Air University Review, November-December 1969

An Examination of The "Military Mind"

Colonel Thomas A. Fleek

In this period following World War II, and particularly in the recent years characterized by a preoccupation with cost effectiveness and management analysis techniques in defense policy formulation, there has been an interesting by-product of our military evolutionary process. This has been the seeming establishment of a widespread belief that there is a particular type of mentality called the "military mind" and that it has some inherently undesirable characteristics.

Precisely what these characteristics are supposed to be, and how they originated, are questions that could stand a more detailed examination. Dispassionate evaluation, if possible, is always preferable to semantic reaction. During the past few years, the services have been obviously concerned with broadening and improving both the capabilities and the image of the military mind. If there has been little headway, particularly from the standpoint of prestige accorded military expertise, it would be well to find out why.

One obvious analytic problem that should make us suspicious of the validity of any general label lies in the complexity of the subject. The history of attempts at character and intellectual assessment is a long one, and the various methods that have been undertaken at one time or another illustrate the difficulties and uncertainties of the task. Psychological tests, intelligence tests, personality inventory tests, psychiatry, palmistry, phrenology, handwriting analysis, astrology—almost every possible measurement technique has been tried in one field or another. Yet it is unlikely that any of them or all in concert have ever enabled anyone to define and analyze exactly the mental makeup of a human being, let alone identify a precise, mass mental orientation that can supposedly result in rigid intellectual or emotional uniformity.

But imprecise as these means of measurement may be, even phrenology might be preferable to what seems so far to have been the analytic method. It has apparently been assumed that the nature of the military mentality is adequately revealed by spoken and written expressions of military thought and by various public actions and pronouncements of those who either are or have been prominent in military affairs. Not only are such sources of data limited to begin with but they also give no assurance that those who have gained most public attention by their speaking and writing on military affairs have been the most able and intellectual.

As for the nature and amount of written matter available for analysis, journalist and military historian Walter Millis, as editor of American Military Thought,¹ highlights the inadequacy of this means. He points out that American military men, until quite recently, have not been given to philosophical reflection on their profession; that we have produced no Clausewitzes and not many who could rank with leading European theorists. American military literature has tended to concentrate on either military history or techniques, usually on controversial operational matters—weapons, tactics, organization, employment of forces, and so forth. He finds that expressions of the ideas of professional soldiers alone are too few and too limited to provide any representative coverage of the broad field of "American military thought."

His conclusions can easily be substantiated by even a cursory review of the many books on military on military strategy and policy that have been written during the past two decades. Most of the authors have been civilians. A good example is Morton H. Halperin’s recent work, Contemporary Military Strategy.² In his acknowledgment of his great debt to his "fellow strategists" and his listing of the most important works from which he has drawn, there is a virtual absence of any military authors.

At this point, then, one early conclusion might be that if there is indeed a military mentality it is not exclusively an attribute of the military man himself. However, if we are to avoid the same hasty identification pitfalls into which others have tumbled, it is apparent that a more searching look into what might constitute the military mind is obviously required.

One of the most thorough reviews of military authority, influence, and ideology in our society is that by Professor Samuel P. Huntington in his book The Soldier and the State.³ He has specifically identified and analyzed a particular intellectual orientation which he has labeled "the military mind."⁴

This orientation he describes as essentially an intellectual and professional one. He asserts that the military officer career is rightfully classed as a profession, since it definitely meets the principal criteria of professionalism, and that the central skill involved is what he calls "the management of violence." One may perhaps argue the use of this particular phrase, but it seems admissible if we agree that the application of military force, in any context and manner, does represent a form of controlled "violence."

He believes that this particular skill, if properly developed, is a highly intellectualized one. It requires a strong sense of social obligation; a general and broad educational background that permits a deep understanding of human attitudes, motivations, and behavior; a high order of expertise; and a strong professional motivation.⁵

As for the resultant mind which this profession develops (or perhaps requires—the chicken/egg analogy seems to apply), Huntington attributes the development of a professional military ethic to the period between the Civil War and World War I: an ethic which views war as a science—a separate field of study. Its philosophy is essentially conservative and it is characterized by a strong feeling of corporativism, the sense of belonging to a special group. His general assessment indicates that he considers  it not so much anti-intellectual anti-idealist: marked by an innate pessimism, where human behavior is concerned, and having little faith in the inevitability of peaceful progress. Its highest values he describes as "subordination, loyalty, duty, hierarchy, discipline and obedience."

To digress a moment in this last regard, if one accepts these values as correct—and it is indeed unlikely that a military man will find much about them to quarrel with—there may lie one possible source of civilian mistrust of the military mind. As Professor Huntington points out, several of these values are directly opposed to the traditional American virtues of self-reliance, initiative, self-determination, and the exercise of individuality.

At the same time, Professor Huntington may have identified a source of military self-contradiction. An adherence to such traditional military values, especially in their most simplified and basic context, can conflict with the broad, intellectual view of what constitutes "professionalism." The principles of "subordination,. . . . discipline and obedience" are, in effect, constraints, developed through conditioning, to ensure the smoothness and continuity of functioning of the many component parts of a single complex operation or entity. Where the individual exercise of technological skill or general functional competence is concerned, however, a strict insistence on such constraints and limitations may well have derogatory results. Not only can it inhibit creative thinking and effective operation; when the result is arbitrary decision-making, it can give rise to serious omission or error.

Thus it is that emphasis on the need for broad general and professional education, and the recognized need for technical competence, at least in the advisory stages of the decision-making process, actually tend to develop an opposition to rigidly authoritarian systems and hierarchic structures.  In the drive for improved educational opportunities, more highly specialized technical skills, and broadened professional education in the service schools, it is likely that there have been set in motion powerful and far-reaching influences that will ultimately affect not only the roles and duties of officers but perhaps the military structure.

It should be recognized that this emphasis on the higher education of officer personnel has resulted from service recognition of the requirement. It is not something that is particularly new or that was recently forced on the services by civilian criticism of former viewpoints and capabilities. For example, it has been more than ten years since Professors Masland and Radway made a comprehensive review of military education and its relation to national policy-making, and their conclusions at that time were:

The record of accomplishments of professional military education . . . is a record of which the armed forces justly may be proud; it is far better than many civilian educators and laymen realize.⁶

And:

We conclude that military education does make a very substantial contribution to the preparation of officers for policy roles. Within a matter of a few years, it is likely that officers assigned to these positions will have had significantly more formal educational preparation than comparable civilian officials.⁷

It should be noted that those "few years" have now transpired, that many of the educational shortcomings which Professors Masland and Radway pointed out have since been corrected, and there has been even more emphasis on both professional and general education. At the same time, another of their predictions has been borne out:

. . . . military officers will continue to participate in the formulation and execution of the most diverse national security policies and programs until national security itself ceases to be a paramount concern of American policy.⁸

In reviewing military efforts to prepare officers to better meet their new and complex responsibilities, Professors Masland and Radway also analyzed what they considered the primary requirements of military professionalism:

· First, military competence, because this, after all, constitutes the military man’s special expertise.

· General executive ability—skill in leadership, the ability to evaluate information quickly and accurately, to establish harmonious working relationships, to communicate effectively.

· The ability to grasp complicated situations, to see the "big picture," to adapt creatively to changing situations.

· A lack of parochialism and a strong sense of job motivation.

It is apparent that there is military agreement with this analysis of requirements, since many of them bear a marked resemblance to the rating factors listed on present Officer Effectiveness Reports. This cannot, however, be taken as proof that the selection process is bringing the military manager ever closer to some goal of ultimate perfection, since admittedly the effectiveness of the system is still limited by traditional hierarchical considerations. For example, a senior officer who has spent a career at base level, absorbed in a variety of daily operational details and preferring this type of duty, may well be rated as highly in all respects as another who has spent much of his career in high-level policy-making areas and activities. Equal rank supposedly makes them equally capable as "general managers." Yet there may well be a world of difference in their viewpoints and intellectual capabilities.

Considering now all the foregoing traits, characteristics, and requirements, we should be able to go back and begin sketching in what we have so far developed as the characteristics of at least a theoretical model of the military mind. It must be emphasized that we do not do so in the sense of making any value judgments. Whether these characteristics are good or bad, desirable or undesirable, and whether and how much they are influenced by basic intelligence differences—these are not the main issues. We are discussing a theoretical model. Our main concerns should be whether or not such a model reflects the characteristics required for the proper exercise of the profession and whether it recognizes and provides for necessary development and adaptation. This last consideration appears to be particularly important, for as a former Commandant of the Air War College pointed out:

The military profession, like our whole civilization, is being carried along by the galloping advance of science. The consequence must be a fundamental change in our thinking habits.⁹

In summary, then, these appear to be the main characteristics of our theoretical model of a military mind:

First—and properly—there is a high concern with professionalism. But despite constant reiteration that military men must become better fitted to participate in high-level policymaking, the interpretation of "professional" still tends to be a limited one. It is likely to be equated with technological skill—with functional competence. This emphasis on the unique and complex nature of special military skills may be a compensatory device, resulting from an apparent neglect of the military man and a corresponding reliance on the civilian expert as a source of more high-level military expertise.

Perhaps as a result of this interpretation, there is a preoccupation with operational matters, to the exclusion of any significant amount of theoretical or philosophical reflection on the science of warfare as a whole. This tendency is self-reinforcing, for it in turn fosters parochialism and encourages arbitrary delineation of roles and missions—factors which, in themselves, tend to limit any analytical or theoretical exploration.

An "inward-oriented" tendency is further encouraged, if not forced, by hierarchial and corporate considerations and constraints. These include the equating of rank with authority and decision-making responsibility, the inherent orthodoxy that characterizes any corporate establishment, and the essentially conservative, rational, and realistic view of human nature and human affairs that is necessitated by the nature of military functions and responsibilities.

There is a growing realization of the need for greater adaptability, for adjustment to change, despite a consequent weakening of traditional military methods and systems. At the same time, the organization, structure, limits of authority, and functions of the military establishment are primarily civilian-determined and -directed. Thus the limited military capability to influence change, despite a recognition of the need for it, can be a real source of frustration.

There is a firm acceptance of the principle of dedication to public service, a perhaps oversimplified but idealistic view of the traditional "soldierly" virtues, and a pessimism and mistrust concerning the more complex liberal-intellectual values. Also, there exists a source of inner conflict in the realization that true professionalism, at the high "generalist" level of management, requires a more liberal-intellectual orientation, a broad, thorough general and professional educational background covering modern management techniques, national security planning and policy-making, and the general conduct of national affairs.

Hence, the theoretical military mind, if there is such a thing, is certainly not a mentality for which one should be apologetic, but at the same time it must be subject to a high degree of frustration. There are powerful conflicting drives, conflicting forces, presently at work within the military establishment itself, as well as within the individual. Faced with what is apparently a pressing need for profound and far-reaching changes, whose exact nature and requirements are ill-defined at best, the military man finds many new concepts at odds with the traditional view of the military role, responsibilities, and organization. At the same time, even as he is assured of the importance of his counsel in the conduct of national affairs, the apparent supremacy of civilian thought and expertise in his own field—the broad area of military strategic and conceptual planning—has further downgraded his intellectual image and self-esteem. As a result and in self-defense, he has tended to equate military professionalism with the performance of those special military skills in which he can claim unquestioned supremacy. He has, in effect, resigned himself to the role of operator and tactician, rather than strategist and theorist.

Whether this trend will, in time, be reversed, or even whether it should be, are not matters-with which I intend to concern myself at the moment. It does appear, however, that attempts to raise the general educational level, to prepare military personnel for broad planning and policy roles, and to elevate military expertise to a recognized high level of importance are being frustrated by many of those same constraints and limitations that I have described as affecting the individual himself.

It also appears that if we are to realize the full potential of the mind of the military professional and make the best use of its inherent virtues and specialized capabilities we must resolve the present main sources of frustration and restraint. How this can best be done is a complex question.

If the military profession is indeed a science, then it is probably subject to the same developmental processes as other sciences. It has been said that we cannot plot the course of scientific advancement in any field as a smooth, steadily rising curve; that instead, sudden, marked advancement is experienced only under conditions of "creative anarchy."¹⁰ If such is indeed the case, and it appears to be, then the great question facing the military establishment today may well be how much creative anarchy can be permitted and how can it be encouraged and still limited?

It is a question well worth pondering.

1.  Walter Millis, ed., American Military Thought, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966).

2.  Morton H. Halperin, Contemporary Military Strategy (Boston: Little. Brown & Co., 1967).

3.  Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

4.  Ibid., p.258.

5.  Ibid., pp. 11-l8.

6.  John W. Masland and Laurence I. Railway, Soldiers and Scholars—Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 502.

7.  Ibid., p.503.

8.  Ibid., p.25.

9.  Major General Arno H. Luehman, "The Changing Role of the Military Professional," address delivered 12 August 1965 to the Air War College class.

10. See Arthur Koestler’s The Act of Creation, specifically Chapter X, "The Evolution of Ideas" (New York: Macmillan, 1966).

Colonel Thomas A. Fleek (M.I.A., George Washington University) is Director, Security Police, Hq PACAF. After bombardier instructor training at Lowery Field, 1941, he served as an instructor and during World War II was assigned to the 346th Bombardment Group in the Pacific. On inactive status he worked with the AEC Security Service at Los Alamos, New Mexico. Assignments after being recalled in 1951 include Chief, Management Section, Office of the Provost Marshal, Hq USAF; Director of Security. Air Force Flight Test Center, Director of Security and Law Enforcement, Hq Fifth Air Force; and Chief, Special Projects, and Deputy Chief, Resources Management Division Directorate of Security Police, Hq USAF. Colonel Fleek has attended the Armed Forces Staff College and Air War College.