Air University Review, July-August 1967
Lieutenant
Colonel Arthur W. Banister
The armed services have long employed various forms of “war gaming” in analyzing the military problems that confront them. In fact, this particular type of analysis has been regarded as almost exclusively a military province, at least until after World War II. “Cold war gaming,” on the other hand, represents a relatively new approach to problem solving within the military establishment. This technique, although largely developed within the civilian community, has already gained a foothold in several service organizations and appears to be gradually winning more general acceptance. In my view, cold war gaming appears especially promising for certain military teaching and training objectives and should be more widely utilized, particularly at the war college level. I shall briefly summarize some of the pertinent facts and arguments supporting this conviction.
the political game
The foundation for much of the present cold war gaming activity in the military service lies in the political game developed by the RAND Corporation in the mid-fifties and later refined at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). This game is also called the “crisis game,” the “reality game,” the “political-military exercise,” and the “politico-military desk game” by various practitioners. For the purposes of this discussion, it will be called simply the “political game.” The game may be summarized briefly as a manual, essentially “free” methodology, consisting of a control team and two or more player teams. Scenarios are furnished to start the play initially, with “move periods” and game time subsequently determined by the control team. Political moves at the national level are generally stressed, although military actions are also permitted in most exercises. The main thrust of the game is the testing of preconceived strategies against intelligent opposition, in an environment of maximum realism. The principal advantage of this approach over more conventional analyses seems to be its ability to uncover unanticipated contingencies, with resulting pressure on players to “live with” the implications of their strategies. This artificial environment of living under stress seems to be particularly appropriate for the training of military officers and responsible government officials.
service school activities
Certain military service schools have adopted the political game or variations there-of for teaching and training purposes. These schools fall into two main categories: the service academies (undergraduate level) and the service war colleges (senior postgraduate level). The command and staff schools (intermediate postgraduate level) do not employ the political game, since they have traditionally been oriented more toward military skills than toward strategic or political analyses.
Of the service academies, both the Military Academy at West Point and the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs have experimented with political games. The West Point experiment took place in 1960 in connection with a joint MIT-Columbia-West Point exercise. While apparently quite successful, the project was discontinued because of excessive demands on faculty time and has not been reinstated.
At the Air Force Academy political gaming has fared somewhat better. The principal game played there is called Strategy and Force Evaluation (SAFE), a methodology developed originally by RAND. Although the emphasis is on procurement of strategic weapon systems, the game does incorporate provisions for political maneuvering—arms control agreements, summit conferences, etc. Significantly, these political activities have been expanded in recent modifications to the game structure. A second methodology, called the statecraft game, was introduced in the fall of 1965. This simulation more closely approximates the political game than SAFE. Initial runs of the statecraft game were well received, and it has again been included during the 1966-67 academic year. A third political gaming methodology was tried on an experimental basis during academic year 1965-66 and became part of the regular curriculum during the spring 1967 semester. This game, called rural-COIN, was developed by Abt Associates under government contract and deals with counterinsurgency situations. As of this writing, it is anticipated that the rural-COIN game will continue to be employed for some time to come.
Of the service war colleges, the Naval War College at Newport is currently the most active in political gaming. The methodology used is called the strategic war game, but it closely resembles the RAND/MIT political game. It is designed to test policies and strategies developed by students during their course of study and is apparently quite successful. At any rate, it has become a regular part of the Naval War College curriculum and seems likely to remain so.
The Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) is experimenting with a computerized cold war gaming activity as part of its curriculum. The experiment revolves around use of the cold war model called TEMPER (for Technological, Economic, Military, and Political Evaluation Routine), developed by the Raytheon Company under the auspices of the Joint War Games Agency (JWGA). This methodology is rather complex and will not be described in detail here. It is fully automated and extremely broad in scope, in that it attempts to simulate the major elements of world conflict over periods ranging up to ten years. This was clearly quite an undertaking and required that a number of simplifying assumptions and aggregations be made. As a result, the model was considered unsuitable for operational problem solving, but it was successfully adapted by ICAF for instructional purposes. The TEMPER methodology was first incorporated into the ICAF curriculum in the 1965-66 academic year and was retained as part of the 1966-67 program. What will happen in future years is of course conjectural, but it seems likely that some form of cold war gaming will be practiced at ICAF for some time to come.
Political gaming at the other war colleges can only be described as minimal at best. The Air War College experimented briefly with the technique during academic year 1964-65 but abandoned it when the curriculum was reorganized the following year. Whether it will reappear in the near future is problematical. The Army War College, although recipient of several fine lectures by noted political gamers, has not seen fit to incorporate this device into the curriculum. An attempt was made to develop an all-encompassing strategic game methodology in l959-60, but the goal was a bit too ambitious, and the project was dropped.
Joint War Games Agency
In contrast to political gaming for educational purposes, which is decentralized in various service schools, cold war gaming for policy analysis is concentrated almost exclusively in the Joint War Games Agency under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is no accident, since cold war gaming must encompass many considerations that are not the exclusive concern of any one service (or any one agency of government, for that matter). Thus, gaming for policy analysis must take place at a level which can provide the many diverse inputs necessary and also command respect when game results are published. The Joint War Games Agency seems to meet these requirements very nicely.
JWGA is organized into three divisions, the Cold War Division of which addresses political gaming and related activities. This division is further subdivided into two branches: the Politico-Military Branch is concerned specifically with manual political games of the RAND/MIT variety, while the Concepts and Developments Branch deals with the broader issues of international relations and technologies affecting national strategy. Both branches coordinate in sponsoring and supervising actual political games. These games are similar in format to those played at MIT, with one principal difference: the addition, when appropriate, of Action Teams and Senior Teams. Since the players in the JWGA games are frequently high-level military and civilian officials, it was found useful to create Action Teams (intermediate-level players) to perform most of the gaming mechanics and to present short daily briefings to the Senior Teams (high-level players). This device allows top officials to contribute their thinking to game problems without demanding more time than they can reasonably afford. Details of game results unfortunately are classified, but the technique seems to be well regarded by most players. Since the games have been conducted for several years and are still continuing, one must assume that the effort is considered useful for planning and policy analysis.
gaming for teaching and training
If use of political gaming for teaching and training within the military establishment is to be expanded, it seems clear that the war colleges, rather than the service academies, should receive most of the emphasis. While students at the latter institutions would undoubtedly find gaming stimulating and useful for testing theoretical concepts, it is doubtful that many of the lessons learned would survive the long years between graduation and the assumption of high command. Students at the war colleges, however, may expect appointment to key positions shortly after graduation. Furthermore, one of the principal objectives of war college training is to give the student officer an appreciation of the interrelationship between political and military considerations, a purpose for which the political game is admirably suited. In support of this view, Lincoln P. Bloomfield, one of the country’s most experienced political gaming practitioners, has stated:
It is hard to think of a better short-run device for the military officer who with increasing rank will face growing involvement in diplomatic situations, an involvement for which his academy training, his years with the troops or the fleet, his correspondence courses and his professional readings have inadequately prepared him.
Political gaming can be very expensive in terms of time, manpower, and money to organize on any substantial scale. On the other hand it can be and has been done for virtually nothing, requiring only willing and capable participants. Among military organizations, the war colleges would appear to possess the necessary environment and expertise for this type of activity to a greater extent than most others. War college faculties and student bodies certainly represent a concentration of high-caliber manpower difficult to assemble under normal operating conditions.
It is significant that most of these senior military schools currently include a war game of some sort in their programs. Perhaps a political game could be substituted—or, better still, employed as a final exercise to test national strategies in situations where military strength is used primarily as a bargaining device rather than directly as an instrument of national power. After all, the contemporary officer is taught that armed forces are better used to deter wars than to fight them, but he seldom gets a chance to practice this philosophy. What better place to do so than at a war college, the last formal professional school of his career?
In summary, it seems reasonable to say that cold war gaming has gained a fair amount of respectability among military circles in the last five or six years but has not yet been universally endorsed. At the operational level, the Joint War Games Agency seems to be proceeding at a sensible pace, primarily in utilizing existing techniques and to a lesser degree in encouraging the development of new ones. However, political gaming for teaching and training in military service schools is uneven at best and could probably be exploited more fully than at present. Substantial benefits could no doubt accrue from more general use of cold war gaming methodologies at the war college level, where senior students must prepare themselves for the politico-military environment in which they will soon serve.
Joint Task Force Eight, Sandia Base,
N.M.
References
1. Bloomfield, Lincoln P. “The Political-Military Exercise: A Progress
Report,” Orbis, Vol. 8 Winter 1965), pp.859-70.
2. McDonald, Thomas J. JCS Politico-Military Desk Games. A
presentation to the Washington Operations Research Council, Washington, D.C.,
1964.
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur W. Banister (USMA; M. S., North Carolina State College) is assigned to Joint Task Force EIGHT, Defense Atomic Support Agency, Sandia Base, New Mexico. After graduating from West Point in 1949 he completed flying training, then served as a fighter pilot at Bergstrom AFB, Texas, (1950-51), in Korea (1952), and Japan (1953-54). He studies nuclear engineering at North Carolina State College under AFIT (1954-56), then was an instructor, later Assistant Professor of Mathematics, U. S. Air Force Academy (1956-60). He attended the Air Command and Staff College (1960-61); served with the Air Battle Analysis Center, Hq USAF (1961-65); and completed the Army War College (1966).
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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