Air University Review, September-October 1969
A little reflection makes a skeptic;
a lot of refection makes a believer.
-LOUIS PASTEUR
While assembling some notes for this article, I ran across the cited quotation attributed to the famous nineteenth century chemist. Realizing that my comments would appear in the Air University Review barely a month after I had left office as the Air Force Chief of Staff, it occurred to me that Pasteur’s thought would be a useful guide for writer and prospective reader alike.
It is hardly necessary for me to call attention to the Hood of critical comment that has been directed toward a wide variety of governmental activities, particularly in the last year. I have often thought that much of this criticism has shown signs of what Pasteur would have called skepticism because it has been founded on much speculation, little fact, and far less reflection. I have no desire to be labeled a skeptic, nor can I see at this point in time any benefit that could result from critical comment by me on recent controversial events. Such events merit far deeper examination and “a lot of reflection”―by myself as well as others―before valid conclusions can be drawn. In this article, therefore, I shall discuss briefly some of my long-held views and convictions and make some observations on my recent tenure in office.
In looking back over the past few years, I recall vividly the personal distinction inherent in my nomination as Chief of Staff and confirmation by the Senate. Without question, the confidence and trust embodied in these actions represent the highest honors that have been bestowed on me during my lifetime. But symbols of honor are temporal, and, in my own mind at least, that initial sense of honor was fully matched by the deep sense of obligation and responsibility that I felt during my entire tour of duty.
During those early months of 1965, I, like others before me, had a base of experience through service as the Vice Chief of Staff under General Curtis E. LeMay. Although I occupied that position for less than a year, the experience proved beneficial for a number of reasons. One was the fact that I became intimately familiar with both joint and service issues of particular interest to the Air Force. More importantly, I gained what I regard as indispensable to a Chief of Staff: a thorough knowledge of the environment of government in which senior military officers must operate to fulfill their responsibilities. By “environment” I am referring not only to the division of authority among government officials and the procedures through which military proposals are considered but also to the policies and attitudes of the individuals who must become involved in the decision-making process.
I am confident that most of my readers are well informed on the legal and functional aspects of government operations and the procedural machinery involved in our system of decision-making as it pertains to national security. However, I am not as certain that there is an equal degree of understanding about the nature of national security problems to be solved or the realistic roles of senior military officers in the process of decision-making at the national level.
In recent years there has been ample evidence that military professionals have accepted the idea that national problems involving security can no longer be rigidly identified as exclusively military, political, economic, or social in nature. Yet I have found some vestiges of an outdated belief that responsibility for solutions to such problems can and should be assigned to particular authorities and departments of government. From my own experience, I can readily testify that the major security issues facing the nation are too complex to be placed in exclusive categories or acted upon through a single instrument of national influence.
To illustrate this point, I need cite only the single example of the conflict in Southeast Asia as a many-sided problem that has affected practically every facet of national activity. There can be no doubt that this problem has conditioned the attitude of the entire nation. More to the point, the repercussions of nearly every official proposal or action with regard to military aspects of the problem have been felt throughout the political, economic, and social activities of government. As for my own activity as the Air Force Chief of Staff, it is no exaggeration to say that the war in Vietnam and related issues commanded the largest amount of my personal time and attention, both as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as the senior military officer responsible for the management of Air Force support for that conflict.
To return to the question concerning the roles of senior military officers in the decision-making process, I have been pleased to note among military professionals an increased understanding of the pertinent laws and directives. Here I am referring to the numerous documents that prescribe the relationship between the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chiefs of the military services as individuals and as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). At the same time I have felt that this relationship has not always been fully and universally accepted as a practical reality when applied to a decision on a particular proposal or issue.
On a number of occasions in recent years, I shared the disappointment of other military officers over unfavorable decisions on proposals which, after meticulous study and review of alternatives, appeared to be the most effective solutions to specific problems from a military point of view. But, as I indicated earlier, most of our national security problems have significant nonmilitary implications. In such cases, I found that the productive role of the JCS was to identify key factors that were vital from a military standpoint and to provide a number of suitable alternatives for the application of military power. It also was clear that alternatives which fully considered political and economic implications were more likely to be accorded attention in depth, since national authorities could choose the one which best solved the problem as they saw it. I believe that one of the more difficult realities for a military officer to accept is the fact that, in a modern governmental environment, a military solution to a problem may not be fully consistent with the broader objectives in the mind of the decision-maker.
A related point that merits additional understanding is the fact that senior military officers are not only advisers and advocates in the decision-making process, but they are also the agents for carrying out a decision once it is made. During my tenure in office I regarded a decision made by a duly constituted authority as my decision and one to be carried out to the best of my ability. I have always believed that responsive action must accompany recognition of authority, and as the Chief of Staff I frequently told members of the Air Staff and others that when a man in uniform felt that he could not support a decision of higher authority it was time to “turn in his suit.”
At the time I entered office, the essential elements of the organized approach to defense management as we know it today were well established. The process of developing and issuing strategic and logistic guidance under the Joint Strategic Planning System had been in existence for years, although it is true that relatively minor changes in that system were incorporated since 1965. Additionally, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had adopted a body of integrated management techniques now known collectively as the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS). Notwithstanding its relatively recent arrival on the scene, the system itself was already a firmly established method of relating military requirements to forces and systems and their costs. I am confident that most readers of this journal are thoroughly familiar with the objectives and procedural aspects of these systems, and my comments here are intended merely to reflect my own views of their value in contributing to the total effort of the Department of Defense.
In general, I believe that the organized approach to defense management as it has evolved over recent years has served a useful and responsive purpose. Without question, the joint plans and documents have been instrumental in fulfilling the obligations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide planning guidance for the armed forces and to submit the advice and recommendations of the JCS to the Secretary of Defense. I can think of no better way to bring together the results of military studies of factors which bear on national strategy and the collective judgments of responsible military leadership concerning actions required to implement that strategy.
Similarly, the modern approach to programming and budgeting has enabled us to examine proposals for changes in force structure with a greater degree of objectivity, to submit such proposals with more clearly defined substantiation, and to process decisions on those proposals in a more orderly fashion. Coupled with an improved data base, advanced data-processing equipment, and progressively more effective analytical techniques, the PPBS has given us an expeditious method of examining complex problems and a higher level of confidence in proposing alternative solutions. Above all, these systems have enhanced our ability to communicate with most echelons of government, thus affording both the opportunities and the means for making constructive military inputs into the decision-making process.
With all its merits, the modem approach to defense management has both real and potential limitations. Once is that the appropriateness of our proposals and the validity of decisions are still largely dependent on personal judgment. Our planning system, for example, remains tied to our ability to interpret facts as we believe they exist and to the accuracy of our projections of trends into a future over which we have little control. This problem is not new, but the translation of perceived threats and national policy into comprehensive strategies and supporting force structures is becoming more difficult―as well as crucial―as time goes on. In practical terms, we have not yet developed reliable techniques for answering the age-old questions, “Is this absolutely necessary?” and “How much is enough?”
A second limitation to our current managerial approach is the risk of using the tools of management as a substitute for strategic thought. In recent years, there has been evidence in some quarters of an attempt to fit the elements of future strategy into the same packages that were designed to facilitate the management of forces and systems. It is well recognized that the current inventory of forces was developed from concepts of defense posture and potential warfare that were commonly accepted in the fifties and early sixties. In following the established management procedure, we now categorize such forces into relatively distinct elements according to predetermined military missions.
It is true that such an approach facilitates a choice between weapon systems competing for the same preconceived mission and aids in defining the performance requirements of a system to accomplish that mission. But the resulting danger I see is a type of strategic thinking that limits the employment of military force to narrowly conceived, unrealistic concepts of warfare and that leads to the development of forces and systems with inflexible mission capabilities. I believe that the Air Force has demonstrated the value of a more flexible approach by interchanging with telling success the traditional roles of strategic and tactical aircraft in Southeast Asia.
Then, too, the integrated system of management depends on a planning input by individual elements that have specialized interests and competence. It is only natural for a specialist to look at a complex problem from a somewhat narrow point of view. As a result, there is an inherent risk that the specialist will give disproportionate weight to one segment of the problem and will devise alternatives and advocate courses of action which place his specialty in a prominent role as the driving force in solving the problem. The hazard of bias can occur in any system; to guard against it, advocacy must be balanced by perspective. In my opinion, the key to success in our whole approach to defense planning and management is not in the organizations and procedures that make up the system but in the attitudes and actions of the people in it. The system works if the people in it allow it to work.
On this score, it has been my experience that military personnel involved in defense management at the national level have been and are now both personally responsive and organizationally efficient in serving the purposes of the management system. The Joint Staff is competent and is fully meeting the demanding requirements of the JCS. I have found also that the individual service staffs have been equally effective in contributing to joint and unilateral service needs. As the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, I was particularly pleased with the quality of work produced by the Air Staff and the support I received from major commanders and their staff personnel. To me, this performance reflected not only a deep sense of dedication to the Air Force and full support of national policy but also a growth in understanding of national security issues and the need for handling them with sensitivity and skill.
In presenting some views on the progress of the Air Force in recent years, I will forego a chronology of events and reiteration of force structure changes. Instead, I will focus on several factors that have had a significant influence on the pace and direction of Air Force affairs in the last four and one-half years.
When I entered office as the Chief of Staff in 1965, it was clearly evident that the strategic capabilities of the Air Force represented the strongest instrument of military power in the world. At the same time the Air Force, as well as all other elements of the Department of Defense, was well along in its progress under a strategic concept that emphasized ballistic missiles as the primary systems for nuclear deterrence and the growth of general-purpose forces as a means of providing a “flexible response” to a wider range of crises and conflicts. As was true under my immediate predecessors, the Air Force faced three major tasks: first, to maintain a strategic force capable of performing assured-destruction and damage-limiting missions as the basic elements of nuclear deterrence; second, to continue the improvement of tactical and airlift forces under an approved mid-range program; and third, to study long-range requirements and propose research and development efforts that we believed would be effective in fulfilling those requirements.
The decision to greatly expand our involvement in the Southeast Asia conflict, of course, added a fourth task which soon proved to be dominant. Without question, the fulfillment of immediate and continuing needs associated with combat operations in Vietnam has had a decided effect not only on Air Force affairs at top management levels but also on the posture of major air commands and operating elements throughout the world. The requirement for substantial reallocations of human, material, and monetary resources to support the war in Vietnam has placed severe restrictions on Air Force progress in other critical areas. In effect, we have been forced to adapt rather than change and to modify rather than modernize.
In spite of the obstacles created by wartime involvement, I believe that the Air Force has made significant progress in meeting a number of requirements arising from that conflict. The substantial improvement in tactical air control, the extensive modification of weapons and systems for increased effectiveness in all-weather and jungle environments, and the refinement of global and in-theater air transport services are just a few among many examples.
More important, Air Force experience in combat has reaffirmed our fundamental convictions concerning the effective use of air power. Particularly noteworthy, I think, has been the clear demonstration of the versatility of manned aircraft and the ability of man to adapt in the environment of battle.
The effectiveness of air power has always been a vital concern of the Air Force, and at this point I would like to bring up a related subject that has been very much on my mind. Throughout the latter years of my career and especially during my service as Chief of Staff, I became increasingly convinced of the requirement for more effective contributions by the military in the vital and continuing study and discussion of military strategy.
My basis for this statement is provided largely by the fact that since the Korean War, and over the past decade in particular, the public expressions of strategy have become dominated by the writings of civilian analysts. In making this point, I want to acknowledge, first of all, my respect for the contributions to our fund of knowledge on this subject by experts who have demonstrated a depth of understanding of strategic issues and the ability to take an objective position. This in no way alters the fact, however, that the views of such analysts can be fully productive only when considered by authorities and opinion-molders along with a complementary input of strategic analysis by the military.
In most of our day-to-day discussions of security matters, we are now giving the appearance of having outgrown the need for explaining the broad rationale of strategy in the context of current and future problems of national security. Judging from the scope of some current statements on defense matters, we seem to be charged with an exclusive concern for the narrower issues―that is, the alignment of functions among the military services and the specific impact of that process on our development and procurement of needed systems and facilities.
I think it is fortunate for the country that the military did not succumb to this kind of mental torpor in the period immediately following World War II. The controversy about atomic weapons and the general-war/small-war assumptions for U.S. defense posture during the late forties served an important purpose. Lacking the stimulus which that controversy supplied, we could have gone into an extended and continuing period of crisis and conflict without benefit of many of the approaches to strategic planning that have since proved to be essentially sound.
In many respects, I believe that the military is suffering from at least a partial stagnation in strategic thinking today. For this reason, I want to present several of my basic viewpoints concerning the task of using military power in support of national objectives―if only to stimulate additional thought.
At the outset, I am convinced that the sole measure of effectiveness of a military strategy is and will continue to be its adequacy and appropriateness for supporting this country’s basic objectives. To achieve those objectives, a succession of national administrations has pursued a policy of helping to create a world environment in which the rule of law is respected and in which the United States and other free nations can survive and prosper.
From my experience, a military strategy geared to such objectives must provide forces that our national leaders can employ as an aid in deterring or defeating aggression at all levels of conflict. Using military power in combination with political, economic, and other elements of national influence for this purpose is a complex undertaking. A sound strategy must justify confidence on the part of our national authorities that our military forces can operate effectively against the full range of threats and at acceptable levels of expenditure and risk.
I am convinced that our continued success in providing such forces will demand several concepts. I want to underscore the need for those adjustments by inviting attention to some widely held views of the threat that I feel to be at least partially in error.
One such view is the frequently expressed opinion that the prime threat is that of a massive nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. This is true in the sense that the Soviets now have the capability for such an attack. A continued deployment of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM’s), especially improved versions with multiple warheads, would enhance that capability in the future. It is also true that the potential consequences for us are so grave that we must continue to give first priority to deterring that threat. I do not believe, however, that such an attack is what the Soviets are most likely to undertake. Their more probable aim is to use their expanding strategic capabilities as leverage to allow themselves a broader range of initiatives in the field of diplomacy, military aid, and conventional operations.
It is for this reason that we should avoid a reaction to the Soviet strategic threat that makes us weak and vulnerable in other areas. For example, we do not want a kind of muscle-bound strategic power that is suitable only for use in the least likely event of all-out nuclear war.
Maintaining an unassailable capability for assured destruction of some fixed percentage of the Soviet population and industrial base is only part of the task. We should also seek to increase the flexibility of our strategic forces. This improvement is needed to give us credible options for responding to major confrontations that could involve a limited exchange of nuclear weapons. A failure to act on this problem could produce an operational gap that would make us vulnerable to limited coercive attacks.
There is still another popular misconception that I believe has obstructed to some degree the Air Force’s full contribution to our national security posture. I have in mind the persistent and widespread tendency to regard aerospace power as being primarily an instrument of full-scale nuclear attack. That identification has imposed a decided disadvantage on the Air Force because at the long and heated campaign against the concept of “massive retaliation.” Further, in the aftermath of the “massive retaliation” controversy, there emerged the concept of “flexible response.” This concept brought no special recognition for air power, because “flexible response” was considered to apply almost solely to the employment of general-purpose forces in land and sea actions at the lower levels of conflict. As will be recalled, that concept was developed in a time period prior to the Southeast Asia conflict, and the thinking behind it reflected a belief that ground action would be dominant in all conflicts below the nuclear level.
As an outgrowth of this logic, several trends have developed in the field of strategic planning that strike me as being counterproductive. The first of these trends has been the tendency to think of all conflict as being polarized into the two extremes of all-out nuclear war at one end of the spectrum and low-level conventional war at the other. Further, there has been a tendency to split up our interacting strategic and tactical elements to an extent that could leave us without the essential reinforcing strength that we require. In this regard, I reiterate my point made earlier that the mere grouping of forces and systems into convenient packages for programming and budgeting actions does not give us a reliable guide for developing strategies or for assigning operational tasks.
And, finally, we have seen an increasingly rigid classification of weapon systems according to either their strategic or tactical functions, thereby reducing the flexibility we need to attain a desired effect by the best available means. On this latter point, we should recognize that the improved performance and versatility of modern aerospace systems have made almost meaningless any attempt to classify them rigidly within strategic or tactical categories. As I emphasized before, the successful interchange of roles between heavy bombers and fighter-bombers in Southeast Asia indicates that the artificial distinctions between so-called strategic and tactical systems should gradually disappear. I think it helps to clear up this confusion if we think in terms of targets that are tactical or strategic, rather than categorizing the weapon systems which might be used to attack those targets.
In proposing solutions for these specific problems, we should continue to build toward a posture of operative deterrence that not only closes the gaps in our war-fighting capability but also opens up opportunities for restoring greater meaning to the strategic objective of deterring aggression at all levels. I believe that we can best avoid all-out nuclear war by demonstrating a clear ability to prevail throughout the intermediate as well as the extreme ranges of conflict.
A posture that would improve our capability for selective retaliation against limited nuclear attacks has been and will continue to be opposed by some, particularly by those whose strategic thinking is confined to traditional patterns. But I believe that the underlying concept of operative deterrence has certain requisite merits. For one, it is pertinent to actual requirements and provides guidance for the application of military force. It also comes to grips with the projected range of threats, and it establishes a workable pattern of response. What is more to the point, I am convinced that it does these things better than the alternatives.
To be sure, we must continue to maintain and improve our forces for assured destruction. It should be recognized, however, that the utility of our current ballistic missile force is essentially limited to the role of nuclear deterrence or employment at the highest levels of warfare. This is true in spite of projected improvements in both land- and sea-based ballistic missiles. We therefore should also insure that additions to our strategic force give us a clearly visible means for projecting usable power in the lower ranges of conflict. These are some of the reasons why I have consistently recommended the development of an Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA).
Moreover, I believe that the massive and sophisticated threat posed by the Soviet Union and by the growing capability of Communist China requires a wide range of closely related defense arrangements. In this regard, I maintain that the Air Force should continue to improve its active and passive defenses against bombers and standoff missiles and initiate active defensive measures against ICBM’S and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM’S).
To meet the bomber/standoff missile threat, we will require a balanced combination of systems, including an advanced interceptor and the Airborne Warning and Control System. These defenses should be closely tied in with the SAFEGUARD ABM program, which is designed to protect a portion of our Minuteman force, thereby helping to preserve the credibility of our deterrent.
In proceeding with SAFEGUARD, we should carry on the examination of additional concepts for missile defense. To me; the more promising outlook for the future is toward airborne systems that will be able to detect, track, intercept, and destroy hostile missiles during their boost or mid-course phases.
Despite the recent setback associated with the suspension of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program, the Air Force should advance in exploiting its opportunities for space defense and communications. In my opinion, a failure to do so would leave an operational gap that could be filled by our adversaries, with serious implications for our own national security.
In the category of tactical aircraft, the Air Force has compelling requirements for an advanced air-superiority fighter with unequaled performance for air-to-air combat and a specialized close-air-support aircraft to assist in fulfilling the Army’s future requirements for this kind of support. The two types of aircraft now under consideration, together with the programmed inventory of modern tactical fighters, will constitute a family of general-purpose weapon systems that will go a long way toward meeting what I believe are the priority tactical requirements for the future.
Of course, there are many other subjects and areas of Air Force interest that merit comment here, but there is one that I consider to be important above all others. I am referring to the human element as the most vital asset in our inventory of resources.
Since the beginning of my military career, I have witnessed the most dramatic changes in the quality of military personnel. No longer do we have squads of soldiers, sailors, and airmen manipulating machinery under the autocratic direction of bosses. We now have integrated teams of highly trained “warfare specialists” managed by highly qualified leaders. What has impressed me most about today’s military men and women is not only their unprecedented level of education and skill but also their fortitude and high standards of moral responsibility in an environment of severe challenge. I am certain that these characteristics have been the underlying reasons for the remarkable accomplishments of the Air Force in recent years.
The global and complex threats which this nation is facing call for a military establishment possessing the most advanced and sophisticated equipment that technology and industry can provide. But this equipment will be useless unless it is managed, operated, and maintained by a team of military professionals. It is this combination of superior equipment and people that now gives us an ability of sufficient scope, versatility, and quality to meet the demanding requirements of protecting the nation’s security.
Coming back to Pasteur’s observation that “a lot of reflection makes a believer,” I hope it is apparent from these reflections on my military career that I am a believer indeed. I believe in this country’s ideals, in our democratic form of government, in the vital mission of our military establishment, and, above all, in the ultimate success of this nation in leading the search for a peaceful and secure world.
Washington, D.C.
General John Paul McConnel (USMA) was Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, from 1 February 1965 until his retirement on 1 August 1969. After flying training in 1933, he served for a time as a fighter pilot; other early duty was in operational, engineering, and administrative assignments, including Assistant Executive to the Acting Chief, Army Air Forces; Chief of Staff, AAF Technical Training Command; and Deputy Chief of Staff, AAF Training Command. Assigned to the China-Burma-India Theater in 1943, he saw combat in Burma and held training, staff, and command positions in India, Ceylon, and China, where he was Senior Air Adviser to the Chinese Government, until 1947. Subsequent assignments have been in Air Force Headquarters as Chief, Reserve and National Guard Division, later of Civilian Components Group, DCS/O, to 1950; in England, where he commanded the Third Air Force and 7th Air Division, to 1953; in Hq Strategic Air Command as Director of Plans, to 1957; as Commander, Second Air Force, SAC, Barksdale AFB, to 1961; Vice Commander in Chief, SAC, to 1962; and Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, France, to August 1964, when he was appointed Vice Chief of Staff, USAF.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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