Air University Review, November-December 1968

Global Air Defense Through Mobility

Major General William D. Greenfield

For the past two decades the Aerospace Defense Command has been equipping, training, and providing a variety of forces for employment in air defense. Initially, this commitment was devoted to defending certain major industrial and population centers of the United States against air attack. Now, however, the concept embraces defense of the entire North American continent under a highly automated and sophisticated system of aerospace defense. Forces are being provided by Canadian and United States armed services for employment within the operational framework of the North American Air Defense Command.

This current system of air defense is oriented primarily against the threat of attack by manned aircraft. Paradoxically, the major threat now stems from the intercontinental ballistic missile and various missile system derivatives, such as the fractional orbital bombardment system, submarine-launched cruise missiles, and air-launched missiles of one kind or another. To be sure, the manned bomber still represents a sizable threat to the North American continent, but on a more modest scale than that originally envisaged for the existing defense system. Consequently, changes in the kind, order, and magnitude of threat are bringing about corresponding changes and adjustments to the system. In effect, the United States Air Force is moving from a system of predominantly air defense to one of aerospace defense that takes into account a full threat spectrum ranging from missiles and space vehicles to manned aircraft employing both air-launched missiles and gravity bombs. The shift was implicit in the recent order redesignating Air Defense Command as Aerospace Defense Command (ADC).

One highly significant and important phase in this transitional period is the development of a global air defense capability. Basically, global air defense calls for highly mobile, quick-reaction air defense forces composed of air-refuelable fighter-interceptor aircraft and attendant command, control, and support elements capable of worldwide deployment to any theater of operation. In view of the increased emphasis upon this aspect of air defense along with recent deployments of Aerospace Defense Command interceptors outside the continental United States, it seems timely to review the command’s progress in creating a mobile air defense force, global in nature and highly responsive to crisis situations involving lesser forms of conflict than nuclear war. Let us examine first some of the recent events that have given rise to this need.

Until 1961, air defense doctrine and planning were shaped, in large part, by the strategy of massive retaliation espoused during the Eisenhower Administration. Air defense forces were tailored almost exclusively to meet the threat against the North American continent and were employed in depth to provide area defense while point defense was left largely to air defense missiles. This technique accorded well with massive retaliation, since a Communist excursion anywhere in the world would be met with nuclear power. Air defense forces had to be constantly ready to guard against any counteroffensive move against this continent. One incident did occur, however, which dramatically pointed up the need for some degree of mobility of air defense forces.

In 1958 Communist Chinese forces were seriously threatening the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, located in the Taiwan Strait, and ultimately Taiwan itself. To meet this threat, the Air Defense Command was tasked to provide F-104 interceptors to Taiwan. Because these aircraft were not equipped for in-flight refueling, they were disassembled, loaded aboard C-124 aircraft, and airlifted to their destination on Taiwan. The operation was neither a timely nor an efficient technique for mobility.

In the early l960s, the Kennedy Administration adopted a strategy of flexible response, which placed renewed emphasis upon improving the abilities of the armed forces in a conventional role for limited-war situations. Harking back to the 1958 Taiwan crisis, several voices were raised within ADC for a mobile air defense force. Some preliminary planning was done, and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 again saw air defense interceptors deployed outside the United States. Since that time, air defense interceptors and command and control elements have, on occasion, been deployed to various overseas locations. Following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964, the worsening situation in Southeast Asia gave increased impetus to creating a global air defense capability.

In the summer of 1965 events in Southeast Asia led to a large-scale, rapid buildup of forces in that area. Concurrently, studies were initiated at ADC headquarters on the most feasible method of deploying F-102 interceptors there. Previous movements of these aircraft overseas were by ship, a slow and costly process that did not readily lend itself to the urgency of the buildup. Consequently, Air Force Logistics Command was asked to do an engineering study on the feasibility of an in-flight refueling system for the F-102. By the end of 1965 AFLC, working with Convair, had developed and proved such a system. Essentially, it consisted of a refueling tube mounted externally along the right side of the fuselage and terminating in the fuselage tank. This rig proved highly effective at only a small penalty to aircraft performance in the cruise configuration, and it could be easily installed and removed in minimum time. In early 1966 sufficient quantities of these probes had been procured and installed to allow ADC F-102 aircrews to be trained in aerial refueling. By February 1966, F-102 aircraft had been deployed to Southeast Asia by using this in-flight refueling system. Later that same year additional air-refuelable F-102s were deployed. General Thatcher, then Commander of ADC, regarded these deployments as the real beginning of mobile air defense.

The in-flight refueling system designed for the F-102 was purely an interim measure to facilitate overseas deployment. Once these aircraft were in their theater of operation, the probes were removed. Although it served to prove the concept of mobile air defense, the F-102 program never reached major proportions. For some time prior to these deployments, the F-102 aircraft had been earmarked for those Air National Guard squadrons assigned an air defense mission. By the time of the Southeast Asia buildup in 1965, the ANG program of converting to F-102s was well under way. Conversion is now complete, and only one full-scale F-102 fighter-interceptor squadron remains in the ADC active inventory. While the F-102 played a brief but highly significant role in furthering global air defense, ADC still did not have a force in-being to fulfill the concept.

The air defense staff urgently began consideration of other aircraft for the worldwide role. Ultimately the F-106 became the interim choice, since it seemed to be the best existing aircraft to offer the combination of high speed, maneuverability, and acceleration demanded by the global air defense situation, particularly in the air-to-air role. The concept of employment envisioned by the planners was basically twofold: the F-106 along with command, control, and supporting elements would deploy to a crisis area and provide the air defense required for the friendly forces and lines of communication—the classic air defense role; and the F-106 would be used to augment or fulfill the air-to-air combat mission—the classic air superiority role.

The effectiveness of the F-l06 in classic air defense is without question, having been proved by its mission in North American air defense. Contrariwise, the global air defense mission is largely carried out in a crisis area or during a limited war wherein air defense fighter forces oppose first-line enemy fighter aircraft. The nature of the F-106s’ North American mission left it relatively untried in the fighter-versus-fighter role. The next evolutionary step, then, in the development of a global air defense capability was to put the F-106 to the test.

In the spring of 1966 the first of a series of fighter-versus-fighter tests was carried out. These tests served two important purposes: first, they were designed to indoctrinate selected ADC aircrews in classic air-to-air combat maneuvers in a purely visual environment; second, they evaluated the effectiveness of the F-106 in the three-dimensional field of maneuver of fighter-versus-fighter combat. Of particular concern was determining the degree of control response and aircraft stability throughout its full performance envelope. To that end, the F-l06 was pitted against the F-102 and the F-104. It exhibited superior characteristics while the ADC aircrews, relatively inexperienced in the air-to-air maneuvering environment, encountered little difficulty in handling the aircraft at the extreme limits of its flight envelope. As a result of these tests, a qualification training program in aerial combat maneuvers for F-106 aircrews was formally adopted and implemented for selected squadrons.

Further tests were conducted at the Tactical Air Command’s Fighter Weapons School at Nellis AFB, Nevada, to determine optimum employment techniques in a hostile fighter environment. In these tests, conducted in a ground-controlled interception (GCI) environment, the F-l06 was arrayed against the F-4C. Here the ADC aircrews enjoyed a decided advantage because of their greater experience in the radar environment. They were particularly adept at early target acquisition on radar and at making the kind of scope display interpretation to permit rapid and precise maneuvering for a fighter kill. The F-106 compared most favorably in performance and maneuverability with the F-4C. These tests, coupled with additional ones at the Aerospace Defense Command Weapons Center at Tyndall AFB, Florida, have provided a sound basis for optimum employment of the F-106 in the fighter-versus-fighter role and for the aircrew aerial combat training program.

Training in aerial combat maneuvers begins with a series of classroom instructional periods on the aircraft and its flight characteristics in the air combat environment. These are followed by comprehensive instruction in the kinds of aerial combat maneuvers and flight tactics most likely to be employed in air-to-air combat. The initial flying qualification phase of the training consists of twelve missions. Confidence maneuvers in the low-speed regime and at extreme angles of attack come first. Training then progresses gradually to full-scale employment of the F-106 using optimum techniques in both the GCI and the purely visual environments. At this juncture it is well to emphasize that this basic program is often the first experience an ADC pilot has in maneuvering his aircraft to defend himself, especially in maneuvering at maximum performance limits to gain the offensive. Just as the ability to thread a needle does not a tailor make, neither does completion of the twelve-sortie aerial combat maneuvering program make a fighter pilot. It does lay a firm basis for developing the necessary skills. More important, the pilot gains confidence while acquiring fundamentals vital to success in the fighter-versus-fighter arena. His continuation training focuses on developing these skills so that maneuvering for a weapons launch advantage is the paramount objective.

One technique for employment of the F-106 in area air defense operations in the hostile fighter environment requires a formation of four aircraft under GCI control. Since visual identification of the unknowns may be necessary, the four F-106s, at the time of commitment, would move to an “elements in trail” formation, and the lead element would then accomplish the identification while the in-trail element, spaced 6 to 10 miles back, would make the attack.

When employed under GCI control, the F-106 would normally carry two radar and two infrared (IR) guided missiles. If the attack is made with a radar lock-on, all four missiles would be fired automatically. If the attack should occur at close-in ranges where automatic tracking is not possible, the m missiles can be fired in a visual pursuit launch. In a non-GCI environment, where most engagements come from close-in combat, an armament load of four IR missiles would most likely be carried. Serious consideration is also being given to installing guns in the weapon bay of the F-l06.

The approach to worldwide air defense requires broadly based tactics and employment techniques. Globally, the air defense force would be confronted with employment in both GCI and non-GCI environments where aggressor forces could conceivably be composed of bombers, transports, first-line fighters, as well as surface-launched and air-launched cruise missiles. All of these are considerations inherent in the global air defense concept. Aerial combat maneuvering, combat tactics, and employment techniques must, perforce, be applied accordingly.

Simultaneously with the development of aerial combat tactics and employment techniques, the development of the concept of operations began, along with the operation plan establishing the global air defense mission and tasking the necessary organizations. The mobile air defense proposal was formally placed before the Air Staff in early 1966. Subsequently a memorandum outlining the concept was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. Acceptance of the idea was reflected in the Secretary of Defense Posture Statements of 1967 and 1968. Secretary McNamara, speaking before the House Armed Services Committee in February 1968, commented on the purposes that our air defense system might serve in the 1970s. One purpose:

Providing a complete mobile “air defense package” which would include a transportable control system and a refuelable or long-range interceptor, preferably one which is capable of close combat under visual identification rules.

With the air defense mobility concept firmly accepted by the Department of Defense, and with the approval, publication, and distribution of the operation plan creating the mission, the time seemed appropriate to formalize this concept in an Air Force directive. Air Force Regulation 23-9, published on 12 February 1968, restated the Aerospace Defense Command mission:

To discharge United States Air Force responsibilities for aerospace defense of the United States and to provide forces for defense of oversea land areas as required.

Headquarters USAF directed ADC to develop and submit such a manual to the Air Staff for review and approval. Draft Air Force Manual 2-41 was completed and forwarded in late 1967. Essentially, it prescribes the operational concepts and capability standards for aerospace defense forces of the USAF providing defense of U.S. and allied resources overseas. Since global air defense forces would be deployed in support of unified or specified commands, AFM 2-41, Operational Concepts and Capability Standards for World-Wide Employment of Air Defense Forces, will be published to provide essential guidance to those commands posturing, supporting, and employing the air defense contingent.

An indispensable ingredient of mobile air defense is an effective command and control system. The global air defense mission entails deployments not only to prepared bases in areas with existing radar networks and command and control systems but also to more austere areas where radar and command and control systems are extremely limited or nonexistent. Deployments in the former circumstances present little or no problem; indeed, the F-106 fire control system is being provided an automatic data link with the highly automated air defense systems now being deployed in certain areas of Europe and the Far East. In the latter circumstances, several possibilities for command and control suggest themselves.

First, deployment of ADC forces to a crisis area where little or no radar network exists would, in all likelihood, be accompanied by a similar deployment of Tactical Air Command (TAC) forces and their attendant Tactical Air Control System (TACS). In this situation, the ADC forces would function as a subelement of the theater air forces and would be charged with the active air defense mission. Certain ADC aircraft control and warning squadrons have been tasked to develop and maintain weapons controller proficiency in the employment of ADC interceptors in such an environment; and some of the weapons controllers and associated technicians would very likely be deployed to assist in conducting the air defense missions. A second possibility for providing command and control lies in the use of ADC airborne early-warning and control (AEWC) aircraft. These EC-121 aircraft offer an excellent means of control in those areas where they can be placed on surveillance stations over water much as they now are off the east and west coasts of the United States. From overwater stations these aircraft can provide good radar coverage of adjacent land areas. A third possibility is the use of a mobile, air-transportable radar and command and control system. This alternative is presently under study by the air defense staff. The problem of command and control inherent in the global air defense mission will eventually be solved with the development of a new Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).

The feasibility of AWACS depends upon the successful development of a “downward-looking” airborne radar that can provide detection coverage of aircraft over land at any altitude. Work on overcoming the problem of ground clutter has been under way for sometime now, and a solution has been demonstrated. With the required technology within reach, development of the AWACS using large jet aircraft such as the C-135 or C-141 should proceed apace. The AWACS aircraft coupled with the F-106 would then provide unlimited possibilities for mobility and rapid reaction. In effect, a truly global capability emerges.

The F-106 required some refinements during its adaptation for a mobile air defense role. The most important of these modifications was an in-flight refueling capability. The entire F-106 fleet is being modified with an internally stowed refueling receptacle located in the top center portion of the fuselage. In its air refueling mode, the F-106 has proved highly compatible with SAC’S KC-135 tankers. ADC aircrews normally complete their initial aerial refueling qualification in four missions, including both day and night sorties. One of these is at least five hours long. Several long endurance flights have been made with the F-106, three of the most significant ones occurring recently. The first was a flight of four F-106s from McChord AFB, Washington, to the Southeast Training Area in the Gulf of Mexico, where they executed live firing passes in a GCI environment against Ryan BQM-34A drones launched from the ADC Weapons Center at Tyndall AFB, Florida. The aircraft recovered at Tyndall. The second involved a flight of four F-106s from Richards-Gebaur AFB, Missouri, to Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. The third was a flight of eighteen F-106s from McChord AFB, Washington, to Naha Air Base, Okinawa. They flew in flights of six aircraft each, and the trip was made in two legs, the second being of 10 hours 30 minutes duration and involving four in-flight refuelings.

Another refinement of the F-106 was the installation of two 360-gallon external fuel tanks aerodynamically designed for the full supersonic capability of the aircraft thereby permitting sustained speeds approaching mach 2. These new tanks may also be refueled in flight. They significantly increase the range and performance capability of the F-106s and permit optimum cruise conditions. The aircraft’s MA-1 fire-control system is also being modified for greater maintainability and reliability through installation of a solid-state computer. This modification, together with certain technical refinements in the fire-control system modes of operation_, will provide a highly reliable system—a crucial factor when the aircraft is deployed to some of the more austere areas of the world.

As stated initially, the Aerospace Defense Command has been providing forces for aerospace defense for more than twenty years. These are not sometime forces; they are highly trained forces in-being, ready for instant employment. What the Aerospace Defense Command is now prepared to do is to adapt and apply its experience to the world arena. Plans have been drawn, forces earmarked, and personnel trained to that end. Already, international events are proving the efficacy of the concept of specially tailored forces for global air defense. An interim capability exists. It has been tried and proved in deployments to Alaska, from McChord AFB to Tyndall AFB, and to overseas locations. Other training deployments are being planned so that the requisite forces, along with their airlift, tanker, support, and command and control elements can be exercised as a complete package. The Military Airlift Command has been providing airlift as needed, but eventually ADC will have its own specially configured airlift forces for global deployments. The AWACS, internal airlift, and the improved F-106 will ultimately provide the long-term capability so urgently needed. Once these are acquired, along with earmarked SAC tanker forces, the Aerospace Defense Command will be able to “scramble” to the four corners of the globe with a force that is ready to fight at the moment of its arrival in the theater of operations. In effect, this concept is a logical extension of the Aerospace Defense Command mission as it has been practiced within the North American continent for the past two decades.

Hq Aerospace Defense Command

Contributor

Major General William Dumont Greenfield is Commander, Central Region of the North American Air Defense Command, and Tenth Air Force, Richards-Gebaur AFB, Missouri. After graduating from Miami University in 1936 and from flying training in 1940, he served with the 8th Pursuit Group, Langley Field, Virginia, later in England; next with the 80th Pursuit Squadron, Australia and New Guinea, 1942; then as Commander, 313th Fighter Squadron to November 1943; Commander, 50th Fighter Group, in Florida, England, and France, to October 1944; as Chief, Combat Analysis Branch, Evaluation Division,. Army Air Forces Board, to September 1945; as Chief, Allocations Branch, Operations Division, Hq AAF, 1946-49; Chief, USAF Mission to Venezuela, to 1952; student, Air War College, 1953. Except for a tour as Commander, 316th Air Division, Rabat, Morocco, 1958-60, General Greenfield has been continuously in Air Defense command or staff assignments since 1953.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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