Air University Review, July-August 1969
Until 1945, the Soviet Union’s overall defense posture since its founding had been essentially defensive in nature and oriented toward the overall support of ground operations. In World War II, air and naval units existed primarily to support the operations of the Red Army. There were no large-scale Soviet strategic air operations, amphibious landings, or carrier operations equating to American operations in the Pacific by U.S. Army Air Force B-29s, Navy carrier task forces, or Marine amphibious units. In a way, it is easy to understand why these types of military maneuvers were never fully developed by Soviet defense forces. Their whole being was ground-oriented with but one purpose-the defeat of an enemy where the theater of operations was the steppes of the western U.S.S.R. and the countries of eastern Europe. There was no overriding need to develop a “deep sea” navy, amphibious forces on the scale of the U.S. Navy/Marine team, or strategic air forces capable of traversing long distances from the Soviet motherland.
The American experience, however, obviously did have a deep influence upon post-World War II Soviet planning. In essence, the development in the United States of powerful nuclear weapons was taken by the Soviet Union to mean it had no alternative but to evolve an offensive capability somewhat along the same lines. The three-year conventional war in Korea had little effect on the long-range outlook of Soviet decision-makers, for by the mid-1950s the Russians were obviously intending to develop their own strategic air force. The Soviet Long Range Air Army (SLRA) was the Russian reaction to the B-47s, B-52s, and B-58s of the USAF’s Strategic Air Command (SAC). For some time it appeared that Badgers, Bisons, and Bears would be built in sufficient numbers to insure parity with the American long-range bomber capability. For military and naval historians, the similarity to the old Anglo-German naval arms race before World War I and the efforts of the U.S., U.K., and Japan to match each other’s naval power between the two World Wars must have seemed like the “same old story” all over again.
In the late 1950s, however, Khrushchev saw an opportunity to leapfrog the American strategic advantage. The Russians cut back their production of Bisons and Badgers and never reached equality with their American equivalents, the B-52 and B-47; instead they devoted their energies to an early Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). By the time of the 1960 American Presidential election campaign, the “missile gap” had become a cause célèbre and a campaign issue because it was felt that the Russians would be able to outstrip the U.S. long-range missile capability. Soon after the election, however, it was learned that the gap turned out to be a Russian problem. Thus the two nuclear powers arrived at the Cuban missile crisis after they had pursued the historically “boring” course of matching each other (or attempting to match each other) weapon for weapon, with the Russians left in the unenviable position of playing catch-up to American bomber and missile superiority. They were also finding it necessary to seek some successful avenue to combating the American capability in Polaris-type submarines, not to mention the long established American ability to “show the flag” with meaningful naval power. While Marshal Sokolovskii’s Soviet Military Strategy does give some credence to the use of long-range bombers and the extension of power through the use of naval forces, emphasis was still upon a ground-oriented war on the Eurasian continent in conjunction with massive destruction of the American heartland by the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces (SSRF).l To American Air Force and Navy officers, accustomed to the extensions of power which their individual service missions allow, this Russian concept must have seemed somewhat self-deluding. Even after World War II the Soviets seemed to be oblivious to areas of air and naval development that were considered by Americans as an integral part of a well-rounded military capability. Khrushchev’s boasts of an orbital bomb in 1960 were still discounted in the West; they were acknowledged as a possibility in the future. The abortive, yet highly imaginative Cuban venture possibly represented a turning point in Soviet consideration to their overall force structure and its future employment. It is with this apparently new Soviet outlook toward the exercise of world military power that this article is devoted.
Cuba must have been a sobering experience for the Soviet Union. The plan itself was audacious, and had the U.S. shown the slightest hesitation to assert itself the U.S.S.R. not only would have pulled an “end around” deployment of older, shorter-ranged IRBM’s (thereby allowing the Russians more contingencies for the deployment of nuclear weapons against their supposed arch enemy) but also would have presented the U.S. with a new and intolerable situation in the delicate balance of power. The U.S. would have also lost the world’s belief in its will to employ, when necessary, its vast arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. This latter failing would have opened up all sorts of favorable possibilities for Soviet Communism in its continuous effort to assert itself. But the opposite was the case. The U.S.S.R. was forced to withdraw its gambit.
From this point on, it appears that the Soviet military planners were acutely aware of the disadvantageous imbalance existing in their defense establishment. Characteristically, they set out to right the errors of the Cuban miscalculation. It is almost as though they vowed that if there were ever another Cuba, the Soviet armed forces would not be found lacking. What appeared in Sokolovskii’s book was Soviet strategy prior to Cuba, at which time it became obvious how wanting the Soviets were. Here was the U.S. Navy able to marshal its forces to effect a quarantine of Cuba, and the Soviets had very little that could show the “Hammer and Sickle.” The reality of Polaris subs on station; SAC bombers dispersed, ready, and on airborne alert; ICBM’s in greater number than the Soviets possessed; carrier forces deployed in the Mediterranean and Pacific; a BMEWS warning capability to negate any hope of a surprise Soviet launch-all gave the U.S. the upper hand. So geared to rapid and varied response was the U.S. military effort that all her forces scattered around the world were brought to an immediate wartime footing, while, for some incomprehensible reason, the Warsaw Pact nations did not come to their highest alert status in order to match the 22 October preparations by the U.S. Something had been lacking in insuring planned alternatives, putting certain types of hardware into the field and reacting with rapid, positive action to any contingency that would face the Soviet Union.
This reasoning—this historical Soviet “defense mania”—is apparently a thing of the past. What has always been the Russian obsession to depend upon a large standing army and the vast space in which to operate seems at an end. The large army is still there, certainly, but the predominant thinking in Soviet defense circles points now to new efforts to insure that the V.S.S.R. is second to none in its ability to carry the battle offensively to any potential enemy. Neither has the idea of a good defense suffered. Let us consider six weapon systems and force structures and their apparent place in Soviet strategical planning: (1) the antiballistic missile (ABM), (2) the Fractional Orbit Bombardment System (FOBS), (3) large ICBM boosters, (4) Navy Bears, (5) Mediterranean fleet, and (6) “Polaris-type” SSBN’S. As we consider these six weapons or forces, let us not forget the large, well-trained Soviet standing army, which can be rapidly expanded in times of emergency. This army reflects the old Russian penchant for big land forces, but it has adapted its tactics to rapid blitzkrieg armored thrusts against nuclear-equipped opponents. Emphasis has been placed upon excellent tanks, self-propelled large artillery, and motorized infantry-all well trained to execute deep thrusts to the enemy’s rear during all types of weather, day or night, and to span rivers, as witnessed by the large number of river-crossing exercises (both day and night) performed during Soviet Army maneuvers.
The first four weapon systems we shall discuss seem to reflect a definite effort to achieve a more varied defense posture, all four being areas where the Soviet Union has pioneered new weapon systems or tactics to outflank American capabilities. The last two, more deep-water fleet operations and nuclear-powered submarines (SSBN’s), reflect a probable desire of the Russians not to fall behind in areas of worth as proven by U.S. Navy operations in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam and by the use of SSBN’s in present-day deployments.
Cuba represented “half time” for the Soviets, and now apparently they are making the necessary offensive and defensive adjustments. They probably feel that the preparations are being laid to “play” the “second half" to a successful conclusion. In terms of the self-imposed six points, how ready and how successful is this latest Russian approach?
the ABM
If we discount the notion that the ABM is mainly a Soviet ploy to help drain us economically, then the idea of an ABM system to guard against a U.S. offensive missile attack seems a reasonable and logical step toward diversity. It is essential that we accept this assumption that the ABM is not merely an economic “weapon.” When one considers the relative strengths of the two economies, it would seem more logical for the U.S. to employ this economic weapon. Obviously developed during the time when the first ICBM’s were operational and the FOBS was under consideration, the ABM offers the Soviet Union a weapon system that is further along toward operational employment than any counterpart in the West. Certainly the Soviets must also be developing a Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) that could carry not only nuclear payloads but also decoys and penetration aids. With this offensive weapon under development, along with their present and future plans for heavy-payload ICBM’s their reasoning would have led them to the conclusion that they must be able to defend against these same types of offensive weapons that they planned for their own inventory, for surely whatever they could develop was a possibility in the West.
The planning and development of the Soviet ABM most likely were started long before the U.S. became deeply committed militarily in Southeast Asia—it was considered strictly a military weapon. Its initial purpose was to defend militarily the primary areas of the U.S.S.R., as witness the open press reports of deployment of this weapon system around Moscow and Leningrad. A further incentive to deploy the ABM (if one was needed) could have been the realization of the added burden a like system in the U.S. would be on our budget. A Soviet ABM system would force us to consider, while fighting a costly war, switching from a research and development phase to a deployment phase. Although initial deployment of an American ABM is primarily a counter to a possible early-seventies Chinese Communist ICBM threat, the Soviet planner must chuckle a little as he witnesses this additional drain on our resources and reversal of original U.S. plans based on not having to depend upon a deployed ABM to counter any Russian threat.
The Soviets’ development and deployment of their ABM seem to reflect the logical conclusion of a well-thought-out plan in the overall Soviet defense system.2 While the several factors discussed previously may have been considered before a final decision, the primary consideration of the Soviets was “How do I insure a better defense against American/ Western missile delivery capabilities?”
the FOBS
When Khrushchev bragged in early 1960 about possessing a secret weapon, he may have referred to an orbital bomb, but most Western press accounts tended to discount this possibility.3 The Soviet leader was probably threatening us with a weapon system then only under consideration or perhaps in its initial development stage. The capability was certainly within reach of either the Americans or Russians. We apparently feel this system would not add substantially to our offensive capability, for evidently we have not developed such a weapon and do not intend to.
The U.S. consideration of “cost effectiveness” has not fazed the Soviet programmers. Most likely they feel just the opposite, for Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara stated on 3 November 1967 that the Russians were possibly developing such a system. His announcement was based on the evaluation of several Soviet Cosmos vehicles that had been launched during the year. Once again the U.S.S.R. was developing a weapon that would insure, along with the rest of the Soviet defense establishment, a varied defense posture. The FOBS, when viewed in the overall picture, should surprise no one in the West. The Russians are not rushing helter-skelter into development of all these varied weapons and force structures. Like their space exploits, these developments reflect a carefully considered program, capable of employment and obviously styled to suit their needs, preferences, and plans.
Any possible Soviet knowledge of the U.S. program to develop an over-the-horizon radar has not dampened the Russian idea that the FOBS would be an effective system worth having in their inventory. Even though this delivery vehicle is regarded as less capable than the ICBM for carrying heavy warheads, it should not be forgotten that the Soviets’ capabilities and intentions have been misjudged before. Perhaps they will develop a powerful thrust system (probably through clustering of present rocket boosters) that will enable FOBS delivery of high-megaton (MT), heavier warheads-warheads larger than anything in the West. If they do, their venture in this weapon system area would be valid. It would offer them delivery capability via the Southern Hemisphere, thereby outflanking our three BMEWS stations and other radars. The idea of delivering FOBS via this route probably resulted from Soviet scheming in the late ‘50s and early ‘60s looking toward a “super” ICBM to deliver warheads on the U.S. undetected. Two arguments against development of such a tactic—inaccuracy and small on-target MT capability—were probably valid and considered by Soviet decision-makers. Their method of circumventing these disadvantages apparently is the FOBS. In mid-November 1967, two Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces generals tended to confirm Secretary McNamara’s statement of 3 November. Colonel General Nikolai V. Yegorov, Chief of the Political Department of the SSRF, made references to a rocket that was about 110 feet long and 10 feet in diameter and capable of “unlimited range, pinpoint accuracy and flight-trajectory parameters that make nuclear-missile blows sudden and unavoidable.” Similar descriptions were made of a probable FOBS by Marshal Nikolai I. Krylov, Commander-in-Chief of the SSRF.4
The FOBS offers the Soviets a solution to getting around our BMEWS. While it is not the most accurate or economical weapon system, it does add to the variety of their delivery systems. It seems to fit in as one of several solutions to the Soviet strategists’ problem of insuring the highest degree of success in any possible nuclear war. It tends somewhat to disregard good economics practices, but the Russian defense establishment is obviously more interested in results than economics, and the FOBS is funded accordingly.
large ICBM boosters
The 1967 Paris Air Show was the first time the Soviets displayed a space booster to the West. Their standard space booster revealed where their impressive boost power of the past ten years had come from: clustered, smaller boosters. There was no Soviet “super” rocket, merely the typical Soviet solution through a practical and simplified approach to problem solving. The fact that we were allowed to see this booster would lead one to believe that they were not showing all, that they had something either in the inventory or on its way that would lift even greater weights.
I mention these large ICBM’s only to point out how the Soviets go about solving problems of defense more often by the simplest method available rather than depending on development of more intricate, sophisticated hardware. For them the practice was a boon. In the mid-1950s, when the U.S. was the acknowledged leader in miniaturization, the Soviets merely developed greater boost power because they lacked the smaller component parts available to the U.S. This forced them to develop larger warheads. The end product was an ICBM capable of delivering larger on-target megatons, without any apparent loss in accuracy. Thus, “hindered” by their seeming inability to “keep up” with the U.S., the Russians achieved an additional benefit from their ICBM development in that larger warheads meant increased damage with one missile. Also during the mid-1960s to early 1970s they possibly can mix the load of their warheads with nuclear bombs, decoys, and penetration aids. Press pictures of the SS-9 that was displayed in the 50th Anniversary Revolutionary Day parade credit it with a possible 20-MT payload capability. It is a gigantic missile, reflecting the old Russian predilection for bigness, and it answers the question of Russia’s ability to put the “product on the market.”
Most likely the Russian approach to bigness in the development of ICBM’s and space boosters has not changed much since the mid1950s, when they lacked miniaturization. Today they continue to develop large boosters because they provide a versatility not duplicated by any other power (though we have solved the problem with a large Minuteman force supplemented by the Polaris-and soon the Poseidon). The Russians’ large boosters enable them to deliver payloads from different directions at longer ranges, should they opt for this less desirable alternative. Who is to say that in the destruction and chaos of a nuclear exchange in a general war the delivery of heavier warheads rather than lighter “dirty” payloads and the change from a North Polar launch direction to a Southern Hemisphere approach might not tip the balance from defeat to victory? Lack of accuracy discounts this delivery against underground hardened sites, but against targets requiring less accuracy it could lay down vast clouds of radioactive materials, endangering the majority of our civilian population, and thus be an excellent terror weapon during any delicate diplomatic discussions.
Soviet Navy Bears
A current purpose of the Bear is reported to be reconnaissance against the various carrier task forces of the U.S. Navy.5 Although that may seem to exaggerate the mission possibilities of this rather outdated aircraft, it may be another example of a simple and inexpensive solution to a Soviet problem: how to keep American carriers under surveillance without like counterforces. It is not the best solution, but it fills the bill until something better comes along. In early 1963 press reports began to reveal how Soviet Badgers and Bears were performing reconnaissance missions against U.S. and NATO naval forces during exercises in the North Atlantic. Such flights have now become routine in several theaters of the world. This may have been the beginning of a new concept in Soviet planning—and as a direct result of the Cuban crisis. One can almost imagine the Soviet planners stating the problem in a staff study: “How to counter the threat of American carriers.”
The Soviet Navy was obviously not yet ready to challenge the “deep-blue” vessels of the U.S. As a stopgap measure, long-range reconnaissance by the only aircraft capable of the mission, the Bear, did offer some interesting possibilities. If the Soviets always knew from the Bear’s information the whereabouts of American carriers, what was to prevent attack either by tracking submarines or by the launching of large megaton missiles based in eastern Europe, on the Kola Peninsula, or in southern Russia against carriers in the Mediterranean or the North Atlantic/Norwegian Sea/Barents Sea areas? The same principle applied for missiles that might be stationed in the Maritime Province or on the Kamchatka Peninsula for attack against carrier forces in the western Pacific. The time involved between notification, launch, and impact would require real-time operations and extreme accuracy in delivery of large warheads to insure destruction or at least incapacitation of possible carrier launches. Even in real-time sequence, a carrier might be as much as 12 to 15 miles from its last reported position, so the Bear would have had to give accurate cruising speed and direction of the carrier to insure successful results.
Another possibility is the delivery of improved air-to-surface missiles (ASM) from Bears or Badgers. The fleet air defense forces should be able to contend with this problem. If the purpose of the Bear reconnaissance is merely notification of positions of American vessels, this mission can be continually performed unhindered in peacetime. During hostilities, ASM attacks by Bears become somewhat unrealistic; but if they continually fly peacetime reconnaissance missions against our carriers, their employment on one of these “established and routine” missions during a well-planned, coordinated attack by all Soviet offensive weapon systems might be neither unrealistic nor ineffective.
Submarines could launch any variety of weapons once they were properly positioned by Bear reports—torpedoes, missiles, or missile-torpedoes (something like a submerged-launched SUBROC-type of weapon which would offer better stand-off capability). The Bear-submarine team is an excellent combination of available equipment utilized to perform a required mission. The Bear and possibly follow-on aircraft with similar long-range combat-air-patrol capabilities could also perform antisubmarine warfare (ASW) missions in concert with killer submarines. Improved Bear-airdropped ASW gear would enable the Soviet Navy to cover greater areas of ocean in relatively short time, not to mention continual surveillance of “positive contact” Polaris submarines. If this seems unrealistic, one might consider that the thoroughness of present and possible future oceanographic surveys by the Soviets should enable their naval experts to predict probable Polaris patrol areas and thus eliminate great expanses of ocean from surveillance.
Soviet Mediterranean Fleet operations
While the Soviet Navy has shown increased vigor in all oceans, it is in the Mediterranean that we now witness not only a new vitality in the employment of large vessels in fleet-sized deployment but also probably a new appreciation of what the equivalents of the U.S. Sixth and Seventh Fleets can do. This development represents a new Soviet realization of the important missions that can and should be accomplished by naval forces. While Cuba may have initiated such thought, the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967 was probably the clincher. Never before have the Soviets continually operated a warm-water fleet in the Mediterranean, as they apparently intend to do now for the foreseeable future. True, they did have submarine bases in Albania before the Soviet-Chinese rift, but this was only one aspect of fleet operations. Possibly the lessons of the Sixth Fleet during Lebanon and that force’s presence during the Egyptian defeat showed the Soviets the necessity of a permanent presence in this all-important sea.
It is important to view these Mediterranean operations in the light of the mission they accomplish in support of general-purpose forces. Presently and for the near future, the Soviet Navy seems interested in building a capability to support limited-war objectives. The military showing of the “Hammer and Sickle” in the Mediterranean is a reality, but its overall value is probably greater as a propaganda weapon than as a viable military force. As R. W. Herrick has stated in his Soviet Naval Strategy, the Soviet Navy is still essentially a defensive force. One military mission will probably be the development and perfection of an ASW force around the two new amphibious assault (LPH-type) carriers Moskva and Leningrad and any follow-on ships of this class. The recent six-week exercise of the Moskva in the eastern Mediterranean showed the keen Soviet interest in operating against Polaris-type submarines.
The significance of the Mediterranean Squadron lies not in its immediate
military capability or propaganda value but in the implication of a new Soviet
approach to the use of sea power. Obviously the resupply of Nasser’s destroyed
military forces offers the Soviets leverage in obtaining Egyptian naval and air facilities to support
this Mediterranean task force. The long-cherished dream of operating south of
Turkey and Persia (Iran) may soon become reality. It is not for naught that
this fleet is on station or that the Soviets apparently became involved in both
airlift supply and the flying of operational missions in the Yemeni fighting
during the latter half of 1967.6
Are the Soviets eyeing the seas south of the Suez, the Indian Ocean, and the Straits of Malacca? The establishment of a strong Soviet influence in these areas would greatly enhance the operational capabilities of their growing fleet through cooperation between units of the Black Sea Fleet/Mediterranean Squadron and the Pacific Fleet. What will unfold politically is a matter of conjecture, but the reality of Soviet force in the Mediterranean is also a warning: on the face of it the U.S.S.R. intends to contest the United States Navy on the high seas of the world.
It would seem that the Mediterranean is both a proving ground and an initial theater where we can expect to have to contend with a formidable opposing naval power. The Soviet Navy has “gone to sea” no matter what Messrs. Sokolovskii et al. stated in Soviet Military Strategy in 1962. The basic mission was outlined in that work, but the emphasis upon the methodology and variety of naval operations has certainly changed. It probably will not be many years before we can also expect to be contending with strong Soviet fleets in the Atlantic and Pacific—fleets far more powerful than the forces presently there and composed of the most modern types of combat ships: destroyers (both DDG and DD types), guided-missile cruisers, submarines (SS’s, SSN’s, SSBN’s and SSK’s), and, possibly in the next decade, aircraft carriers (CVA’s and/or CVAN’s).
Although the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron should probably be viewed as both an extension of power and a proving of naval ability and tactics, only time will confirm the intentions of the U.S.S.R. The primary purpose of naval power is to gain and maintain supremacy of the seas. Only the future and later history can possibly confirm the American view that the attack carrier is the capital ship to maintain this supremacy, as opposed to the apparent Soviet view that reliance upon SAM and SSM-armed cruisers and destroyers can act as the guarantor of final domination of the world’s oceans. Until the Soviets build attack carriers also, it is difficult to view their Navy as a meaningful offensive force for use in a general-war environment.
In October 1967, Vice Admiral William E. Ellis, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic, stated that the Soviet Union was building its first carrier. The mission of this carrier was thought to be either for ASW helicopters or helicopter assault forces.7 The next logical step would be carriers to handle high-performance aircraft. This is the only major type of unit lacking today in the Soviet Navy, and it certainly is the logical follow-on weapon system to accomplish missions now being carried out by Bear aircraft. Carriers would offer the Soviets an even better opportunity to put visible evidence of force on the scene in theaters of operations never before contemplated by the Russian military. The Mediterranean offers the Soviets the opportunity to outflank NATO’s southern wing.
As stronger and larger fleets gain experience in sophisticated, modern operations far from home ports, the new “deep-blue” Soviet Navy will acquire greater ability and confidence to accomplish its mission. While the development of a true “high seas” navy is not predicated on new technology or new weapon concepts, it does once again underscore the Soviets’ ability to offer their defense establishment a great number of choices, a willingness to forsake old concepts, and the readiness to recognize a good thing when they see it.
Soviet “Polaris-Type” SSBNs
The Americans have shown the Soviets the way when it comes to the development of this particular naval weapon. Imitation is supposedly the sincerest flattery, and the U.S.S.R. has indicated what they think of SSBN’s by employing them as rapidly as possible. Discussion of this type of delivery vehicle can remain very limited because Soviet defense planners realize the added capabilities that SSBN’s allow them among the different alternatives they would like to have available for putting nuclear warheads on target.8
It will no doubt take the Soviets several years to accrue the necessary numbers of SSBN’s and the experience to operate this type of weapon in a highly professional manner. In view of their ability to reach goals sooner than we had forecast, it probably will not be long before they reach their SSBN goal. There is no reason to assume they will not be able to duplicate Polaris by the early 1970s, if not sooner. Then this system at full strength and on station will present us with the same ASW problem that our present fleet of Polaris subs gives the Soviet defense strategist.
This article has been limited to six areas of weapons and forces. The discussion has covered the more prominent problems facing U.S. Air Force and Navy planners today as a result of a seemingly new approach to defense problems by those who establish Soviet military goals. Also, I would like to leave this thought: The Soviet approach to problem solving often seems simple, but it is very versatile and effective.
In the beginning I posed the question, “How ready and how successful is this latest Russian approach?” The Russians are leaving no stone unturned in developing as varied a defense establishment as possible, and it appears that they have given equal attention to defensive and offensive weapon systems. It is for us to be constantly aware of possible new technological developments, new weapon systems, and new tactics. We must be prepared in the future to contend with an opponent who has shown he intends to be second to none when it comes to the defense of his homeland.9 While the Russian military hierarchy may have its roots deeply imbedded in the thought and experience of land warfare and general forces, there seems to be little doubt that new ideas, new weapons, and new leaders are entering the Soviet scene.
United States Air Force Academy
Notes
1. V. D. Sokolovskii, ed., Soviet Military Strategy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 338.
2. “Sowjets zielen auf absolute Ueberlegenheit,” Die Welt (Hamburg), 13 March 1968, p. 1.
3. U.S. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, “Soviet Space Programs: Organization, Plans, Goals, and International Implications,” 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 52.
4. “Orbital Missile Hinted by Soviet,” New York Times, 19 November 1967, p. 15.
5. “The Soviet Thrust,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 13 November 1967, p. 21.
6. “Soviet Comeback as Power in Middle East Causes Rising Concern in West,” New York Times, 15 January 1968, p. 1.
7. “Russians Building Aircraft Carrier; Policy Shift Seen,” New York Times”, 23 October 1967, p. 1.
8. “Soviet Missile Submarines on Patrol Off U.S. Coasts,” New York Times, 10 May 1968, p. 3.
9. “Creativeness in Total Defense,” Anthony Harrigan, Military Review, July 1968, p. 12. “The rethinking of our needs is, of course, a mission for the US military services inasmuch as the basic role of the US Armed Forces is to insure the survival of our society.”
Major William T. Wilson (M.A., Stanford University) is Assistant Professor of German, USAF Academy. Commissioned upon graduation from Texas A&M in 1954, he has served as Radar Intercept Officer in two lighter squadrons of Air Defense Command; as Navigator with the 964th Airborne Early Warning and Communications Squadron; McClellan AFB, California; as Intelligence Officer in ADC lighter squadrons; and with DCS/I, Eastern Air Defense Force, and ACS/ I, Alaskan Air Command. Major Wilson studied German under AFIT, has presented papers on Soviet force structuring at two symposiums of Military Operations Research Society, and is a consultant to the Hq USAF Policy Planning Studies.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor