Document created: 4 June 04
Air University Review, September-October 1971

NATO’S Third Dimension

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which commemorated its twentieth anniversary in 1969, has been an unqualified success as a defensive military alliance, maintaining the territorial integrity of the member nations. In addition to this military aspect of the alliance, throughout its history there has been considerable political consultation among NATO governments. Nevertheless, some scholars have pictured NATO as somewhat dysfunctional in its role as a regional organization under Article 52 of the United Nations Charter.¹

NATO’S efforts have been almost wholly military/political in nature, and efforts in the more functional economic, cultural, and social spheres were accorded only token recognition. In the face of a grave threat to the security of Western and Central Europe, it seems natural that the alliance was preoccupied mainly with a security posture that would provide a basis for economic recovery and political stability. The maintenance of this security position dictated that the focus of the alliance rest on military considerations.

As the estimated severity of the military threat diminished, evidenced by the Harmel Report of 1967, NATO entered an era of détente, recognizing that détente and defense were compatible pursuits.² The alliance was seeking a more active role in exploring ways of reducing tension. Thus the last few years have seen NATO striving to expand its nonmilitary efforts.

NATO’S military and political dimensions, faced with the possibility of U.S. troop reductions and a cooling of U.S.—Soviet relations, were buoyed by the renewed solidarity expressed at the NATO ministerial meeting in December 1970. At that meeting the allies agreed on conditions for a European Security Conference, and the United States, Canada, and the major European members agreed on a $10-billion five-year plan designed to improve the NATO defense posture. In addition, President Nixon pledged that no substantial troop reductions would be made without reciprocal reductions by the Soviet Union. One observer considered that the statements of the leaders of the major NATO powers reflected a tendency to place “détente” in a secondary role and that the meeting appeared to give NATO a more militant aspect than any meeting since the one immediately following the Russian action in Czechoslovakia in 1968.³

In the general atmosphere of détente that has prevailed during the last few years, resulting from what most consider to be a decreasing military threat, NATO’S raison d’être has been threatened, and its continued existence has become open to conjecture. At the very least, the nature and thrust of NATO’S future role have come under scrutiny.

What has been called NATO’S “third dimension” was added at a time when NATO was searching for new avenues of expression as an international organization. The impetus for NATO’S new dimension was provided by President Nixon at the 43d Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington in 1969. In an address to the session, President Nixon pointed out that NATO is more than a military alliance and that the time had come to devote more attention to those nonmilitary aspects which could result in mutual benefits for all members. Elaborating on this theme, the President said:

. . . I strongly urge that we create a committee on the challenges of modern society, responsible to the Deputy Ministers, to explore ways in which the experience and resources of the Western nations could most effectively be marshalled toward improving the quality of life of our people. That goal is provided for in Article 2 of our treaty, but it has never been the center of our concerns. . . .⁴

The President further commented on possible areas of concern for the third dimension. He indicated that he did not consider that a NATO thrust in these areas would be competitive with other international organizations.

The North Atlantic Council, in a communiqué issued at the close of the 43d session, expressed a concern for environmental problems and instructed the Permanent Representatives to study this area in order to determine the manner in which NATO could contribute most effectively in these pursuits.⁵

In December 1969 the North Atlantic Council established the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) as the organizational instrument to work on common environmental and social problems and to stimulate action by member nations of the alliance in these areas. The committee was instructed to submit a progress report to the spring 1970 meeting of the North Atlantic Council. At the first meeting of the CCMS in December 1969, the body considered several pilot studies of environmental and social significance. The committee agreed to recommend to the North Atlantic Council that these pilot studies be undertaken as a first step. In January 1970 the council approved eight pilot projects, each with a nation designated to be responsible for it:

1. Road Safety, with the United States as pilot nation;

2. Disaster Relief, with the United States as pilot and Italy as co-pilot nation;

3. Air Pollution, with the United States as pilot and Turkey as co-pilot nation;

4. Open Waters Pollution with Belgium as pilot, and Portugal and France as co-pilot nations;

5. Inland Water Pollution, with Canada as pilot nation;

6. The problems of individual and group motivations in a modern industrial society—with emphasis on 

     individual fulfilment. The United   Kingdom will act as pilot nation;

 

7.The problem of transmission of scientific knowledge to the decision-making sectors of governments. 

    The Federal Republic of Germany is to act as pilot nation for this project;

8.Environment and the strategy of territorial developrnent.⁶

The CCMS is concerned with two basic themes: (1) the “pilot study” concept, in which one country (often in association with another) is made responsible for a study on a particular subject; and (2) the idea that the committee efforts are directed not towards carrying out research but towards the stimulation of governmental policy formulation and possible legislation in the fields of interest. The work of the committee is to be open, and cooperation with other international organizations and/or nonmember states is envisaged.

Thus it can be seen that NATO has taken on a third dimension in an effort to fulfill the promise of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Nevertheless, there is doubt in the minds of many as to the propriety or necessity of NATO’S involvement in these more functional tasks. Critics generally express concern about the utility of NATO as an effective instrument for progress in the environmental and social areas, citing possible duplication of effort and conflict with other international organizations also dealing with these problems. NATO’S Assistant Secretary-General for Scientific Affairs, Dr. Gunnar Randers, who also chairs the CCMS, has provided arguments supporting NATO’S involvement in these nonmilitary pursuits.⁷

Dr. Randers has pointed out that an important basic fact is simply that NATO is there, i.e., the organizational structure and framework exist and have functioned for two decades. During this period NATO has provided the mechanism for considerable consultation and cooperation between governments and a great amount of technology transfer. In addition, problems of pressing urgency, if they are considered by NATO, have drawn the attention of the highest government levels in each NATO country. He further contends that NATO’S concern in the environmental/social field is fully compatible with Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Further, the fact that the NATO membership is made up of relatively advanced countries, having generally the same problems, makes NATO one of the few international organizations with such a common flavor (as opposed to other international organizations with a great diversity of members).

In response to charges of NATO’S possible duplication of efforts of such agencies as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or European Economic Community (EEC), Dr. Randers considers that the problems of improving the environment in which we live are so vast and complex that they should and must be dealt with by many organizations. He feels that information or recommendations from two or more organizations may give a nation a better framework for making decisions and adopting programs; that the dual pressures of recommendations by NATO and another organization (for example, OECD) could give added political impetus to action. Some coordination with the OECD has already occurred, when nations have sent their representatives to the OECD Committee on Research Cooperation to the meetings of the NATO CCMS. NATO’S Secretary-General has already discussed cooperative efforts with the Secretary-General of OECD.⁸

Dr. Randers notes that the CCMS does not conduct research but that it hopes to be a research-gathering agency, using existent knowledge and experience and making recommendations for governmental action. He maintains that the political weight of NATO may make it better suited to effect physical results than other international organizations, citing the NATO infrastructure program as an example of NATO’S physical achievements.

Perhaps one of the most important results of establishing CCMS, Dr. Randers notes, is that it has brought the problem of the environment into focus in some of the NATO nations. Some of them had no government agency to deal with these problems and found it necessary to establish responsibility for environmental problems within their governments.

Another important facet of the third dimension is its potential as an area in which possible cooperation can be achieved between the nations of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact, in a memo adopted in June 1970, indicated a general willingness to discuss cultural and environmental problems in conjunction with other mutual problems.⁹ Of course, the environmental problems are greatly overshadowed by the more crucial and pressing East-West issues. Nevertheless, the environment is an area that may hold promise for reaching agreements between the two blocs.

Regardless of rhetoric about NATO’S rightful role in environmental problems, the organization has moved ahead in this field, seeking to deal with specific aspects of the problem. Meetings were held in Detroit in May 1970 on the subject of the latest auto safety devices. Meetings and discussions were also conducted in May and June 1970, on open water pollution, air pollution, disaster relief, and inland water pollution.¹⁰ It should be noted that two nonmember nations participated in one of these meetings.

In October 1970 the CCMS held its third plenary meeting to take stock of progress of the pilot studies. Observers from several organizations, including the European Economic Community, attended the meeting. In November 1970 a special meeting of the CCMS was held for the purpose of considering the conclusions drawn at the colloquium on oil spills sponsored by Belgium as part of the coastal waters pollution study. The meeting resulted in a declaration by NATO governments to start work at once in order to achieve, by 1975 if possible, the elimination of intentional discharge of oil and oily wastes into the sea.¹¹ This declaration has been endorsed by the North Atlantic Council.

The December 1970 meeting of the North Atlantic Council was held in an atmosphere of concern over possible U.S. troop reductions and growing concern over Soviet influence in the Middle East and Mediterranean. That meeting devoted little attention to the third dimension. Nevertheless, the members seemed determined to make the third dimension an important part of NATO’S future.

In May 1971, the United States and NATO jointly sponsored the International Conference of Cities at Indianapolis, to consider the common problems facing urban officials. Representatives of fifteen nations attended this conference.¹²

At the recent NATO Ministers Meeting in Lisbon, which dealt primarily with Soviet overtures for discussions on mutual and balanced force reductions, the Ministers expressed satisfaction in the impressive progress achieved by the CCMS.¹³ The Ministers took special note of the fact that the benefits of the allied efforts had not been confined to the countries of the alliance.

Whether or not there will be a continuation of the initial enthusiasm for the third dimension and interest in its adoption as a major NATO concern is a question that can only be answered by future events.

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Notes

1. Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VIII, “Regional Arrangements,” Article 52.

2. The Future Tasks of the Alliance—Harmel Report  (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1968).

3. “Nixon Gives NATO Pledge on Troops,” New York Times, December 4, 1970, p. 7.

4. “Speeches at the Commemorative Session,” NATO Letter, May 1969, p. 5.

5. Ibid., p. 11.

6. “NATO Council Approves Projects,” NATO Letter, February 1970, XVIII/2, 14.

7. “Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society,” NATO Letter, January 1970, XVIII/1, 8-12.

8. Ibid., p. 10.

9. “Documentation,” NATO Letter, September 1970, XVIII/9, 23-24.

10. “NATO’s Work on Environmental Problems,” NATO Letter, July-August 1970, XVIII/7-8, 7.

11. “ ‘Actions’—Keyword of the CCMS,” NATO Letter, December 1970, XVIII/12, 12.

12. “17-Nation Parley Focuses on Cities,” New York Times, May 27, 1971, p. 52.

13. “NATO Seeks, Talks with Soviet Bloc on Cut in Troops,” New York Times, June 5, 1971, pp. 1-3.  

Contributor

Senior Master Sergeant Marshall E. Wilcher, USAF (Retired), (M.A., West Virginia University), is a Ph.D. candidate in international affairs, University of Pittsburgh. During his military career he served in administrative positions at Hq USAF; with the U.S. Air Attaché in Taiwan; with USAF Recruiting Service; and at Hq SHAPE, Paris, for seven years. He is also a political science instructor at the New Kensington Campus, Pennsylvania State University.