Document created: 31 December 03
Air University Review, January-February
1972
First Lieutenant
Robert J. Black
During the mid-morning hours of
Che Guevara had always believed that, because of the successful effort in
Since 1959 Fidel Castro and Guevara have tried to transfer the Cuban model of revolution, based upon these principles, to more than a dozen Latin American countries. Time and time again they tried, and time and time again they have failed. With each failure came a new and determined effort to succeed. In spite of the failures, they never gave up attempting and promoting rural-based guerrilla warfare. The solid belief in this method finally found open expression at the 1966 Tricontinental Conference and the 1967 Conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization. These conferences are a Cuban-controlled mechanism for promoting guerrilla warfare in this hemisphere. At any rate, the dictate was laid down that rural-based guerrilla forces were the appropriate vehicle for overthrowing the governments of Latin American countries.
But what was out of focus for the Cuban model was the thinking behind it
all, as well as the application to entirely different situations. For example,
in
By their refusal to grant organized resistance movements in the cities proper credit, Castro and Guevara overlooked an extremely important aspect of any insurgency, the potential of an effective program of urban guerrilla warfare.
More recently, however, the importance of the large urban area as a
political battleground has certainly not been overlooked. It is, in fact,
receiving more and more emphasis and is currently being tried and tested, much
to the chagrin of law enforcement officials all over the world. From
In answering these questions, we must examine the problem and then proceed to some explanations. Although Che Guevara evolved into a rural guerrilla theorist, his early writing indicates that he did not overlook the importance of terrorism in urban areas. In his first book, La Guerra de Guerrillas, Guevara did, indeed, perceive the importance of the cities. He wrote:
There has been a lack of appreciation of the value of guerrilla fighting in the suburbs, but it is, in fact, very important. Appropriate operations of this kind, extended over a wide area, can almost paralyze the commercial and industrial life of an area and cause disturbance and distress to the entire population. This makes the people anxious for violent developments to bring an end to their troubles. If thought is given at the beginning of the war to future possibilities, specialists can be organized for suburban fighting.2
The individual who fully appreciated the insurgent role of the cities and
expounded further to develop an entire theory of guerrilla warfare in the
cities was Carlos Marighella. Marighella was a Brazilian who believed that the
key to violent overthrow of a government was to begin in the cities. He felt
that through the cities his objectives could best be met. A communist and
former member of the Brazilian Congress, Marighella began his urban-based
terror campaign in the crowded cities of
Marighella’s chief contribution was a 55-page manual on the mechanics of
conducting an urban insurgency. It is called the “Mini-manual of the Urban
Guerrilla.” This manual has been published in Italian, English, French,
Spanish, and Portuguese and has been widely distributed throughout the world.
It has been banned in
Although Marighella is currently the most popular exponent of urban
insurgency, he is certainly not alone. There is, in the
“The new concept is lightning campaigns conducted in highly sensitive urban
communities with the paralysis reaching the small communities and farm areas. .
. . It sustains a state of confusion and destruction of property.”3
He goes on to say that “when all communications and power facilities have been destroyed, the urban centers will cease to function and the economy will fall into a state of chaos. All manner of terror and violence will occur.”4 When an attempt is made to analyze the various reasons or factors precipitating this change, a Pandora’s box is opened. The factors are, indeed, complex and varied. To group, simplify, and analyze these factors is the purpose of this article.
Possibly the foremost factor in attempting to analyze such a shift is found in looking at the geographical movement of the people themselves. This movement entails a mass exodus from the rural areas to the already overcrowded urban centers. This move normally is accompanied by rising expectations and generally is thought to be a panacea for all conceivable ills. The migrants, seeking to break past ties and traditions, expect to find a new and better life in the exciting city atmosphere. But herein lies the major problem: when they arrive at a large city, they are confronted by a myriad of complications and pressures. Most migrants who come to the city are former sharecroppers or landless peasants. They represent unskilled labor. Consequently, in most developing countries there are very few opportunities for them in the cities. Here they remain, looking for work and always receiving the same negative answer. Remember, Che Guevara wrote that “one need not wait for the fulfillment of all conditions of a revolution because . . . they can be created.”5 In the great slums surrounding the cities, the conditions need not be created because they are already there. Inadequate housing, poor sanitation, boredom, unemployment, corrupt landlords, and little educational opportunity are but a few of the conditions that can be exploited by a smooth-talking agitator.
Today, in many
These figures are sufficient to account for dramatic change and warrant a rise in terrorism in the cities, simply because, if revolutionaries are to have a popular base for a revolution, they must go where the population is. Also, city dwellers, for various reasons, tend to be more violence-prone than their counterparts in the rural areas. Loss of traditional values, changing environment, and overcrowding are just a few of the reasons to which this change is attributable. Overcrowding, in particular, is an extremely potent and potentially explosive problem area. More often than not, when migrants come to the cities they tend to congregate with others in their same situation and with similar backgrounds. Seldom in the history of man have so many crowded into so small an area, three instances in the U.S. being Detroit’s 10th precinct with 23,000 people per square mile, Cleveland’s Hough with 33,000 per square mile, and Newark’s 5th with 30,000 per square mile.7 Unfortunately, these figures are matched by other cities around the globe. Any time there is such a huge concentration of people, the potential for violence is ever present. Agitators, instigators, insurgents, troublemakers, criminals, etc., can have and are having a field day in the crowded conditions of large cities.
Mao Tse-tung reportedly has stated that a guerrilla is to the people as a fish is to water: take the fish out of his environment and he soon dies. In the seemingly endless sea of people migrating to the cities, there is little chance of being out of one’s environment.
One of the reasons for Fidel Castro’s success was that his base area,
Many urban-oriented groups today possibly would not have survived if they
had begun in the rural areas and followed classic Mao guerrilla theory to the
letter. One can only ponder the fate of such groups as the Weathermen, the
Panthers, and the Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ). It would be exceedingly
difficult to organize and lead rural guerrillas in highly developed areas such
as
Possibly another reason for the increase in urban activities would be the
need for ready cash to finance the movement. In the rural areas, the badly
needed capital is virtually nonexistent. The rural guerrillas must rely on the
peasants for their “daily bread.” The urban-oriented guerrillas do not seem to
have the “traditional patience” associated with the rural group. This may be
because money is readily available. Banks, homes, and jewelry stores are but a
few of the easy sources of instant income. This new-found capital can be put to
good use in bribing corrupt officials, buying weapons, printing material for
propaganda purposes, etc. It can also be used in a way that dates back to Robin
Hood’s day in medieval
The famous (or infamous) Tupamaros of Uruguay have built a reputation of
stealing from the rich to give to the poor. In this way they use stolen capital
to bolster their support among the poor in the city and, hopefully, enlarge
their safe areas. To demonstrate the effectiveness of such tactics, one need look no further than
Recently, chiefly as a result of the Mini-manual and other publications,
there has been a rash of political bank robberies in such countries as Brazil,
Uruguay, Guatemala, Venezuela, and Argentina, and the fever is spreading to the
United States and Canada. In
This technique was developed by Joseph Stalin in 1917 during the Bolshevik
revolution and later refined by Lenin. “Political robbery” is also being
experimented with in other militant groups in the
If one is going to begin, instigate, conduct, and eventually win or lose a
revolution, many items are needed to insure success. Quite obviously, the need
for arms and ammunition is paramount. To begin a rural insurgency, one needs an
adequate supply of weapons on hand and in reserve. If disaster strikes, and one
or more arms or supply caches are found or destroyed, this places the entire
movement in jeopardy unless adequate supply lines are once again established.
But in the cities there are veritable gold mines of weapons and supplies.
Sporting-goods stores, department stores, police stations, and armories are but
a few of the potential sources. This fact has not been overlooked in the
Another aspect related to the procurement of arms is the establishment of munitions factories to help resupply the insurgents. In a rural area, smoke from a factory would be suspect immediately to government planes, but in a city, a properly concealed plant would appear as just another factory.
The continual need for publicity (propaganda) and its resultant effect upon
the incumbent government constitute another factor influencing the urban
guerrilla. It would be relatively easy to place a blackout on news of any newly
formed group operating in the countryside. This would connote that all was
quiet and that the central government was in full control and capable of
handling any situation. Batista tried a blackout in
Again, in the cities it is much more difficult to place a clamp on events that happen in plain view of all. Any time a North American-owned company is bombed or attacked, it usually gets on the wire services. Soon afterward, a message is usually received by a radio station or newspaper, claiming credit for the terrorist act. Mention of this in the news media adds credibility to the insurgent movement, whether or not an organized group is actually responsible!
One of the major features fostering a seeming change in perspective is the availability of recruits. Che Guevara learned the hard way that rural peasants are unpredictable and, more often than not, apathetic toward grandiose schemes and flowery promises. In contrast, there is a group of individuals who are more susceptible to the “revolutionary rhetoric.” This group is composed of easily swayed college students and, to a lesser degree, the labor force.
University students, who are the more idealistic group, usually are quickest to resort to violent methods against the establishment. In many countries around the world, college students have appointed themselves “protectors of the freedoms and champions of the right to dissent.” More often than not, the seeming majority of students will side with the “oppressed underdog” against the vague, abstract structure known simply as the “establishment.” It makes little difference to them what issues are involved as long as the enemy is the established order.
Because most students are from the middle and upper classes and are used to the “good life,” they have earned the ignominious nickname “weekend warriors.” These are the individuals who mouth the rhetoric and occasionally throw a Molotov cocktail, but when it comes to actually abandoning all the comforts of home and moving to the rural areas, a profound change occurs. The hardships of a guerrilla campaign would be more than these “weekend warriors” would care to endure. They simply prefer the city to a jungle hideaway. Most could not adapt to the ways of a Che Guevara, a Fidel Castro, a Luis Turcios. To subsist on a minimal diet and endure the constant moving add up to too big a price to pay. Therefore, to use the energies and enthusiasms of the students, yet not turn them away, the action must be in the city. Guevara said an ideal revolutionary and fighter would be between 25 and 35 years old and in excellent health and physical condition. I dare say most young revolutionaries would hardly measure up to the rigorous standard needed to wage successful guerrilla warfare.
Another potential source of active support would be the labor force. Hopefully,
the laborers would join the revolution early, refuse to go to their jobs, and,
consequently, cause the economy to fall into a state of chaos; thus they help
precipitate the eventual overthrow of a government. As labor unions are
organized, these ready-made organizations would save valuable time in
establishing an infrastructure. In most cases, they would follow the guidance
and direction of their union officials and theoretically be easily subverted.
In
The urban insurgents, instead of waiting for the government forces to act before deciding what measures to take, are in a better position for intelligence-gathering activities. By clandestinely penetrating a police station or an army headquarters, they can obtain a great deal of information. In the guise of a typist, clerk, or janitor, the sympathizer can collect information easily and almost unnoticed by the authorities. In this way the insurgents can always stay one step ahead of the police.
Always paramount in the mind of any guerrilla is the need for rest areas,
where he can rest and recuperate. Once a group in the rural areas has been
located by government forces, it becomes almost an unending race. With the
greater mobility of the pursuing forces, the best bet is with them. This is
another one of the lessons that Che Guevara learned the hard way. Frequently in
the past, guerrilla movements used the cities as rest areas. In the larger
cities there are virtually unlimited possibilities for hiding or taking refuge.
A recent New York Times Magazine article discussed the extent of the
underground in the
One of the chief rest areas, especially in
As a result of the Cuban revolution and its later impact upon hemispheric
solidarity, there has been a concerted effort on the part of
Another boon to the military has been the great advance in new and better equipment to fight guerrillas. There is today better and more effective counter-guerrilla equipment than ever before. The helicopter, with increased firepower; has made life very difficult for the rural-based guerrilla. Consequently, insurgents are moving to the cities, principally to insure their own survival. In the cities, helicopters and increased firepower are relatively useless. Also, the military, as compared to the police force, might provide yet another clue: a new recruit in the police force receives far less training than his counterpart in the military, yet the policeman is in the public’s eye every day as contrasted to only short periods of time for the armed forces. Thus, more is expected of the police, and they have less to begin with. This situation is changing, though ever so slowly. Only recently have the research and development departments of industry channeled their efforts to aid the “cop.” It is hoped that this new aid will help stem the growing tide of urban subversion.
One of the final reasons for this apparent shift to cities would be found
within the policies and guidance of the overseas Communist parties. In
This is essentially the formula for the Communist Party
There is considerable evidence that in the U.S., as well as on a world scale, the Communists feel the present tactical situation calls for increased utilization of rioting and mob violence and that the U.S. Communists will follow the Moscow policy that, in effect, internal violence is the order of the day and that riots are one of the weapons that they are to use in order to achieve total victory.14
This ideology is generally alien to Cuban thought and intended action. But, because of their monumental failures, nationalistic insurgents have been looking elsewhere for guidance and assistance. Many have gone to the Communist parties, and they are being coached in tactics that can be directed easily and controlled from a central source.
The main object of this writing has been to answer the question, Why are the insurgents tending to move to the cities? In
order to provide some answers, I have necessarily focused principally upon the
pros rather than the cons of moving to the cities. Nothing has been mentioned
about the problems that face the urban insurgent, but certainly they are many.
Nor has this been an attempt to justify the movement; rather, to understand
why the movement is occurring. Historically, insurgents have mounted a real
threat only when striking with a combination of tactics; that is, by dividing
the counter-guerrilla forces into two fronts—one in the cities and one in the
countryside. When this balance has been achieved, the insurgency has become
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to defeat.
It is doubly important not only to monitor the rhetoric of a revolution but also to analyze each and every situation and the pressures exerted upon it. No two insurgencies will ever be the same; therefore, constant monitoring is necessary to arrive at the best plan of action to defeat any potential threat to international security. Only a systematic approach, tailor-made for each fluid situation, will enable us to cope with and ultimately overcome this threat of internal subversion. All indications point to increased urban terrorism in the future. Because of the seeming shift in centers of operation, the policies and procedures that apply to rural insurgency must be examined and revised as needed.
Hurlburt
Field
Notes
1. Ernesto (“Che”) Guevara, La Guerra de Guerrillas, reprinted in
2. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
3. “Guerrilla Warfare Advocates in the United States,” House Unamerican Activities Committee Staff Study, 1968, pp. 23-24.
4. Ibid.
5. Guevara, pp. 14-15.
6. James Goodsell, “Latin Americans Flock to the Cities,” Christian
Science Monitor,
7. Eugene Methvin, The Riot Makers (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1970), p. 118.
8. Sanche de Gramont, “How One Pleasant Scholarly Young Man from Brazil Became a Kidnapping, Gun-Toting, Bombing Revolutionary,” New York Times Magazine, 15 November 1970.
9. “Guerrilla Warfare Advocates in the
10. Larry and Mrs. Jean Powell testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, Hearings on Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders, June 18, 24, 25, 1969, Part 19.
11. Ibid., p. 3794.
12. “Recently Reported Incidents of Theft of Dynamite and Other Explosives
in the
13. J. Anthony Lucas, “On the Lam in
14. “Mob Violence as a Communist Weapon,” House Unamerican Activities Committee Staff Study, 1960.
First Lieutenant Robert J. Black (M.A.,
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of
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