Air University Review, November-December 1967
Lieutenant Colonel David C. Collins
Statements by leaders at all levels concerning military operations in
Air Force Manual 11-1, Air Force Glossary of Standardized Terms and Definitions, defines doctrine as: “Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.” From this definition, we can isolate three basic elements of doctrine. First, it consists of fundamental principles; second, it guides the actions of military forces; and third, it supports our national objectives. The first two of these elements are readily recognized and widely accepted. The third, however, is less well known.
Military forces are maintained to support national objectives. National
policies, as expressed by the executive and legislative branches of our
government, determine the means by which we seek to achieve our national
objectives. Thus, a change in national strategy can generate a requirement for
new doctrinal concepts regarding the employment of our forces. A prime example
of this occurred in 1960. International political trends indicated that future
armed conflicts were most likely to be limited wars that would not involve the
employment of nuclear weapons. Accordingly,
It was only natural that some divergence of opinion between these services would result from such a major change in concept. Under the atomic concept, the Army bad been relegated, in the minds of many, to a police-force role following the air delivery of nuclear weapons, which would be the decisive phase of the war. Air Force thinking had been centered around its strategic retaliation capability for general war and the Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) concept for limited war. The change in national emphasis from nuclear to conventional weapons caused both the Army and Air Force to develop concepts for increasing the mobility and combat effectiveness of Army forces. The Army wanted to divest itself of the need to depend exclusively on the Air Force for all its close air support, reconnaissance, and airlift support. The Air Force, on the other hand, while indorsing the need for increased mobility for the Army, felt that such mobility should be provided by each service’s contributing those capabilities that it was best organized, equipped, and trained to perform.
The reader will recognize the preceding sentences on Army and Air Force positions as being generalized statements of the results of the Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board and the USAF Tactical Air Support Requirements Board, commonly referred to as the Howze Board and Disosway Board, respectively
A major recommendation of the Disosway Board was
that extensive joint testing and war gaming be conducted to determine the best
method of providing increased Army mobility. Tactical Air Command was directed
to develop comprehensive Air Force concepts for the employment of tactical air forces
in anticipation of such tests. This involved a major study effort by TAC and
led to the formation of the Tactical Air Warfare Center (TAWC) at Eglin AFB,
These concepts were given extensive tests both unilaterally and under the auspices of United States Strike Command. The tests of Air Force concepts culminated in Joint Exercise Gold Fire I, conducted by CINCSTRIKE in the fall of 1964.˚ Although the Air Force’s basic concepts were proved valid, Army aviation was greatly expanded to provide vastly increased numbers of helicopters and a limited number of short-range reconnaissance and airlift vehicles.
During this period Tactical Air Command undertook a major revision of the seven Air Force doctrinal manuals dealing with tactical air operations. The timing of this endeavor was very appropriate, for TAC was able to include in these manuals the latest concepts and doctrine that reflected the lessons learned in the tests just mentioned. Although these revised manuals adequately fulfilled the immediate requirement for current unilateral Air Force doctrine, they did not fill the void which then existed in doctrine jointly agreed to among the services.
The Air Force took a positive step to fill this void in early 1963 when Air Force Regulation 1-1, “Responsibilities for Doctrine Development,” was published. One of the primary purposes of this regulation was to clarify and assign the responsibility for developing, coordinating, and establishing doctrine and procedures for joint operations. Tactical Air Command was assigned responsibility for developing doctrine in coordination with designated agencies of the other services in the following areas:
Air defense from land areas other than continental
Tactics, techniques, and equipment of interest to the Air Force for amphibious operations
Procedures and equipment employed by the Air Force forces in airborne operations
Close combat air support of ground forces
Tactics, procedures, and equipment employed by air forces in counterinsurgency operations.
TAC immediately opened negotiations with the Army Combat Developments Command (CDC) to develop joint doctrine manuals on those subjects of primary interest to the Army and Air Force. CDC was not only receptive to the idea but eager and enthusiastic. Working together, TAC and CDC prepared draft manuals on airborne operations, tactical air support of land forces, and air defense from overseas land areas. This effort constituted the first major attempt by the Army and Air Force to reach agreement on joint tactical doctrine since the late fifties. The joint Tactical Air Command/ Continental Army Command (CONARC) manual, Joint Air-Ground Operations, which was published in September 1957, had served well to guide Army-Air Force operations throughout the world, although it did not enjoy departmental blessing. The shift in national emphasis from a strategy of nuclear retaliation to one of flexible response focused new attention on the requirement for joint operations. Since planning for such operations must be based on sound principles of doctrine, the requirement for jointly agreed, up-to-date doctrine assumed major importance.
Inasmuch as TAC is the Air Force command most closely associated with the Army for joint training, it was appropriate that TAC should work with CDC on development of joint Army-Air Force doctrine. The initial efforts between the commands produced important expressions of the two services’ views on several controversial issues. While the first drafts of the several manuals involved were of great value, an important side benefit was derived from the development conferences. Participants on both sides came to recognize the facts of life concerning future warfare involving conventional weapons. Basically, this boiled down to an acceptance of the idea that no single service could by itself completely dominate or win a future war. When this premise was accepted by all, the next step was obvious.
How can the capabilities of the services best be utilized to accomplish the overall objective? From the discussions this question provoked, a better understanding of the other service’s problems, limitations, and requirements for support emerged. As this mutual understanding developed, many of the past misunderstandings of the other service’s position disappeared. At this point in the discussions, a method of operation began to appear that would serve as a guide for future doctrinal development. Simply stated, this method was a recognition by all that progress in solving divergencies could only be achieved by a full and complete exchange of information by both services. Without complete knowledge and understanding of the other’s position, no discussion leading to militarily sound concepts could develop. With acceptance of this method of operation, true progress in the development of joint doctrine began to occur.
One of the first significant products to emerge from the efforts to agree on
joint doctrine was a concept for improved joint air-ground coordination. In
1962 the Army-Air Force fire support coordination system then in effect was
based on organizational and procedural arrangements set forth in the 1957
TAC/CONARC manual, Joint Air-Ground Operations. In an effort to improve
joint operations, CINCSTRIKE requested that a joint effort be undertaken by
TAC, CDC, and CONARC to analyze the organization for fire support coordination
and determine the optimum arrangement to support forces of varying magnitude.
As a result of this effort, a system referred to in the Air Force as the
revised Tactical Air Control System was developed. It corrected many of the
faults of the old system and provided an increased responsiveness of immediate
close air support and tactical air reconnaissance for the Army. The new
system underwent extensive testing in four USSTRICOM joint exercises―Three
Pairs, Coulee Crest, Swift Strike III, and Desert Strike. These tests proved
conclusively that the new system was vastly superior to the old. The concept
was officially approved by the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force in
early 1965 and is presently being used in
From the Army viewpoint, it seems likely that the most significant aspect of the jointly approved concept is the provision relating to apportionment and allocation of the tactical air effort. Prior to the agreement, no formalized arrangement existed by which tactical air would be routinely apportioned in advance to perform the close air support mission. The approved concept provides:
Apportionment. The unified/joint commander will decide, on a day-by-day basis, the proportion of the air effort he intends to apply to counterair, interdiction, and close air support tasks. His air and land component commanders will submit recommendations in this matter. Only the joint commander can change the daily apportionment of air effort.
Allocation. The air component commander will inform the land component commander daily of the number of close air support sorties that the component will commit in response to the apportionment by the joint commander. The land component commander may allocate these sorties to his subordinates. Subordinate commanders may sub-allocate the sorties. Land commanders allocating, sub-allocating, re-allocating sorties will inform the DASC [direct air support center] through the ALO [air liaison officer] at their echelon in addition to normal notifications through the chain of command.
Other significant achievements in the realm of joint doctrine include JCS Publication 8, Doctrine for Air Defense from Overseas Land Areas; AFM 2-50/FM 100-27, U.S. Army/ U.S. Air Force Doctrine for Tactical Airlift Operations; JCS Publication 12, Standardized Procedures for Use in Joint Operations; and FM 31-11/NWP22 (B) /AFM 2-53/LFM01, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. Many other manuals on subjects of joint concern are in various stages of coordination or preparation. They include such subjects as airborne operations, close air support of land forces, and ground defense of air bases.
Another milestone in the area of joint doctrine development was the agreement between the Chiefs of Staff, Army and Air Force, on the control and employment of certain types of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. The agreement resulted in the transfer to the Air Force of all Army-owned CV-2 aircraft, now designated C-7A. From a doctrinal standpoint one of the most important points in the agreement was a recognition by the Air Force that in cases of operational need the CV-2, CV-7, and C-123 types of aircraft performing supply, resupply, or troop-lift functions in the field area may be attached to the subordinate tactical echelons of the field army as determined by the appropriate joint force commander. In effect, what this amounts to is an Air Force commitment to the Army to meet its requirement for support from these types of aircraft. When operational requirements so dictate, we have agreed to attach these units to the Army, which can then employ them as it sees fit.
It becomes obvious that tremendous progress has been and is being made in
development of joint doctrine. However, much remains to be accomplished. TAC is
convinced that as new weapon systems are developed a corresponding development
of operational doctrine for their employment is required, to insure that they
are properly integrated into the overall efforts of tactical air forces. In
this regard, the conflict in
Although TAC initiates and develops most of the new doctrinal concepts for employment of tactical air forces, careful attention is given to the ideas and recommendations of all Air Force commands with tactical forces assigned. Almost every agency within the Air Force either directly or indirectly concerned with a doctrinal subject is given an opportunity to comment and coordinate on proposed doctrine. Comments received from these sources are included in revised drafts, which are then recirculated for additional coordination. Thus draft manuals may go through several revisions and require extended periods of time to progress from the initial stage of preparation to the point where the manual can be submitted to Hq USAF for Air Staff approval. In revision of joint manuals, the process is complicated by the fact that all the services must agree to each change proposed, which further lengthens the time required for approval and publication. This seemingly endless process can be frustrating, particularly to the action officer responsible for shepherding a manual from inception to publication. It is, however, a necessary process, since doctrine, once published, becomes authoritative and influences operations and planning decisions at all levels.
In spite of the success being achieved in developing doctrine, one pitfall
remains. It concerns the difference between doctrine and procedures. There is
an increasing trend throughout the services to incorporate within doctrinal
manuals not only guidance on what to do but also instructions on how to do it.
They are usually incorporated in a section of the manual called “procedures
for.” The danger in this approach is twofold. First, fundamental principles,
which are intended to be used as a guide to actions, are often overlooked or
ignored by the individual concerned with getting the job done. He becomes
obsessed with the “how” rather than the “why” of doing something. Second,
according to the JCS definition of doctrine, those fundamental principles are
authoritative but require judgment in application. Judgment is required to
apply the principles in accordance with the situation as it exists at a
particular time and place. Thus the procedures for conducting air strikes
against the enemy might be entirely different in
While major progress is being made in resolving some of the problems of long standing between the Army and Air Force, the job is far from complete. Much remains to be done in such areas as airspace control and reconnaissance. A major problem concerning airspace control is the desire on the part of the Army to reserve a block of airspace over a prescribed area wherein Army aircraft would operate freely without regard to Air Force control. Conversely, the Air Force believes the need for proper identification is a must if we are to maintain an effective air defense capability. Safety is also a consideration. It takes little imagination to visualize the chaos and danger that could be created by the entry of an Air Force close air support jet aircraft into a prescribed area already occupied by some 400 helicopters. Nevertheless it is easy to see that flight clearance procedures presently employed by the Air Force would, if applied to Army aviation in a fluid battle situation, completely disrupt the Army’s methods of employment.
The answers to this and similar problems lie somewhere between the extremes of the opposing positions. Proper solutions will depend on compromise that will allow both services to employ their respective weapon systems effectively. Such solutions can be reached only through a thorough and sympathetic understanding of the problems that each service faces.
TAC is dedicated to the task of solving these problems. Our knowledge of the Army’s capabilities, limitations, and concepts is increasing every day. The expansion of this knowledge will permit us to develop concepts of employment of tactical air forces that will not only enhance the effectiveness of our own forces in joint operations but also permit the Army to operate with greater confidence in the Air Force’s ability to provide the support the Army needs.
Hq Tactical Air Command
˚See “Exercise Gold Fire I” by Major Robert G. Sparkman, Air University Review, XVI, 3 (March-April 1965). 22-44.
Tactical Air Operations―Continued
This article, “Doctrine Development for the Employment of Tactical Air
Forces” by Lieutenant Colonel David C. Collins, and the next, “Tactical Air Employment―Current Statue and Future Objectives” by
Lieutenant Colonel Edward O. Stillie, are follow-ons to the series of articles about tactical air operations
featured in our September-October issue. The earlier group consisted of “Tactical
Air Command” by General G. P. Disoway, “Tactical
Airlift” by Captain Lowell W. Jones and Captain Don A. Lindbo,
“Battles Are Bloody Maneuvers: A View from the Cockpit” by Major John P. O’Gorman,
and “The Closer the Better” by Colonel John R. Stoner.
Lieutenant Colonel David C. Collins is
Chief, Supporting Systems Branch, Doctrine Division, Hq Tactical Air Command. During World War II he
served as navigator on B-29s, completing 25 combat missions against
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of
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