Document created: 11 August 05
Air University Review,
September-October 1966
Lieutenant Colonel,Cortland P. Auser USAF (Ret)
Not too frequently there appears a book which, despite its generally unheralded birth, sooner or later is discovered by the cognoscenti as being a work both germinal and provocative. I feel that Stanley Hoffmann’s The State of War* is such a book. The author succeeds in bringing together essays on the theory and practice of international politics and merging them into the meaningful pattern of a complete analysis.
It almost borders on the truistic to make the observation that many students in the main disciplines of human knowledge may far too often be guilty of remaining immobile, static within set frameworks of thought. This immobility might first take the form of their uncritical acceptance of terms and phrases used to represent “key” concepts within an area of study or to announce principles upon which responsible policy-makers might act. Unless the words of a discipline are frequently examined in terms of their connotative relationships to the real world, too often the abstract verbalizations lose contact with the “actuality” of events, and consequently statements describe “maps” and not “territories.” Certainly any degree of semantic confusion is detrimental to clear thought and expression in the area of political science, but particularly in the special province of international relations, such confusion may be tragic. Concurrently, at times, apathy of a kind might affect the unthinking, so that the creative exercise of the intellect working upon the subject matter of a discipline diminishes, and necessary alertness ceases.
It is fortunate, then, that there are qualified scholars who are not bound by the seeming restrictions of words or by the apparent inflexibilities of definitions, who are therefore able to break these barriers of inertia, who are able to “think aside” as Arthur Koestler describes the process), and who are able to get outside the limitations of their own field to gain perspective and re-examine the “axioms” and “principles” that have been uncritically accepted and used and reused without reference to changes in the world. A primary part of any critical re-examination of concepts is an analysis of the meaning of key and crucial ideas. Mr. Hoffmann has done a semantic service for readers, especially for students of international relations and the policy-makers in foreign affairs. Moreover, all literate, thinking citizens should examine this work, for, to readapt an observation from Georges Clemenceau and Raymond Aron, strategy is too important to be left to the political scientists! A sine qua non for any reader of Hoffmann’s book is that he have an open mind, a mind, in fact, ready and willing to be jarred. Chairborne and large-mahogany-desk strategists may turn aside from their precious shibboleths, if they will permit Hoffmann to have his say, for among many other accomplishments he has sifted and sorted out theories and terms that have lost meaningfulness in these critical years of the twentieth century.
Hoffmann aspires to clarity. He succeeds. Among the requirements for a study in the area of international relations, he stresses the need for “pure theoretical research.” He feels that good understanding is necessary before action. Many concepts used again and again by political scientists or would-be political scientists are fuzzy, he states, and so he recommends that it is time for an examination to be made of what phenomena are covered by what terms. He stresses the need for “precise typologies.” Hoffmann’s hope and realism combine in his stating “political philosophy must include. . . both the quest for an ideal that corresponds to the values which inspire it and the presence of a constant awareness of limitations.”
Hoffmann at least is sure of one political reality—the uncertainty that characterizes many aspects of the international relations and policy fields. His observations in this respect recall Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy–there are so many variants and degrees of uncertainty. Hoffmann does not hesitate to enumerate them and cite their significance to political theorists today. One thing he points out, among others, is that there are uncertainties in strategic-diplomatic behavior; there are other uncertainties that derive from the theorists’ belief in the idea of causality in social action in these spheres. Regarding theory itself, Hoffmann repeats important questions from the work of the internationally famous political theorist Raymond Aron concerning how many of the present features of the real international world “invalidate past theory.”
In describing the problem of men in the modern world seeking peace, he appropriates the classical myth to which Albert Camus has given new life in our time. Hoffmann writes that man’s condition is epitomized in the myth of Sisyphus, whose punishment was to be constantly pushing a heavy rock to the top of a hill, only to have it immediately roll down again. If the rock means for us the problems and complexities of international relations, we must as realists unsentimentally accept the fact that the rock is ever going to continue to roll. Unmetaphorically, then, we have to do all we can by concerted action to cut down violence. The political scientist feels that if the searchers into theory exercise a healthy skepticism, the “nature of the approach should not hinder the continuance for a search.”
Having established the need for re-examination of the meaning of political concepts and having described the mood in which this investigation is to be made, Hoffmann in another chapter turns to one aspect of the historical-philosophical background of a search for theoretical meaning in international affairs. He restores Jean Jacques Rousseau to a place as a theorist on international law, war, and peace, and there is much that is relevant for today’s questers after certainty in what the Frenchman wrote. Many of Hoffmann’s statements are allied to Rousseau’s. For example, both men feel that there is no “general society of mankind;” that nothing else than the human condition has brought men together into a “society.” Both Rousseau and Hoffmann are convinced, however, that the roots of violence are not in man’s nature. This pertinent historical excursion keeps the reader within the atmosphere of realism in which Hoffmann continues his analysis.
Many readers, I feel, may be surprised to note the contemporaneity of Rousseau. His views on war are indeed less assuring than those of the more famous Hobbes. Hoffmann concludes that, in our century, war derives many times from the fragmentation of power among states. Very often, interdependence, instead of fostering good will, works in the opposite way and breeds suspicion and antagonism.
Further along in his examination, Hoffmann labels the idea of restraint in “a common interest” by the great powers as fictitious. Because of his awareness of the extensive examination of international relations and systems made by Rousseau and Kant, he hears in the background of any twentieth century discussion purporting to focus on world peace as a goal echoes of the permanent dialogue between Rousseau and Kant.
The transition which Hoffmann makes to what he feels to be a necessary analysis of international law is a natural one after the discussion about Rousseau and Kant. He is cautious as he proceeds carefully to examine and describe international law vis-à-vis domestic law. International law, he finds, is characterized by a low degree of institutionalization, by numerous gaps, and by the exercise of limited authority.
International law, he well emphasizes, is “caught between the Charybdis of universality at the cost of vagueness and the Scylla of precision at the cost of heterogeneity.” His metaphors are again exact and appropriate. Imaginative readers, conscious of his employment of such figures of speech, might well regard the author as an alert and intelligent Ulysses fit to perform this extensive odyssey through the realms of international politics from the Hades of limited war to the Aeolian winds of endless political bargaining.
Concluding, Hoffmann finds among the gaps existing in international law the omission of any definition of the “upper limits” of airspace. Again, there is an uncertainty about traditional rules as well as the widespread belief that present international law contains much that is obsolescent, much that reflects only a dead system. After examining many of these factors, Hoffmann feels that numerous social scientists do not study international law because they think they would be studying that which is irrelevant.
Hopefully, the author believes that a historical sociology of international relations would help “to put the study of international law in situation.” No one concerned with these very important matters should avoid, according to Hoffmann, a study of the underlying political realities. The approach he thinks best is that of looking at and underlining the “links between international law and historical international systems.“ He feels that the social scientist can contribute much to this task, which must be approached with a certain amount of modesty. By so doing, they may achieve an “inventory and delimitation of uncertainty.”
Hoffmann is admirably frank in focusing upon what he considers the weaknesses of America’s approaches to her international problems. One great shortcoming, in his eyes, is clearly demonstrated in what he identifies as America’s “engineering approach to solutions.” For him there is too much reliance upon this type of solution, creating an apparent mood of certainty which in fact is not justified by and does not correspond to all the aspects of reality. In addition, he shows that there are discontinuities in America’s policies, a fact which indicates America’s interest in only the immediate solution. Situations arise that are unanticipated, and America finds herself improvising solutions and thereby constructing, at best, a piecemeal policy. Allied with these negative aspects are the qualities of impatience and of faith in an omnipotence on the part of her policy executives.
A restraint of another kind which Hoffmann discovers working against the proper execution of policy is the application of Parkinson’s Law. While a number of mushrooming agencies may provide positions for many worthy citizens and experts, there is a proliferation of personnel in the field. Consequently, this explosion in the number of commissions or agencies of experts makes it difficult to secure a consensus among those who have a hand in foreign policy.
After his frontal attack on the shortcomings in the execution of American international policy, Hoffmann expresses the hope concerning the international situation that there might be a gradual change in the “game” and in the “rules of the game.” He even envisions an end to bipolarity. One way he sees in which history might favor American policy is in situations where Soviet plans of domination over new nations show themselves. Then America’s exercise of respect for the national independence of the emergent nations might result in a positive policy.
Hoffmann reserves his final negative criticism for game theories. He is of the opinion that the combination of variants in any conflict situation is too abstract and therefore predictions regarding outcomes cannot be made with accuracy. Games and solutions do not and cannot take into consideration the interrelationships and the interplay of personalities and characters in war. Rounding the circle then, Hoffmann comes back to the many types of uncertainties that exist for the problem analysts. At the heart of the matter is the basic “conceptual uncertainty” regarding what particular abstractions mean or do not mean. Uncertainties surround as well the factors of time, geography, and the number of nuclear players involved. Appropriately, when he comes to examine the matter of technical uncertainties related to a nation’s search for invulnerability, he recalls Franz Kafka’s neurotic animal searching for “peace and security” and frantically digging a burrow in many directions to avoid feared dangers.
The great paradox in the present system is the need for force coupled with the fear of it. He sees the present system as dual-faced: one of the faces is that of bipolarity—power in the hands primarily of the Soviet Union and the United States. The other face is that of “polycentrism” in view of these same powers’ impotence to use nuclear weapons. Hoffmann feels that the facts of weapon proliferation and the concurrent and continuing paradoxes of instability and stability in international affairs must give the knowledgeable reader pause for deep and extended thought.
With clarity still, Hoffmann confronts a few of the paradoxes regarding war. He points out that war on the one hand might appear to be “the outlet of barbaric impulses,” yet it results, in actuality, from man’s identification with the state in which he is a citizen. Consequently man’s acts in war result from or are involved with an ambivalence; the feeling of community, Hoffmann indicates, often demands sacrifice.
He concludes too that violence in the past may have led to beneficial changes but that today’s tragedy springs from the “autonomous growth of the means of war.” Whether we like it or not, the total wars of our century have brought about the extreme in dislocation, the predominance of annihilative aims in society, and the militarization of our peacetime economy. War in this century has proven dysfunctional. In the last analysis, then, in our era the tragedy of war, Hoffmann avers, may blot out meaning.
One with the tone and the approach is his conclusion about the degree of “indeterminacy” that exists in international relations and systems today; in fact, for him, indeterminacy becomes a prerequisite for the freedom of the policy-makers as they choose a course. Questions essentially revolve about the “margin of freedom” enjoyed by the “effective units in international relations.” Significant are the queries as to how much choice exists and how effective the choices will be once they are made. It is up to the social scientist to define the constraints on policy-making and to exploit the uncertainties of his examination. Hoffmann closes appropriately by pointing again to what the uses are of the social sciences: to show the limits of our knowledge and to provide tools for analysis.
Hoffmann hopes that the facts of international life and relations will ultimately, but soon, move in the direction of international law. He writes that if we are “given the quasi certainty of annihilation,” then “we must use the freedom we have” to reach “a world without a major war.”
Hoffmann’s examination, then, deserves consideration by the political scientist, but certainly not by him alone. It should be read carefully by the discerning and discriminating historian (military or civilian), by the sociologist, and by the military policy-maker. Each is sure to agree that in depth, perception, and in coverage this work equals the best studies in this field. In my opinion the book is essential to clear thinking, understanding, and theorizing about the “state of war.”
The great relevance of Hoffmann’s book lies in its questioning approach and the inevitable disturbing effect it will have on thoughtful readers. The work is directly concerned with the discipline of political science, to which many disparate elements of the Air Force have committed themselves. Individuals responsible for the formalized and extended education of the Air Force officer have a double obligation to read, to absorb, and to study this work. Knowledge of the problems of which Professor Hoffmann writes is especially important to the Air Force policy-makers or power wielders, for indeed action or inaction by members of the military often may significantly augment the complexities of problems in the foreign relations field.
Inevitably, Hoffmann’s book will have its effect upon such analysts as Huntington, Janowitz, Rapoport, and Lasswell, and their reactions will appear and be read in many places. Until then, the literate and alert citizen should take up the work for serious reading as a simple matter of conscience. Hoffmann writes: “It is man’s task to enlarge the margin of freedom, to strengthen the conditions which are conducive to life as against those which are conducive to death.“ It would indeed be a disastrous mistake in our individual life and in our national life if we were caught, as he phrases it, “in stereotyped alternatives of thinking.”
Yorktown Heights, New York
*Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1965, $5.95), 276 pp.
Dr. Cortland P. Auser, LT. Col., USAF Retired (Ph.D., New York University) is now a member of the English Department staff of the City College of New York. He was Professor of English at the Air Force Academy from 1963 to 1966. During World War II he graduated from the Signal Corps OCS and served in air warning units, returning to civilian life in 1946. He taught English at Brooklyn College until his recall to active duty in 1951, then served as Adjutant, Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, and later as executive officer for the General Counsel of the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. Dr. Auser has also taught at the University of Maryland in Europe, the University of Virginia in Arlington, and the University of Colorado, Cragmor Campus. He has edited and written for numerous academic, historical, and scientific publications.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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