Document created: 11 August 05
Air University Review, September-October 1966
The full battle staff is in position. The air defense commander watches the progress, analyzing each move as dozens of enemy aircraft enter his area of responsibility.
Each man on the battle staff busily carries out his duties. The intelligence officer constantly evaluates simulated inputs and advises the battle commander accordingly; the fighter officer quietly monitors the availability of fighter-interceptors and provides information on the latest aircraft status; the communications and electronics officer gazes in all directions, checking the radar operation capability of the prime radars, the status of the computer, and the condition of the electronic displays.
To the uninformed eye, it appears that North America is under attack. Such is not the case. Rather, the entire semiautomatic ground environment (SAGE) operation is being exercised via a SAGE System Training Mission (SSTM).
Two hours later it’s all over. The bogies have been splashed, the interceptors are returning to home base, and once again the situation display consoles are showing only routine traffic. Everyone from the commander to track monitors in the surveillance room wearily moves away from the positions occupied for the last two hours.
As the threat of air attack against North America grew in the period after World War II, military leaders realized the need for a relatively inexpensive method of attack simulation to supplement the live missions. It had to be realistic, versatile, and designed to exercise all elements of the Air Defense System.
Prior to official moves toward a comprehensive training system, commanders of air defense units throughout North America and overseas saw the need for synthetic air defense training, and they filled the requirements as best they could. The procedures and equipment used varied from squadron to squadron, but the effectiveness was quite limited.
The early Fifties saw the beginning of disorganized efforts in this direction. Simulated attack environments were indiscriminately concocted at the start of the operations crew’s eight-hour shift. These training missions were unsophisticated, poorly planned ventures into air defense simulation, and the crews soon became bored with the whole effort.
Imaginary tracks would be originated from various locations, and the position of these “canned tracks” was passed by voice circuits from radar site to radar site. This gave the plotters standing behind the Plexiglas boards an opportunity to practice writing backwards—a rather deficient total result. As veterans of this era of radar operations crew training will attest, a little of this type of activity went a long way, especially in the wee hours of the morning.
Even though this training was dull and laborious to say the least, there were times when “Yankee ingenuity” devised ways and means to “put a little sparkle into the training schedule.”
Those on aircraft control and warning (ACW) duty in northern Japan during the early Fifties vividly recall running simulated tracks toward Russian territory. Soon the heavy radars adjacent to Sakhalin and the Kuriles were painting live Russian aircraft that had scrambled out to patrol the line against aircraft reportedly in the area. Obviously, other ears were tuned to the HF net. The thought of scrambling pilots out on a wintry Siberian night in pursuit of a simulated track apparently beefed up the “fun factor” for ACW personnel.
Such locally devised training programs served to pass the time, perhaps, but the value in skill upgrading was, of course, quite restricted.
During 1952, plans were initiated for the System Training Program (STP). The RAND Corporation began work on a program designed “to exercise and train the various levels of the operational air defense system through realistic simulated inputs of great variety and complexity.” Purpose? To increase the operational effectiveness of the system.
An air defense direction center was set up at RAND headquarters in Santa Monica, California. In order to observe the system’s behavior under various situations, methods were developed for simulating the system environment. Following each mission the crews were given information about their performance and allowed to discuss and interpret their actions. Crew improvement was immediately obvious. These procedures and techniques were then adapted for use in training crews at operational direction centers. Following a highly successful test in an Air Defense Command division, STP was accepted for installation throughout the command.
According to the people who designed the program, STP is based on five well-established learning principles.
Train a functionally complete unit
. The missions are designed so that they may be conducted at any level in the air defense network; however, they are usually run on the air division level. Such a unit is small enough to make regular training practical, yet is functionally complete—a unit that receives, processes, and takes action on all essential information generally available within the system.Simulate the real environment of the system.
In order to maximize the transfer of training to actual operations, the simulation of air defense environment must be sufficiently realistic to enable the system to respond as if it were a real situation.Train the system to operate under stress
. If the system is to develop and maintain a high level of proficiency, it must be trained to handle a variety of stress situations effectively. STP problems can be produced that contain heavy traffic loads, realistic invader attacks, electronic countermeasures (ECM), battle damage, and other stress situations not encountered in day-to-day routine.Give the system knowledge of results
. If members of the system are to improve in their performance, they must know the results of their actions. During system training missions, detailed performance records are kept by trained observers. These records permit operators to systematically evaluate their actions, identify specific problems, and work out solutions.Train the system frequently
. Operational personnel require continual practice in dealing with a variety of air situations if they are to develop and maintain flexibility in the use of system skills and procedures. As more and more of the aircraft control and warning squadrons and air division control centers implemented STP, an upsurge in personnel proficiency was apparent.In the manual system, which carried the entire air defense load prior to the advent of SAGE, simulated blips appear just as though they were actual aircraft radar returns. These simulated targets come from a special problem film that is fed into the AN/GPS-T2B problem-reproducing equipment.
“Old heads” of radar operations at the aircraft control and warning level recall that it didn’t take long to see that these missions were going to be useful far beyond their expectations.
In the beginning, the simulated problems were run to exercise each ACW operation separately. Later, of course, the adjacent subsectors were included in the division-wide missions, and the scope of the training was further broadened. Lateral tell between stations had always been a problem. Now a comprehensive training aid had been developed to rectify this persistent problem of maintaining tracking continuity.
Thanks to STP, a realistic method of improving the proficiency of the weapons controllers and radar operators also was available. Of course, simulation lacks the overall psychological impact of live activity, but it provided a good program to bring the weapons director’s experience level up to a good jumping-off point for the live intercept work.
Dozens of humorous stories are told and retold concerning some of the weird happenings in air defense operations when STP first came on the scene. Hopefully, no records exist showing how many times live interceptors were scrambled against a track that had somehow lost its simulated identity.
Embarrassing? Yes—but our people were learning. Perhaps “the tail wagged the dog” for a while, but ADC’s air defense boys soon cut the monster down to size and made it work for them.
Those who worked in manual air defense years ago and those assigned to manual operations today recall the large numbers of training aids and materials involved in running a mission. The problem aids package consists of films, punched cards, magnetic tapes, maps, scripts, and lists. They contain much data, of course, used by the operations crews to create a synthetic air defense situation and to observe and record the system’s performance during a training mission.
As students of air defense will remember, it soon became apparent that the manned-bomber threat against North America was changing. The Soviets had developed and reportedly would produce hundreds of supersonic jet bombers. To counter this threat, air defense planners saw a two-pronged need for the future: (1) an all-supersonic jet interceptor force and (2) a radar detection and weapons system capable of responding to this jet-age threat. Thus were born the century series of all-weather fighter-interceptors and SAGE.
Here was a system with a capability of coping with the jet-age air defense needs, a modus operandi by which the Air Force could summon the forces of computer technology to assist it in the complexities of defending North America against supersonic manned-bomber attack.
Development of SAGE began in 1951. The Lincoln Laboratory, established under Massachusetts Institute of Technology, used a Whirlwind I computer in its initial research into the semiautomatic ground environment. Seven years of testing and development culminated in the first operational sector in 1958.
What about training? The need for day-to-day personnel proficiency development had been proven in the advanced stages of the manual program. It would no doubt be needed in SAGE. Would it be necessary now to go out and design a training system compatible with SAGE? Not a chance!
Need for a specially designed training system was clearly defined by air defense planners early in the game. The SAGE System Training Mission program was designed concurrently with the SAGE system and was ready to go when the first sector became operational. This program was developed by the System Development Corporation, formerly a branch of RAND Corporation.
As experienced air defense personnel began to “cuss and discuss” the SSTM program, they found it an old friend (or adversary) dressed up in new and refined toggery. The simulation techniques used for the Manual System Training Program have been carried forward to the SAGE system. However, these simulation techniques have been expanded to include the SAGE computer, with more emphasis on the man-machine relationship. Even today training requirements are constantly reviewed to keep pace with the ever changing technology of weapon systems and the dynamic man-machine concept.
The SAGE air defense system has been the I keystone in North America’s air defense for eight years. During that time, operations crews have been exercised on a weekly basis. In addition, once each month the battle staff and battle staff support center are brought into play.
Everyone gets a chance to evaluate his air defense know-how. Although the SSTM’s are primarily for crew and battle staff training, the entire NORAD system is exercised quarterly via the “Desk Top” missions.
As discussed earlier, the RAND Corporation and the System Development Corporation (SDC) have since 1952 been involved in developing simulated air defense problems for ADC. During these years, RAND and SDC field representatives have been assigned to the air defense facilities. The purpose of their presence was to oversee the project and assist field units where possible. In SAGE, these SDC people have actually designed the missions to be run. Design, of course, depended upon observed weaknesses in crew operation.
An important development in the design and scripting of SSTM’s came about on 1 July 1965. On that date, the Air Force took over these responsibilities from SDC. This new program is called the Site Production and Reduction System. Military personnel can, through the use of this SDC-developed program, accomplish everything from start to finish in building a simulated war on tape.
So simulation in Air Defense has gone full circle. In the early days Air Force people planned and executed unsophisticated ventures into attack simulation. Succeeding years saw the RAND Corporation and SDC develop and monitor highly effective simulation problems in manual and SAGE systems. The air defense system drilling is now back in the hands of those wearing the blue uniform—not a spur-of-the-moment, locally devised “time killer” but a realistic, versatile training system.
32d Air Division (ADC)
Captain Herbert E. Ray (B.S., Colorado State University) is Director of Information, 32d Air Division, Gunter AFB, Alabama. Upon entering the Air Force in 1953, he was assigned to the Weapons Controller School, Tyndall AFB, Florida, and next was assigned to Japanese Air Defense Force, Misawa Air Base, Japan. On inactive reserve status in 1955, he did graduate work at Colorado State University until his recall to active duty in 1956. He has since served as Senior Director and Operations Officer, Sault Sainte Marie AFS (ADC), Michigan; as student, Squadron Officer School, 1958; as Commander, Wallace Air Station, Philippine Islands; as student, SAGE Air Defense School; and at Minot Air Defense Sector (ADC), Minot AFB, North Dakota. Since changing his career field in 1962, Captain Ray has served as Information Officer, Sundance AFS (ADC), Wyoming, home of the PM-l Nuclear Power Plant, to 1965; as Information Officer, Montgomery Air Defense Sector (ADC), Gunter AFB, Alabama; as student, Boston University School of Public Communication; and in his present position since the ADC reconfiguration On 1 April 1966.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor