subsequent investigation established Chennault’s culpability in this nefarious affair. (p. 378) She then asserts that Chennault’s financial operations in China were one cause of General Arnold’s disfavor and determination to replace Chennault in July 1945 with General George E. Stratemeyer. The fact is that Arnold’s decision had nothing to do with Chennault’s wrongdoings, if any, or his going outside the chain of command to obtain backing for his plans. (p. 520) Rather, Arnold felt that Stratemeyer was more capable of directing aerial logistics, which was the most likely type of air operations to take place during the rest of the war. (Letter, General H. H. Arnold to Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, June 17, 1945, 825.161-1, Stratemeyer’s Personal File, Air Force Archives) This is one example, among many, that indicates the author’s tendency to rely on one convenient source—the Stilwell collection at Carmel, California. These documents prove to be a far from impeccable source for interpretation.

Tuchman, in repeating Stilwell’s allegations and disparaging remarks, levies accusations against many highly placed officials. For example, she suggests that President Roosevelt yielded to the will of Madame Chiang in ordering immediate use of the C-46 cargo transport to fly the Hump before the plane’s airworthiness had been ascertained. She repeats Stilwell’s claim that flaws in the aircraft design, which became apparent in turbulent conditions associated with flying the Hump, “proved lethal for many fliers, further embittering the already sour morale” of the Air Transport Command. (p. 352) This simply was not true according to many members of the Hump Pilots Association.

Stilwell played a negative role during much of his time in China. He expended a great deal of effort combating attempts to increase the size of Chinese and American air forces and sought to place restrictions on all aid in order to coerce the Chinese into reforming their armies. This policy finally culminated in the disruption of relations between Chiang and Stilwell. After two years of resentment and animosity, the situation reached an impasse, and Stilwell was recalled by Roosevelt.

The manner in which Mrs. Tuchman treats the incident which led to Stilwell’s recall is in keeping with her biased portrayal of him. Roosevelt had been pressuring Chiang to place Stilwell at the head of all Chinese and American forces, but without success. Finally, the President sent Stilwell a telegram for delivery to Chiang, indicating that no further delay was to be tolerated in giving Stilwell this command. It was this incident—Stilwell’s delivering of Roosevelt’s ultimatum—that exacerbated relations beyond repair. Stilwell delivered the ultimatum to Chiang in a jubilant and vengeful spirit, without any semblance of softening its effects.

The author’s handling of this one incident is typical. (p. 493) General Patrick Hurley, Roosevelt’s special envoy to China, was in a conference with the Chinese, negotiating the granting of just such a commission to Stilwell, and witnessed Stilwell’s presentation of Roosevelt’s message. However, Hurley is only allowed to speak from a footnote, thus depreciating his validity as a reliable reporter. Tuchman charges Hurley with giving highly dubious testimony in the congressional hearing that followed the Communist take-over of China. Perhaps the tone of those hearings was not conducive to testimony free of emotion and bias. However, General Hurley later maintained, in an interview to members of the U.S. Air Force Historical Division in January 1949, that Chiang was about to confer full command of the Chinese armies upon Stilwell. But Stilwell would not be dissuaded from delivering the degrading ultimatum. Although he was in a precarious position careerwise, still he would deflate the Generalissimo’s ego and embarrass him as head of state. Stilwell celebrated his short-term victory in malicious doggerel about Chiang in which he called the Chinese leader a “little bastard.” (p. 494) Inevitably, Washington removed the frustrated and inept general from the Chinese scene.

To the end of the book Mrs. Tuchman maintains that “Stilwell’s mission was America’s supreme try in China.” (p. 531) Her continuing to press this thesis seems absurd when much of the evidence indicates that the building of a modern Chinese air force was the better expedient in lieu of reforming the army and thereby threatening the system of military bureaucracy. The effort to build a strong air arm represents the essence of American involvement in Chinese military affairs.

Mrs. Tuchman’s well-written book has already gained the reading public’s attention and will undoubtedly make a lasting impression. Unfortunately, her considerable skill as a writer will sway many who are not sufficiently versed in modern Chinese history to challenge her dubious contention that Stilwell best represents the American experience in China.

* Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China (New York: Macmillan, 1971, $10), xv and 621 pages.

Tan Son Nhut Airfield, Republic of Vietnam

Contributor

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon K. Pickler (Ph.D., Florida State University) is a navigator, 360th Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron, Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam, and head of an Improvement and Modernization Program. He was a combat crew member in B-57s and B-47s for twelve years before attending Air Command and Staff College. As a faculty member there (1966-69) he was selected for the Air University Ph.D. program.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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