Air University Review, January-February 1971

The Role of Communist 
Ideology in Insurgency

Charles A. Russell 
Major Robert E. Hildner 

One of the most frequently perpetrated myths in some professional and in most popular writing on the subject of insurgency is the importance attributed to the role of Communist ideology in insurgency.* ¹Often considered an essential ingredient in the development of an effective revolutionary movement, Communist ideology has been viewed as the primary force responsible for motivating physically isolated and socially divergent guerrilla cadres and molding them into cohesive groups. Thus the reader of some contemporary literature on insurgency operations in such widely separated geographic regions as Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia often is left with the impression that members of these movements who are students, young intellectuals, and peasants all derive their basic inspiration from Communist doctrine.² This impression is further heightened by frequent press comment on the alleged close correlation between the Marxist-Leninist “dedication” of guerrilla cadres and their “exceptional” combat capabilities.

In view of the continuing belief that Communist ideology is an important motivational force for the rank and file in most successful insurgency movements, it seems desirable to examine why this premise has become so persistent in American writings on the subject as well as to test its validity in the light of experience.

The tendency to see Communism as a central element in most insurgency movements may stem from three interrelated developments: (1) the highly charged ideological nature of the current East-West divergence, which, in relation to the lesser developed world, tends to exaggerate the role of Communist doctrine and thereby often obscures the less political but more realistic causes of insurgency; (2) U.S. inexperience in the general field of insurgency/counterinsurgency operations; and (3) the French doctrine of “la guerre révolutionnaire,” which was used to justify the military operations against the National Liberation Front in Algeria.

The ideological divergence inherent in the present East-West confrontation has tended to focus undue attention on the allegedly significant part played by Communism and indoctrinated Communists in the revolutionary movements that continue to emerge throughout the lesser developed regions of the world. Many Americans are reluctant to accept the fact that real social and economic change in these areas often is virtually impossible without a violent revolution, from which frequently emerge governments that are authoritarian in nature and socialist or Marxist inclined. These Americans have tended to equate all revolutionary change with Communism.³ The ultimate result of this rather simplistic view is to see Communist doctrine as the basic motivational force responsible for most revolutionary and insurgent movements, even in instances where Communist participation is minimal or nonexistent.

Unfortunately, this fixation with the inflated importance of Marxism-Leninism has made it difficult for most Americans to realize that revolutionary activity and insurgency almost never spring from a single cause (such as Communist ideology) but rather from a combination of highly diverse political, socioeconomic, and interrelated personal/situational factors. Particularly significant among these is the nationalistic spirit so prevalent throughout much of the underdeveloped world today. Within many former colonial possessions and newly independent states, this spirit is often brought to a boil by young student/intellectual elements and directed toward the achievement of absolute independence from any form of foreign economic or political control. In other nations, characterized by backward and reactionary governments drawing support from traditional landowning oligarchies, similar student and young intellectual forces frequently focus on demands for rapid and thoroughgoing social, political, and economic change. Aware that the technological revolution of the past several decades now makes such changes a real possibility, the young reformers are also acutely aware that entrenched traditionalist elements frequently will resist to the end any erosion of their power. Accordingly, the only apparent alternative often is the violent overthrow of existing governmental and economic structures. Thus, nationalism and a corollary drive for social, political, and economic change—rather than Communist ideology—have been the factors contributing most directly to the generation of a number of those successful revolutionary movements that have evolved during the past two decades within many areas of the underdeveloped world.

While Communist ideology per se is rarely responsible for the generation of an effective insurgency movement, Communist Party elements have been most successful in penetrating and influencing revolutionary groups, including those completely non-Communist in origin. Being excellent organizers and highly skilled propagandists, the Communists have also been most effective in exploiting popular and often legitimate discontent to accelerate the development of a potential revolutionary situation into an armed insurgency, thereafter directing it toward the achievement of Communist objectives rather than those sought by rank-and-file guerrillas. Indicative of this capability is the significant Communist influence now evident within those insurgency movements active in several Latin American nations as well as the increasingly strong Communist presence in a number of African revolutionary groups that were non-Communist in origin also.

Intimately linked to nationalism and demands for political change as causative factors of insurgency are several basic motivational issues which the effective insurgent leader can exploit to develop popular support for his cause. In most underdeveloped nations the appeal of these issues is to the landless peasant, the underpaid and underemployed urban worker, and the small middle-class merchant. An insurgent leader’s promises to initiate an effective agrarian reform program aimed at breaking up the large estates of the landed oligarchy almost inevitably draws strong indorsement from the exploited and landless peasant. This issue is particularly important in areas such as Latin America, where a still substantial rural population presses heavily upon available resources of arable land.⁴ For the landless peasant, whose livelihood frequently depends upon subsistence agriculture and who sees no action by the incumbent government to carry out any reform through which he can acquire title to land, the call to revolution by an insurgent leader often seems the only solution to his problem. In a similar manner, the obvious concentration of available wealth in the hands of a small elite—so characteristic of many lesser developed states—is another strong inducement to violent change. Aware of the chance for a better life but denied it by traditional economic and political systems and his own lack of familiarity with them, the peasant or underpaid urban worker often sees little possibility for change except through revolution.

Closely associated with the issues of nationalism, land reform, and concentration of wealth in the hands of a small elite is the revolutionary potential flowing from an economy based totally on the export of one or a few basic agricultural or mineral commodities. Although characteristic of most nations within the underdeveloped world, young nationalist-oriented students see such dependence as clear-cut evidence of economic imperialism on the part of the foreign states that purchase the bulk of these commodities. The student/intellectual elements, who often are themselves unable to find positions commensurate with their academic training in a stagnant economy or corrupt governmental bureaucracy, see industrialization and rapid economic development as essential to ending their nation’s client status. And they see little possibility for change outside the revolutionary process, since the government in power is usually representative of the interests producing these commodities. Thus, these and similar factors, when exploited effectively by popularly based leaders, form the actual cement necessary to fuse disaffected elements of a nation into a revolutionary force dedicated to overturning an incumbent government and creating a new social, economic, and political system. Within this process, however, Communist ideology sometimes does not come into playas a motivational factor influencing the rank-and-file insurgent, even when the guerrilla leader himself is a Communist.⁵ Accordingly, the net effect of emphasizing Communist ideology as a key element in the generation of insurgency often has been to downgrade the real causes of such activity and thereby render them more difficult to eradicate.

The unwarranted importance attached to Marxist-Leninist ideology as a cause of insurgency also results, in part at least, from limited American experience in this field. In contrast to a number of Western European nations that for many years have faced the problem of revolution and guerrilla warfare in their colonial possessions, the United States has not undergone a like experience except for earlier military ventures in noncolonial areas such as Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Philippines. Accordingly, much of our knowledge of modern-day revolutionary warfare, and insurgency in particular, has been derived from study and analysis of Communist writings. Thus guerrilla leaders such as Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, Nguyen Giap, and even “Che” Guevara have seen their commentaries, diaries, and writings turned into virtual reference works on the subject. As a result there has been a natural tendency for many students of insurgency and revolutionary warfare to accept not only the strategic and tactical analyses of these authors but also the importance they accord to the role of Marxist-Leninist ideology. This tendency, in turn, has done much to re-emphasize the alleged importance of Communism as a “critical” unifying and motivating force in the development of an insurgent movement.

Contributing to the general acceptance by many American military and political leaders of Communist ideology as a motivating force in insurgency was the French doctrine of “la guerre révolutionnaire.” Although this doctrine had its roots in the Indochina war against the Viet Minh, France used it also to provide an acceptable rationale for military operations in Algeria by alleging that that insurgency was either directed, controlled, inspired, or exploited by Communists. To reinforce this view, it was further inferred that the insurgency in Algeria was part of the overall Soviet plan to encircle Europe.⁶

Despite the fact that many if not most Americans continue to view insurgency as ideologically inspired, the rather substantial evidence accumulated in studies of both present and past revolutionary movements clearly refutes this belief. As pointed out previously, successful insurgent operations normally result from a combination of two basic elements: (1) significant and deeply felt political and socioeconomic factors strongly affecting one or more key population segments (usually including the young intellectuals/students and the peasantry); and (2) a charismatic leader capable of mobilizing armed dissent around these grievances.⁷ Thus in the Cuban revolution of 1956-59 Fidel Castro, one of the most magnetic Latin American leaders of the past decade, exploited very effectively the real and imagined grievances of Cuba’s peasantry and dissatisfied students/intellectuals in order to develop a climate suitable for insurgency. For the peasants he demanded a much-needed program of agrarian reform,⁸ and for the middle-class students and intellectuals he demanded a much-desired end to corrupt politics, a thoroughgoing reform of governmental administrative practices, and a return to the constitution of 1940.⁹ Ideology, specifically Communist ideology, was never a factor of significance in mobilizing popular support for this revolution. In this connection it is interesting to note that even a professing Marxist such as Regis Debray has admitted that ideological arguments and Communist propaganda are totally ineffective in generating support for an insurgent movement.¹⁰

As in the Cuban revolution, Communist ideology played an insignificant role in motivating the rank-and-file participants in most of the insurgent movements that have developed within other nations of Latin America and the lesser developed world. In each of these movements—even those in which the leaders were practicing Marxists—the issues exploited by them to generate popular support have been those very real and basic socioeconomic or political grievances of important population groups. One insurgency, reportedly resulting in an estimated 180,000 or more deaths during the decade 1948-1958, grew largely from such nonideological issues as a stagnant domestic economy, large landholdings and absence of any effective agrarian reform program designed to get land into the hands of landless peasants, intense rivalries between non-Communist political groups, and an economy geared to a single basic export crop.¹¹ While Communist guerrilla leaders did not hesitate to exploit such issues in developing the insurgent movement, Communist ideology per se was conspicuously absent as a motivational force inspiring the guerrillas.

In Africa and Southeast Asia, basic and nonideological issues have been exploited by revolutionary leaders to mobilize popular support for an insurgent movement. In this connection, perhaps one of the best illustrations is the successful insurgency waged by the Algerian National Liberation Front ( FLN ) against the French from 1954 to 1962. In spite of the then relatively widespread belief of the American public that the Algerian insurgency was Communist inspired, directed, and controlled, there is little evidence to support this conclusion. The basic issues used by the FLN leadership to popularize their movement were nationalism and the economic and social discontent widespread among the Muslim segment of the Algerian population. Communist influence in the FLN was virtually nonexistent in the formative stages of the revolt. In fact, individual Communists did not join the FLN until well after the insurgency began, and the Soviet Union itself did not recognize the provisional government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) until the fall of 1960. The role of Communist ideology, therefore, was indirect at best, and some argument can be made that the insurgency might never have developed at all if the French had acted to reduce the economic, social, and political causes of Muslim discontent.¹²

In Southeast Asia, another example can be drawn from the Malayan insurgency that spanned the period from 1948 to 1960. Although the insurgency was directed and controlled by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), its roots were in the deep-seated historical problem of communal relations between the indigenous Malays and the immigrant Chinese, who were systematically excluded from participation in the civil administration of the country. The MCP, which traditionally drew its membership from the Chinese community, exploited the sense of social isolation experienced by the Malayan Chinese. This exploitation was significantly assisted by the wartime record of the MCP and the success of the Communists on mainland China. To combat the insurgency, the British instituted a number of counterinsurgency measures, not the least effective of which was the announcement that Great Britain intended to grant self-government and independence as soon as order was restored and a common Malay citizenship and government established. The widespread publicity accorded the British avowal reduced the appeal of the MCP to the Chinese community and lessened the latter’s support of the MCP.¹³

While Communist ideology has been relatively unimportant as a motivational force during the military phases of any insurgency, it often plays a much more significant role once the revolution has been completed. After the victory, certain goals that had been useful inducements to insurgent participation during actual antigovernment military operations have to be realized: agrarian reform, social and economic change, elimination of a wealthy oligarchy, an end to foreign economic and political domination, etc. To achieve these goals, the often undisciplined guerrilla and his unit leader are unsatisfactory instruments. Instead, a unified and trained political cadre, able to implement revolutionary change, is essential. In the organization of this cadre, the unifying bonds of a common and seemingly progressive economic and political ideology such as Marxism-Leninism are quite valuable. The experience in Cuba, following Castro’s January 1959 assumption of power, illustrates clearly the importance of such a trained cadre and ideological base. Not long after placing his guerrilla leaders in control of various governmental agencies during 1959, Castro began to realize that little but chaos was flowing from the disorganized efforts of these insurgents-turned-administrators. To correct this situation, the Cuban leader began the movement of trained and disciplined organizers of the old-line Cuban Communist Party into key governmental, industrial, and union positions during the early 1960s, thereby providing the new regime a much-needed sense of stability and organization.

In the process of making these changes, Castro apparently also foresaw the need to create an “indigenous” ideological basis upon which to build a “new Cuba.”¹⁴ Accordingly, he initiated an intensive “educational” campaign aimed particularly at the indoctrination of young revolutionaries in his peculiarly nationalistic interpretations of traditional Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Personally loyal to Castro and well indoctrinated in his revolutionary concepts, these “new Communists” have gradually replaced the older party members in most key government posts. Thus the net effect of these activities has been to create not only a reliable political cadre, able to initiate revolutionary change, but also a body of common revolutionary doctrine that links together members of the ruling hierarchy and provides the essential philosophical and ideological underpinnings for the regime. Of particular interest in regard to this aspect of the Cuban experience is the fact that rather similar patterns of development have been evident in some radical postrevolutionary governments within Sub-Saharan Africa.

In the growth of revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped areas of the world, available evidence indicates that neither Communist ideology nor a nationalized variant thereof has been a significant motivating force for those insurgent cadres involved in the military phases of a revolution. Instead, they are most often moved to action by a combination of two factors: (1) the belief that only violent revolution can achieve effective social, political, and economic change within their nation; and (2) the often deep-rooted feeling that such change is essential for the achievement of a better life. With these considerations in mind, the skilled insurgent leader—whether Communist or non-Communist—normally plays down any ideological commitments he might have and instead focuses his appeals directly on the problems affecting those population groups whose support he seeks. These generally include the peasantry, urban workers, and elements of a nationalist-inclined student/intellectual community. The appeals usually stress such practical issues as land reform for the landless peasantry, full employment for unemployed urban workers, and an end to governmental corruption and foreign economic/political intervention.

While these issues are equally exploitable by both non-Communist and Communist insurgent leaders, the latter are particularly well skilled in their use. Well trained in the techniques of propaganda and agitation, they move quickly into positions of leadership within an insurgent movement, subsequently directing it toward the attainment of purely Communist goals and objectives—aims not necessarily synonymous with those sought by the rank-and-file insurgents. After the revolution has been successful, some form of Communist ideology plays an important role as an ideological underpinning and rationale for those political and economic changes programmed by the new regime. Thus, Communism, even when not a primary motivator for guerrilla warfare, retains a meaningful role in revolutionary activities within the underdeveloped world.

* For the purpose of this discussion, insurgency is denned as a subversive, illegal attempt to weaken, modify, or replace an existing government through the protracted use or threatened use of force by an organized group of indigenous people outside the established governing structure.¹

Directorate of Special Investigations, Hq USAF

Notes

1. Human Factors, Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (Washington: American University, Special Operations Research Office, 1966), p. 1.

2. Illustrative of this literature are publications on the Cuban revolution by authors of a rightist persuasion, such as Nathaniel Weyl (Red Star Over Cuba), and those of a leftist orientation, such as Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy (Cuba, Anatomy of a Revolution) and Jean Paul Sartre (Sartre on Cuba).

3. For an evaluation of the dangers flowing from this view see, among others, Chas. O. Lerche, Jr., The Cold War and After (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 58-59; Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff, The New Politics: America and the End of the Cold War (New York: Coward McCann, Inc., 1961), pp. 40-60; Morton A. Kaplan, ed., The Revolution in World Politics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), pp. 216-23.

4. Thomas F. Carroll, “The Land Reform Issue in Latin America,” in John D. Martz, ed., The Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 174. In Latin America as a whole, roughly 90 percent of the land is controlled by 10 percent of the people. As pointed out by Carroll, this degree of concentration is far greater than in any other region of the world of comparable size.

5. For an excellent discussion of those factors generating insurgency and the insignificant role of Communist ideology in that regard, see P. Kecskemeti, Insurgency as a Strategic Problem (RAND Corporation Memo RM-5160-PR, February 1967), pp. 21-24.

6. See D. M. Condit et al., Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Vol. III, The Experience in Africa and Latin America (Washington: American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, 1968), p. 177.

7. Merle Kling, “Cuba: A Case Study of a Successful Attempt to Seize Power by the Application of Unconventional Warfare,” in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May 1962, vol. 341, p. 47.

8. Fidel Castro, Pensamiento Político, Económico y Social de Fidel Castro (Havana: Editorial Lex, 1959), pp. 44-45. See also Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, rev. ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 264; and Merle Kling.

9. A careful analysis of the development and susceptibility of Cuba’s middle class to Castro’s appeals is contained in J. Alvarez Diaz et al., Cuba: Geopolítico y Pensamiento Económico (Miami: Duplex Paper Products, 1964), pp. 397-418. As pointed out so well by Theodore Draper in Castro’s Revolution, Myths and Realities (New York: Praeger, 1962), the Cuban middle class (including strong student, intellectual, and professional elements) was the population group primarily responsible for the success of the revolution.

10. Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1967), pp. 53-54. Another significant refutation of Communist ideology as an important motivating force for an insurgent movement is contained in Fidel Castro’s 10 August 1967 speech to the final session of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO), reprinted in Discursos (Havana: Instituto del Libro, 1967).

11. John J. Finan, “Colombia (1948 until 1958)” in Condit et al., pp. 419-20.

12. Paul A. Juredini, Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Algeria 1954-1962 (Washington: American University, Special Operations Research Office, 1963), pp. 7-15.

13. Condit et al., p. 462.

14. Castro’s awareness of the need for such an ideological base was clearly evident in a speech he made in December 1961 at Havana’s “Universidad Popular.” This speech was reprinted in the Cuban magazine Bohemia, No. 50, 10 December 1961, pp. 48-55 and 84-87, under the caption “El Programa del Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista Será un Programa Marxista-Leninista, Adjustado a las Condiciones Objetivas Precisas de Nuestro País.”

Contributor

Charles A. Russell (M.A., American University), is Chief, Analysis and Dissemination Branch, Counterintelligence Division, Directorate of Special Investigations, Hq USAF. He was a special investigations officer, 1951-54. With Major Hildner, he has lectured at Air Command and Staff College and USAF Special Operations School on insurgency in the underdeveloped world and the role of counterintelligence in counter-insurgency.

Major Robert E. Hildner (M.S., University of Colorado) is Chief, Middle East, Africa, South Asia (MEAFSA) Section, Analysis and Dissemination Branch, Counterintelligence Division, Directorate of Special Investigations, Hq USAF. He served in counterintelligence with OSI in Japan, 1962-65, and was Commander of the OSI Detachment at Da Nang Air Base, Vietnam, for a year preceding his current assignment in February 1970.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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