Air University Review, November-December 1967
Lieutenant Colonel Edward O. Stillie
The war in
Most of us agree that today’s world situation indicates a strong probability
of
evolution of national and
military policy
To refresh one’s memory of the changing nature of national policy and its
inherent effect upon military doctrine and strategy, it is necessary to look
back a few years into our military past. History has recorded, and we as
students of military strategy are familiar with, the nature of the conflict and
the conditions surrounding World Wars I and II and the Korean affair. Perhaps
the period immediately following
Our dilemma was short-lived, however, as the development of a nuclear delivery capability within our fighter force soon created a new dimension in tactical air warfare. Air refueling extended the range of fighter aircraft, permitting rapid intercontinental deployment of forces. In 1956 the Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) concept was conceived, and this capability to rapidly deploy small units with an abundance of destructive firepower helped further to shift the emphasis from a large strategic bomber/missile force to a more flexible and mobile system of employing nuclear weapons. During 1957, the fighter wings of the Strategic Air Command were either transferred to TAC or deactivated as the massive retaliation concept continued to gain momentum. Little capability was retained within the Air Force to fight a conventional type of war, and such a requirement for the future was given little consideration.
Our sister services also were geared for all-out warfare. The Navy removed guns from ships of the line and replaced them with missiles. Fleet air groups were converted to nuclear delivery roles, and the ballistic missile submarine was introduced. The Army equipped its forces with guns capable of nuclear delivery and developed rockets and missiles with a nuclear capability. By 1960 the servicewide conversion was completed, although during this period there had been little interservice relationship and interface of effort, each military department being allowed to proceed more or less on its own volition.
During the period of our nuclear conversion, however, there began to materialize some definite and different trends in the Soviet approach to international conflict. Her classic announcement of the decision to foster and support worldwide insurgencies was made to the world, and her intentions to promote this policy soon became evident. Red China’s challenge to Soviet primacy in the Communist World, her nuclear progress, and her revolutionary fervor added food for thought for the geopoliticians. Our involvement in various contingency situations clearly indicated that there were serious threats to our national security far short of general war. With changes being made in our foreign policy to counter these situations, it again became necessary to develop new concepts for the employment of our military forces.
TAC capabilities at the beginning of Vietnam
Today it is academic whether we fault the national policy-makers or the
military planners for failing to respond to these geopolitical trends. As we
entered the war in
Fortunately, during the period immediately preceding
Generally speaking, however, we had again conformed to the pattern that has prevailed throughout history by permitting our military potential to reach a state of limited effectiveness-this time through inflexibility resulting from overemphasis on the philosophy of nuclear warfare.
tactical air forces to
The air resources most likely to be employed in limited wars and
counterinsurgencies are tactical air forces. Such forces must possess the
flexibility to react instantly and effectively to differing situations and
constraints requiring a variety of weapon systems to perform the classic roles
of air superiority, close air support, interdiction, air defense,
reconnaissance, tactical airlift, and special air warfare. TAC units became
gradually, but deeply, involved in
In essence, we have had to relearn to live and fight in a conventional war
environment and to fight jointly with the other services. Strange things have
occurred, and often we have had to improvise to fit some obsolete system to a
particular job. The role of the lowly O-1 forward air controller (FAC) aircraft
has often overshadowed that of the mighty intercontinental bomber. The
venerable C-47, redesignated AC-47 and armed with three 7.62-mm cannon, is
being used in a ground support role against the Viet Cong. We have become
experts in the not-too-glamorous art of special air warfare. The
problems in
We have had problems in
We are aware of these and other operational problems, and many have already been overcome, Our R&D, testing and training programs, and planning actions will provide other solutions at the earliest possible date.
Actual combat is the final test of the effectiveness of a military force. Just as our current capabilities, whether adequate or deficient, are tied to past decision, so will our future military posture become the result of the planning effort of today. Projecting ahead, we shall examine the thinking in TAC in terms of future capability objectives, force employment, and the organizational structure we feel will best enable us to do our job. Numerous analyses and studies have also been made or are in progress to insure that we will profit from experiences in the current conflict in designing our future forces. Considering first the hardware most likely to be employed by TAC in the future and the capability objectives we have set for these forces, we look first at the tactical fighter area.
tactical fighter force
In the development of a tactical fighter force, we must consider the need to perform a variety of discreet tasks, and, therefore, we are beset by a number of competing requirements. If we had the resources to specialize, we could provide a specific weapon system for each fighter task-counterair, interdiction, close air support, and air defense. This is not the case, and most of our fighter aircraft today are designed for penetration and ground attack, with the air-to-air combat capability, until recently, receiving little interest.
Air Force doctrine stresses that the crucial counterair battle will be won
by attacking enemy aircraft on their home airfields. This rationale is
particularly valid in general war; but, as we have seen, in a limited-war
situation international considerations may preclude such strategy, and we may
be required to destroy enemy air power solely by air-to-air combat. Whether
control of the air is gained by suppressing the enemy force in the air or on
the ground or by a combination of the two, we must possess the means to control
the air and to do so as quickly as possible. Our experiences in
In terms of air defense of overseas land areas, we must be able to detect, intercept, and destroy an enemy intruder force under any type of weather situation and in any environmental condition. Needed are improved systems, both stationary and airborne, for identifying and tracking enemy aircraft-systems designed specifically to support the air defense mission. Our air defense resources must be flexible and deployable on a global basis. Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and other methods of enemy detection and intercept control are being studied and show considerable promise.
The objective of interdiction operations is to destroy enemy forces and material resources prior to their arrival at the time and location required to conduct effective, sustained military operations. Tactical air forces must be designed to disrupt the enemy line of communications (LOC) through destruction, delay, or harassment, to neutralize the effectiveness of enemy reserves and compromise the position of enemy forces engaged directly in combat. Air interdiction efforts must be based on continuing reconnaissance information and conducted in accordance with the plans and objectives of the theater commander. We must have the capability to respond with effective weapons and sensors to locate the enemy and to conduct interdiction operations on a sustained basis.
Close air support provides supporting firepower closely integrated with ground forces’ fire and maneuver. It provides escort and suppressive fire for airmobile forces and surveillance and security for Army patrols and probing operations. Adequate, well-coordinated close air support will normally be the decisive factor in the outcome of the battle. We must, therefore, be able to respond quickly and with adequate striking power to do the job. Such a capability demands mobile, flexible units with aircraft that offer a variety of tradeoffs among speed, range, loiter time, and payload.
Current and future tactical fighter forces will include the F-l00, F-105,
and F-4, the latter possessing our main air superiority capability. The F-111,
soon to become operational, will modernize and greatly enhance our fighter
force. We strongly support the F-X, a follow-on air superiority vehicle
designed to counter the air threat imposed by technology of the 1970-plus time
period. The prop-driven A-1 of the Special Air Warfare Force and the F-100 are
being employed in
reconnaissance
During peacetime and all phases of conflict, there is a requirement for accurate, adequate, and timely intelligence information. Airborne methods of collecting intelligence data include visual, photographic, radar, infrared, and electronic systems. Reconnaissance aircraft must be able to operate during all types of weather conditions, both day and night, and systems will vary from low-altitude, low-speed vehicles to supersonic, deep-penetration aircraft and missiles or drones. A systematic, visual surveillance program with strike aircraft on call for quick reaction is in-being today and is effective in visual weather conditions during daylight hours. In permissive environments, the airborne visual reconnaissance pilot is of invaluable service in the recce role, and this method of intelligence collection will continue to be used to great advantage in the future, particularly in light of the improved aircraft that are being programmed. High-performance aircraft are required for deep penetration of hostile territory, and high-speed, high-altitude characteristics are needed to insure reliability and survivability. Today the latter concept employs tactical fighter aircraft specially configured for the reconnaissance mission. Greatly improved sensor equipment is also needed for detection of enemy forces and LOC’s under adverse weather conditions and in all types of climate and terrain. The acquisition of reliable, jam-free sensors could, some day, revolutionize concepts for employing tactical air and Army ground forces in a combat situation. Our objective is to acquire a complete tactical air reconnaissance intelligence capability that includes, as part of the tactical air reconnaissance cycle, delivery of the product to the user.
As for equipment, the O-1 has been the workhorse of the visual reconnaissance pilot. These aircraft are soon to be replaced by the O-2 and OV-l0, which will provide greater capability in low-altitude reconnaissance and control. In the deep-penetration role, the RF-101 and RF-4 are now being employed, but the RF-10l is soon to phase out and the RF-111 will be introduced as a reconnaissance vehicle.
tactical airlift
Tactical airlift is the means by which personnel and materiel are air-delivered on a sustained, selective, or emergency basis to dispersal locations at any level of conflict, during all weather situations and over any type of terrain. These forces must be organized, trained, and equipped to provide maximum battlefield mobility and an effective air line of communications for ground combat units. Priorities are established and airlift sorties apportioned by the joint force commander to meet the needs of all the services. Centralized control of tactical airlift resources under the Air Force component commander provides the flexibility necessary to perform effectively and to insure that aircraft are available to respond to the apportionment made by the joint force commander.
There must be a coordinated interlock between tactical airlift and strategic airlift. We are similarly concerned over the interface with strategic sealift. With the development of the Fast Deployment Logistics Ship (FDL), a tactical STOL and follow-on V/STOL aircraft system could mesh with strategic sealift at coastal areas, obviating our reliance upon large port or sophisticated air base facilities for offloading and transshipment. Our objective, simply stated, is to satisfy user needs by delivering what is needed, where and when and in the quantities desired.
Today the C-130 aircraft is the basic system being employed in the role of
tactical airlift. The C-123, originally assigned a special air warfare mission,
is being used chiefly for tactical airlift in
special air warfare forces
The all-important and widely diversified special air warfare mission of tactical air forces involves the three interrelated areas of counterinsurgency, psychological operations, and unconventional warfare. More important, particular emphasis must be placed on using SAW forces in overseas internal defense operations prior to the occurrence of organized insurgent warfare. This includes the use of highly trained area-oriented Mobile Training Teams, which will train and assist indigenous air forces in internal defense, including civic-action and nation-building programs, psychological operations, and conventional/unconventional warfare. Aircraft whose configurations can be changed in the field to meet a variety of offensive, reconnaissance, logistics, and other tasks are required. Small, rugged aircraft are needed that can be operated from semiprepared surfaces under primitive conditions. They should be armored for crew protection, possess a high degree of survivability, and be capable of varying crew and payload configurations. Helicopters and fixed-wing vehicles with VTOL/STOL characteristics are vital in this type of operation. There should be commonality between USAF and Military Assistance Program (MAP) equipment committed to the SAW mission. Emphasis must be placed on low initial and support costs for SAW aircraft destined for use by indigenous air forces, and the equipment should be compatible with the varied technological capability of less-developed nations.
Psychological operations, designed to influence the behavior of the enemy, require tactics and techniques which may vary widely as the level of conflict changes. Airborne and ground communications equipment and leaflet-delivery devices are employed in concert with the ground effort to influence human behavior. Improved audio and leaflet-delivery systems are needed to insure a greater degree of effectiveness, and V/STOL or helicopter aircraft are particularly suited for this type of operation.
In unconventional warfare, SAW forces are used for the infiltration and exfiltration by air of personnel and materiel in areas under hostile control. Fixed-wing and V/STOL aircraft designed especially for this task are required. They should possess a low-level navigation capability, guidance devices for night and all-weather landings in unimproved areas, apparatus for airborne pickup and delivery, and secure air/ground communications.
Today we are using a variety of “cats and dogs” for the SAW mission, even some modified World War II aircraft. Among these are the O-1, U-10, B-26, A-1, C-47, and C-123. Needless to say, these aircraft have outlived their intended lifespan, but to date no other weapon system specifically designed for special air warfare has been made available. TAC has proposed a family of aircraft purposely designed for the many and varied tasks of this mission.
organization and forte
employment
Perhaps the top priority program in TAC today concerns future reconstitution
of our forces. Called the TAC Enhancement Program, it thus far concerns only
our fighter force but could involve our other forces as well following
cessation of hostilities in
We have given careful consideration to the types of conflict in which TAC is
likely to become involved and the changing environments in which our forces
must operate. Our forces must be configured to support national policy, and we
assumed that the
We have established that, in the future, we are most likely to encounter
low-intensity, conventional, nonnuclear conflicts, probably involving the
so-called
Our philosophy for employing tactical air forces is based on three main points:
First, the United States Air Force must be capable of operating as a unilateral instrument of national policy should this requirement be imposed by authority. Thus, the force must possess the full range of tactical air capability and should be politically suitable to carry out a show of force under control at the highest level or, as an alternative, to execute combat operations.
Second, tactical air forces must be capable of operating with indigenous forces, each force possessing its own level of capability and sophistication. This requires careful consideration when planning for the capabilities that must be built into our units.
Third, the tactical force must be ready to assume its role as a coequal partner with the Army and to interface with the Army’s current capabilities and those it will possess in the future. We also have similar though lesser responsibilities in our relationships with the Navy.
In developing our future force, we were careful to bear in mind our total responsibilities as a major USAF command: to organize, train, and equip forces for close combat and tactical airlift support of the Army; to carry out tactical air defense and interdiction operations; to conduct the full spectrum of special air warfare operations; and to participate in joint amphibious and airborne operations. Simultaneously, as AFSTRIKE, we must maintain a general reserve of combat-ready forces for overseas deployment and employment by the overseas unified commanders. Our forces must, therefore, be able to mesh with existing command structures without loss of motion or effectiveness, and they must readily adapt to existing command lines and operating procedures. Further, TAC forces may be required to operate where no command structure exists at all. In this type of environment, the command element will be provided as an integral part of the force on deployment.
It was against these considerations that we designed and postured our future fighter force. With the success we anticipate, this concept may well be applied to other organizations requiring a flexible, mobile, quick-reaction capability. Also, against the employment philosophy outlined, we have developed some broad objectives for the TAC Enhancement Program:
· The force will have a rapid-reaction capability. Combat units will deploy with all essential resources and be ready to commence operations within a matter of a few hours after reaching their operational base. They will be able to sustain operations indefinitely, provided an LOC is established to give the needed support.
· In order to respond to a wide variety of conflicts on a worldwide basis; TAC units will be able to operate from any one of an assortment of air bases: a main operating base with everything the commander needs to support his unit, a forward operating base with reduced facilities, a dispersed operating base that provides minimal support, or a bare base where any facility other than the landing strip would be considered a luxury.
· Not the least important of our objectives is the ability of TAC units to conduct wartime operations without reorganization. This may appear basic until one recalls that these units may be required to move into some other existing command structure or to conduct a variety of tasks from bases that offer support ranging from unlimited to almost none at all.
As specified in AFR 23-10, TAC is the Air Force agency responsible for developing doctrine for the worldwide deployment of tactical air forces. In this regard, we work closely with overseas tactical air force units in PACAF and USAFE to bring the widest range of knowledge and experience to bear on this task. A great deal of emphasis has been devoted to documenting our basic concepts and convictions, and these have been tested by wargaming, validated by CINCSTRIKE, and translated into USAF doctrinal manuals. Our unilateral Air Force manuals have recently been updated to provide our forces in the field with current rules for employment, and we maintain close liaison with our Army counterparts―particularly the Combat Developments Command―to insure that the same is true in the joint operations area. From this favorable position and applying the guidance contained in joint and Air Force publications, we evaluated our enhancement program from the standpoint of established doctrine and have postulated a future force capable of moving faster and fighting harder and more effectively than ever before.
basing requirements
In analyzing our ConUS basing requirements to establish the optimum, we
considered a variety of options: Should we have one tactical fighter wing per
base? Two wings per base? Or should we mix fighters,
reconnaissance, and airlift forces on the same base? Optimum basing is required
to meet the rapid-reaction criteria and the closure time to meet foreseeable
contingencies. We desire that our forces be located in close proximity to the
U.S. Army units that we must support, so as to facilitate joint training. We
further desire the best basing arrangement to permit maximum use of available
weapon ranges in the ConUS. Our forces would be balanced between TAC’s two
geographically oriented air forces, the Ninth Air Force in the eastern
aircrew training
From the standpoint of our wartime aircrew training program, our enhanced
organization must be able to operate effectively in peace and war. Here we had
to consider our overall aircrew requirements, the effect of the
The training concept which evolved was to maintain the three centralized combat crew training schools (CCTS’s) on a reduced basis, to introduce new pilots into our weapon systems. These schools would train pilots for the F-4 rear seat and F-111 right seat and provide A-7 pilots with training in transition and tactics. We would decentralize other training which has been accomplished by the CCT’s to the tactical wings and give them additional aircraft and people to do the job.
This concept is important for two reasons. First, and most important, the additional aircraft and people in the tactical wings will increase the resource base from which to deploy a full combat-ready wing, this being our goal. In addition, this configuration allows us to transition easily to the greater wartime aircrew training program because we will have not only the three centralized training schools, which can be expanded, but also a training capability existing in each wing. In other words, with our present force structure, we would have 15 potential Replacement Training Units (RTU’s) to support wartime training requirements. The RTU’s would support the wartime training requirements for both aircrews and maintenance personnel. The CCTS’s and RTU’s would both provide the same aircrew training course in wartime.
equipment
We recognize the need for additional equipment for our units to meet the mobility requirements we have established. Each tactical fighter wing will have as an objective its own bare base equipment, and certain items of heavy equipment can be prepositioned or pooled. Equipment-wise, however, the wing will be capable of deploying one, two, or three squadrons to operate from a bare base or from two forward operating locations, one of which may be a bare base.
squadron functions
We believe that numerous functions must be organic to the squadron and that the squadron commander should have something to command. We propose to give him people to handle his administrative needs and monitor his personnel program, and a small dispensary with a flight surgeon and some Medical Corpsmen; he will retain normal flight operations and training of aircrews; and he will have intelligence people to provide target folders and handle his escape and evasion program. Also organic to the squadron will be security and law enforcement personnel to guard its assets, some people to operate motor vehicle dispatch and vehicular maintenance sections, and a unit supply to maintain its mobility kits and records. It will have a maintenance capability to remove and replace parts, including aircraft engines, and to calibrate, test, and accomplish phased inspections on its aircraft. Mobility kits will contain spare parts and equipment to support operations while an LOC is being established.
Other resources required by the squadron may also deploy with the basic unit. This will vary according to the support capability of the deployment base. In other words; the squadron may be deployed to a main operating base that already supports the type of aircraft involved and may operate indefinitely with little or no additional help from the parent wing, or it could deploy to a bare base that requires additional people and resources from the wing to support its operation.
internal wing organization
This planned decentralization of functions will have a definite impact upon the internal organization of the tactical fighter wing. The wing will be geared to deployment/employment requirements, and the added training responsibilities. The objectives are (1) to provide a more effective organizational structure for our fighter wings; (2) to establish a training concept that will take us from peace to war and back to peacetime operations without reorganization; (3) to establish mobility requirements and long-lead-time items to meet these requirements; (4) to determine the additional personnel and materiel assets needed to configure the force; and (5) to recommend a ConUS basing structure.
The efforts we have expended in the current conflict and the opportunities
we have for further enhancing the effectiveness of our tactical air forces are part
of a continuing search for means to discourage aggression. The plan discussed
here will permit the Tactical Air Command to perform its mission better and
provide the air support needed by the Army in its peacetime and wartime
operations. Our goal, in simple terms, is to realize a tactical force with the
strength and effectiveness to deter limited aggression as effectively as our
strategic retaliatory forces have deterred general war, and, should this fail,
to provide the
Hq
Tactical Air Command
Lieutenant Colonel Edwards O. Stillie (B. S.,
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the
author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of
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