Document created: 25 March 04
Air University Review, March-April 1971
Brigadier General
Robert N. Ginsburgh
Captain Pember W. Rocap
Despite increasing specialization, the military profession today is exposed to problems unknown to earlier military leaders.
The primary role of any professional is to meet the requirements of his profession.
There was a time when a military officer could be called upon to do anything—and be expected to do it well. This spirit was well expressed by the old cavalry soldier who described himself as “lover, fighter, wild horse rider, and pretty durn fair windmill man.”
Although many modern fighter pilots may fancy themselves to be as versatile as the old cavalry soldier, the military profession no longer requires an officer to be able to do everything. The military, like other professions, recognizes that this is an age of specialization.
Yet at the very time when the likelihood of having to fill a number of diverse roles has become less for the individual military man, it has become greater for his profession as a whole. These conflicting tendencies are at the root of much of the criticism of our profession from without and soul-searching from within: all are centered on the question of the proper role for the military profession.
Answering that question is complicated because, first, the military has not one role but many; and, second, these roles are changing. Thus, a serious examination of the changing role of the military profession must include the factors that are causing changes and the effect of those changes on the military profession per se—that is, on its expertise, corporateness, and responsibility. These are the parameters of this article.
There are four major determinants that shape the role of the military: American society, the world environment, technology, and the profession itself. As such, changes in each of these determinants are the source for changes in our professional roles. An exhaustive analysis of all these changes cannot be given in one brief article. However, we offer a few examples that may help to stimulate thinking in preparing oneself to cope with the dynamics of our fast-changing profession.
American society
All societies have a part in determining the role of their military. The military mirrors the character of the people from whom it draws its manpower. Obviously, in a democracy society’s direct influence is greater than in an autocratic society. The American military, while directly controlled by the government, is ultimately responsible to the people because of the government’s own responsiveness to the citizenry.
The basic role of the military is to provide for our nation’s defense. That is our very raison d’être. Our professional expertise is built around that role. But the military profession is expected to engage in other roles in support of American society, roles quite outside the traditional concept of the military as a force for the defense of the nation.
Actually, the idea of nonmilitary roles for the American military establishment is not new. Some forty years ago Captain A. Robert Ginsburgh wrote an article entitled “Things the Army Does Besides Fight.” Modern military men may recall some of those things from their own knowledge of history: exploration and survey of the West; the building of roads and railroads; flood control; construction of the Panama Canal; medical discoveries, such as yellow fever immunization; and the Civilian Conservation Corps.
In more recent times we have seen the military’s significant role in racial integration. The armed forces’ example in leading the way toward integration is well known. But because the continued existence of racial prejudice is contrary to the basic principles of this country and detrimental to our strength, the military profession will continue to have a role in this area. On the strictly practical level, every good commander should know that the effectiveness of his organization is reduced by racial prejudice in any form.
Another of the military’s socioeconomic roles is exemplified by Project 100,000. Whereas the Selective Service has been just that—selective, especially for the Air Force—Project 100,000 required the services to accept and train a large number of young men who, because of poor educational achievement and background, otherwise would have been rejected by the military and left on the lower economic fringe of society.
These are the kinds of domestic action roles for the military profession which will be continuing if not actually increasing. Last year Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird outlined several general areas in which the Defense Department could do more toward resolving this country’s domestic problems: procurement, manpower, transfer of knowledge assets, community relations, and equal rights and opportunities.1
The military’s role in these areas is often misunderstood by some American military men and civilians, both convinced that domestic action is really none of the military’s business. The former see such involvement in domestic problems as a certain reduction in the ability to prepare for and fight wars; the latter are apt to see it as a “potential extension of military authority if not authoritarianism.”2 Both are also likely to view the military as separate from the mainstream of American society and largely unreflective of society’s values; and some fear that going to all-volunteer armed forces will make the military’s isolation complete. To show them wrong on all counts, one need look no further than the latest news.
During the past few months there have been reports of the following: clashes between the races on military installations in the U.S. and overseas; military personnel with membership in organizations ranging from the Ku Klux Klan to black power groups; a marijuana and drug problem that reaches from the Air Force Academy to Vietnam; and the existence on military bases of enough soldier unionizers, protest groups, and underground newspapers to rival some college campuses.
On the positive side, many people in the military are trying to find solutions to prevent the individual and institutional destruction that often accompanies these problems. Thus, the military has a growing role in helping to solve domestic problems not only because we have been told to do so by the civilian leaders of this country—not only because what is good for the country is good for the armed forces—but also because these problems are the military profession’s own problems in a very real sense: most of us face them daily in our own units.
We do not want to overstate the case. The primary role of the military is—and should be—national defense. But we do have important roles involving our country’s socioeconomic problems, which we should not and simply cannot ignore.
There are two other roles arising directly from the demands and needs of American society. One, disaster relief, occurs as regularly as the hurricane season and will continue as long as man is the victim of storms, floods, and earthquakes. The other role, that of law enforcement and riot control, will, hopefully, belong less and less to the military. Unfortunately, this is not because rioting and other large-scale disorders are occurring less frequently in this country; it is because the relatively common occurrence of civil disturbances in large cities and on college campuses has compelled police forces to direct much of their training and efforts to coping with such problems. The more proficient they become, the less likely it is that the military will be called on to augment them. A second reason for the change in the military’s role in this area is the plan for increased dependence on reserve forces to meet this country’s external security needs. Recently the Nixon Administration has ordered the armed forces to depend on the National Guard and Reserves—not on increased draft calls—to meet future overseas emergencies. At the same time, when situations arise that are beyond the capabilities of the police, they will still have to be handled by the Guard and Reserves. Meeting these twin responsibilities will present an even greater challenge to their professionalism.
world environment
The Administration’s policy of placing increased importance on the Guard and Reserves to cope with external threats to our national security leads to the second determinant of the role of the military profession: the world environment.
The world environment—including adversaries, allies, and friends—gets directly to the hard-core role of the profession, the national defense responsibility. If we look closely, we can see that we are really concerned with four roles in one: a preventive role, a fighting role, a negotiating role, and an advisory role. None of these is static; all are dynamic.
As far as the preventive role is concerned, deterrence has been a fundamental role for the military profession during the entire career of more than 90 percent of the current officer force and during most of the career of the others. Yet for the generation that preceded us deterrence was not a major military consideration. Instead, as one historian described the period between the world wars, “the armed forces of Britain and the United States disintegrated under a violent reaction of war, and the French Army suffered a decline in morale and efficiency so severe as to constitute an inadequate defense force for the nation.”3
Thus, the American military establishment was not directly concerned with preventing or deterring war. Instead, its task was to maintain relatively small military forces which could serve as a cadre for a vast military manpower expansion and to maintain plans for an industrial mobilization necessary to equip such expanded military forces. The military and industrial potential of America (as opposed to our military strength in-being) was, of course, a factor in the possibility of deterring war. But deterrence itself was supposed to be the province of the diplomats. Fighting was the role for the military if the diplomats failed to deter.
With the advent of nuclear weapons and intercontinental delivery capabilities came the possibility of a violent, short, decisive war. Under these conditions America’s great mobilization potential, which was amply demonstrated in two world wars, became even less significant as a deterrent factor than it had been between the two wars. With the nation’s very survival at stake, deterrence of nuclear war by combat-ready forces in-being became a primary role of the military profession.
This role seems unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. President Nixon indicated this in his February 1970 Foreign Affairs Message to Congress when he said that “the nuclear capability of our strategic and theater nuclear forces serves as a deterrent to full-scale Soviet attack on NATO Europe or Chinese attack on our Asian allies” and that America has “primary responsibility for nuclear defense.”4
In thinking of deterrence, we most often worry about the problem of deterring nuclear war. This should properly be our greatest concern. At the same time we should not ignore our objective of deterring all wars, large or small.
The military’s role in helping to prevent wars does not diminish the role of the military profession as a fighting force; in fact, successful deterrence depends in part on the profession’s ability to fill its fighting role. General Thomas D. White, while he was Chief of Staff of the Air Force, was fond of stating that “forces which cannot prevail will not deter.” And because deterrence is constantly liable to failure, especially in the lower spectrum of conflict, the profession still has an active combat role. But here again, while basic, the combat role is subject to change and is dependent on the changing world environment. The current counterinsurgency role is one example, among many others. Most military professionals, if they have not actually participated in or supported counterinsurgency operations, are aware that COIN has become a basic role for the U.S. military. This has happened because Communist aggression in recent years has been at that level, in part, because of the successful deterrence at the higher bands of the warfare spectrum. Twenty years ago a COIN role for the U.S. military was not a serious concern of most professionals. Yet seventy years ago counterinsurgency was the primary role of the U.S. Army in the Philippines.
Future changes in our counterinsurgency role will depend on the way President Nixon’s proposed foreign policy is implemented. Rather than expect U.S. military forces to cope with the entire spectrum of threats, the President has said:
The best means of dealing with insurgencies is to preempt them through economic development and social reform and to control them with police, paramilitary and military action by the threatened government.
We may be able to supplement local efforts with economic and military assistance. However, a direct combat role for the US general purpose forces arises primarily when insurgency has shaded into external aggression or when there is an overt conventional attack.5
Perhaps the newest role for the military profession resulting from the changing world environment is that of negotiator. The end of hostilities in Korea resulted not from diplomatic negotiations, although diplomacy paved the way. The end of these hostilities, a truce, resulted from negotiations at Panmunjom, in which military men played a major part. Almost twenty years later their military successors aided the negotiations for return of the Pueblo crew.
These are just a few examples of the new military role in negotiations. As military men, we are well aware that once a war starts, the civilian leaders no longer simply turn the conduct of the war over to the military. Nor is the military simply turned out by the diplomats at the time of negotiating, once the war is over. The U.S. will probably always be willing to sit down and talk about possible conditions if they will shorten a conflict and decrease the destruction. When this occurs while the fighting is still going on, the military is required at the negotiating table to insure that conditions are not agreed to that would either immediately or eventually jeopardize American security and interests. This role is still being accomplished by the military in Korea, and there is U.S. military representation at the Vietnam talks in Paris. Similarly, the military is directly involved in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in Helsinki. As long as military forces have a role in preventing conflict or stopping it once it has started, they also will have, as experts, a negotiating role.
Our relations with our allies, as with our adversaries, also shape the military’s role. Since World War II we have had a large advisory role because of the needs of our allies. This occurred first to our European, Asian, and Latin American allies, especially during the forties and fifties, and more recently to emerging Third World nations.
In conjunction with the $350 million approved for military assistance in the 1970 Foreign Assistance Act, there are thousands of U.S. military involved with Military Assistance Programs and Advisory Groups around the world. Although often overlooked, much of our effort in Vietnam has been in this area; the Vietnamization program calls for more. In Latin America, providing military equipment and advice has been almost exclusively our role. President Nixon’s re-emphasis on this particular form of partnership and military assistance to other nations makes this an even more significant role for the military in the future.
And as this advice and assistance specifically include our technology and the knowledge required to use it, our advisory role becomes greater. In the nineteenth century the care and use of the most complicated weapons (a Gatling gun, for example) could be quickly learned by one man. The technological complexity of modern weapons, however, makes complete mastery by one person impossible. Inasmuch as our assistance to our allies is in the form of weapon systems, it must be accompanied by much operating and maintenance instruction. Providing a country with a squadron of aircraft, for example, often requires extensive instruction of the allied pilots in the United States and the lengthy assignment of USAF personnel in the receiving country to train their maintenance personnel. Recently as part of the sale of F-86s to Tunisia, 14 Air Force personnel spent a year in that country on a training mission. Now, the F-86 is hardly the most modern aircraft in the inventory, and the training was essentially flight-line maintenance rather than more complicated field or depot-level maintenance. As our assistance to friendly nations becomes more heavily technological and advisory and less in the form of conventional troops, the importance of this role for the military profession will increase.
technology
Actually, the major effect of technology on the role of the military has been paradoxical. Technological advances have greatly increased the variety and power of the weapons available to the profession. Simultaneously, there has been a decrease in the autonomy of military commanders in deciding what weapons to employ when and where. There seems to be an inverse relation between the power of a weapon and the authority to employ it: the more powerful the weapon, the less likely the military will retain the final authority to use it. In the case of the most powerful weapons—nuclear bombs and missiles—the decision has been completely removed from the military. As Alastair Buchan has written: “. . .as long as nuclear weapons exist, no government will grant to a military commander in a distant part of the world the freedom of action that Allenby had in Palestine in the First World War, or Alexander, MacArthur and Eisenhower had in the Second.”6 And because of great advances in communications, even the use of conventional forces down to the lowest tactical level may be subject to civilian monitoring and decision-making.
During every crisis of the sixties—such as in Berlin, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic—hardly an aircraft or a platoon involved moved without direct authority from Washington. Technological advances have lessened the authority of the military professional in his role as commander and manager of violence.
Technological advances, combined with the military’s deferring to the political nature of war, have also caused a change in conventional tactical roles. The aircrews that flew F-4s and F-105s over North Vietnam from 1965 to 1968 can confirm this. For them the change took the form of ignoring the fundamentals of an established role: this occurred whenever the strike force flew over a North Vietnamese air base, and the training and experience of each fighter pilot there told him that today he should be hitting those MIG’s on the ground; tomorrow he could bomb the bridge or power plant or whatever was actually on the frag. His training said, “First remove the challenge to air superiority, then hit other targets.” His experience said, “Those MIG’s down there will be up here challenging you when you come off the target.” But his Commander in Chief had decided that, for the time being anyway, Phuc Yen and Kep and other bases would not be bombed. And they were not until he said otherwise. It was a classic example of a military man having to make what on the surface appeared to be a gut rejection of the requirements of one particular role in order to meet overriding requirements of the profession.
That technology is constantly creating entirely new roles for the military profession is obvious. A new type of weapon means a new role for the military. A weapon does not become operational until someone has learned to use it. And if the other side has a new weapon, someone must learn to defend against it. These role changes are occurring at an increasingly faster rate. Before 1950, inter-continental missiles existed for the most part on paper and in the minds of a few rocket scientists; today ICBM’S constitute a large portion of our strategic power. Before Vietnam, our tactical aircraft had never been threatened in combat by a surface-to-air missile; now SAM suppression has become a vital role in our tactical as well as our strategic air arm. Future technologically related changes will appear even more quickly.
the profession itself
Finally, the military profession’s own influence in determining its roles cannot be overlooked. This influence occurs through the actions and decisions of military leaders and because of certain qualities that are inherent to the profession.
A leader’s effect on the profession’s role occurs not simply by the orders he carries out but by those roles which he personally fills or otherwise favors. The Army has an airborne role today for a variety of reasons, among them the ever possible need to move troops quickly over a long distance and have them hit the ground combat-ready; and in the case of battalion and division commanders in helicopters in Vietnam, the need for a commander to know and control all the action on the battlefield. Yet this emphasis on an airborne role is underscored by the personal endorsement of it from Army leaders, full colonel and above, either by their words or by their actions, such as, at the last part of a career, learning to fly.
Another role occurring, in part, from the actions and example of leaders is the one the following men have in common: Admiral Leahy, General Hines, General Walter B. Smith, Admiral Standley, Admiral Kirk, Admiral Anderson, Admiral Spruance, General Gavin, and General Maxwell Taylor. The list goes on and is quite impressive. The role these men have in common is not just that they are military leaders; it is that they have all served as United States Ambassadors to foreign countries within the past thirty years. For several that role came after they had taken off the uniform, but for some it did not. All of them served with the same dedication that had marked their military careers. And the example set by them is bound to affect the profession.
Naturally, one reason why members of the military are often called upon to fill roles somewhat removed from their normal duties is that their careers have demonstrated their possession of certain qualities that are often required in the successful accomplishment of difficult tasks—qualities such as courage, resourcefulness, a sense of public duty, the ability to remain calm and act with judgment even under conditions of great stress, and many others.
Possession of these and other qualities was partly responsible for the diplomatic roles being given to the generals and admirals just mentioned. Similarly, such qualities have also been responsible for the explorer role given the military profession, from Lewis and Clark’s trek across the continent to Admiral Byrd’s polar expeditions to the more recent substantial participation of military professionals in the exploration of space and ocean.
There are also attributes and abilities that the profession as an organization possesses which influence and determine its roles. Arising essentially from the military’s expertise, these attributes often attract noncombat roles. For example, the military’s ready capability to move large amounts of men and supplies quickly and in an orderly fashion is one reason for its disaster relief role. And its ability to deal with violence on a large scale gives rise to its role in riot control.
The roles of the military profession, then, are being changed from without by influences from American society, the world environment, technology, and from within by its own leaders and organizational abilities. These changes have a significant impact on the core of the military profession; its expertise, corporateness, and responsibility are all affected.
A previous examination of this subject indicated that of the three areas constituting the military’s expertise—strategy, tactics, and administration—the greatest challenge was to strategy.7
That challenge has continued. The strategy guiding the military today is just as much a product of lay strategists now as it was then. Furthermore, a similar civilian involvement in tactics has become commonplace since 1964. The selective and restrictive use of air power in North Vietnam is one clear example of this.
If the trend appears to be forever narrower limits of the area where the military is the exclusive practitioner of its skill, the cause is technological as well as political. Although as Samuel P. Huntington has pointed out, “it must be remembered that the peculiar skill of the officers is the management of violence and not the act of violence itself,”8 technology requires an even higher degree of technical competence from the officer. This has had several results. First, there is a greater requirement for specialists. In the Air Force there are now over 300 specialties identified for officers, not counting the legal, chaplain, and medical fields. A similar situation exists in the other services. Second, there is even less of a chance now for an individual to be used in a wide variety of jobs.
One of the results is that a premium is placed on professional education for the individual to learn about the rest of the profession. The overriding demand growing out of the increasing complexity of the profession is for generalists to tie it all together. The need is for what General William C. Westmoreland has called “spherical” thinkers, “men who can view the several parts as a whole.”9
This need affects the profession’s corporateness as much as its expertise. Officers who can be found to transcend specialty differences, command rivalries (of the SAC versus TAC type), and service competition will without doubt strengthen the corporateness of the profession. But our sense of corporateness will also be affected by the changes occurring in relations between career officers and reservists and between senior and junior officers and by requirements to incorporate those who before would have been forced out.
The reference to career officers automatically includes both regular and active duty career reserve officers. This particular portion of the Reserves is in reality already incorporated in the profession; now the inactive Reserves and National Guard will be to a greater extent.
In the fifties, Huntington’s rationale for placing the reservist essentially outside the professional officer corps was based on the following: “The reservist only temporarily assumes professional responsibility. His principal functions in society lie elsewhere. As a result, his motivation, values, and behavior frequently differ greatly from those of the career professional.”10 The greater role in national defense planned for the reservists in the next few years will alter this observation. The new corporateness of the profession can no longer be said to exclude the Reserves.
Our corporateness will also change as manpower requirements and transformation of society compel us to rehabilitate and accept personnel who until recently would not even have been considered by the military. Much of this will be caused by elimination of the draft. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower Roger T. Kelley has said, “We should examine whether we can get better use out of people.”11 The interpretation that “this would mean enlisting more women, and people who are now rejected as being overweight, underweight or who have limited mental capacity” is only the beginning.12 An Army Medical Corps member has recently suggested unofficially that “perhaps we need to regard marijuana as we do alcohol: if it doesn’t interfere with (a soldier’s) duty, it should be overlooked.”13 Not too many years ago such a suggestion would not have been made.
The military’s concept of its responsibility has also been affected by many of the changes mentioned in this article. After his Korean experience, General Douglas MacArthur protested against, in his words, “a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch and the Government rather than to the country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend.”14 The protest was singularly MacArthurian; the profession as a whole has realized that it has a definite job in implementing political decisions. And since World War II military professionals have accepted the need for public speeches to be cleared for security and policy. This insures that they do not speak out against policy while still in uniform; however, the extent to which the profession should be called upon to advocate current policy is unsettled.
Within seven months after he took office, President Eisenhower had replaced the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff, including the Chairman, General Omar Bradley. This “was interpreted as an effort to remove the military chiefs from the shadow of politics.”15 The relations between the President and General Bradley, his West Point classmate, were further strained by General Bradley’s reported statements about the new Administration’s fiscal policies: “that economy, conditioned by politics, and not military reasons, dictated the decision to cut spending by so much.”16 In short, the old Chiefs had become too closely identified with the Truman Administration. Curiously enough, the new service chiefs, approved by President Eisenhower, were all a year older than their predecessors.
A more recent example occurred in 1967 when General Westmoreland, then MACV Commander, was asked to return to the States to speak in support of the effort in Vietnam. One congressman said that he regretted “that General William Westmoreland has been making public statements in the United States on questions going far beyond his area of responsibility and expertise.”17 A senator said that “if General Westmoreland is to become a propagandist for the Administration in this war, let him take off his uniform and come back in civilian life.”18 On the other hand, another senator saw fit “to commend the distinguished commander of the Advisory Group in Vietnam for acting in a manner which is consonant with the responsibilities and duties of the military.”19 It is not enough to argue that this particular disagreement about the military’s responsibility arises from the peculiar war that is Vietnam. It is an issue that the profession will have to face even after Vietnam. The military profession does have a responsibility to support the Commander in Chief; but the military will continue to be subject to criticism as long as the critics fail to recognize that such support is based on professional duty and not on political motives.
This article has indicated many of the changes and some of the problems currently facing the military profession. To meet the requirements of the profession, older officers must be receptive to new ideas, even those seemingly contrary to past experiences, and younger officers must be more understanding about the responsibilities of being prepared to fight, not only five or ten years from now but next week or tomorrow. Therein lies the inertia confronting new but untested ideas.
Aerospace Studies Institute
Notes
1. “DOD’s Domestic Action Program Well Underway,” Commanders Digest, July 11, 1970, pp. 1-2.
2. Donald McDonald, “Militarism in America,” The Center Magazine, January-February 1970, pp. 30-31.
3. Gordon B. Tucker, A History of Military Affairs Since the Eighteenth Century (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952), p. 467.
4. Richard M. Nixon, “U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: A New Strategy for Peace,” as published February 18, 1970, Congressional Record, 91st Congress, 2d Session, Vol. 116, No. 21, p. H943.
5. Ibid.
6. Alastair Buchan, War in Modern Society (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1968), p. 151.
7. Robert N. Ginsburgh, “The Challenge to Military Professionalism,” Foreign Affairs, January 1964, pp. 255-68.
8. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), p. 13.
9. William C. Westmoreland, “Army’s Role in Our Society,” Army Digest, May 1969, p. 36.
10. Huntington, p. 17.
11. Rob Schweitz quoted Secretary Kelley in “DOD Lures for All-Vol Described,” Air Force Times, October 28, 1970, p. 8.
12. Ibid.
13. Captain James P. Gilchrist quoted by Jerry Williams, “Less Marijuana Piety Urged,” Denver Post, September 23, 1970.
14. Telford Taylor, Sword and Swastika (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952), p. 487.
15. Anthony Leviero, “Radford Is Named Joint Chiefs’ Head; Ridgway for Army,” New York Times, May 13, 1953, p. 1.
16. Editorial by Robert L. Smith, Los Angeles Daily News, as included in Congressional Record Appendix, 83rd Congress, lst Session, Vol. 99, Part 12, p. A4149.
17. Representative Jonathan B. Bingham, 28 April 1967, 90th Congress, 1st Session, Congressional Record, Vol. 113, Part 9, p.11164.
18. Senator Wayne Morse, Congressional Record, Vol. 113, Part 9.
19. Senator Mike Mansfield, Congressional Record, Vol. 113, Part 9.
Brigadier General Robert N. Ginsburgh (USMA; Ph.D., Harvard) is Commander, Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University. He has taught at the U. S. Military Academy and been a research fellow, Council on Foreign Relations. He has held staff, liaison, and planning positions at HQ USAF, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of State, etc. He is author of U.S. Military Strategy in the Sixties (1965) and numerous articles and is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Air War College, and National War College.
Captain Pember W. Rocap (M.A., Texas Technological College) is Aide-de-Camp to General Ginsburgh. He formerly served as a member of the Hq ATC Command Equipment Management team and as a production control and aircraft maintenance officer in three F-105 wings in TAC and PACAF. Captain Rocap is a distinguished graduate of Squadron Officer School.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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