Air University Review, March-April 1969

United States Policy in Asia

Lieutenant Colonel Norman D. Eaton

Perhaps more than any event in our national experience the Vietnam War has caused observers from virtually all sectors of our society to hasten to draw conclusions from an ongoing and highly complex political-military operation. As a historian of sorts, aware of the revisionism which usually commences shortly after an event and which seems to continue indefinitely if the event is significant, I marvel at the tone of certainty in which conclusions regarding our involvement in Vietnam are already being voiced. It has been alleged, for example, that almost all current domestic woes have their roots in Vietnam,² that American character and society are being corrupted by “an arrogance of power”; that the United States is futilely trying to block China in an area that is her natural sphere of influence; that the domino theory is in fact a law; that the strategy of graduated response is totally discredited. (Concerning that strategy, I believe it has indeed been discredited, at least as it has been applied in Vietnam, piece-meal and in small increments. Had it been tested in a less permissive political and military environment, its failure might well have been disastrous.) It is not astonishing, in view of the length of time we have been tied down in Vietnam and the cost in lives and resources, that public discussion has tended to drift from objectivity into polemics.

There are, of course, some safe and obvious conclusions to be drawn from our present involvement in Southeast Asia. One of these-that all Americans, not just policymakers, need a better understanding of Asia and our relationship to that great area and mass of people-is the basic theme of Edwin O. Reischauer’s recent book.* If this argument seems obvious to the military professional, it has not been so, contends Mr. Reischauer, to most Americans, including in particular the professional educators, who have failed to give proper emphasis to studies of the Far East.

*Edwin O. Reischauer, Beyond Vietnam: The United States and Asia (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968, $4.95), 242 pp.

Our basic lack of understanding of Asia, says Mr. Reischauer, has led us to some unsound conclusions and generalizations and prevented us from perceiving, or at least from fully appreciating, some fundamental truths. In particular we have formulated Asian policy upon our knowledge of and experience in Europe and our evaluation (a correct one) of the post-World War II Communist threat in that area. But, continues the author, the Asian problem is not analogous to Europe. The problem in Asia is not to restore prosperity and stability; prosperity never existed, and stability was related to colonial or semicolonial status. Asian realities are change, quest for national identity, reaction against colonialism, and demand for a better life. While admitting that Communism has been successful in harnessing these factors, Mr. Reischauer is convinced that the Asian countries’ demand for independence will prevent their falling under Chinese or Soviet domination. In particular Mr. Reischauer warns us against appearing to oppose Asian nationalism.

It is precisely in this framework that Mr. Reischauer condemns our deep involvement in Vietnam. In spite of his insistence, stated in the first sentence of the book, “This is not a book about Vietnam,” the author devotes the next forty pages directly to that subject as illustrative of the problem to which lack of knowledge and understanding lead. In short, Reischauer considers our military commitment in Vietnam to have been a mistake. Alarmed by what appeared to be a Communist threat to all of Southeast Asia, the United States made the serious blunder of supporting France in Indochina, thus aligning on the side of colonialism and against nationalism. Ho Chi Minh had already made himself the leader of the anticolonial movement, although, to be sure, his Communists were not the only anti-French faction. Mr. Reischauer further believes that the United States compounded its blunder by failing to support the Geneva agreement of 1954. He readily admits that the 1956 elections provided for in the agreement would have resulted in a unified and Communist Vietnam. But this would not necessarily have been a catastrophe, he argues. Ho would likely have been an Asian Tito, and Vietnam would have been a “dike” between China and the rest of Southeast Asia.

Mr. Reischauer does not, of course, suggest that we abandon Vietnam. We have placed on the line the prestige and reliability of the United States, a commitment he describes as “the most significant of all escalations.” To fail to secure an honorable settlement would have the most serious international and domestic consequences. Thus, from among three possible courses of action major escalation, a pull-out, or a continuation of military pressure and diplomatic initiative Reischauer, like most Americans, favors the third.

Having used Vietnam as an illustration, the author proceeds to a definition and analysis of our Asian problem. After comparing the underdeveloped world (with emphasis on Asia but treating Japan as a special case) with the West in terms of populations and gross national products, Reischauer defines the bases for our interest in Asia: (1) since war and disorder are contagious in our unitary world, we must promote stability in Asia; (2) we have a moral imperative to help those who need help; (3) we have an important stake in the future Asia, when it will be important to our security and economic interests.

This last point requires further comment. While regarding the future Asia as very important to us, Mr. Reischauer states, “Clearly we have no vital national interests that can immediately and directly be threatened by Asians.” The key words, of course, are “immediately” and “directly.”

Having defined the problem, Mr. Reischauer conducts a tour d’horizon in Asia, dealing in specifics with two countries and one group of countries: Japan, China, and, in the third category, the rest of Asia. Japan receives special attention because of its unique position in Asia as a bastion of strength, vitality, and stability. China’s special importance requires no comment. As to lumping the rest of Asia-from Pakistan to Korea-together, the author admits that “It may seem somewhat cavalier. . . .” But this treatment is very much in keeping with the relatively small importance he assigns to these countries.

Mr. Reischauer’s brief survey of Japanese political, social, and economic development and his estimate of Japan’s importance to the United States are gems of clarity and insight. The reader should be prepared, however, in view of the author’s long years of experience and service in Japan² and the normal tendency to sympathize with one’s host country, to be particularly critical of remarks such as “Japan’s future and our relationship with it are of much greater long-range importance to us than anything else in the vast area on the other side of the Pacific.”

Were it necessary to establish an order of importance with respect to our relations with Asian countries, I suppose I would not take issue with Mr. Reischauer’s evaluation, except in reference to the military role he would assign to Japan and, by inference, all medium and small powers:

The world already has such a military balance of terror between the two great powers that the military strength of other countries has relatively little bearing on the world balance of power and becomes a matter of only localized significance. It is hard to see what advantage it would be to Japan to greatly increase its military power—as long as the United States continues to maintain a stabilizing military presence in the Western Pacific.

Here the author seems to be saying that military power as it affects a regional balance is unimportant. I cannot agree with this view. Regional balances cannot neatly be separated from the world balance. Moreover, a postwar policy of the United States, and in general a successful one, has been to promote stability through regional arrangements. Furthermore, the author would seem to concede to the United States and the Soviet Union the roles of gendarmes of the world at a time when these two giants find it increasingly difficult to influence even their own allies. Military nakedness in a multipolar world does not make sense for a power like Japan.

Military considerations aside, we can agree with the author that Japan should play an important part in Asian development through furnishing economic and technical aid. And we can take comfort in Mr. Reischauer’s confidence that the United States and Japan will remain on close and friendly terms, that our security treaty will be renewed, and that the Okinawa question will be solved.

Turning to China, Mr. Reischauer sees an unstable, frustrated, and xenophobic giant but one whose near-term importance and power we have overestimated. China’s present weakness makes major military adventures impossible. The real threat is the support and promotion of insurgency. The author finds containment of China to be a sound policy but argues that nonrecognition is no longer productive. He sees us moving slowly toward a more realistic stance: “containment without isolation.” He believes Japan has an important role in educating China and helping her achieve a normal relationship with the world.

In a section dealing with the rest of Asia, Reischauer re-emphasizes the relatively low importance these countries have to the United States. The thrust of his argument is to avoid getting deeply committed to these myriad unstable and weak countries. Promote stability through aid and advice (including military advice, in some cases, being careful not to let the advisory role escalate into participation in military. operations). We should not try to prop up the unproppable, we should retain flexibility, and we should play hard to get.³

Also in this section, Reischauer takes a final glance at Vietnam (two percent of the smallest third of Asia, he reminds us), sketches out the kind of settlement that would be satisfactory, and suggests how it might be attained. While he is more conciliatory than our official policy has been (at least until the President’s announcement of 31 October 1968), he proposes nothing really new.

In the final chapter Mr. Reischauer outlines measures to improve our policy-making performance in Asia. In terms which might describe the perfect air staff, he calls for machinery capable of integrating specialized knowledge with broad understanding, thence arriving at a fully coordinated position. Required are more money, more personnel, and new concepts of diplomacy, adapted to the problems of communicating with peoples, not just their governments.

In a closing passage the author calls for reforms in the teaching of history. Most Americans, Reischauer insists, are exposed to a mere smattering of Far Eastern history, and even that is presented so as to prove the superiority of Western civilization. He is right about this, but the Air Force and the Army can take pride in having been leaders in correcting the deficiency. The United States Military Academy, at least since about 1945, and the Air Force Academy from the beginning have taught as separate and required courses the history of the Far East.

By embracing such a wide area of lands, peoples, and problems, this book exposes itself to attack from many directions. In spite of that, few flaws can be found. 

Mr. Reischauer’s views on Vietnam will most certainly pique the hawkish reader. But as the author insists, the book is not about Vietnam. Whatever the reader’s views, he will have to admit that the Vietnam issue is a good introduction to the author’s main points. Moreover, military professionals should find no contradiction in giving complete and wholehearted support to the war while at the same time giving careful consideration to and making their private evaluation of the costs of the war in relation to the objectives. For example, research and development and the acquisition of badly needed new weapon systems have been affected by shortage of funds. It has been estimated that after the Vietnam War is over, $15 billion will be required just to replace stocks and equipment. Certainly, and perhaps more important, our flexibility to respond to crises elsewhere has been degraded.

One might fault the author on some small points. For example, he suggests a barrier extending into Laos to “seal off” North Vietnam from the south. A barrier, however, is not an impermeable membrane. The Laotian sector of such a barrier would necessitate the deployment of ground forces in that country, a requirement which Mr. Reischauer seems not to appreciate and certainly would not support.

A more serious criticism may be that the author, in his effort to emphasize Asia’s importance, has failed to relate events in Asia to the world balance of power. Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé’s recent article⁴ is worth considering in this framework. Strausz-Hupé argues that the Vietnam struggle can accurately be viewed only as a part of the global conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and that the credibility of American strategic power, and thus world stability, is at stake. In any case, what we do in Southeast Asia, in Korea, in Taiwan, and elsewhere within that “smallest third” of Asia certainly is not to be decided by Asian considerations alone.

Few Americans have served their country as well as Mr. Reischauer and perhaps none has been so respected in the foreign land in which he lived. This outstanding book, written in a clear and dignified style and devoid of the sarcasm and polemics now so often used in connection with policies under criticism, can only add to the author’s reputation.

Phan Rang Air Base, Republic of Vietnam

Notes 

        1. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Bitter Heritage, Vietnam and American Democracy 1941-1946 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p. 50.

        2. Mr. Reischauer was born in Japan in 1910 and lived there until 1927. He was United States Ambassador to Japan from 1961 to 1966.

        3. Mr. Reischauer’s views are remarkably like those of Mr. George F. Kennan. See The Viet-Nam Reader, edited by Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 15-31.

        4. Robert Strausz-Hupé, “On the Southeast Asian Confrontation,” Air Force and Space Digest, May 1968, pp. 38-41.

Contributor

Lieutenant Colonel Norman D. Eaton (USMA; M.S., University of Wisconsin) is assigned to Phan Rang Air Base, Republic of Vietnam, where he was declared missing in action on 13 January 1969 while flying combat crew duty.  Previous operational experience includes tours as instructor pilot in Air Training Command and fighter-interceptor pilot in Air Defense Command.  He was an instructor and assistant professor of history, United States Air Force Academy, 1957-61.  Other assignments have been as staff officer at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and in the Directorate of Plans, Headquarters USAF.  Colonel Eaton is a graduate of Command and General Staff College and Air War College.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.