THE GULF WAR of 1991 might have had a much different outcome had Saddam Hussein possessed a small nuclear arsenal or if he had decided to use his chemical weapons. The Bottom-Up Review conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD) in 1993 identified the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of a small number of antagonistic regional adversaries such as Iraq as the number one security threat to the United States. President Clinton has addressed this theme in public speeches, and in his address to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in September 1993, he vowed to give WMD proliferation a higher profile. Consequently, his
subordinates are developing a two-pronged—some people allege two-faced—approach to controlling this problem.

On the one side, the Clinton administration vigorously advocates traditional nonproliferation measures. US leadership was instrumental in securing the unconditional and indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in May 1995. The United States is moving forward with negotiations for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cutoff. The administration also promotes the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention despite the resurgent opposition of congressional conservatives. Under US leadership, classical diplomatic approaches to WMD nonproliferation are enjoying broader international support than ever before.

The CPI has five components for development:

- formally creating the new mission,
- acquiring hardware suitable to the threat,
- developing new war-fighting doctrine,
- improving intelligence capabilities, and
- building consensus with allies.

It remains to be seen whether these components will be effective and whether they will provide a long-range tool compatible with the various nonproliferation treaties and agreements.

To some analysts, pursuit of both paths appears to pose a conflict of interest. Many proponents of traditional diplomatic nonproliferation efforts fear that the coercive element of counterproliferation, especially the threat to use military force, will undermine the international cooperation and consensus upon which nonproliferation depends for its success. They also criticize counterproliferation as a short-term solution to the WMD proliferation problem because it does not directly confront the long-term security concerns that motivate regional adversaries to acquire WMD in the first place. Others point out that some people view counterproliferation as a panacea, whereas, at best, it is probably only a stopgap measure that could be stillborn if required technologies cannot be developed. They know that military operations are not without risk, pointing to past intelligence and operational failures. Finally, some people fear that counterproliferation will undermine the traditional US leadership that has been so vital to negotiating, implementing, and improving various nonproliferation treaties and agreements.

Can we develop counterproliferation so that it lives up to its proponents' expectations to enhance traditional nonproliferation without undermining what diplomacy has already accomplished? To answer this question, we must check for any hard evidence that counterproliferation erodes confidence in the treaties and agreements that make up the

Japan and South Korea... while greatly concerned over the North Korean nuclear weapons program, appear to have neither welcomed nor condemned counterproliferation.

On the other side, DOD launched its defense Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI) in December 1993 under the sponsorship of the late secretary of defense Les Aspin. Counterproliferation provides military options to counter the acquisition and use of WMD by regional adversaries. Its supporters claim that these new military options will strengthen and enhance the traditional nonproliferation options. Key DOD officials have been careful to stress that counterproliferation will in no way replace nonproliferation, but that its purpose is to provide usable options when nonproliferation fails.
nuclear nonproliferation regime and in other WMD nonproliferation initiatives. Thankfully, little exists. We then look below the surface to examine various tensions that counterproliferation has created for the United States and decide if these can be managed and minimized from the perspective of national policy.

Tensions Caused by Counterproliferation

After the CPI was announced, three types of tensions affecting the formation of a national counterproliferation policy became apparent: (1) tension between the United States, its key allies, and other partners; (2) tensions between agencies and departments of the US government; and (3) tensions between the government and its society. Models of state decision making found in Graham Allison’s classic work Essence of Decision, a critical analysis of US and Soviet decision–making processes during the 13 days of the Cuban missile crisis, help us understand these tensions. Allison uses three models to explain how each side thought through and acted out its policy. These models have since been adapted to explain a wide variety of decision–making and policy–process scenarios. Two of the models are readily adaptable to explaining the tensions produced by counterproliferation. A third model is of my own design.

Intergovernmental Tensions

Allison’s model one, often called the rational actor or “classical” model, addresses intergovernmental tensions between the United States and its key allies and partners, explaining state decision making as “the more or less purposive acts of unified national governments.” This model focuses on key individuals acting for the government or on a sequence of known or expected logic such as cost–benefit analysis. Allison explains the model as a chess scenario in which “an individual player [moves] the pieces with reference to plans and tactics toward the goal of winning.” Model one probably provides the best way to explain tensions created between the United States and other governments, which, although publicly muted by diplomacy and secrecy, are nonetheless present.

Issues with NATO. Two of our strongest allies, the United Kingdom and France, have welcomed the initiative with considerable enthusiasm. Only six weeks after Aspin’s announcement of the CPI, the British defense minister expressed his approval, saying that “the American administration has made countering proliferation a major policy priority. We warmly welcome this, and we are looking forward to discussions with our NATO allies on this important subject over the coming months.” The French defense white paper, “Livre Blanc sur la Defense,” issued in March 1994, devotes six pages to the need to improve deterrence against WMD and calls for a new strategy using conventional military capabilities that emphasize action, prevention, and protection of military forces from WMD. France also showed its enthusiasm and staked its claim in counterproliferation by insisting that it provide the first European cochairman of the NATO Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP), a subcabinet–level working committee that is now studying counterproliferation and other WMD issues. This move also helped NATO solidify counterproliferation as a political issue—not just a military one. British and French interest in counterproliferation gives the concept far greater legitimacy, not only within NATO but also within the broader international forum. Consensus building with these and other allies helps reduce government–to–government tensions.

Other NATO allies have been more reserved and have tried to focus NATO’s interest in counterproliferation only on the defensive
and intelligence-collection aspects. In a rare public display of potential allied tensions over counterproliferation and non-proliferation, German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel issued his Ten Point Nonproliferation Initiative on 15 December 1993, eight days after Aspin announced the CPI. Based on the timing of the document's release and its content, it seems clear that the initiative was intended to provide a European counterbalance to the CPI. The final point took a direct slap at any US intention to conduct counterproliferation unilaterally, by insisting that military enforcement measures—except in the case of defense against armed attack—always require the approval of the UN Security Council.

Could a future scenario involving US resolve to execute counter-proliferation strategies or tactics hinge on the willingness of a future president to make a decision without the consent of key allies or without informing the UN Security Council?

In general, NATO's slow response to the CPI is not necessarily a cause for concern and is in fact viewed positively by DOD. After all, NATO has a history of reluctantly following controversial US initiatives. For example, NATO took over six years to adopt its own doctrine of "flexible response" after President Kennedy first proposed it. It is helpful here to remember that key allies have not always viewed proliferation with the same urgency as the United States. Disagreements over export controls of sensitive technologies are but one example. From the perspective of international-relations theory, NATO allies have the luxury of "free riding" on the US initiative while maintaining cautious or ambivalent stances in the public forum. Tensions that persist appear to be inevitable but are probably manageable. They are likely to decrease as counterproliferation policy and military capabilities become better defined.

Issues with Other Countries. Non-NATO allies greeted the CPI with what appeared to be a "wait and see" attitude. Japan and South Korea, for example, while greatly concerned over the North Korean nuclear weapons program, appear to have neither welcomed nor condemned counterproliferation. Officials or private citizens have had little to say publicly, most likely because they are understandably unwilling to provoke North Korea. The stance of the Japanese may also be a reflection of their reluctance to be mired in controversial, foreign-politico-military issues while they struggle with their government's stability and an economic recession. Australia, another key ally, also has been notably quiet, perhaps because it is less directly threatened by nuclear weapons and is part of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The CPI might upset its own initiatives in chemical and biological nonproliferation, so it has much to gain by fence-sitting, while continuing its own initiatives. Other foreign governments were remarkably reserved in their response to the CPI, a reaction not completely unanticipated since governments tend to be cautious in their handling of controversial foreign-policy issues. It is also likely that some government-to-government contacts on this issue will remain closely guarded exchanges between ambassadors and key officials, and are likely never to be aired in public. The Russian General Staff, for example, received a briefing on the CPI from US officials and agreed to future meetings, but Russian Federation officials have had little to say, except in off-the-record settings. Aside from the diplomatic tradition of discretion, there are several other possible explanations as well.

Many states, particularly developing nations and those belonging to the Non-
aligned Movement, simply do not have the resources to focus on more than one or two WMD proliferation issues at a time. Such states will work on issues of most immediate concern to their national interests. Until recently, many dwelled on the NPT extension process, concentrating on how best to use their voting power and how to maximize concessions or financial aid in exchange for their votes. Others are interested in nuclear-weapons-free-zone negotiations, the easing of export controls, or the clarification of dual-use technology issues. Few took more than a passing notice of an initiative designed to target the few states that might break their NPT obligations. Although significant latitude existed for developing states to allege that the CPI was part of the discriminatory regime of nuclear states over nonnuclear states, no one has raised this issue officially. Further, it has not inflamed a North-South debate, except among a handful of private political analysts.

Interagency Tensions

Allison's model three, also known as the government politics or "bureaucratic" model, helps explain the decision-making process from an intragovernmental perspective by examining "mechanisms from which governmental actions emerge." It "focuses on the politics of a government" and explains policy "not as choices or output, [but] . . . as a resultant of various bargaining games among players in the national government." An analyst using model three has "explained" an event "when he has discovered who did what to whom that yielded the action in question." He also presented the model-three perspective as a chess variant involving "a number of players, with distinct objectives but shared power over the pieces . . . determining the moves as the resultant of collegial bargaining." Tensions that developed between DOD, the State Department, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) may thus be explained as the outward manifestations of bargains and power plays between entrenched bureaucracies and political figures vying for power. Many of these tensions were resolved when turf and responsibilities were clarified by Daniel Poneman of the National Security Council (NSC) and subsequently by former undersecretary of defense John Deutch, but in hindsight the tension was probably avoidable.

The CPI seems to have caught the government arms control community by surprise. The ensuing confusion over definitions and turf gave the appearance that prior dialogue with the State Department and ACDA was ineffective. The new military mission appeared to be in direct competition with the diplomatic approach and precipitated a behind-the-scenes bureaucratic battle over its compatibility with existing treaties and agreements. Disclaimers that the new mission would not replace diplomacy and would not lessen nonproliferation efforts were not altogether convincing. They also implied a possible conflict of interest. When a policy initiative cuts across cabinet boundaries, as it clearly did in this case, the least controversial approach calls for the president or the national security advisor—not a department secretary—to announce it. This approach would clarify that it is the president's plan, not just the plan of one of the competing bureaucracies. The CPI clearly had the labels "defense" and "initiative" and was thus destined to create bureaucratic tension. Its critics inferred the worst—that DOD might start advocating the use of force to replace diplomacy.

The lack of presidential and cabinet-level involvement in this issue to date is of no little consequence. It affects debate both within and outside the administration. Neither President Clinton nor Secretary William Perry has referred publicly to the CPI or even used the term counterproliferation in a major speech. This seems odd when one considers that counterproliferation is touted as the nation's leading military response to its
number one military threat. Only Ashton Carter, assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, and his assistant Mitchell Wallerstein mention it in public. It seems as though officials above Dr. Carter’s level are satisfied with the “let’s study it” approach and are therefore comfortable with remaining publicly noncommittal on counterproliferation for the present.

When Aspin announced the CPI, he said that “President Clinton not only recognized the danger of the new threat, he gave us this new mission to cope with it.”16 But the five points that Aspin announced, as well as the spectrum of new proliferation–response options they created, were not clearly understood within the competing agencies—thus the need for Daniel Poneman’s well-known memorandum explaining the difference between counterproliferation and nonproliferation. As analyst Joseph Pilat observed, the counterproliferation debate became unnecessarily “complicated by divergent bureaucratic interests and the absence of a widely accepted definition of the term.”17 Policy initiatives should help clarify what an administration wants to do—not create additional confusion within its own ranks. The CPI backfired in this regard. The fact that one finds little direct evidence of this tension in government documents or speeches by key officials speaks well of the American system of political discourse, the relative efficiency of US government bureaucracy, and the discretion of key officials and their staffs. But tension was clearly evident among secondary sources, including working–level officials and private analysts who regularly interact with them.

Aspin’s strong unilateral approach created new tensions among inherently competitive bureaucracies, particularly DOD, State, and ACDA. The inability of DOD officials at both the senior and working levels to clarify their intentions exacerbated the impression that DOD was encroaching on diplomatic turf.18 Even Carter admitted in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 1994 that “frankly, I don’t think we have done a very good job of explaining what we mean by counterproliferation.”19 All these bureaucracies have long traditions of independence, assertiveness, and rivalry. The egos of both senior and working–level officials also play a part in any contest between organizations. One government or corporate staff is often contemptuous of a rival staff if the latter appears disorganized or advances a contrary position.

The NSC hierarchy for managing the full spectrum of proliferation responses, as now formalized in the Deutch Report, helps reduce bureaucratic tensions. Tasking originates with NSC principals and working–level committees and is then disseminated to the proper agency for action. This process legitimizes tasking, helps minimize interagency bickering, and makes NSC the conduit of the president’s authority in defining the national interest and security policy. Ultimately, NSC acts as arbiter of the delicate balance between nonproliferation and counterproliferation, and as the crucial link from both sides of proliferation policy back to the president. Clarification of NSC’s role as manager of all counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues represents a positive step towards defusing interagency tension.

State–Societal Tensions

To explain tensions that counterproliferation creates between the US government and society—particularly those between government and nongovernment organizations (NGO)—I propose a third, “state–societal” model. This model explains state decision making as one result of a state’s interaction with its society, specifically, the impact of expert and public opinion on decision–making processes. Allison did not address this issue, which may have been far less relevant in the 1960s and early 1970s, when he did his work.

Like the chess players in model three, a committee representing US government agen-
cies and the executive branch must achieve consensus before moving the pieces. In addition, however, these players are subjected to loud, often conflicting, information from a grandstand full of spectators who are obviously interested in the game but are not responsible for its outcome (i.e., the plethora of opinions tendered by the NGO community). Like a rowdy crowd at a sporting event, this gallery of proliferation connoisseurs produces much noise, with occasionally coherent shouts from individuals or a group. These shouts may either influence the game or be ignored in favor of the existing game plan. Each player weighs a suggestion or criticism before acting but reserves the right to act independently. NGO analysts make important contributions to the debate and policy-making forum because they are free to discuss issues that government officials must consider but are sometimes reluctant to acknowledge.

The most constant and vociferous tensions emerge from the NGO community's steady stream of criticism, much of which is "noise," with few implications for US policy. Examples include concerns raised by analysts—many from developing countries—as well as organizations such as Greenpeace International. They assert that counterproliferation discriminates against developing countries, and some allege that the initiative is a thinly disguised attempt to retarget US nuclear weapons against the third world. Others complain that counterproliferation violates principles of international law and order and will further undermine the authority of the UN. Although these concerns are interesting and have strong moral appeal, many of these analysts look at counterproliferation in isolation from the rest of US policy. They infer from its declaratory counterproliferation policy that the United States will somehow abandon its long-standing commitment to reinvigorate the UN, uphold the rule of law, and strengthen traditional diplomatic nonproliferation efforts.

One must carefully consider NGO criticisms in the context of US national interest to determine whether any substance exists that may ultimately affect security policy. Occasionally, NGOs succeed in raising issues that the US government is reluctant to address, such as the tension created by counterproliferation over the possible use of US nuclear weapons. This tension may turn out to be a healthy one; indeed, if the government deliberately keeps it ambiguous and if the NGOs keep it in the public light, it may turn out to serve both counterproliferation and nonproliferation. Such ambiguity may cause regional adversaries to reassess the costs and risks inherent in seeking to acquire WMD. It may also cause states interested in stopping WMD proliferation to work harder for consensus, for fear that the

The possibility that the United States might use its nuclear weapons against a regional adversary armed with WMD constitutes a significant reality check for that state.

United States may resort to unilateral military means in the absence of progress towards a solution.

One of the reasons the CPI has caused so much intellectual tension with the NGO community is that it engages two key debates of the post–cold-war era. The first is whether or not the United States will use its military forces unilaterally in the future or only as part of multilateral coalitions, as the government currently claims. For example, could a future scenario involving US resolve to execute counterproliferation strategies or tactics hinge on the willingness of a future president to make a decision without the consent of key allies or without informing the UN Security Council? It is possible
to imagine a scenario in which no time exists for such consultation. The second debate concerns when military force should be used and when diplomatic efforts are no longer productive. NGO analysts have the freedom to make strong moral and emotional appeals across the full spectrum of these debates without bearing the responsibility for security or policy ramifications. They often operate in the sphere of idealism rather than realpolitik. For this reason, much of what they say is of relatively little use in the formulation of US or NATO defense policy, although it is important to listen to and filter the issues they raise.

Manageable Tensions Make Progress Possible

The five key components of the nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime include (1) the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, (2) the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), (3) the two nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZ) currently in effect in South America and the South Pacific, (4) positive and negative security assurances, and (5) export controls. These components are healthy and enjoying fairly robust international support. Although all five have problems and need strengthening, they are enjoying broader support than ever before, owing in large part to the strength of US leadership and the repeated (although occasionally inconsistent) willingness of US presidents to engage proliferation issues as an ongoing part of foreign relations. The indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT in May 1995, without so much as a mention of counterproliferation over the entire course of the public debate, is ample evidence that proceeding with counterproliferation will not damage the regime. The IAEA enjoys greater support and credibility than at any other time in its history and continues as one of the UN’s most effective agencies. Progress with the Middle East peace process, including latent hope of a Mideast NWFZ, continues to move forward under US leadership. Although security assurances remain static for the present, they are in no danger of being abandoned by any of the declared nuclear-weapons powers who have underwritten them. Export controls continue to be problematic, although the consequences of failing to apply them are more clearly understood in light of the experience with Iraq and the desire to inhibit other would-be proliferators from emulating the Iraqi procurement network.

The United States as Leader

Time and again over the past 50 years, the United States has affirmed its leadership in slowing and preventing WMD proliferation. The NPT extension, while not exclusively a US “victory,” is nonetheless a mandate for continued US leadership in this field. Experts in international law concede that the treaty’s weakness lies in the realm of enforcement. But counterproliferation may actually represent a means of enforcing, or at least forcefully underwriting, the principles and institutions of nonproliferation by providing a means of countering states that violate their nonproliferation obligations.
The Threat of US or NATO Military Action

The threat of possible US or NATO military action against a potential proliferator provides a healthy tension that may convince a nonnuclear state to forgo acquisition of WMD. It also may cause a nuclear state to think twice before it brandishes or threatens to use its WMD. Counterproliferation also provides hope that the effects of WMD can be eliminated or at least countered on future regional battlefields. The possibility that the United States might use its nuclear weapons against a regional adversary armed with WMD constitutes a significant reality check for that state.

Counterproliferation Not New

The intellectual history of counterproliferation antedates the first nuclear weapons. Avner Cohen notes that the Manhattan Project, in addition to its task of producing nuclear weapons, had “the task of monitoring and, if possible, denying German nuclear weapons activities.” He also ordered commando and bombing attacks that destroyed the German heavy-water facility at Vernork (Rjukan), Norway. Fearing that a “German Oak Ridge” was fast developing near the towns of Bissengen and Hechingen in the Black Forest, he chose not to bomb these facilities “since that would only drive the project underground and we would run the risk of not finding it again in time.”

His concerns offer insight into the current question about the effectiveness of military strikes as a counterproliferation tool. In the closing months of the war, Groves ordered the bombing of a facility that manufactured thorium and uranium components and the seizure of a German uranium stockpile to prevent them from falling into Soviet hands. In the final days of the war, US forces were diverted to the Bissengen–Hechingen area—well inside the French zone of advance—to quickly round up German scientists; seize equipment, uranium, and heavy water; and dismantle German laboratories ahead of the advancing French army.

Renowned British socialists and pacifist philosopher Bertrand Russell, upset with the brutality of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe and deeply concerned with the prospect of a nuclear arms race, suggested in 1948 that the United States use its nuclear monopoly to threaten war in order to force the Soviets to accept nuclear disarmament. He justified his position on the basis that “some wars, a very few, are justified, even necessary. They are usually necessary because matters have been permitted to drag on their obviously evil way till no peaceful means can stop them.” Many prominent American “doves” ultimately agreed with Russell. One might apply a similar rationale to the use of force in counterproliferation.

On two occasions, the Soviets considered using military force to stop the Chinese nuclear weapons program, at one point consulting with the US government about the possibility of joint action to destroy China’s gaseous diffusion plant. During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy’s NSC executive committee considered conventional air strikes against Soviet medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile sites before finally deciding to impose a naval quarantine. The quarantine option is also an example of counterproliferation, even though it targeted a state that already had nuclear weapons rather than rolled back a nascent nuclear weapons state. More recently, coalition forces bombed various Iraqi WMD facilities in the Gulf War of 1991, although in hindsight, these strikes also revealed the limitations of coalition intelligence, targeting, and strike capabilities. From the outset, the war itself took on a preventive coloration, much in the spirit of counterproliferation.
Clearly, counterproliferation is not a new concept. The United States has a long history of counterproliferation--like activity, including intelligence collection, analysis, planning, and even using military force to protect against WMD proliferation. Using Russell's logic, one can justify counterproliferation on moral grounds—an argument consistent with the American tradition of morality in its foreign affairs, including the use of force. In peacetime, it seems prudent to develop and engage wholeheartedly in the full range of counterproliferation activities short of actually using force—and to anticipate using force if necessary.

Anticipatory Self--Defense

The liberal but controversial interpretation of a country's inherent right of self--defense derives from Article 51 of the UN charter. Built by case law, it espouses the doctrine of anticipatory self--defense. Under this interpretation, a nation need not wait for the first blow to fall before it defends itself. This issue has long been a source of international debate and is, without doubt, the strongest single tension evoked by the CPI. Although the Israeli air strike on the Osiraq reactor arguably violated the UN charter by the narrow view of self--defense and was almost universally condemned at the time, Israel justified its actions, based on the broader view. The strike and the Begin Doctrine, articulated shortly thereafter, were based on the notion that in rare circumstances a state may justifiably act in anticipation of a threat. In the spring of 1992, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney effectively reversed US condemnation of the Osiraq air strike by publicly thanking Israel and noting that its action had clearly prevented Saddam Hussein from possessing nuclear weapons at the time of his invasion of Kuwait. In hindsight, many countries agreed with Cheney.

Conclusion

Although intelligence and military capabilities will always have limitations, technologies and policy developed under the CPI could possibly provide a threefold update to US grand strategy in terms of prevention, deterrence, and defense. It may be possible to prevent future regional adversaries from fielding WMD or using them effectively. Counterproliferation also broadens the scope of US deterrence strategy by allowing for the future possibility of deterring WMD by conventional means. Finally, technology may allow for a viable defense against WMD through current theater ballistic missile defense technology as well as other new technologies. We should vigorously pursue all three fronts without apology, on the grounds that it is just and moral to fight some preventive wars and to prevent wars with a robust grand strategy capable of responding to any external threat.

As always, the US government should continue to insist upon the right to a broad interpretation of the inherent right of self-defense for its own citizens, territory, and vital interests, as well as those of its allies. The “carrot and stick” approach to WMD proliferation is appropriate. Further, we should vigorously support and broaden nonproliferation whenever possible, while developing and improving an effective counterproliferation strategy and the military capability to implement it, should the need ever arise.

Notes


2. Ibid., 7.


5. France does not formally participate in the NATO Military Committee. French involvement in counterproliferation necessitates that it be conducted on the political side of NATO. This rendering of counterproliferation as a political issue parallels DOD’s assertion that counterproliferation is a set of additional response options subordinate to diplomacy. By placing counterproliferation under its political structure rather than under its military structure, NATO avoids the perception of a conflict of interest inherent in DOD’s management of the CPI as a possible competitor that could supplant diplomatic means.

6. In contrast to the normal criticism that the CPI is too vague and does not provide a clear definition, Virginia S. I. Gamba believes that the lack of definitions “seemed to have worked as a stimulant rather than a hindrance . . . [and] that months before the U.S. administration had a firm idea of what its own initiative meant and what it entailed, major NATO partners were already busily interpreting Aspin’s words on counterproliferation.” See Virginia S. I. Gamba, “Counterproliferation: Harmony or Contradiction?” in Mitchell Reiss and Harald Müller, eds., International Perspectives on Counterproliferation, Working Paper no. 99 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995), 58.


9. See Seongwhun Cheon, “A South Korean View of the U.S. Counterproliferation Initiative,” in Reiss and Müller, 110–12. Cheon states that “the South Korean government and public have expressed consistent opposition to any measure that might increase tensions on the Korean peninsula.” He also notes that the vast majority of the Korean population opposed a statement made by South Korea’s president, Kim Young-sam, in April 1991 that the North’s suspicious Yongbyon nuclear complex should be struck by a commando raid.

10. There have been no official allegations of North–South discriminations from developing or nonaligned states, but the issue has been raised by environmental and other “watchdog” groups such as Greenpeace International. Surprisingly, it was not raised at the NPT extension conference.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., 7.

14. Ibid.

15. Daniel Pomper, the NSC’s special assistant to the president for proliferation policy, wrote a broadly circulated memorandum on 18 February 1994 to Robert Gallucci, assistant secretary of state for political–military affairs, and Ashton Carter, assistant secretary of defense for nuclear security and counterproliferation. The memorandum defined counterproliferation and nonproliferation, the former as “the activities of the Department of Defense across the full range of U.S. efforts to combat proliferation, including diplomacy, arms control, export controls, and intelligence collection and analysis, with particular responsibility for ensuring that U.S. forces and interests can be protected should they confront an adversary armed with weapons of mass destruction or missiles.” Deutch’s subsequent Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs affirmed Pomper’s definitions and identified two NSC committees with oversight responsibilities for counterproliferation policy. These committees give the NSC the ability to task specific aspects of proliferation policy to the appropriate government agency, thus mitigating interagency turf battles and tensions.


18. This perception is a synthesis based on office interviews with various working–level officials and private analysts. A primary cause of this tension was that the working–level officials under Ashton Carter had little prior experience with WMD proliferation. They were proven analysts from other areas of DOD, but initial confusion was inevitable. After the first year, Carter’s staff had developed effective working relations with their counterparts at State and ACDA and had gained an in–depth knowledge of WMD proliferation issues.


22. Ibid., 188–89. Groves calls the location Rjukan, but most scholars call it Vemork.

23. Ibid., 218.


25. Ibid., 241.


27. Cohen, 73. Cohen does not elaborate on a primary source, but this possibility was confirmed in an oral interview with Prof. Patrick J. Parker of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, who was an official in DOD at the time.

28. See David A. Brown, “Iraqi Nuclear Weapons Capability Still Intact,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 134, no. 26 (1 July 1991): 3. In this account, Lt. Gen. Charles Homer, USAF, commander of the coalition air forces, concedes that “possibly eighty percent of all Iraqi nuclear facilities were hit” over the course of the 43-day air campaign. See also Thomas A. Keary and Elliott A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 78–79. This account is an in–depth critical study of the entire air campaign, concluding that “the Iraqi nuclear program was massive . . . and less vulnerable to destruction by precision bombing than Coalition air commanders and planners or U.S. intelligence specialists realized before Desert Storm.” It also notes that at the start of the air campaign, the target list contained two nuclear targets but that postwar inspections by the IAEA under the auspices of the UN Special Commission on Iraq ultimately revealed more than 20 sites, including 16 key facilities.

29. In September 1807, the Royal Navy bombarded Copenhagen and seized the Danish fleet in anticipation of an impending alliance between Denmark and France. The British goal was to prevent the Danish navy from aiding the French before Denmark actually joined the conflict. See William L. Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History: Ancient, Medieval, and

30. Frank J. Gaffney Jr., "An Exchange on Proliferation," The National Interest, no. 27 (Spring 1992): 108. See also Cohen, 101, note 80, which refers to Shlomo Naakdimon’s First Strike: The Exclusive Story of How Israel Foiled Iraq’s Attempt to Get the Bomb (Hebrew revision) (Tel Aviv: Edanim Publishers, 1993), 381-82, which reports that Vice President Dan Quayle and Secretary of Defense Cheney both openly acknowledged their gratitude to Menachem Begin for his decision to attack Osiraq.