Air University Review, May-June 1967
Captain Hermann Hagena,
Air Force of the Federal republic of Germany
In August of 1966 the resignation of two of the highest-ranking German
generals focused worldwide attention on the German Armed forces, the Bundeswehr. Lieutenant General Werner Panitzki, Inspekteur der Luftwaffe (a position similar to
The double resignation, without precedent in German military history, was
remarkable enough. The events that followed heralded the changes that
democratic process has brought about since the days of Moltke
and Schlieffen. Both Panitzki
and Trettner were invited to appear before the
Defense Committee of the Bundestag, where they had an opportunity to
explain to the committee members the reasons for their resignations. Their
testimony, given in the presence of their former commander, revealed
considerable differences of opinion between the civilian and military leaders
of the Bundeswehr. It brought to light
the fact that cooperation between military and civilian departments was often
far from ideal and that continued efforts were necessary to create effective
team. Last, and perhaps most important, the generals’ testimony raised the
question of just how much and what type of civil control was necessary and
practical in the Bundeswehr.
There was, of course, also the usual amount of informed and uninformed speculation over the true motives of the resigning generals. Some praised the generals for their devotion to duty. Others called their action a revolt, 2 imply that the generals had meddled in politics; that they had tried to gain more power for the military through illegal pressure. While this argument may be left to the historians to be settled, a look at the events leading up to the resignations and at the public statements of Trettner and Panitzki is in order.
While the two generals resigned almost simultaneously, they did so for
different reason and under different circumstances. Panizki
acted in the face of possible suspension. His
F-104 Starfighters had experienced a dismal year in
1965. In addition, the tragic death of a pilot who ejected over the
Trettner’s resignation came shortly after the Minister of Defense allowed members of the armed forces with long enlistments to join the Union of Workers in Public Service, Shipping and Transportation. While the Minister probably did not have much choice in the matter (he was faced with a court injunction ordering the admission of unions to military installations), Trettner resented the fact that an order of this importance had been given without his prior consultation.4 In his testimony he was highly critical of certain procedures within the Ministry. He particularly objected to the fact that in the Minister’s absence he had to take orders from a civilian deputy, who was a career civil servant. (Article 65a of the constitution makes no provision for a civilian deputy to the Commander-in-Chief.) He argued that as long as a military deputy of the Minister was politically unfeasible, the highest-ranking general officer of the armed forces should have at least the same status and protocol standing as the Minister’s civilian deputy. It was evident from Trettner’s remarks that his relations with the incumbent civilian deputy minister, Karl Gumbel, had been far from good.
At this point it may help in understanding the situation to examine the
concept of civilian control of the armed forces. In the rearming of
(1) The position of Commander-in-Chief is held by the civilian Minister of Defense in time of peace. The command passes over to the Chancellor in time of war. Appointments are made by the President, who also determines uniforms and insignia.
(2) There is neither a general staff nor a national high command in the Bundeswehr. With minor exceptions, all Army divisions, the Fleet, and the Air Force wings and missile batteries are integrated into NATO.
(3) The ranking generals and admirals, as heads of the military departments, are no longer designated as “Oberbefehlshaber:” They are called Inspekteur, a title that is linked traditionally with supervisory functions.
(4) Military law and a code of military justice.5 were retained, but the military courts were abolished.6 Civilian courts now have jurisdiction over soldiers even in the case of purely military offenses, such as disobedience or desertion. Disciplinary boards, which can levy sentences such as reduction in pay and demotion or separation from the service, have at least two military men as assessors. However, these boards, too, are headed by a civilian judge.
(5) Every soldier may submit his complaints through channels. In addition,
he has the right to communicate directly with a special commissioner of the Bundestag
concerning any grievance that he may have.7
(6) These safeguards may seem formidable even in countries where the principle of civilian control has long been established. However, the founding fathers of the Bundeswehr found additional measures of an organizational nature necessary. Because of the absence of a national high command, they were able to organize the Ministry of Defense along civilian lines, as shown in the accompanying chart. The military departments, i.e., Army, Navy, Air Force, Territorial Defense, and Medical Corps, have the same standing as the civilian departments, such as Technical Affairs, Economic Affairs, or Administrative and Legal Affairs. (Civilian departments are predominantly staffed by civilians and headed by a civil servant.) It is noteworthy that the key departments of Personnel and Budget report directly to the Deputy Minister. The fact that Personnel is a department that is formally independent of the respective service departments is a good indicator of the degree of civilian control in our armed forces. To be sure, there exists close cooperation between the service departments and Personnel, but it is also clear that the present system satisfies political demands rather than practical needs.8
By looking at the organizational chart, one can better appreciate Panitzki’s charge that the departmental system in the Ministry was not well suited to cope with the problems of a complex weapon system such as the F-104G Starfighter. Practically any action to be taken must be coordinated with one or more civilian departments. If agreement cannot be reached, the Minister or his Deputy must decide. This process is not always conducive to quick decisions even if all concerned are trying to be cooperative.
(7) Civilian control does not end in the Ministry (where it belongs). The traditional face of the German armed forces was further changed through the establishment of an independent civilian administrative service down to the unit level. In the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht, companies, regiments, and divisions formerly had their administrative specialists—soldiers with special training in their particular career field. Their place has been taken by civilians, over whom commanders have no direct control. The system is supposed to relieve commanders from the burden of attending to such details as pay, housing, messing, and other support functions. Like any system, it can be, and has been, made to work, but it is hardly one that military men consider the most practical in the interest of the mission.
The resignations of Panitzki and Trettner must be seen against this background of civilian control. Neither of them doubted the prerogative of the civilian administration to determine defense policy. Von Hassel himself conceded before the Bundestag that he detected no signs of disobedience among the generals.9 Trettner and Panitzki were fully rehabilitated in this respect when they were publicly, if somewhat belatedly, decorated for service to country.
The two generals did, however, disagree with some of the manifestations of civilian control, and they used whatever means they had to make their point. Ultimately their actions may have contributed to the replacement of von Hassel as Minister of Defense when the new coalition government was formed.10 It is highly doubtful that this was their motive, since the issue was and remains one of principle and not of personalities: how to insure the necessary amount of political control without interference with the military mission. There may not be an ideal solution, but it must be realized that any arrangement that seriously impairs the functioning of the armed forces under all conditions is ultimately defeating its own ends.
As far as the German Air Force is concerned, the search for an optimum solution in the management of the Starfighter has produced a first result. The Ministry announced that Panitzki’s successor as Inspekteur der Luftwaffe, Lieutenant General Johannes Steinhoff, has been given the necessary powers to solve the problems still associated with the Starfighter.
Notes
1. See Article 65a of the constitution (Grundgesetz)
of the
2. Typical of this attitude was a cover story carried by the influential news magazine Der Spiegel entitled “The Generals’ Revolt,” 29 August 1966.
3. His views were supported in an interview given by Brigadier General Krupinski, one of the few general officers current in the F-104 aircraft, to Der Spiegel, 5 September 1966.
4. As far as the author can tell, the effect of union activity on the unit level has been minimal in the first half-year.
5. Wehrstrafgesetz of 1957 (BGBI. I p. 298).
6. Clearly the result of the number of death sentences imposed by military courts at the end of World War II.
7. See Gesetz über den Wehrbeauftragten des Bundestages of 1957 (BGB1. I S. 652).
8. During the building years of the Bundeswehr, Personnel was headed by a civil servant, who later became Deputy Minister.
9. A parliamentary debate on the Bundeswehr was forced by the Social Democrats on 21 September 1966. Their motion of no confidence in the Minister of Defense was defeated, 236 to 199.
10. Von Hassel remained in the cabinet of Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger as Minister for the Affairs of Refugees.
Captain Hermann Hagena, Air Force of the
Federal Republic of Germany, served on exchange duty with the United States
Air Force, Academy, Department of Foreign Languages, from 1963 to 1966. He is
presently serving as a pilot with the 741 All-weather
Interceptor Squadron,
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of
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