Air University Review, May-June 1969
Consultation has come to play an important role in American defense policy. As part of its worldwide defense structure, the United States has a great variety of consultative arrangements with other countries. Consultation has many important advantages for the Unites States in fulfilling our defense requirements. It also has some definite limitations. However, we have seldom, if ever, specifically examined the attributes of this type of consultation. With a more precise awareness of the consultative process, we can better avoid its pitfalls. Equally or more important, we can use its advantages to improve our political and defense posture in the world.
National security in today’s complex and dangerous world imposes stern and varied requirements. To meet these requirements, the United States has had to seek cooperation and commitments in many areas of the world and accordingly has obtained a variety of bases and communications facilities in other countries. The United States also encourages and participates in regional defense alliances, and American military forces are deployed in pursuance of these alliances and to meet other situations dangerous to peace and order. Furthermore, the United States provides military training and equipment to bolster the defense capabilities of free world nations. Success in these complex activities has required us to take into account the political, economic, psychological, and military interests of many other countries.
The United States has a variety of arrangements for consultations. For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) includes many groups providing various types and levels of consultations. The North Atlantic Council, composed of permanent representatives stationed in Brussels, meets at the ministerial level twice a year; the ministers survey the state of the alliance and related developments, try to concert their national contributions, and provide political guidance for NATO’S planning. In addition to the ministerial meetings, the Council meets regularly at NATO headquarters. The Ministers of Defense from the fourteen nations other than France meet from time to time as the Defense Planning Committee. The Military Committee and its subsidiary organizations deal with many of NATO’S military questions. A Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee supervises a number of bodies planning for the civil aspects of a wartime emergency. These groups include planning boards for ocean shipping and European inland surface transport and committees dealing with petroleum, communications, civil defense, civil aviation, food and agriculture, industry, etc. The alliance at anyone time also has working groups and experts considering specific problems of the moment. While common participation in NATO provides a great deal of mutual interest, achieving agreement in these various forums puts a considerable premium on constructive consultations.
The structures of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTRO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) are not as elaborate as that of NATO, but both also have a number of consultative bodies. CENTRO has an annual ministerial meeting and an ongoing Council that meets in Ankara, Turkey. The United States attends as an observer, rather than as a full member, but participates actively. The United States shares fully in CENTRO’s military planning and in its subordinate groups such as the Economic Committee and the Council for Scientific Education and Research. Similarly, SEATO has an annual meeting of foreign ministers and a Council and Permanent Working Group, both located in Bangkok, Thailand. The United States participates actively in these bodies and in SEATO’S military planning and other subordinate groups.
The United States also has consultative arrangements with a number of specific countries. The base agreements with Spain, for instance, provide for a joint military committee to deal with questions regarding the operation of the agreements. It was a meeting of the U.S.-Japanese consultative committee that dealt with the recent return to Japanese control of a number of American military facilities in Japan. Australia, New Zealand, and the United States meet annually or more often in the ANZUS Council to consider defense and political problems of mutual concern. Formally or informally, the United States must consult frequently with countries such as Thailand, Korea, and the Philippines, with whom we are engaged in joint defense arrangements.
The arrangements between Canada and the United States constitute an excellent example of ongoing and largely successful consultative procedures. The close military cooperation between Canada and the United States was not a preordained achievement. For all their similarities, there are important differences between the two countries. Canada and the United States were enemies for more than a century, and truly close military relations date only from the beginning of World War II. Over 40 percent of Canada’s population is French in language and culture; the development of a mutually satisfactory bilingual and bicultural nation presents Canada with many ticklish questions. The population and economy of Canada are only a fraction the size of those of the United States, and Canadians are acutely aware of this. The Canadian government and people are loath to appear to be subordinate to the United States.
Successful military cooperation between the United States and Canada has thus meant a variety of consultative arrangements to identify and deal with difficulties and differences. The senior organization dealing with military and related matters is the Ministerial Committee on the Joint Defense; it is composed of the two nations’ cabinet-level officials dealing with foreign affairs, defense, and finance. The Permanent Joint Board on Defense was set up in 1940 and has met several times a year since then. There is also a U.S.-Canadian Civil Emergency Planning Committee. Another joint committee looks after the U.S.-Canadian Defense Production Sharing Program, which seeks to give Canadian industry an appropriate opportunity to participate in defense equipment purchases. Below these bodies there are working-level groups of various types. The success of U.S.-Canadian defense cooperation testifies to the need for careful and continuing consultation and to its value.
The content and frequency of the consultative arrangements in which the United States is engaged obviously vary. This fact alone suggests the breadth and complexity of this process that we have become involved in.
Substantial common interests manifestly exist between the United States and many other countries. These common concerns are likely to increase, particularly as instability and dangerous outbreaks of violence occur as part of the developing process in many areas of the world. Common problems and common interests are thus sufficient for consultation to be useful and to provide a basis for effective consultation.
The United States needs the cooperation of other countries and probably will for the foreseeable future. Our security would be in extreme jeopardy without the NATO alliance. Facilities in several countries in the Far East are all but essential to the support of our position in Vietnam and in Asia generally. Without friendly ports in the Mediterranean, maintenance of the Sixth Fleet and its stabilizing effect in that volatile area would be virtually impossible. Cooperation by other countries is also necessary for our vital worldwide communications and electronics network. Our access to the developing areas, which are the likeliest site of future violence, is greatly facilitated by the cooperation of certain countries. Research projects in matters important to our technological progress and defensive capabilities often require access to specific locales in other countries. Put simply, in many practical ways the United States needs the cooperation of other countries to maintain our defenses.
To win this cooperation, the United States must make allowances for the concerns of other nations. We cannot simply address matters in terms of what we consider to be militarily desirable. On a number of occasions it might have been “quicker” or “easier” or “militarily more efficient” to station American forces in Canada to defend North America. But Canadians, a justifiably proud and competent people, have been unwilling to appear to have to be defended by Americans. Canada has thus consistently declined, even in the desperate days of 1940, to have American forces under sole American control stationed on Canadian soil.
In such a situation, even though we are acting in the common defense, we are usually asking the other government to give us something. No self-respecting government is willing to appear to be told what to do by the United States, most especially on its own soil. To get some sense of what is involved, we can imagine the reverse situation. Suppose our government gave another country military rights in this country. There would have to be very convincing justification that the step was in the best interests of the nation and was taken solely for that reason. We must constantly search for mutually acceptable arrangements; we must find ones that satisfy local political, economic, and psychological needs and still reasonably fulfill our military requirements.
The local considerations can be various. The host country may want to participate in the venture so as to develop its own capabilities. An important consideration for Spain in the base agreements with the United States was the opportunity to modernize the training and equipment of its armed forces through the U.S. military assistance that was part of the quid pro quo. Another country may be concerned about the effect of our proposals on its relations with its neighbors or on its international role. Or its government may seek a quid pro quo in the form of economic, military, or diplomatic assistance from the United States.
There may be a decided impact on the local economy, requiring careful and complicated handling. This was a concern when our bases were first constructed in Spain and in the Southeast Asian countries where new American facilities have been built in recent years. The problem could be the effect of a marked increase in wage rates on local labor conditions, or it could be the inflationary impact of injecting a large new cash flow into a developing economy. Another frequent concern is that local labor and local companies have a fair opportunity to develop their talents and participate in the new economic energy generated. Virtually all agreements authorizing U.S. defense facilities in Canada include clauses providing equal opportunities for Canadian contractors and laborers in connection with the construction and maintenance work. Elaborate arrangements have been developed in NATO to spread contracts for military facilities among the industries of the member nations.
Questions of legal jurisdiction over American defense personnel can also be sensitive, for no government wants to appear not to be master in its own house. These legal matters become more difficult to define neatly when they extend beyond the servicemen themselves to their dependents and to civilians, local employees, contractors and their employees and dependents, etc. To what degree, for instance, should American contractors building U.S. military facilities in another country be exempt from all local taxes? They benefit from local tax-provided facilities, but any taxes they pay increase the costs to the United States government. The payment of provincial and local taxes by contractors on U.S. defense facilities in Canada has been a thorny issue. This mundane subject of taxes and exemptions is one that all governments take a practical interest in. This question, too, poses many perplexing points of detail.
Cultural and religious attitudes can also play a powerful role. The seemingly simple matter of dress can have a powerful public impact. For instance, shorts are not worn by women or men in Spain, and to wear them in public would produce a decidedly unfavorable public reaction. To avoid such a contretemps, the U.S. forces in Spain had to ban the use of shorts and some other items of clothing by Americans and their dependents in Spain. American personnel at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia had to pay careful attention to Muslim religious strictures, such as that against alcoholic beverages or those regarding the sheltered role of women. This area can be particularly sensitive because it is one in which we could easily overlook a crucial point.
This catalog of possible local sensitivities is illustrative, but it again brings out the variety of considerations involved in obtaining the cooperation of other nations. Even if the problem is essentially psychological, the United States cannot afford to ignore it. No country wants to be taken for granted by the United States, or even to appear to be taken for granted. It is obviously unacceptable for any government to appear to its people as having a limited say in matters important to the country’s security. Consultation, at a minimum, can be valuable as a face-saving mechanism. This alone is a virtue not to be regarded lightly in a world of prickly national sovereignties.
Consultation, more broadly, can have real practical advantages for the United States. It helps identify viewpoints. Again, this is an advantage that should not be shortchanged. It is remarkable how often questions are not fully understood by both sides. Human communication is often a defective process. Remember, for instance, the confusion of the British and Americans during our first consultations of World War II until we realized that we attached opposite meanings to the move “to table” a proposal. With the benefit of hindsight it is apparent that much of the atomic weapons controversy with Canada several years ago resulted from misunderstandings; both sides, wittingly or unwittingly, often failed to understand precisely what the other was really saying. Especially when operating across cultures and into other political environments, both sides can miss or misinterpret important considerations. Misunderstandings are far more common than either side suspects. Furthermore, in terms of systems analysis, it is important that the United States identify all its options accurately.
When fully understood, seeming differences often disappear or become peripheral to an adequate arrangement. At a minimum, consultations can clarify differences. Both sides can then at least be sure that they fully and accurately understand each other’s position. By carefully defining the issues, they can sometimes narrow the problems and thereby make agreement possible on at least some of the issues involved. In fact, one of the principal advantages of consultation is that candid and careful identification of differences frequently suggests mutually satisfactory solutions.
Consultation, when undertaken in good faith, tends to foster a conscious search for solutions. Since both sides have a considerable degree of mutual interest, they tend to search for acceptable middle ground. Certainly this is the secret of the general success of U.S.—Canadian consultation and accounts for much that has been accomplished in NATO. Adequate solutions can be found more often than not.
Consultation provides the United States with a forum for more informal discussion than is possible in formal government-to-government negotiating and is more in keeping with the American way. It also encourages flexibility and candor. Generally speaking, the more informal the consultation can be, the more useful it will be. Examining questions early on a “no commitments” basis enables both sides to exchange information and observations before viewpoints harden. They can thus judge the dimensions of problems and how best to deal with them. Informal discussions can also help develop among the participants the mutual confidence needed for a constructive attitude toward problems.
Consultation also has a “reverse” advantage: it gives the United States a means to make clear the practical restraints on what it can do. Despite our desire for mutually acceptable arrangements, there are limits to what we can do. We have political, financial, legal, and other restrictions. There are also limits beyond which we cannot go if our essential defense requirements are to be met. A bedrock difficulty in the U.S.—Canadian atomic weapons dispute some years ago was the American conviction that atomic weapons were essential, under the then obtaining circumstances, to the defense of North America. These are examples of clarifications that often need to be made. Obviously it is better that this be done early in any discussions, in a friendly and candid way; it is also better done in private, thus reducing undue expectations, embarrassment, or public polemics.
Obviously consultation also has real limits. In truly critical situations, such as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, it is not feasible; it is not a quick-reaction procedure suitable to rapid events or to the requirement for great discretion or maximum security. More generally, security restrictions regarding particularly sensitive subjects impose forbearance on American participants in some consultations. In a similar vein, the legal provisions requiring exclusive American control of nuclear weapons place limitations on the United States role in consultations; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty apparently will also mean similar restraints.
A variety of other considerations can restrict the participation of the United States in consultations. The United States policy interests elsewhere can impose restraints on our participation in a given consultation. We cannot always make everybody happy; we cannot make both Spain and Great Britain happy in our attitudes toward their dispute over Gibraltar. The degree of common interest and the other country’s ability to contribute to the common defense also affect the usefulness of consultation to the United States. As a practical matter, the need for coherent internal studies and decisions places a limit on how much we can speculate until we have had some chance to study a matter and arrive at some reasoned ideas. Specifically, the cycle now used in U.S. defense planning makes engaging in consultation more exacting than it used to be. At what point short of the President’s approval of the Secretary of Defense’s annual recommendations is it proper or feasible to discuss matters with other governments, even informally? Keeping these limitations in mind is clearly important to effective consultation; but none of them frustrates or invalidates the process.
Consultation has served and can continue to serve the United States well. This conclusion emerges clearly from a pragmatic examination of the process itself and its postwar development. It is equally true that consultation is no cure-all, and this should never be forgotten. The record, however, indicates that early, candid, informal discussion between two countries generally constitutes the best way to mutually effective military arrangements. This lesson should not be lost on us in meeting the many defense problems that we face in today’s complex world.
Arlington, Virginia
Dr. Raymond J. Barrett (PH.D.,) Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland) is Deputy Chief, Program Staff, Office of International Conferences, Department of State. He is a U.S. Foreign Service Officer, having served at the American Embassies in Mexico, Managua, Dublin, Cairo, and Madrid. He also served in the Office of Southern and East African Affairs, 1961-63, and as Canadian Desk Officer, 1963-65, when he was U.S. Secretary of the U.S.-Canada Permanent Joint Board on Defense. Dr. Barrett has contributed several articles to the Military Review and the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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