Our Goal: Promote the Best with the Best System

Nobody has a right to be promoted; but he does have a right to equal consideration with his fellow airmen.

He has a right to be told honestly if he is not capable of promotion. He has a right to understand the system he lives by.

Hon. L. Mendel Rivers¹

When Chairman Rivers made this statement in August 1967, few of us realized the far reaching of effects his words would have on out system selecting airmen for promotion. The shape of things to come was clearly outlined, however, by General J. P. McConnell, then Chief of Staff of the Air Force, when he challenged the 1968 Airman Promotion Conference by saying:

Our basic Air Force promotion objective has been and always will be “to promote to enable the Air Force to fill its requirements for specific grades and skills in each Air Force Specialty (AFS) within the limits established by grade ceilings.”³ General McConnell’s remarks further set the theme that any new promotion system must do more than meet the basic Air Force objective; it must, he said, be “people oriented.”

Lieutenant General Horace Wade, then USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, in the keynote address to the same conference, reiterated this point when he said:

With the implementation of the Weighted Airman Promotion System (WAPS) this year, an entirely new “people oriented” selection concept has come into being. It is clear that any new system, to be acceptable, must satisfy both the basic Air Force promotion objective and the needs of the airman force. The Weighted Airman Promotion System was conceived and designed to do just that.

What criteria must a system meet to be “people oriented”? First, each competing individual should be in a position to do something constructive about his own promotion chances--generally to excel in performance. If he is not selected for promotion, he should know why not and know where he stands in relation to his fellow airmen. Next, it should have “visibility” in order to do away with the many shortcomings we know existed in past systems. Without exception, these systems failed to provide an airman who was not promoted with any understanding of the reason for his nonselection or the things he could do to improve his chances in the next cycle.

Another factor, of equal importance with those mentioned, is the centralization of selections. Our human-relations experts tell us that people do not want or expect favoritism in personnel actions pertaining to them; they simply want the fairest possible break, and this “goes double for promotions.” However, many airmen feel that they cannot receive fair and equitable treatment at the hands of locally constituted boards. They believe that under a decentralized system too much is dependent on factors beyond their control; for example, shredouts of promotion management list quotas rather than compete Air Force-wide within each career field.

We do know that centralization of E-8 and E-9 selections has been outstandingly successful and has eliminated much of the dissatisfaction among eligibles for those grades. It was for these reasons―to satisfy our people and to design a system that would be as fair and equitable as possible―that the WAPS was conceived and that all promotion selections to grades E-4 through E-9 were centralized at Hq USAF.

At this point I am sure that several questions come to mind. What were the problems beyond Air Force control that General McConnell was talking about?―Why did we wait so long to go to a Weighted Airman Promotion System?―Why a mechanized system?―In the final analysis, does the WAPS meet the criterion of being “people oriented”? A review of some of the selection systems used in the past and an explanation of how we arrived where we are today should provide at least some of the answers to these questions.

Before World War II the unit commander, with the advice of his first sergeant, promoted individual airmen to all grades. Qualitative standards were not applied to any very high degree in determining promotion selections. An individual was considered promotable if he had no marks against him in the first sergeant’s “Black Book.” Promotions were made only to fill positions vacated through attrition. Units were fairly stable during this period, with very few enlisted personnel being transferred, so promotion opportunity was extremely limited. It was not uncommon for a man to retire from the service without ever having advanced beyond the grade of corporal.

The promotion outlook changed rapidly with the World War II buildup because the accelerated personnel turnover created frequent vacancies in every grade. Promotion opportunity, for a time, became almost unlimited. Here again, however, there were no established qualitative criteria to govern selection in the promotion process―grade vacancy and the unit commander’s decision were still the deciding factors.

It was not surprising that a system of promotions to fill grade vacancies proved unacceptable in a greatly expanded service. As vacancies were generated by rotation of personnel to and from overseas units, promotions were made in the units to fill these vacancies. Inevitably the grades of personnel were rap-idly exceeding the authorizations of the units to which they were assigned. Recognizing this dilemma, the Army Air Forces published AAF Regulation 35-54 in October 1944, which established certain criteria for promotions and retention of grades. Vacancies created by departing personnel would not be filled but would be held to absorb grades of requisitioned replacements. Grades would be retained only if minimum standards for the military occupational specialty and the level of demonstrated proficiency within the specialty were met. Quality was brought into the promotion process by requiring each Army Air Forces base unit to establish a board to give detailed consideration to all promotions and make recommendations to the commanding officer. Although no standards or criteria were set for the board’s use, this action was a step toward qualitative promotion selections.

The absence of guiding standards and promotion criteria allowed a countless variety of systems to be used for promoting personnel during the World War II era. The resulting problems were inevitable and were being recognized when the Air Force came into being in 1947. When World War II ended, the AAF was top-heavy with noncommissioned officers, many with only three or four years' service. Reduced enlisted strengths and a rank-heavy structure of career-minded NCO’S created our first serious hump condition, virtually blocking promotions for lower-grade airmen. This hump not only reduced promotion opportunity to a minimum but also caused great imbalances in many career fields as Air Force requirements for highly skilled personnel changed rapidly. For the first time Air Force planners had to start thinking seriously about using promotions as a tool for balancing the force among specialties.

During 1950 the Air Force made another attempt to regulate the promotion of enlisted personnel. On 24 March of that year the pertinent Army regulations were rescinded, and the Air Force established its own policy governing the promotion of airmen. The new procedures, however, still retained many of the characteristics of the old Army system. Grade authorizations were governed by the Department of the Air Force, and decentralized control was maintained by permitting group commanders to make promotions to all grades. Authority to promote to E-2 and E-3 could be delegated to squadron commanders. The really significant feature of the new policy was that it established eligibility criteria, consisting of minimum time-in-grade requirements for promotion.

The practice of promoting against unit vacancies continued until 1953, when the Air Force adopted the system of allocating promotions to the major air commands. A new regulation, AFR 39-29, “Promotion of Airmen,” dated 2 January 1953, contained guidance stating that promotions to grades above E-2 would be controlled by the periodic allocation of promotion quotas from the Director of Military Personnel, Headquarters USAF.

The regulation further explained that promotions would be strictly limited to quotas allocated for each of these grades. This new system furthered decentralization of control by authorizing delegation of authority to promote to lower echelons. The regulation also made one other significant change in the minimum time-in-grade requirements for promotion: it increased the time in grade required for promotion to a more realistic figure in connection with the control of promotion allocations.

Yet another revision occurred during 1954: on 31 March authority to promote to grades E-5, E-6, and E-7 was restricted to major command or higher level. Commanders of major air commands retained, however, the authority to delegate promotions to grades E-2, E-3, and E-4 down to and including squadrons.

Grade ceiling control began in 1958 as a direct result of the rising costs in pay and allowances required to support large numbers of noncommissioned officers. Initially, the control restricted Air Force manning in the top four enlisted grades to 55 percent of the enlisted force. In 1960, grade controls were extended to include the newly created E-8 and E-9 grades, and the ceiling was increased to 58.5 percent. In 1964, the Department of Defense further extended grade controls to include ceilings on each of the top six enlisted grades. Under this program the Air Force is required to compute and state its manpower requirements by grade to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on an annual basis. OSD then evaluates stated Air Force manpower requirements in terms of projected program changes, grade authorizations, grade structure, anticipated attrition, promotion opportunity, costs, and the long-range effects of the requirement if it is approved. When OSD completes this evaluation, it issues authorized enlisted grade ceilings for the next fiscal year. These grade ceilings, once issued by OSD, are considered absolute and binding on the Air Force. The Air Force must scale its promotion quotas to comply with the OSD grade ceilings and is responsible for seeing that the total number of enlisted personnel serving in each of the top six grades does not exceed the authorized ceiling. Actual grade vacancies are determined by computing the number of losses projected to occur during the year. The difference between the year’s beginning and ending strengths, plus the projected losses, provides the Air Force with the actual number of available promotion vacancies. The Air Force then promotes to fill these vacancies but must not promote more than the OSD ceiling will allow. The ceiling for each grade is reflected in the approved fiscal year end strength.

The importance of the control that OSD exercises over the top six enlisted grades cannot be overemphasized. This system actually enables OSD to direct the Air Force promotion operating program by grade and also to determine the number of enlisted promotions which the Air Force can make during any fiscal year.

One need only examine the differences that have occurred between the OSD grade ceilings and the stated Air Force manpower requirements to determine the effect this arrangement has had on the Air Force enlisted grade structure. During the past few years the Air Force has continually stated a requirement for a larger percentage of its total enlisted strength in the top six grades. Since 1966 the top six requirement has been approximately 73 percent of total enlisted strength. In 1966 the Air Force was authorized 58.2 percent, but rather than create a promotion hump by a surge of new grade authorizations, the Air Force elected to phase up to requirements systematically, with increased authorizations in the top six grades spread proportionately over five years. OSD has concurred in the Air Force plan. Fiscal year 1970 is the first time the Air Force has requested and been authorized a grade structure in accordance with its requirements.

The lower grade ceilings authorized by OSD have represented the maximum allowable manning which the Air Force could have serving in each grade. This has meant accomplishing the Air Force mission with an enlisted grade structure below that which was believed to be necessary. The promotion system must operate within this limitation, and the promotion quota for each grade must be restricted to the vacancies that are projected to occur in the authorized grade structure during the year. Further, the existence of these OSD ceilings has required the Air Force to establish additional management controls designed to balance and create a more equitable grade manning structure in all Air Force specialties.

The Air Force, from its very beginnings, has been overmanned in the noncommissioned officer grades. The Korean War added to this problem by creating further distortion in the grade-service profile, forcing the creation of new management controls in order to correct grade imbalances. Just so many grade authorizations are issued by OSD, and it is incumbent upon the Air Force to see that its total manning for each grade does not exceed these authorizations. Faced with this problem, the Air Force has had to channel airman promotions into those specialties that are manned below their authorized level, in an effort to improve grade capabilities and bring the grade manning by skill into balance. To do this the Air Force has resorted to a stringent promotion management system. The key element in this system is the Promotion Management List (PML), which specifies the maximum percentage of eligibles in each specialty that may be promoted without overmanning the next higher grade.

The controls and limitations imposed on the airman promotion system by the PML are derived from a number of computations, which in turn are based on the promotion operating program levels and authorized manpower allocations. Initially, the management controls were very restrictive, particularly for those specialties that were overmanned. These specialties were allowed only a token quota of 2 percent. Other specialties were authorized increments of 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 percent. These management controls remained relatively unchanged until 1959, and still many specialties continued to exceed manpower authorizations. A revised regulation, AFR 39-29, “Promotion of Airmen,” dated 4 March 1959, implemented more stringent controls and established the promotion criteria for two new enlisted grades, senior master sergeant (E-8) and chief master sergeant (E-9). The authority to promote to these grades was restricted to wing commanders or higher.

Only minor changes in promotion management occurred during the early sixties. Time in grade was reduced and promotion opportunity increased because of some relief in the OSD grade ceilings. However, problems were still encountered with promotion management. During October 1965 the Air Force adopted additional controls in an attempt to better balance the grade structure among the various specialties. Specifically, an exact allowable percentage of promotions within a specialty was established. It could not exceed grade manning and was intended to bring all skill areas up to a common operating level.

In 1965 the promotion program for E-8 and E-9 came under intensive scrutiny. The small number of promotions being made to these grades was causing inequities in selection consideration, primarily because a decentralized system was being used. In 1966 a decision was made and implemented to centralize E-8 and E-9 selections at Hq USAF. The results confirmed the advisability of centralization for other grades in order to enable eligible airmen to compete on equal terms for all available vacancies.

Prior to 1967 promotions were made by cycle―one, two, or three cycles per year, depending on grade. This system frequently caused the Air Force to fall below its grade ceiling authorization between cycles. The 1967 World-Wide Airman Promotion Workshop developed methods for monthly incremental promotions that allow selected airmen to be promoted earlier. They also permit the Air Force to take advantage of grade vacancies on a monthly basis rather than by cycle, thus having an immediate effect of creating more promotions.

Even after these extensive changes, the problems of promotion by specialty were still evident. The old axiom of “being in the right place at the right time” was a major factor in promotion opportunity. Airmen complained of competing for promotion with airmen in other specialties. The Airman Promotion Conference in 1968 evaluated the possibility of central selection of airmen both by board process and by a point promotion system. Because of the volume of eligibles, the finding was that it would be impossible to centralize promotions at Hq USAF when a board and selection folder were involved. Airmen also continue to complain about the board process because they could not be told why they were not selected or what they could do to be selected.

To manage better by specialty, to promote the best qualified in each specialty, and to give the system visibility, the Weighted Airman Promotion System was adopted in July 1968. It was scheduled to become operational with cycle 71-A, the first promotions under it to begin on 1 June 1970.

The WAPS is a revised automated airman promotion system designed to select airmen for promotion to grades E-4 through E-7 using specific weighted criteria. It provides each nonselected airman with a promotion status report, provides increased visibility, and answers the questions “Why was I not promoted?” and “What can I do to improve my chance for promotion?” It enhances each airman’s confidence in the promotion system because it is understandable; it provides a more equitable method of selecting airmen for promotion; and it facilitates and expedites the promotion administrative process.

The weighted system was approved by the Secretary of the Air Force on 3 July 1968 and by a special Congressional subcommittee on enlisted promotion policy on 3 July 1968. Congressional interest in the promotion practices of the armed forces developed as a result of the thousands of letters from enlisted men to congressmen during the fifties and sixties complaining about promotion programs in general and promotion boards in particular. As a result of these complaints and the concern of individual congressmen, the Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services established a special Subcommittee on Enlisted Promotion Policy Review. The findings and recommendations of the subcommittee indicated that a major revision of the Air Force airman promotion system was essential. This is reflected and confirmed in these extracts from the special subcommittee report:

With the WAPS the Air Force now has a unique airman promotion selection process that provides fair and equitable consideration for all eligibles to a degree impossible under any previous system. By featuring a high degree of “visibility” and describing in detail the factors upon which promotions are based and the weight given each factor, the new system will restore the confidence of all airmen in the Air Force promotion program. By correcting the inequities in the old system and removing the doubts and misconception that surrounded it, WAPS will significantly improve morale. This should ultimately remove the primary basis for the thousands of letters of complaint which congressmen have received from Air Force enlisted personnel.⁶

The WAPS was developed after extensive study and research into the Airman Career Management Program. The policies and procedures are sound and do meet the desire goal of selecting the best qualified airmen Air Force-wide for promotion. However, as in any new system that relies on voluminous machine-processed data, WAPS in its present configuration is not the ultimate. Continued study is needed to insure that the program mains current, serves the needs of the Air Force and the individual, and continues to meet established objectives. Some prime problems for review are frequency of testing promotion eligibles, frequency of promotion cycles, the elimination of grade E-4 from the WAPS, the inclusion of promotion to grades E-8 and E-9, analysis of the factors and weights given to each factor, and re-evaluation of the eligibility criteria for each grade.

Any such system as the WAPS could not have been implemented until the Air Force had the capability to collect the voluminous personnel data required in the selection process. The Personnel Data System (PDS-A1) did provide this capability with some minor exceptions, e.g., airman performance report and decorations data. The nonavailability of some data in-system, plus the requirement to re-evaluate PDS-A1 data, has caused the WAPS to become a self-standing system. The more sophisticated systems with larger data bases that will come into being during the seventies, such as the Personnel Management Information System (PMIS), will eliminate the need for an independent system to capture and store promotion data. The interface of WAPS with PMIS will give us a faster, more responsive, and extremely accurate method of acquiring and processing promotion data.

We have come a long way since the days of the first sergeant’s “Black Book.” We now have a system that is promoting the best.

1. L. Mendel Rivers, Enlisted Promotion Policy Review, Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Enlisted Promotion Policy Review, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968, p. 6325.

2. General J. P. McConnell, remarks delivered to 1968 Airman Promotion Conference, Bolling AFB, D.C., 2 April 1968.

3. Air Force Regulation 39-29, “Promotion of Airmen,” Washington, D.C., 25 November 1969, para 1.

4. Lieutenant General Horace M. Wade, keynote address to 1968 Airman Promotion Conference, Washington, D.C., 1 April 1968.

6. For a comprehensive view of the WAPS, see AFR 39-29, 25 November 1969, and AFM 30-3, 21 June 1968, volume II, Chapter 7.

Major Thomas A. Kustelski (B.A., College of Saint Thomas) is Chief, Promotion Management Branch, Hq USAF Military Personnel Center. He has held various personnel positions and had USAF Security Service assignments in Germany and Turkey. Major Kustelski is a graduate of Squadron Officer College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.