Document created: 24 August 04
Air University Review, September-October
1970
Today there is a Military Airlift Command, but it is the airlift command in name only, not in fact. There are other airlift units outside the command, and within MAC itself its efforts and energies are diluted by its responsibility for supervising functions that are no more directly related to airlift than to other USAF principal missions. These nonairlift organizations are the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS), Air Weather Service (AWS), Aerospace Audio-Visual Service (AAVS), and Aerospace Cartographic and Geodetic Service (ACGS).
While these units are receiving somewhat limited supervision, planning assistance, and support from a MAC staff that is primarily―and rightly so―oriented toward resolving airlift problems, it is paradoxical that elsewhere in the Air Force there are major and significant airlift units: in the Tactical Air Command, in the U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and in the Pacific Air Forces. Some have opined that these airlift units in nonairlift commands receive about the same emphasis and management as the nonairlift services do in the Airlift Command.
If the organizational anomalies described had no measurable effect on our military efficiency and strength, any discussion would be academic; but it is my thesis that the fragmentation of airlift roles and missions results in duplication, overlapping, unnecessary redundancy, and blurring of responsibilities. My present purpose, therefore, is to voice an appeal for change in the management of our nation’s airlift capability: change toward a single functionally oriented force. This appeal has been made many times in the past decade―in the Congress,1 in the Pentagon,2 in various studies. But each time it has been rejected or set aside to await further study and evaluation.
The duplication and blurring of responsibility begin at the highest USAF management level, the Air Staff, where responsibilities for airlift functions are split, divided, and at times fragmented among a number of staff agencies, most notably the Airlift Division, Directorate of Operations, DCS/Plans and Operations, and the Directorate of Transportation, DCS/Systems and Logistics. Here in the inner workings of the Air Staff is reflected the continuing struggle between airlift as an operational capability (represented by the Airlift Division, Directorate of Operations) and airlift as a transportation resource (represented by the Directorate of Transportation). Since it is both3and is so used, dependent upon the requirement, consideration should be given to combining these Air Staff functions. Precedent was established with the organization of the Special Assistant for Strategic Mobility in the offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
At the major command level there is duplication, with airlift planners and experts in MAC, TAC, USAFE, PACAF, AFLC, and others. Only in MAC is airlift the principal mission. In the other commands the voice of airlift is often weak and seldom heard or heeded. Nevertheless, all the staffs expend varying amounts of manpower and resources on formulating policy, plans, and procedures for airlift tactics and techniques; combat control team doctrine; air transportation systems; design and operation of passenger and air freight (cargo) terminals; aeromedical evacuation systems; compilation of airlift data through sophisticated machines and computers; and a myriad of other functions related to airlift and its uses and application.
In field operations the duplications―or, even worse, the omissions because of blurred responsibilities―are more dramatic. One terminal may be operated by MAC according to MAC policies and guidelines, another by AFLC according to AFLC policies and guidelines, or by PACAF, or by USAFE. And seldom are any two operated in the same way, or are manpower and work standards the same, or is documentation exactly the same (although much has been done to standardize documentation).
Maintenance and support of expensive and sophisticated materials handling equipment (part of the 463L system) differ, depending on the using command’s emphasis. (In this regard, implementation of the 463L system has been slowed and hindered by multiple command responsibility for its development and design.)
The efficient use of personnel resources also is hampered. It is conceivable―and it has happened―that in an overseas area a decrease in airlift workload results in a temporary overage of personnel at one station while another, with an increased workload, has a shortage; but because the air terminals and related functions are operated by different commands (MAC vis-à-vis USAFE or PACAF) there is no way to realign the resources in a timely manner. The same problem sometimes develops in the use of equipment, in the use of facilities, and even in the use of aeromedical evacuation crews.
What is the answer? The simple ―and to countercritics, overly simplified―solution is to make the Military Airlift Command the one true airlift organization. Just as we have a Strategic Air Command, an Air Training Command, an Air Force Logistics Command―all with relatively straightforward and homogeneous responsibilities―let us have a command that is responsible for all airlift, and only for airlift. Only three actions will be necessary:
· First, strip away from MAC the technical services of ARRS, AWS, AAVS, and ACGS. These services (like the Communications Service and the Chart and Information Center, both once part of MAC) do not need to be assigned to MAC; they would increase in stature by becoming autonomous.4
· Reassign to MAC the so-called tactical airlift resources and responsibilities of TAC. The former distinction between “tactical” and “strategic” airlift has been erased; the artificial command structure delineation should also be erased. Both MAC and TAC have combat airlift missions. Both work on a daily basis with Army units in furthering combat missions.5 The duplication of effort should be eliminated.
· Assign to MAC the resources and responsibility for operating the overseas airlift systems in the Pacific, Europe, and other theaters. These systems, including aeromedical evacuation, should be managed by MAC but in accordance with requirements established by the theater commanders. Airlift should be the servant of the theater commander; his requirements should dictate the system to be established, but airlift experts should supervise its operation.
With these three actions I believe we would achieve a single integrated airlift organization not only capable of fulfilling the current military airlift needs of the nation but also capable of planning a single organization for fulfilling future needs, one that will reduce if not eliminate the wasteful practices and inefficiencies resulting from the present duplication of effort and fragmentation of responsibilities.
Counterarguments will be posed, many of which have been heard before. I shall mention only four of them, with my rebuttals.
1. MAC would be “too big,” the airlift organization would be bigger than most of the users to be served. I need only point to AFLC; it serves all commands, and its size is not cited as objectionable.
2. Different ideas from different commands create a “healthy” situation and contribute to progress. Responsible and productive debate is always desirable, but not the kind that results in duplication and waste. Two Strategic Air Commands have not been needed to stimulate ideas for our strategic striking capability.
3. The Airlift Service Industrial Fund (ASIF) under which MAC operates is cumbersome; it complicates and even inhibits the use of airlift.
Granted that the ASIF is anathema to many military personnel. Yet it is noteworthy that not all airlift operations have to be under ASIF. Further, a quote from the original Mr. Airlift, Lieutenant General William Tunner, puts the industrial fund concept in proper perspective:
The . . . Airlift Service Industrial Fund is unique to a war-ready military force. But it is an administrative funding device only and should not be permitted to becloud the true nature of MATS’ reason for being . . . (Emphasis added)6
Any industrial fund concept should accommodate to the needed airlift organization; the airlift organization should not be structured to accommodate to industrial funding.
4. Theater commanders should have their own airlift, under their control, to use as required.
As indicated earlier, there is no argument with the “as required” part of this. The airlift force can and should be established to meet the needs of the theater commander, but it should be operated by airlift specialists. Theater and USAF component commanders do not “own” their strategic bombing capability, their air rescue capability, communications service, their weather service, or many other theater resources that are part of a specialized command.
Other arguments will be advanced, some specious, some valid. But on balance I am convinced that consolidation of the nation’s military airlift forces is desirable. Parochial views and vested interests should be set aside, and steps should be taken to establish a Military Airlift Command in the truest sense of the name. It is in the nation’s interest.
Travis Air Force Base, California
Notes
1. See, in particular, “Report of Special Subcommittee on National Military Airlift of the Committee on Armed Services,” House of Representative, Eighty-Eighth Congress, First Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1963.
2. A review of many organization options was conducted in 1963 (completed in January 1964) by a DOD special study group, chaired by Solis Horwitz, its inconclusive report entitled “Study of Organization and Management of Military Airlift.”
3. An interesting treatment of this aspect is contained in a recent article by a former commander of MAC, General Howell M. Estes, Jr., “Modern Combat Airlift,” Air University Review, XX, 6 (September-October 1969), 18.
4. If the Air Force “separate operating agencies” would thus become too numerous, a case could be made for consolidating all into a “services command” to support the Air Force in such functions as are now performed by diverse agencies. I doubt that such a consolidation is necessary, however.
5. Those who are not aware of the scope and magnitude of MAC’s involvement in what was once known as “tactical airlift” will be interested in Major General Courtney L. Faught’s “Combat Airlift Training in MAC,” Air University Review, XX, 6 (September-October 1969), 35-43.
6. Lieutenant General William H. Tunner, “Strategic Airlift,” Air University Quarterly Review, XII, 3 and 4 (Winter and Spring 1960-61), 112.
Colonel Lester R. Ferriss, Jr., (M.A., George Washington University) is Chief of Staff, Twenty-second Air Force, Military Airlift Command. He has served most of his career in MAC, including reconnaissance, weather, training, and traffic. Upon completion of National War College in 1960, Colonel Ferriss was on the Air Staff, Directorate of Transportation. He has served two tours in Japan and assumed his present position in 1967 after serving in Vietnam.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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