Special Express

When a bomb screams down to explode on Viet Cong insurgents, it is traveling the last few thousand feet of a 10,000-mile journey. The pilot who releases the bomb finishes a job that began at the Ogden Air Materiel Area (OOAMA), Hill AFB, Utah, months before and involved thousands of man—hours of work. The destruction of the enemy position below is the payoff of one of the most complicated and challenging logistics efforts in history.

The bomb, along with thousands of its “relatives,” was delivered by the use of a new concept in logistics, “Special Express.” It was a new concept because never before has the American military had to maintain a supply line of such awesome length-over 10,000 miles.

If logistics was a problem in our Vietnam involvement before the military buildup in 1965, it became a real dilemma for the planners when the intensification of our involvement assumed the proportions of war. Port handling and discharge facilities in both the Philippines and the Republic of Vietnam were already overloaded. Soon these facilities became saturated, with resultant long delays that could not be tolerated.

Logistics experts became aware of the need for a more efficient supply system in 1964. At that time the Air Force had only three A-1E Skyraider squadrons and a few B-57s deployed in Vietnam. In the fall of that year the supply system was under heavy strain to meet the logistics needs of even this token force.

The Air Force Logistics Command’s Ogden Air Materiel Area has the responsibility of logistics support for airmunitions. OOAMA acquires the airmunitions bound for Southeast Asia.

The supply line stretched from California to Clark Air Base in the Philippines to depots in Vietnam. Commercial transport ships under contract to Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) hauled the explosives. Supplies had to he unloaded at Subic Bay in the Philippines and trucked to a storage site at Clark. To transport them to depots near the area of conflict in Vietnam as needed, Clark personnel had to truck them back to Subic Bay and load them onto ships, which, of course, took precious time.

Logistics planners hoped to keep a 30-day supply level at forward operating bases in Vietnam and a 120-day backup supply level at Clark AB. The average time required to replenish the munitions depot at Clark was 90 days, while resupply time from Clark to Vietnam was 24 to 35 days. The following is a breakdown of pipeline segments:

Order and shipment to ConUs water ports	30 days
ConUS port hold time, loading, shipments in transit	45 days
Discharge at Subic, movement to Clark	15 days
On hand stocks at Clark	120 days
Average resupply time, Clark to Vietnam	30 days
Forward operating base stock levels	30 days
Total pipeline time	270 days

When munitions ships finally chugged into Vietnamese harbors, the problems were not over. Supplies for Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa bases were unloaded near Saigon, because of their proximity. The munitions had to be unloaded at Nha Be, the explosives discharge area 10 miles southeast of Saigon on the Saigon River.

The LST transport ships hauling the munitions had to be anchored in the middle of the river. The munitions were loaded onto barges, which were pushed to shore by tugboats and guarded by light gunboats. Only two tugboats were available, so barges often had to wait up to 40 days to be unloaded. In late 1964 it was not unusual to see 20 or 30 barges waiting impatiently for the tugs and gunboats.

Storage of munitions was also a critical problem. Available real estate for storing explosives was extremely limited in Vietnam. Safety criteria for quantity/distance often had to be waived in order to achieve maximum storage.

In short, all these factors added up to a disturbing situation: the 30-day stock level standard was impossible to achieve.

Logisticians realized that shortcuts must be taken in order to increase the availability level of supplies. After studying the problem, they formulated a system involving new concepts in logistics support, namely, “Special Express.”

Special Express ships still sail from Concord Naval Weapons Station, California, to Subic Bay, but they stay there only one day to take on water and fuel. Instead of unloading their cargo, they sail on to the coast of Vietnam, where they serve as “floating warehouses.” Total time from California to Vietnam—23 days.

The transports carry a wide range of supplies, stored in warehouse fashion. This enables selective discharge of any item at any port. With this capability, the Thirteenth Air Force and Seventh Air Force can direct movement of the ships based on a day-to-day analysis of the supply needs of each base. This flexibility eliminates the necessity for a backup storage area at Clark and also makes large, vulnerable depots near field bases unnecessary.

When the ships reach the Vietnamese coastline, they are under the direct control of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF).

Naval LCM (landing craft medium) transports, manned by USAF personnel, unload the large transport and take the cargo to shore. Since the LCM’sare self-propelled, no tugs are needed. At Cat Lai, a few miles south of Saigon, a concrete ramp once used to service French seaplanes extends into the river. The ramp has proven ideal for unloading the LCM ‘s, which are capable of beaching. An ingenious idea has speeded up the unloading process considerably: a 25-foot trailer is placed in the well deck of each LCM, munitions are loaded from the ship into the trailer, and when the vessel crawls onto the ramp a truck or tractor is backed into place, and the trailer is hitched onto it. The munitions are then hauled in truck convoys, protected by armed Air Police, to the base airmunitions depots.

The finishing touch to this speedy process was added by the use of C-141s and C-130s to fly fuses, fins, and arming wire to Vietnam ahead of the bombs from OOAMA. Each day a big transport plane touches down at a base, carrying these additional components necessary to arm the bombs.

That done, the bombs go aboard an attack aircraft for the final lap of their journey. They make an excellent present for “Charlie”—compliments of Special Express.

Lieutenant Colonel Ruskin M. Bland (B.A., West Virginia university) is Deputy Chief, Transportation Management Division, Directorate of Transportation, Hq Air Force Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. He recently served in Vietnam as Director of Transportation, Seventh Air Force, Tan Sol Nhut Air Base, Saigon. Previous assignments have been with the Military Airlift Command and the Office of The Inspector General, USAF, 1958-61.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.