Document created: 25 March 04
Air University Review, March-April 1971
As America moves into the 1970s, it is painfully apparent that our society is deeply troubled and divided over a broad range of social and political issues. This generation of youth, in revolt against many established values, traditions, and institutions, is demanding responsiveness and relevancy from the nation’s academic, governmental, and social institutions. Perhaps no other public institution has experienced more severe criticism than the Selective Service System. For many individuals and groups, it has become the focus of hostility as a symbol of tyranny and arbitrary governmental interference in a democratic society.
The crisis in the legitimacy of the current system of military recruitment has resulted in a variety of proposals to reform or replace the draft. An all-volunteer system is one proposal that is offered as a basis for producing a greater consensus in a turbulent society.
While an all-volunteer system is supported by a number of national political leaders and other distinguished Americans, it has also generated much criticism. The range of criticism includes problems of cost, efficiency, feasibility, and flexibility, as well as arguments that such a force would be incompatible with democratic institutions and thus constitute a threat to society. The following discussion will focus on some implications of an all-volunteer force in terms of changes that could occur in civil-military relations. It will also identify certain changes within the military that are necessary in order to maintain social responsiveness and professional viability.
civil-military relations
One of the implications of establishing a volunteer system is that the traditional civilian-military relationship may be altered. As the draft is eliminated, a volunteer military might tend to become a more self-contained establishment, the danger being if a professional volunteer military began to see itself as distinct and alienated from society.1
While this idea seems generally valid, it is also important to note that concern about social alienation may tend to exaggerate the difference between volunteer and conscripted forces. Two aspects of voluntary recruitment need clarification, namely, the qualitative composition of a volunteer force and the estimated turnover in a volunteer military.
The Gates Commission, appointed by President Nixon to study the feasibility of an all-volunteer force, estimates that the qualitative standards for entry into military service will probably be no different from current standards. Mental, physical, and moral standards will continue to determine the types of personnel found in the armed forces. It is unlikely that men who fail to qualify for military service now will qualify under an all-volunteer system. In terms of numbers and personnel turnover, the Commission offers the following analysis:
At a force level of 2.5 million men the volunteer force must attract 325,000 men, the conscripted force 400,000 men. The men who join the volunteer force will not all become long service professionals. An estimated 215,000 men will leave after serving a single tour. As a result, about half the men will be in their first tour of duty. The large infusion of new men will help insure that neither force becomes isolated from society.2
An important distinction is necessary at this point. Many critics of a volunteer system reason that a conscripted military, because it is a so-called “citizen army,” involves closer contact with the community at large and is therefore less likely to constitute a separate military class and independent political force. The fallacy in this argument is that the political danger has little if any relation to the method of recruitment. In short, the danger comes from the officers, who are for the most part a professional corps of volunteers. Hence, the focus of the discussion will be on the officer forces and the means to prevent the isolation and alienation anticipated by critics of a volunteer system.
One of the means by which the nation has maintained an effective and loyal military leadership is by recruiting officers in such a manner as to assure a wide distribution of social and economic backgrounds. Because of the increase in size of the military and the need for trained specialists, the patterns of recruitment have tended to encompass a wide social base. There has been very little self perpetuating of a professional military elite because of the diverse career opportunities open to an increasingly educated youth.3 Recruiting officer personnel from a variety of social levels helps maintain a strong bond between the officer corps and society. In addition, the growth in social representativeness of the military profession has contributed to a diversification of social and political outlooks within the profession. A related concept is that a relatively high turnover rate in the armed forces serves to keep the military attuned to the larger society. If these features are considered of great importance, the question is whether an all-volunteer system could maintain them.
The Gates Commission emphasizes that the men attracted to an all-volunteer force will not necessarily make military service their career. It is estimated that about 65 percent of the men who enter the volunteer force will leave after a single tour of duty. The turnover under a volunteer system is estimated to be three quarters of the turnover in a comparable mixed force. In the words of the Commission, “. . .52 percent of the men in the projected voluntary force will be first termers—only slightly less than the 60 percent in the mixed force.”4
These estimates, if valid, suggest no dramatic changes in the composition of the armed forces, hence no major changes in the relationship between the military and society.
recruitment
Foremost among the current policies which aid in giving the officer corps a wide social, economic, and geographical background is the ROTC program and various officer candidate school (OCS) programs. To a lesser extent, the distribution of appointments to the service academies has given a wide range of social and geographic origins to the students of these schools.
However, increasing problems related to ROTC programs at a number of universities, particularly those in the northeastern section of the country, suggest that movement toward a volunteer system will narrow the base of recruitment into the officer corps. These events may indicate a trend toward regional recruitment for the bulk of the officer corps. This regional bias may shift to the southern and southwestern areas. Professor Janowitz suggests as another trend that the military seek a higher percentage of officers trained in the service academies. If this becomes necessary, it will emphasize the trend toward social separation, if more officers are trained at the academies in contrast to ROTC units and officer candidate programs.5
To the extent that a diverse distribution of social backgrounds is desired, the officer recruitment policy under an all-volunteer system must be flexible enough to bring this about. In effect, programs such as ROTC and OCS should be strengthened under a volunteer system.
A number of Department of Defense studies have recently been undertaken concerning the future of ROTC. While differing somewhat in goals and procedures, all recommend an increase in the number of ROTC college scholarships. These scholarships would attract those whose skills or aptitudes are in short supply in the military. The Gates Commission recommends an increase of 4500 scholarships a year for each service, producing 1000 additional ROTC officers a year per service.
It is also important to note that under an all-volunteer system it is likely that fewer students will volunteer for ROTC training, thus compounding the recruitment problem. Summarized below are the recommendations of the Gates Commission concerning the recruitment of officers from various programs:
1. To insure that ROTC instruction remains available to interested students on a broad social base, it may be advisable to establish area training centers. This would permit students from a number of schools in one geographic region to participate in the same training program.
2. Officer candidate programs should be expanded to provide greater flexibility in the recruiting of officers. These programs require less lead time, three to nine months as opposed to two to four years for ROTC. In addition to new college graduates, the services will probably try to attract somewhat older civilians who desire to enter the more specialized branches of the military. The military training required by these volunteers can probably be provided more efficiently through officer candidate programs.
3. Direct commissioning programs, in addition to those aimed at lawyers, physicians, dentists, and chaplains, should be available to civilians who already possess the training and skills required by the military.
4. The Commission recognizes that the planned expansion of the Army and Air Force academies will be adequate to provide this source of new officers. Any further expansion would be very costly and would detract from the advantages of recruiting from a wide range of civilian universities with broad social distributions.
In a wider context, it is important to recognize the problems which many ROTC programs are experiencing at a growing number of universities and colleges. Antimilitary sentiment further complicates the difficulty of resolving such issues as academic accreditation and professional qualification and status in the university community of ROTC instructor personnel. In short, these problems suggest that major revisions of ROTC programs are necessary to make them relevant to the needs of a changing society.
Of importance here is the fact that officer recruitment programs must be structured to attract the kind of people that will make a volunteer force responsive to the needs of a complex military organization as well as the demands of an increasingly divided and turbulent America. A professionalized, volunteer military can ill afford to become a sanctuary for militant individuals seeking immediate solutions to national and international problems. The military establishment of the 1970s must be able to adapt itself to a new set of national priorities. These priorities suggest that national security is as much dependent on improving the quality of American life and reforming archaic institutions and processes as it is on aggressive military preparedness.
Obviously, economic incentives and overall upgrading of the quality of service life are fundamental to the success of a volunteer system. Success means not only the ability of a manpower system to recruit the required personnel to manage the military enterprise but, more important, the ability of a system to recruit, develop, and retain people of a quality that will insure professional vitality.
To prevent the isolation and alienation of a volunteer military described by some critics, the all-volunteer force concept should be based on a comprehensive recruitment effort that must encompass the whole range of living and working conditions which shape the image of military service. It is highly unlikely that any partial program that does not substantially alter the entire scope of military service can hope to succeed.6
The troubled British experience with a volunteer system may be instructive to the United States by dramatizing the need to match economic incentives with overall improvement of the military image. Monetary rewards alone do not necessarily produce the required perspectives or professional commitments.
In their role as advisers and managers of the instruments of war, the military services need to re-establish a strong professional image. To be effective in meeting the challenge of this responsibility, all the services must earn the attention and respect of all Americans. They must re-establish themselves as purposeful, reliable, educated, and efficient managers of people as well as weapons.
The end of Selective Service and reliance on a volunteer system emphasize the need of the services to challenge the imagination of youth who are today better educated, more skeptical, and more politically and socially aware. For a volunteer force to achieve social and professional viability, it must draw from these resources and offer them meaningful career opportunities. Today’s youth, although cynical about many of our social institutions, are not lacking in patriotic and humanitarian concerns. They are eager to contribute to peaceful social progress and improve the conditions of world order. These values and goals are no different from those that have always been a part of the military profession. The task of the military profession, then, is to strengthen these common motivations and show that the military is an integral part of society and exists only to serve that society.7
Another means of strengthening the representative character of a volunteer professional force is to provide opportunities for lateral recruitment. Professor Janowitz suggests that lateral recruitment could involve limited tours of duty or the opportunity to take up a full career in the professional military even several years after university graduation. These opportunities will tend to make the military more flexible and attractive to a wider range of skills and professional expertise.8
education
There is little doubt that education is fundamental to the development of a military profession capable of dealing with an increasingly complex world, more and more unforgiving of miscalculation: The image of a professional volunteer military dramatizes the importance of education as fundamental to integrating the military with society. It should be emphasized that educational development in the sense intended here encompasses not only technical or managerial expertise but a heightened consciousness of the responsibility of the military to society as a whole. Speaking for this kind of professional consciousness, General Albert P. Clark has noted:
. . .we do have a troubled society and the Armed Forces, being composed of a cross section of this society, can hardly maintain themselves much above it in the long run. Thus, we cannot remain aloof to the issue. We must participate in the national effort to save this society. . . or we shall perish with it.9
Various domestic action programs and Project 100,000 reflect a growing awareness of the military to social needs.
Another aspect of education that is central to strengthening civil-military relations is the requirement to increase the awareness of the military to the limits of force in international relations.10 Any evolving military profession must continue to demonstrate increased sensitivity to the political and social consequences of military action.
In conclusion, it is important to understand the changes and social implications of an all-volunteer force. Broadly speaking, this movement expresses a trend toward greater institutional specialization.
A social consequence of the movement suggests that traditional civil-military relations may be changed as a result of the military’s becoming more self-contained. This is not to say that the volunteer force will threaten democratic institutions, be unresponsive to civilian control, or become isolated from society. However, institutional specialization emphasizes the need for the military profession to adapt itself to rapid social change if it is to prevent alienation from society.
Recruitment, particularly in the officer corps, should draw from a broad social and educational base as well as provide opportunities for lateral entry. This flexibility can strengthen the vitality and representative character of a volunteer force.
The discussion has also highlighted the need for a complete upgrading of the quality of military life and the necessity of improving the military image. In every sense, military institutions are a reflection of the value system of the society which produces them. Certainly a volunteer force cannot operate in a political democracy without a variety of social links to civilian society. Flexible recruitment policies and broad educational opportunities are links which are vital in providing meaningful relations with society. It is the strength and relevance of these ties that will determine the vitality and responsiveness of a volunteer force to the needs of society as well as serve its own demands.
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Notes
1. Morris Janowitz, “‘The Military Profession: Beyond the 1970’s,’’ a paper presented to the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, annual conference, October 1969, p. 7.
2. Thomas S. Gates, Jr., The Report of the President’s Commission on all All-Volunteer Force (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., February 1970), p. 135. Hereafter referred to as The Gates Commission Report.
3. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 100.
4. The Gates Commission Report, p. 133.
5. Janowitz, “The Military Profession,” p. 9.
6. Letha P. Willingham, Colonel, USAF, “Analysis of Civilian Attitudes on a Voluntary Military Service in the Post-SEA Period,” unpublished Air War College Professional Study, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1970, p. 9.
7. Ibid., p. 10.
8. Janowitz, “The Military Profession,” p. 11.
9. Albert P. Clark, Lieutenant General, USAF, “Motivation—A Challenge to Leadership,” quoted in Readings in Military Management (Air Command and Staff College text, Vol. 1, Maxwell AFB, Alabama), p. 136.
10. Janowitz, “The Military Profession,” p. 16.
Major Neal G. Sorensen (B.S., University of Utah) is a C-123 pilot assigned to the 315th Tactical Airlift Wing in South Vietnam. A 1970 graduate of Air Command and Staff College, he had previously served with Strategic Air Command air refueling squadrons as a KC-135 aircraft commander and instructor pilot.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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