Air University Review, September-October 1967
Lieutenant Colonel Edward P. Mazak, Jr.
Americans in particular seem to have a strong inclination to record things for posterity, to “get it down on paper” so that all can read and heed. Apparently we are convinced, and with some justification, that “experience is the best teacher.” The military community has long been a strong advocate of using past experiences as a basis for applying tactics and strategies to new situations. This approach may be responsible, in part, for the slow, painful extension of the military into the arena of space.
Of course, the military is now irrevocably involved in space activities, much to the delight of some and to the regret of others. And now is an excellent time to examine carefully where we are and where we are going in space. Also the opportunity now exists to consider how the current situation evolved and to learn from the experiences of the past.
The beginnings of the Space Age have been more than adequately described in
two books recently published: The History of Rocketry and Space Travel* by
Von Braun and Ordway, and This New Ocean** by Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander. These books have much to offer the
military reader. Within the bounds of security limitations, both books provide
an insight into the rationale that shaped
The History of Rocketry and Space Travel, as is apparent from the
title, covers a considerable period of time in an effort to trace the
development of the rocket motor and show its effect on military weapons. The
book is interestingly illustrated and offers a tasteful mixture of science,
fantasy, and personal analysis. It does not provide the serious military reader
with the rigorous treatment of
The authors and the publisher have packaged most attractively extensive information on this facet of technology. Most technical libraries should have a copy, to provide their readers with an appreciation of the men and technical skills that were required to exploit a new approach to the propulsion problem.
The major weakness of the book derives from essentially the same source as its strength. The personal experiences of Dr. von Braun in the initial development of rockets, for both military and space use, seem to overwhelm the efforts of others involved in collateral efforts. The Von Braun team comes on just a bit too strong for this reader’s taste.
As a result of this emphasis the
But in spite of its insisting “I told you so,” the book does sell. The depth of material and the personal experience of Von Braun combine to produce an intelligent and understandable review of all those events that have fashioned our existing technology in rockets and space travel. Some of its timeliness will be rapidly overshadowed by the advance of the world’s space efforts, so read it now!
The second book, This New Ocean, is considerably different in scope, approach, and purpose. Although its NASA team of authors has included some ancient history, the purpose is well served: to establish the technological base from which Project Mercury was launched. The book is composed of three sections, each written by a different man, yet the style seems consistent and a surprising continuity is maintained throughout. I found it interesting and readable. If there is too much detail for some readers, they must remember that the purpose of the book is to record events in detail.
The development of the Mercury program is shown from the civilian point of
view, unlike the other book’s military slant. Readers of both books will be
able to draw some interesting conclusions about initial
But no matter what the approach, the Mercury program is fascinating reading. From the initial proposals, through the technological developments, to the ultimate successful orbital flights, the NASA team of authors has managed to capture the spirit that characterized the program. It is a privilege to get even part way behind the scenes and see just how a major national space program is organized, directed, and pursued. Aside from the managerial and technical skills associated with Mercury, the writers have managed to provide some indication of the personalities involved, a facet often lacking in histories.
In fact, the story of Project Mercury is basically a story about people rather than technology. The ideas and materials required to place man in space were available, but the stimulus to put them together derived primarily from personality. These men did not always work in harmony, and the in-fighting must have been fierce, but the program increased in vigor as a result of the give and take involved. And of course the impact of the program on the American public was strengthened by the personalities of the astronauts themselves. Their impact on Mercury was perhaps more significant than any other factor.
This New Ocean tells the Mercury story fairly and completely. Everyone with an interest in space research and development will find it absorbing and profitable reading. Everyone with an interest in drama and adventure also will find excitement between the same covers.
It seems that there is much to learn from the experience gained in achieving manned orbital flight. The military community, in particular, stands to profit from a careful review of the initial efforts to master space technology. Several specific items caught this reviewer’s attention in reading the two histories.
The services came out second-best in attempting to be first to put man in space and also in directing the succeeding Apollo program. At least part of the difficulty lay in the lack of a recognized in-house scientific expertise.
The technological risk inherent in the Mercury program was a paramount point in the selection of a civilian agency with a record of technical success to do the job. I do not minimize the desire of the government to establish space for peaceful purposes; but if the services had been better prepared to propose and defend their initial space programs with a generic technical competence on a par with that available outside the military, a combined approach by a NASA/military team might have proved to be more nearly the optimum solution.
The concept of using the combined talents of the civilian and military communities has, of course, been since introduced into the Apollo program with great success. I suspect that each group has learned to appreciate the singular contributions of the other. But for such a partnership to continue to show a mutual profit, the contributions of both sides must continue.
What is derived from this part of the history is that the military cannot again neglect the area of research by its own people. The problems of the future are often solved by techniques discovered in pursuit of something quite different. The current practice of funding only those research programs that have a clearly defined objective is, at best, a shortsighted one. Surely the defense budget has a place for research programs, conducted by military scientists, that explore targets of opportunity or, in more common terms, areas of compelling interest to the researcher.
The Von Braun team was a significant part of the Army’s efforts to accomplish the major portion of the nation’s space program. Their technical competence alone almost made them successful. The Air Force, on the other hand, contracted for most of its technical support, and in my opinion this method was not as responsive as the Redstone organization. It is questionable that the Air Force was really ready to assume the primary role in putting man in space.
The number of engineers and scientists in uniform or employed directly by the services is quite large. Yet only a small percentage of these trained men actually perform in a scientific role. This does not mean that all scientists should be placed in a laboratory, given a blank check, and told to work as their fancy dictates; it does suggest that the military has the necessary basic technical resources but must organize this talent, provide adequate funds and facilities, and guide the research effort with a gentle, informed hand. No one can say what the next national crash program will be, but one can say with some assurance that a competent technical force will be required for its accomplishment.
Another interesting point hidden in the history of rocket development through the Mercury Project is that of compartmentalization of information. The fundamental work of Goddard on rocket theory was not as valuable as it might have been because his data were not disseminated to all those who had use for them. The end result was finally reached, but at the expense of time and some duplication of effort. Some similar penalties were paid in our early space efforts because of a lack of free interchange of information.
Even today most of the effort expended by the Air Force in the area of space systems is done under the “need to know” concept of security. Only those with a direct and specific requirement are allowed access to the project files. Those with a collateral or general interest in a particular subject find it almost impossible to learn what is being done. Under the present system the least effect is a slowdown in the proper exchange of ideas; worse yet, valuable information may be denied those who need it. Granted, security is essential; but so also is the timely exchange of knowledge. Perhaps some change can be effected that will satisfy both the security officer and the scientist.
One final point of salient interest to the Air Force reader concerns the developmental history of the rocket motor. Both in theory and reality, the rocket has been with us for a long time. This method of propulsion (excluding the ion and plasma systems) is now being pushed to practical, if not technical, limits. The physical size of our most powerful rocket is looming as the major barrier to placing large payloads in orbit economically. Some new technique or invention is needed.
One step in the right direction was the recent fiscal support given to the nuclear rocket development program of the Atomic Energy Commission. This particular program has been worked on at varying levels of effort for several years. It offers the hope of providing an efficient booster system that will enable very large payloads to be orbited.
The military must continue to search for a new solution to the propulsion problem. This can best be done by making effective use of in-house technical capability in consonance with the talents of industry. In the fiscal environment currently existing at the DOD level, it is difficult to obtain funds for research not specifically oriented to an end item. The savings resulting from this fiscal attitude may not be enough to offset the overall disadvantage of maintaining an inefficient status quo. The problems of the future must be solved in the laboratories today. The number of solutions found is dependent upon the money and effort expended.
Not every Air Force officer will be interested in reading both The History of Rocketry and Space Travel and This New Ocean in their entirety. They are long books and quite detailed. But they do offer a chance to become acquainted with the magnitude and complexity of efforts associated with the early phases of our national space program. Every officer can find something of interest and value merely by thumbing through the pages.
The military services, and particularly the Air Force, are committed to the support that space systems now offer. It is essential that the services be aware of what the future can provide in this area of military activity. Men, money, and material must be made available to insure that succeeding generations of space systems are developed efficiently. Successes of the future will depend upon how much we have learned from the experiences of the past.
Defense Atomic Support Agency