Air University Review, May-June 1969

The Military Commander and 
Maintenance Management Responsibilities

Lieutenant Colonel William J. Dess
Major Robert W. Kunstel

The military commander’s occupation is unique in that he must be a commander as well as a manager. He has total responsibility for his personnel, their performance on the military job, and their conduct and performance standards in both the military and civilian society. A commander may at times be required to exact performance that a manager need never anticipate: performance demanding an individual’s life. 

Agreement can be readily achieved concerning the many responsibilities of command, but it is usually difficult for the commander to identify and define his maintenance management responsibilities. To help the commander, the authors propose that the means of solving these difficulties can be obtained by a systematic approach to answering the question, “What do I need to know?”

This question is the basic maintenance management problem of the commander. He usually puts it to his maintenance manager (or maintenance analyst) and either receives a response limited to the latter’s concept of command or is asked in return, “What do you want to know?” The resultant impasse creates confusion, doubt, and poorly defined requirements. An impasse need not exist, however, because the commander can determine the answer to his question—“What do I need to know?”—by using a systems approach to maintenance management. By using this approach he recognizes that maintenance as a system is a “complex of elements standing in interaction.” l This concept recognizes that management must not attempt to set formulas for treating each item of the host of elements making up the maintenance complex but must first determine what the system is and what part each element plays in that system. The concept also recognizes that the interaction of the elements is dynamic and that the movement and change of this interaction constitute a problem not solved with fixed formulas or fixed responses. The systems approach thus identifies the “big picture” in maintenance management and then breaks down each part of the system into logical, interrelated components. This permits treating each bit, part, echelon, or structure with appropriate attention and concern. As a result, the commander will be in a position to determine and decide what his own requirements are and what he needs to know. He can make these decisions without rushing up blind alleys or giving inordinate time and energy to minor irritants—the actions indicative of one dealing with symptoms rather than problems.

A “big picture” or systematic review of maintenance management must begin with the identification of a maintenance program and objectives at the highest or Department of Defense level. This will serve as a guide for determination of the commander’s position in the maintenance program, and the commander can identify his own objectives within the overall DOD objectives. He can thus also accomplish a basic management requirement: the establishment of objectives. The establishment of objectives will enable the commander to delimit his basic question to “What do I need to know to meet these objectives?” The knowledge of the overall maintenance management program will also establish the basis for the commander’s evaluation of his own maintenance accomplishments.

The DOD maintenance program, which has been developed and the revisions projected, covers a broad range of requirements aimed at insuring effective maintenance management and provides the means for improved efficiency in that management. The program is expressed in statements of concept, DOD directives and instructions, and many separate papers; but for this article all the published material can be reviewed and summarized in three statements of basic policy:

· Military hardware is the source of maintenance requirements and the sole basis for the establishment and retention of a maintenance capability. The output product of maintenance is mission-ready end-item equipments (weapons/support systems). Maintenance management objectives and emphasis must therefore be oriented toward end items or systems as contrasted with homogeneous commodity groupings of hardware associated with many end item equipments, or purely an organizational or functional approach. 2

This statement emphasizes that military hardware establishes the need for and justifies the maintenance function. Because the hardware is of paramount importance, the attitude toward maintenance and maintenance management must be one that makes decisions to support the hardware required for mission accomplishment. Personnel must be provided in numbers and skills to meet the hardware requirements, not to supplement ground-keeping chores or conform to a fixed ratio of X number of 7 levels to Y number of 5 levels, or to “Do it the way we did with B-17s.” The management organization and levels of authority must be those which will provide for the designed performance of the hardware. Maintenance organizations, policies, and procedures must be structured to support the mission effectiveness and insure effective and efficient use of resources.

· Meaningful system management requires knowledge of total maintenance demand and resources applied since there is a continual shifting of demand and effort between the various levels of maintenance support. 3

This is a corollary of the first statement of policy. When military hardware is considered in the end items/systems concept, there is an obligation to develop a maintenance management system that provides complete and current experience information on the systems hardware, and there must be a continuous interchange or flow of information through and between all levels of maintenance. Obviously if at an organizational level a capability is gained or lost, there is a reaction upon the next level (field or intermediate) and the third or depot level. Consider the impact if, within a system, a component was designed for complete maintenance at the user or organization level, and then the organizational commander decides to ship to the depot a large accumulation of the items requiring maintenance. Where would the manpower, supplies, tools, fixtures, etc., come from to meet this demand? The depot would have—theoretically, at least—scheduled all of these resources for other work. Disruption also occurs if work was to be done at depot level and the lower-level command or maintenance unit arbitrarily determines that it will do the required repair.

Managers or commanders at any level must know that decisions involving maintenance cannot be accomplished at anyone level in isolation. The dynamic forces must be recognized; and at the very minimum, when action is contemplated concerning the maintenance management of a part of a weapon system or a part of the maintenance management system, the commander should ask for information relative to the impact of his decisions on the total system.

· In the final analysis, maintenance effectiveness and efficiency must be adjudged on the basis of ability to sustain established end items or weapons/support systems “equipment readiness” goals at the least cost. 4

Maintenance management may be inspected for its clean shops and its ability to plan and schedule and to fully employ assigned personnel. However, the ultimate question, which—paradoxical as it may seem should be the first question, is: “Does maintenance produce the standard of equipment readiness that meets programmed operational requirements?” Regardless of the many yardsticks available, the final evaluation as to whether or not maintenance is effective will depend upon the answer to that question.

The DOD program has thus established the logic sequence that military hardware determines the basis for maintenance, that maintenance management must manage on a weapon/ support system concept, and that the prime evaluation of maintenance is based on its ability to provide mission-ready systems. Once effectiveness has been determined, the cost of the resources expended to accomplish the attained state of readiness must be determined. Thus, maintenance efficiency can be expressed in terms of cost per hour of operation of the weapon/support system, or cost per hour of availability, or cost per hour of readiness, compared to acceptable cost standards for the condition, use, or availability. Briefly, first be effective, and then determine the efficiency or cost of being effective.

maintenance management information needs

The sequence of management logic now leads to the inescapable requirement for information by which the effectiveness and efficiency of maintenance can be measured. The DoD maintenance program identifies the basic information needs for maintenance management as: (1) Equipment Inventory and Readiness Data, (2) Maintenance Performance and Management Data, (3) Maintenance Cost Information, and (4) the Depot Maintenance Program and Production Data.

It is within these information systems that the commanders and maintenance managers have the data to answer questions and provide the information base for decisions. It is also unhappily true that the available data have many times developed into a mass of material whose sheer volume and ways of presentation tend to overwhelm the individuals concerned or to confuse or hide real issues.

This problem of “mass” information is a major one that the commander and his maintenance managers must solve. They cannot at all times use all the information, and in some cases they need only occasional reference to some of the data. Of the four information systems listed, for example, the tactical Commander may have very rare Occasion to delve into the Depot Maintenance Program and Production Data. He should know, however, that all these systems will at one time or another have an impact upon him and his mission. It is in recognition of this problem of selecting the data to answer “What do I need to know?” that these information systems are reviewed. A systems or logic approach can show the relations of the systems to each other and to the commander, which is better than attempting to “put out fires.”

maintenance performance and management data

The commander of an aircraft unit should have knowledge of the technical (performance) and production aspects of the equipment given to him to perform his mission. The maintenance data collection (MDC) system (AFM 66-1, Chapter 9), originating at base level and flowing through all levels of command, provides these answers, and a review of the highlights is necessary to answer our question, “What do I need to know?” A lengthy discussion of who does what is not necessary, but the significant features of the system can be presented. Figure 1 illustrates an analysis pattern of how a commander may use maintenance data.

Maintenance data, recorded by the mechanic, provide the commander with the man-hours spent in production to support a flying-hour program, the causes for that maintenance effort, and what equipment or part caused the expenditure. The data also identify the malfunction, when maintenance need was discovered and by whom, parts used, and maintenance actions that occurred.

The maintenance data system, by showing how many maintenance hours were expended for a type of equipment, pinpoints how these hours were spent (Item B, Figure I). Maintenance falls into two broad categories: scheduled—those scheduled maintenance inspections as specified in the inspection manual applicable to the equipment (Item D, Figure I); and unscheduled—all work accomplished on equipment or components except scheduled maintenance, servicing, cleaning, and movement5 (Item C, Figure I). The relationship of these man-hours indicates the effectiveness of workload planning and surveillance by the maintenance personnel over their troublesome systems or subsystems. There will always be unscheduled maintenance because things will break or wear out. However, the relationship of scheduled to unscheduled maintenance for the type of equipment should be established.

Figure 1. A logic path for using maintenance data
Figure 1. A logic path for using maintenance data

Generally, a ratio of more than 50 percent unscheduled to scheduled maintenance may be a problem, caused by ineffective periodic or phase inspection, training problems, improper workload schedule, or failure to recognize significant nonmaintenance factors such as inadequate design criteria or operational abuse of equipment. 6 As a minimum effort, the commander should investigate increasing ratio trends in this area as a means of anticipating or avoiding problems.

Within the category of unscheduled maintenance, it should be determined which equipment systems or components are problems (Item E, Figure 1). The analysis section in the maintenance organization can identify the systems or components causing problems. Analysis can depict high consumption of man-hours, frequency of malfunction, and when the malfunctions causing aborts or removal from operationally ready status can seriously affect mission capability.

When a problem system is identified, the commander should know what the maintenance managers are doing to solve it and whether the problem is local or Air Force-wide. The major command and the Air Force Logistics Command System Managers (SM) or Item Managers (IM) can help in this regard. From the data created at base level and forwarded to AFLC, a series of monthly reports known as the K-260 series is provided the SM/IM and major commands on all end items of equipment. Local commanders have to ask the questions, but the AFLC data bank provides data in depth that should answer any question asked. If there is a Weapon System Liaison Officer (WSLO) on base, he should get the answer. His job is to help, as an extension of the Air Materiel Area (AMA) responsible for logistics support of the type equipment at the facility.

Another assistance for answering problems is the AFLC GO 26 Report (Materiel Improvement Project Index and Status Report). This report is provided by the AFLC System Managers to all major commands and directly to some bases upon command approval. Problem systems that have been identified and analyzed anywhere in the Air Force are listed in this report. Action agencies for correction of problems, target dates, and other information are spelled out. If any base maintenance personnel have initiated an Emergency Unsatisfactory Report (EUR) and a project has been established to correct the deficiency, it will also be contained in the GO 26 report. Knowledge and use of this report can save a local commander a great deal of time and trouble, for a problem new and perhaps considered unique by him may already have been identified elsewhere and a solution determined. 

Another major concern of the commander involves expenditure of maintenance man-hours on malfunctions which are finally classified as “No defect” (Item G, Figure 1). The importance here is the expenditure of resources for no apparent need. This problem occurs with both the equipment/systems and the supporting shops maintenance. It could be an operator problem, caused by his lack of understanding of the system, or it could be a maintenance problem.

Thus far we have traced a logic path (Figure 1) from flying-hour program evaluation to maintenance man-hours expended, whether for scheduled maintenance or unscheduled maintenance, and then to determination of validity of reported defects in a component or part.

The next item to consider is the repair of the “broken” item. The commander should know whether items are repaired or not repaired and, if not repaired, the reason. This information is the essence of the status of a unit’s “self-sufficiency program.” The impact here is the question of utilization of available resources in relation to what an organization is authorized to repair, what the rationale is, and what actions the Repair Capability Evaluation Section7 has taken on items that should be repaired by the organization. Base maintenance data provide the identity and quantity of items repaired and those condemned or shipped off base in the category of “Not Reparable This Station (NRTS).” Items shipped NRTS are also grouped into numbered categories or reasons for the NRTS action: i.e., “Repair Not Authorized,” “Lack of Equipment, Tools, Facilities,” “Lack of Skills,” “Lack of Parts,” etc. Specific attention should be given to what maintenance has done about “Lack of Skills,” “Shop Backlog,” “Excess Requirements,” and “Condemned.” Corrective action needed is then more readily apparent and local control more likely.

A commander can examine maintenance management actions relative to NRTS for a training program, proper shop scheduling techniques, whether or not equipment requirements are monitored, and whether or not proper condemnation procedures are in effect locally. The commander can expect more difficulty in eliminating problems with NRTS coded as “Repair Not Authorized,” “Lack of Equipment,” “Lack of Parts,” and “Lack of Technical Data.”

equipment inventory and readiness information

It was previously stated that in the final analysis, maintenance effectiveness and efficiency must be judged on the basis of ability to sustain equipment readiness goals at the least cost. In dealing with equipment readiness, the commander has the opportunity to establish objectives and develop a system of information to observe the effectiveness of the materiel maintenance function. What he needs to know about equipment readiness can be obtained by using a logic path or diagram such as was used to evaluate maintenance production. See Figure 2.

Figure 2. A logic path for using equipment-readiness data
Figure 2. A logic path for using equipment-readiness data

The readiness system has had a great deal of ground work already accomplished for the commander. Equipment readiness goals have been established for many items of equipment.  For example, the readiness goal for aircraft is 71 percent of the number possessed. (AFM 65-110) The local achieved readiness rate can first be considered as a raw figure, for by itself it reveals little. When compared to a standard or objective rate, it answers part of the question “How am I doing?” If the local rate equals or exceeds the standard, there may be cause for some satisfaction. However, even this situation could be checked for a trend, to determine if the rate is getting better or poorer or is stable and an estimation of the likelihood of maintaining the position. Most of the problems arise if the local achieved rate is below the desired goal or standard. If this occurs, the local commander can trace what he needs to know in a systematic manner, as indicated in Figure 2.

Beginning with the comparison of achieved operational readiness (O/R) (Figure 2A) versus standard or goal, the first questions should be asked to determine which major area is a primary factor, logistics or operations. Operations areas should be considered to evaluate impact on O/R, and questions may be asked concerning any changes in commitment, requirements, tactics, etc. Usually a number of summary reports at every level will provide assistance in establishing which major area, operations or logistics, is primarily affecting the O/R rate deviations. (If operations is determined to be the major factor, the authors assume that the commander, who is normally from an operations background, can quite readily assess this area in his own way. The logistics area will be reviewed further.)

The logistics area can first be investigated to determine whether or not a “pure” maintenance impact has created the Not Operationally Ready (NOR) rate (Item C, Figure 2). An example of this would be the technical order requirement to perform a special time-consuming check of an aircraft component or system after each flight. The need to know is answered quite readily in a situation like this, and identification of the technical order as the “culprit” almost automatically establishes a course of action for the commander.

Usually a “pure” situation is not so readily revealed, and the need exists to investigate the interfaces and intermingling of supply and maintenance. At this point the need to know is whether it is a NORM (Not Operationally Ready, Maintenance) situation (Item G, Figure 2) or a NORS (Not Operationally Ready, Supply) situation. Either NORM or NORS can be reviewed in a systematic manner, moving from general queries to details. It must be emphasized that a great many false moves and ulcer situations will be avoided if the commander takes the logic sequence approach and goes from general to detailed analysis. To demonstrate this, the NORM situation will be developed first and then NORS.

NORM (Not Operationally Ready, Maintenance)

The first effort should be to determine whether or not it is scheduled or unscheduled (Items J and K, Figure 2) maintenance that is causing the condition. Scheduled maintenance should be a part of basic planning and should be relatively stable. Changes in scheduled requirements have readily discernible impact, but obtaining such changes is a relatively long process. This article cannot attempt to go into further detail in this particular area. Locally available publications permit a review of scheduled maintenance, and the items requiring correction will normally require local staff review and then coordination with a depot-level staff.

It is in the area of unscheduled maintenance that further investigation and decision must be made. At this point in reviewing his “readiness” information, the commander is reviewing maintenance performance, and by recognizing this he is in a position to use a familiar logic path, the path described for maintenance performance and diagrammed in Figure 2. By entering the chart at the point “unscheduled maintenance” (Item C, Figure 1), the commander can continue on to determine the impact of maintenance performance on his operationally ready rate.8

NORS (Not Operationally Ready, Supply)

This area requires review of both maintenance actions and supply actions. In general, if the equipment operating performance has been steady or according to the planned or designed rates, and if supply quantities have been available according to the support plan, maintenance may actually be causing the NORS. This occurs when maintenance is either failing to repair properly or fails to meet repair priority requirements. The repair cycle assets information in Technical Order 00-20-3 should be utilized. If, however, NORS items are those for which a requirement has been relatively stable or predictable, and if there is still a NORS condition, then perhaps procurement or supply (distribution) is the basic factor. If NORS is due to a new or unique requirement, then both maintenance and supply should be checked for their ability to make a timely identification of the problem and to act, communicate, and coordinate to correct the situation.

A great many things may be discussed in this area, but for ready access to what must be done at this point a commander should confirm that his supply and maintenance personnel have procedural information such as that contained in Directorate of Supply and Services Newsletter, Hq USAF, Vol. V, No.1, January 1967. The check list of NORS contained in this article is one of many that have been provided to help the commander direct and evaluate local investigations of NORS problems.

The preceding development of the Figure 2 operationally-ready-rate logic sequence provided a sequence for asking the specific question, “What do I need to know?” The sequence began with an objective (O/R), a measurement or standard. The action that evolved established a pattern of going from general to detailed question, all within a system and systematic review. By applying this same technique to all phases of his maintenance and supply responsibilities the commander will be in a position to achieve all his objectives better.

maintenance costs

The logical and mandatory extension of management action, once quantitative measurements of readiness, maintenance actions, and maintenance performance have been made, is to determine the cost of doing business. The cost consideration is mandatory, not because of DOD instructions or departmental regulations but because management must relate actions, resources developed or consumed, or almost any other aspect of maintenance to a cost basis. If this is not done, efforts to evaluate and compare the many parts of management effort will be like a continuous process of mixing “apples and oranges.” In minimum terms, cost is the action of putting a dollar sign on a quantitative measurement and thus establishing a common denominator for all things managed.

Each command element should have an awareness of the operational cost of the assigned weapons support systems for management guidance.

Measured cost, once effectiveness has been achieved (i.e., readiness), enables commanders to evaluate maintenance efficiency. If, for example, 75 percent readiness is achieved, what resources did it take to do it?

Was it necessary to expend overtime or hire additional personnel, or was there a more efficient way? Use of cost information, such as for comparing what it cost another unit to do the same job, provides for valid conclusions.

The maintenance resources required to maintain at any level must be considered in terms of cost.9 This information can then be used to determine, for example, whether maintenance should be performed at organizational level or field (intermediate) level or if it should be transferred to depot level. Proper use of cost considerations makes for a valid base self-sufficiency interpretation. If, for example, maintenance on an item could be performed at field level with the purchase of a $60,000 test stand, a command could question the return for that investment. If, in turn, the questioning revealed that only two $10 items per year would be handled by that test stand, a decision to ship the two items to the depot would contribute most to overall improved maintenance efficiency.10

If the preceding discussion of cost information has a familiar ring, if it sounds like much of the Resources Management Concepts, it is because these maintenance management concepts of cost do fall within the concept of Resources Management Systems. In this respect the commander is fortunate, for the maintenance management information systems already provide quantitative information in a form and manner readily adaptable to computer use and conversion to cost data.

A Commander and his staff can best accomplish their maintenance mission by a management process that establishes objectives within the framework and cognizance of the DOD maintenance management program.

This program is based upon the philosophy that military hardware is the source and basis for the existence of a maintenance capability and that the product of maintenance is mission-ready end items/systems. The systems concept permits establishing a concept of identifying and understanding the whole system and, within it, all interfacing or interrelating parts. The knowledge includes total knowledge of all the actions within the system, ultimately in real time as opposed to historical data.

The systems concept establishes the requirement for total knowledge of maintenance and maintenance management, and the key information systems were reviewed in this article. Proper use of the system is the systematic interrogation of data, beginning with measurement of achieved versus established quantitative objectives. The priority of management attention must be upon achievement of equipment readiness to meet operational objectives, and then these must be an accompanying measurement of efficiency. To measure the many varying factors concerned with maintenance, the manager/commander must employ the common denominator of cost, information. Cost data applied to quantified action data provide the measure of efficiency of the organization or function. The systematic tracing of objectives to effectiveness to efficiency provides the manager with valid answers to the perennial question, “What do I need to know?”

Air Force Institute of Technology

Notes

1. Max D. Richards and Paul S. Greenlaw, Management and Decision Making (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966), p. 21.

2. From an unpublished document from Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics. Extracts of statements of DOD Maintenance Programs presented to Dr. Robert N. Anthony, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. AFM 66-1, March 1968, par 5-41 and Attachment 2, par 1c.

6. From research of AFLC Log K261 reports by Major Robert Kunstel (AFIT). The ratio of scheduled to unscheduled maintenance will vary by weapon system and length of time in active inventory.

7. AFM 66-1, March 1968, par 3-65.

8. For a comprehensive systems review of “operationally ready,” see presentation by Marshall Hendrickson, Operations Analyst, U.S. Naval Systems Command, in “Proceedings of the First Aviation 3M Data Products Symposium,” U.S. Naval Systems Command, Washington, D.C., 1-2 May 1967.

9. Department of Defense Directive 4100.35, Development of Integrated Logistic Support for Systems and Equipment. (Includes all DOD references annotated in 4100.35.)

10. U.S. Department of Defense: Study Group for Aeronautical Depot Maintenance, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L), 18 January 1964.

Contributor

Lieutenant Colonel William J. Dess (B.A., Sacramento State College) is Head, Department of Maintenance and Supply, School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology. During World War II he served as a bomber pilot, 1944-46, finally flying B-29s with 20th Bomber Command. Out of the service 1947-51, he has subsequently filled squadron- and wing-level aircraft maintenance assignments at Mather and Castle AFB, California, and Aviano, Italy, to 1960; as Chief, Maintenance and Analysis Branch, Hq Fifteenth Air Force, March AFB, California, to 1964; and as Maintenance Advisor to Republic of Korea Air Depot, until his present assignment 1966 . . . . Major Robert W. Kunstel (M.S., George Washington University) is a member of the faulty, Air Force Institute of Technology. After flying training in 1952, he served in Korea through 1953. He completed the Maintenance Officers Course, Chanute AFB, Illinois, 1955, and subsequent assignments have been with Air Force Logistics Command as deport flight-test pilot, contract maintenance officer, and Maintenance Staff Officer, Military Aircraft Storage and Disposition Center, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona; and as student, Air Command and Staff College, 1966.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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