Air University Review, September-October 1969
Major General Courtney L. Faught
In the Military Airlift Command, “combat airlift” is defined as the employment of strategic airlift forces to fly fighting elements directly into a combat zone; airlanding or airdropping the troops and their equipment; and resupplying them through either direct, long-range air lines of communication (ALOC) or high-volume intertheater operations. The method of insertion into the objective area is a function of the mission that the airlifted forces are to carry out and of their capability.
MAC’S ability to carry out this combat air-lift mission gives our national planning and decision elements a rapid, responsive capability for direct delivery of CONUS-based battle-ready units to areas of conflict or threat anywhere on earth. On certain occasions in the past, rapid reaction to deteriorating situations (Lebanon and the Taiwan Strait, among others) has helped to limit and contain conflicts which, without the timely interposition of sufficient force, might have grown into uncontrollable threats to world peace.
The rapidity, as well as the size, of such responses will in the near future be greatly enhanced with MAC’S all-jet C-141/C-5 combat airlift force. Whereas it has previously been necessary to use intermediate staging bases to transfer combat forces from long-range propeller-driven aircraft to short-range tactical aircraft in order to execute the employment phase of the mission, the combination of the C-141 and C-5 will eliminate the necessity for that deployment/employment transfer.
The difference is perhaps best illustrated by a typical scenario from onload at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, to airlanding or airdrop in Southeast Asia.
With the C-124 type of force, 73 hours elapse between first takeoff at Pope and destination. The time is generated by the low speed of the aircraft, mid-Pacific routing to maximize the allowable cabin load (ACL), and a 12-hour ground time at Kadena to transfer to the theater’s C-l30 aircraft for the final (employment) segment of the mission.
With the C-141/C-5 force, the elapsed time is 27 hours from first takeoff at Pope to arrival of the formation over the objective area. This elapsed time includes two-hour ground time at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, and four hours at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa. The four hours at Kadena are required to enable the force to “close in” and then take off with a 30-second formation interval for a 10-second in-trail separation to the objective area. The 46-hour saving not only is significant as a matter of accelerated responsiveness, which could in itself spell the difference between success and failure, but is magnified many times over when the situation calls for recycling the airlift force for massive delivery within a short time period. And of course planning factors are greatly simplified by the elimination of transloading, and potential confusion is correspondingly reduced. Comparable savings of time and complication apply, of course, to any other area of the globe.
staff reorganization for responsiveness
This very fundamental difference between the old C- 124 type of capability and the combat airlift potential of the C-141/C-5 force has necessitated a great deal of change within MAC. The command is now in the process of reorganizing its staff structure from the headquarters down to the airlift wings, so as to carry out its combat mission more effectively. New combat tactics and techniques staffs are responsible for the support and planning functions that were previously divided among diverse staff agencies in the various headquarters. Complete and responsive staff support is now provided for all the tactics and techniques required for training and deploying the MAC airlift forces. The planning functions of these new staff agencies include the employment portion of operations plans, operations orders, and frag orders.
aircrew training
Combat airlift/airdrop training is required of all MAC C-141 aircrews, and the entire C-141 aircraft force possesses the airdrop mission capability. The crews accomplish aerial delivery training in their local areas, using drop zones (DZ) selected to meet all criteria for a safe training environment.
A training mission begins when the crews arrive for the mission briefing, which includes a description of the operation, navigation information, weather, communications, and the other details necessary for successful performance. Specialist and serial lead briefings are also held if the nature or complexity of the training operation so dictates. The aircraft commander or his representative conducts a troop briefing at planeside. Specific times are determined for each portion of the mission, from start engines to taxi, takeoff, on-course departure, time over target, and landing. The flight portion of the mission includes the maneuvers of formation takeoff and assembly, IFR and VFR climb-out, weather penetration, orbits, descent into the objective area, low-level enroute navigation, two types of slowdown procedures and, finally, the airdrop.
The tactical airdrop formation of the present era is an in-trail aircraft formation with 2200 feet between element aircraft (three aircraft to an element) and a two-mile separation between element leaders. All aircraft maintain the same altitude, with the element wingmen establishing wingtip clearance to the left and right, respectively, to avoid jet wash and wingtip vortices. A slowdown to drop airspeed (130 knots) is established one to three minutes prior to arrival over the DZ. TheVFR in-trail formation is normally used for entry and exit of the objective area at minimum altitude and high speed. Drop altitudes for training are l000 feet for personnel and between 700 and 1100 fees for equipment. Equipment drop altitude varies with the type of parachute and whether parachutes are used singly or in clusters. For Wartime airdrop of Personnel, the altitude can go as low as 600 feet, according to the decision of the troop force commander. The equipment drop altitude, however, will be the same in war as in training, since it is realistically based upon the altitude at which the recovery parachute load system can be expected to function reliably.
The question has arisen as to why we do not use the World War II airdrop formation, with its nose-to-tail and wingtip-to-wingtip clearance. The answer goes back to 1963 and the Tactical Air Command’s Project Close Look, which evaluated new equipment and tactics for improvement of aerial delivery modes. Among the conclusions was a recommendation that the high-speed, low-level, in-trail formation be adopted in place of the V formation, for the following reasons:
a. Enroute and DZ weather minimums could be lowered.
b. The formation is more maneuverable, permitting maximum evasive action and consequent reduction of vulnerability.
c. As the number of aircraft increased beyond 27, less time would be required for delivery on the DZ by the in-trail than by the V formation.
d. Training requirements for initial pilot checkout would be reduced, resulting in better economy of operation.
The new procedures, together with other possibilities, were thoroughly field-tested in 1966 in a large-scale maneuver, Exercise Rapid Strike II. Out of this three-week operation, which included the airdrop of 9075 personnel, 282 vehicles, and 67 tons of other equipment, came the jointly agreed position that the in-trail formation be adopted as the standard technique.
MAC is now developing an additional formation procedure growing out of low-level airdrop experience in Vietnam. With complete control of the air in that conflict, it is tactically more sound for the airlift force to approach the DZ above 5000 feet, descend in-trail to arrive at the DZ airdrop altitude and airspeed, accomplish the drop, and then begin climb and increase airspeed in order to get out of range of any small-arms fire as rapidly as possible. This specialized technique, of course, will be applicable only to a situation like that in Vietnam, lacking counterair.
The MAC airdrop training program is presently being strengthened through use of Strategic Air Command’s radar bomb scoring (RBS) sites. Runs are made by C-141 aircraft against the RBS site at the culmination of a low-level navigation route. The aircraft is scored according to its actual air position in relation to the desired computed air release point (CARP) position. After departing the RBS site, the crew makes a run on a local DZ. The combination of the RBS run and a standard airdrop provides varied and realistic training for all crew positions.
In addition, MAC conducts large-scale (36 C-141s) airdrop training exercises, with aircraft and crews from every C-141 airlift wing. These COLD MASS operations provide aircrew, staff, and command/control training in large-scale formation techniques and procedures, as well as a practical basis for their refinement.
The Military Airlift Command also sponsors an intracommand combat airlift competition that brings together the finest airdrop crews from each wing in a contest to determine the best crew and wing in MAC. The competition fosters the objective of all-around improvement in the command’s aerial delivery competence.
mission support
The entire training program requires a great deal of specialized support from other wing sections. The aerial delivery section of the MAC Aerial Port Squadron is a case in point; its day-to-day mission is to provide cargo parachute packing, airdrop load buildup, aircraft loading, and DZ load and parachute recovery services. This type of unit is manned by airfreight personnel and aircrew loadmasters who specialize in aerial delivery operations. One of their typical functions is the packing of 64- and 100-foot-diameter cargo parachutes, by means of which 4000-pound supply loads, jeeps, and other Army vehicle and equipment items are delivered.
Another essential support section of the Aerial Port Squadron is the Combat Control Team (CCT). The CCT is manned by Air Force jumpers whose war mission is to parachute into the objective area to mark the drop zones and provide communications and air traffic control at the airhead in an airborne operation. The unit also provides landing, taxi, and takeoff instructions during an airlanding operation when normal air traffic control services have not previously been established. The CCT is equipped with portable UHF, VHF, FM, and HF radios, visual marking equipment, radar beacons, and the weapons and field gear necessary to support deployed combat operations. During local aircrew training, the CCT mans the DZ and furnishes jumpers to satisfy wing aircrew training requirements for dropping personnel.
For deployment missions at locations where MAC does not have established operations, a special organization known as an Airlift Control Element (ALCE) is used for command and control of the mission. Within the ALCE is a nucleus of personnel who are specialists in the operation of deployed missions; they are supplemented by other wing personnel resources as required by the scope of the particular task to be accomplished. In addition to the control function, the ALCE furnishes operations, materiel, aerial port, and support resources at the deployed location.
exercises
The MAC airlift force is tested for capability as realistically as possible during large-scale joint training exercises, deployments, and maneuvers. The MAC contribution to these missions is broadly variable: it ranges from deployment to a theater staging base; through participation in the employment phase by airdrop of personnel alone, or equipment only, or personnel and equipment in combination; or by airlanding only; to any combination of these various levels of participation. In many of these varied airlift tasks, MAC joins with the Tactical Air Command (TAC) and theater airlift forces.
Some typical missions of the above categories include the airlift of the 101st Airborne Division (—) to Vietnam in December 1967; the 10,000-man Army/Marine reinforcement of our Southeast Asia forces in February 1968; the airdrop of 2000 U.S. and Greek paratroopers with equipment 20 miles from the Bulgarian border in August 1968; a large airdrop in east central Spain during December 1968; the airdrop of 82d Airborne Division elements on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico, in January 1969; and the deployment and redeployment of the 24th Infantry Division (—) from Fort Riley, Kansas, to Nürnberg, Germany, in February-March 1969.
The MAC force is also tested for mission capability through the medium of the wing Operational Readiness Inspection Test (ORIT), which commences with the no-notice arrival of an inspection team from MAC headquarters. In the course of the ORIT the wing is evaluated on its performance and reaction in all aspects of wartime, contingency, and disaster conditions.
One part of the response is a six-aircraft day/night mission with a personnel/heavy equipment airdrop. The mission imposes precise requirements as to takeoff time and time over target, and the air-delivered loads of personnel and equipment must impact on the DZ within 300 yards of a predetermined point.
affiliation program
Combat airlift training within MAC is supplemented by an active wing/division affiliation program. This program establishes liaison between specific MAC wings and identified Army, Marine, and Tactical Air Command units. The activities of the program are directed toward the ultimate goal of faster reaction to contingency requirements. Individual MAC airlift wings are associated with from four to nine units of the other services, ranging in size from a brigade to a division. The unit staffs maintain a close working relationship, with cognizance by each of the other’s mission, capabilities, and requirements. The planners of both the MAC units and the supported units have developed a deeper awareness and understanding of airlift planning requirements under various conditions of deployment. This close and informal working liaison at all levels ensures more effective response during deployment outloading as a result of unified team effort; such teamwork is facilitated because the people involved have labored together during both training exercises and actual contingency conditions.
The affiliation training program is strengthened by classroom instruction in load documentation, preparation of equipment for air shipment, aircraft capabilities and limitations, load planning, tie-down, and loading procedures. The instruction is provided by MAC aerial port loadmasters to the personnel of the user units. Classroom training is followed by four to eight hours of actual aircraft loading practice, with various aircraft configurations and loads.
Beyond that, affiliated troop units have been furnished construction drawings for a universal loading simulator (ULS) designed for local fabrication. The simulator can be quickly modified to provide load training for the C-5, C-141, C-133, and C-130 aircraft. Through use of the ULS, training costs for both MAC and the user are significantly reduced, eliminating some of the static load requirements for use of actual airframes.
To round out the affiliation arrangement, the wing and unit staffs periodically review airlift requirements, prepare load plans, and develop onload airfield marshaling procedures—all aimed at optimizing effective utilization of the combat airlift force and ensuring a smooth, integrated flow of troops and equipment. They also survey adjacent airfields for equipment and facility capability, as well as availability for support of future deployment operations. These surveys enable MAC to determine the number of ALCE personnel and the equipment necessary to support operations from such locations.
The payoff of all these joint affiliation activities is a responsive effort that has materially reduced the time required to plan and load forces for whatever emergency or contingency may arise.
The combat airlift task of the Military Airlift Command has been shown to include a full range of command and joint programs to support and increase mission effectiveness and efficiency. These programs include: responsive staff organization; a continuous and comprehensive aircrew training regimen; necessary mission unit support arrangements; a vigorous wing/division affiliation program; and an active exercise schedule to ensure current and proved performance capability along the entire spectrum of the Military Airlift Command combat airlift mission.
Hq Military Airlift Command
Major General Courtney L. Faught is Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Hq Military Airlift Command. Commissioned from flying training in 1942, he served in the Southwest Pacific Theater as a flight leader, executive officer, and commander. Post-war assignments have been in combat crew and troop carrier training and operations, 1945-46; Professor of Air Science and Tactics, Ohio University, 1947-49; Commander 8th and 7th Troop Carrier Squadrons, 1950-52; Commander, 6th Troop Carrier Squadron, Japan, 1953; Director of Operations, 315th Air Division, FEAF, to 1956; and since 1957 in Military Airlift Command in staff or command positions, except in 1960-65 at Hq USAF in DCS/O or P&O for tactical and transport forces and JCS matters. General Faught is a graduate of Air Command and Staff School and National War College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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