I'd like to start by thanking the authorities for allowing me to address this 20th reunion of the Air University classes of 1997. As you may know, last year’s Military Control Act makes assemblages of officers, even retired ones, illegal without special permission. Since the countercoup of 2015, the civilians want to keep a close eye on us.

Frankly, I don’t blame them. After we lost the High-Tech War of 2007 and the Second Gulf War just three years later, the coup plotters cleverly laid the groundwork for their takeover by blaming these bloody defeats on “incompetent” civilians. When General Brutus occupied the White House after the president’s mysterious death in 2012, the people welcomed the change at
first. But after only a couple of years of military rule, everyone realized how wrong they had been.

Many of you may be familiar with “The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012,” an essay by the Prisoner.² The Prisoner’s letter to a war college classmate recalled US civil-military relations as they existed in 1992.³ It also described the military’s evolution into a highly politicized organization that, ironically, couldn’t fight.

Today, I want to focus on US civil-military relations as they appeared later—in the 1996–97 time frame. With the benefit of 20/20—no, make that 2012—hindsight, I’d like to talk to you about the lessons learned from the coup. All of these lessons are based on circumstances as they were over 20 years ago, when you were sitting in this very auditorium about to begin your studies. What kinds of issues regarding the military’s role in American society should you have been thinking about back then?

**The Civil-Military Environment in the Late 1990s**

First of all, the fact that no one was planning a coup in 1996 didn’t justify the complacency encouraged by too many analysts back then.⁴ They simplistically concluded that the military’s acceptance of shrinking defense budgets and the imposition of social policies on the armed forces “proved” that civilian control was secure.⁵

Instead, they should have examined the unique implications of a large peacetime military during the late 1990s. Historically, the United States organized large forces to fight specific wars and quickly demobilized those forces at the end of a conflict.⁶ After World War II, the exigencies of the cold war required maintaining a sizable peacetime defense establishment,⁷ which probably gave birth to a highly politicized military.⁸ However, because the overarching threat of a nuclear-armed Soviet Union absorbed so much of the armed forces’ energy during the cold war, the military’s politicization didn’t present the perni-

**Vietnam and the Politicization of the Military**

It is difficult to overstate the influence the Vietnam War had on civil-military relations during the last decade of the twentieth century. Robert McNamara’s duplicity, revealed in his memoir of 1995,¹² rekindled deeply held beliefs that much of the blame for the defeat of the United States in Vietnam lay at the feet of inept and mendacious civilians. Officers at every level, therefore, believed it was necessary to become far more assertive in the political process than ever before in order to avoid “another Vietnam.”¹³ Accordingly, our war colleges gave increased emphasis to domestic politics, economics, and international relations.¹⁴ Of particular interest was the emphasis they placed on Clausewitzian theory.¹⁵

Although historian John Keegan disagrees,¹⁶ Clausewitz’s assertion that war is a continuation of politics by other means still resonated in US military thinking.¹⁷ When taken out of context, Clausewitz’s dictum became another rationale for
officers to insinuate themselves into the political process. After all, if war is so intimately connected with politics, shouldn’t military officers be involved? Wasn’t that the lesson of Vietnam? Georges Clemenceau’s adage was turned on its head: to the generals, war and the political decisions that surround it were too serious to be left to politicians.

Consequently, the military placed hundreds of midlevel officers in congressional offices to study political techniques. As we should have expected, they inevitably became entangled in partisan activities, reportedly as early as 1996. In another politicizing move, Congress turned the promotion process into a political football. Back in 1996, for example, the Senate delayed the confirmation of thousands of officers’ promotions to exact cooperation from the Defense Department for a plan to reorganize the intelligence community. Predictably, this kind of activity encouraged uniformed officers to become partisans in political battles.

Politization occurred in other ways as well. For instance, it was widely reported that the protests of gay-rights activists scuttled the nomination of Gen Joseph Hoar to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). What was his alleged offense? As the commander of Marine Corps Depot Parris Island, he enforced the homosexual exclusion policy put in place not by military officers but by the civilian leadership. This action sent a message that the nation would later regret: military officers should circumvent or ignore the directives of civilian superiors if they think a different course of action might be politically expedient in the future. As Col Harry Summers observed with respect to Vietnam-era protests, targeting the military—the executors rather than the makers of policy—politicizes the armed forces and thereby weakens civilian control.

Gay-rights activists also unwittingly facilitated the coup by undermining the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). For decades, ROTC had been an important source of progressivism in the armed forces. Unfortunately, protesters succeeded in driving it from many top universities—often the very ones needed to preserve the balance of views so necessary for a professional military in a free society. By the mid-1990s, many officers privately expressed delight that there were fewer officers from the more liberal campuses to challenge their increasingly right-wing philosophy.

In addition, a new set of qualifications for promotion arose. Skill at political infighting, not traditional war fighting, became the mark of up-and-coming officers. Indeed, as far back as 1993, Adm William Crowe, former CJCS, declared that few officers reached senior rank “without a firm grasp of international relations, congressional politics, and public affairs.” Eventually, our leaders became skilled politicians but, as we saw in the Second Gulf War, poor war fighters.

Nontraditional Missions and Civil-Military Relations

Another key source of politicization was the explosive growth of nontraditional missions in the 1990s. These ranged from drug interdiction, disaster relief, and youth programs at home to nation building and humanitarian and peacekeeping missions abroad.

The Prisoner critiqued this drift into nontraditional missions in his letter. What changed from 1992 to 1996, however, was the institutionalization of these missions. Armed with catchy acronyms like MOOTW (military operations other than war), a powerful constituency arose within the ranks. Make no mistake about it, this was a basic change in orientation. Gen John Shalikashvili, former CJCS, admitted that “while we have historically focused on warfighting, our military profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array of military operations other than war” (emphasis added).

Overlooked was the fact that military officers who concentrate on activities other than war eventually become something other than warriors. An ever-increasing percentage of the shrinking officer corps “came of age” focusing not on the
military arts but on decidedly nonmilitary enter­prises. All of this would prove disastrous.

We learned the hard way that assigning mis­sions like domestic drug interdiction to military personnel inevitably entangles them in policy mak­ing, a political task best left to civilian authori­ties. Could we have seen this coming in 1996? Recall that back then, a four-star Army gen­eral—along with a cadre of active duty offi­cers—was retired to help make domestic drug-control policy.

Just as disappointment about law enforce­ment’s inability to stem the flow of drugs led to the military’s involvement in counterdrug efforts, so did a series of terror attacks result in a similar role in counterterrorism just a few years later. Public frustration and fear led to the Suppression of Terrorism Act of 1998. This act gave the armed forces significant internal security powers, something for which the shadowy Special Opera­tions Command had been preparing for years.

As we now well know, the trend toward non­traditional missions ultimately undermined ci­vilian control of the military. In his classic book The Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington ar­gued for “objective” civilian control. That condition, I contend, is best realized when the armed forces concentrate on professionalizing them­selves through truly military endeavors. Apolo­gists for nontraditional diversions gushed, rather naively in my view, about the “training” such mis­sions were supposed to provide, as if chauffeuring Olympic athletes for a couple of months equated to a visit to the National Training Center or Nellis Air Force Base. Even more significantly, in­volvement in these activities perversely created a generation of military personnel much more at­tuned to and interested in almost anything other than the dirty but necessary business of war.

We paid a terrible price for this in twenty-first­century conflicts.

One can trace the origin of this strange disin­clination toward war fighting to the military’s peculiar form of post-Vietnam syn drome. Determined to avoid another quagmire, the defense establishment embraced a set of prereq­uisites to the use of armed force. Military leaders interpreted these mushy standards—known as “[Caspar] Weinberger’s rules”—to, as one com­mentator put it, “subvert civilian controls” by ef­fectively exercising a “veto” over virtually any operation they wanted to avoid. Despite studies to the contrary, the US military became a prisoner of the notion that public support for the use of armed force inevitably erodes (à la Vietnam and later Somalia), even when the number of casual­ties is relatively small.

Nevertheless, Gen Colin Powell, former CJCS, created a major controversy regarding the politicization of the military when he successfully used Weinberger’s rules to oppose early interven­tion in the Balkans. Though roundly criticized for exceeding the proper role of a serving offi­cer, Powell set a precedent for unabashed asser­tiveness in the political process. Of course, military officers, aware of the horror and destruc­tiveness of war, should approach combat opera­tions warily. Still, a fundamental tenet of the military profession demands, as General Shali­kashvili said back in 1996, “extraordinary dedica­tion and sacrifice under the most adverse conditions” (emphasis added).

But the chairman was appealing to an ethos that was under attack on many flanks. Especially insidious was the assault of a new ideology known as total quality management (TQM). No one back then truly objected to teaching better man­agement skills. But TQM and, more accurately, the corruption of its beneficial aspects became much more than that. With cultish frenzy, its devotees attempted to reduce to metrics the ulti­mately unquantifiable nature of combat readiness and war fighting. Somehow, the performance of military functions was equated with “products.”

TQM’s effect on the military’s self-concept was just as pernicious. Traditional superior-subor­dinate and comrade-in-arms relationships were re­placed by faddish customer-supplier associations. This change ultimately undermined discipline, as military personnel began to believe they were “empowered” to ignore orders that didn’t suit them. Furthermore, TQM’s obsession with unit self-assessments encouraged commanders to focus too much on subordinate-customer “satisfac­tion” and so-called quality-of-life issues. Interestingly, one expert charged that an over­
emphasis on quality-of-life issues led to the failure to take appropriate but unpopular security measures prior to the Khobar Towers bombing of 1996.\textsuperscript{43} Plenty of officers in the 1990s recognized the lunacy of TQM, but few were willing to confront its powerful zealots.

TQM was yet another reflection of the nefarious commercialization of the profession of arms. An altruistic calling rapidly turned into a job marked by self-seeking opportunism. As William Pfaff wrote in January 1996, “You do not join the American army or navy today to be a warrior. You do it to learn a trade, or earn money for college, or to have a well paid retirement after 20 or 30 years. War—even a deployment like Bosnia—interferes with that. The troops resent it.”\textsuperscript{44}

When the new military “executives” analyzed proposals for risky deployments, they quickly voiced their disapproval. Clearly, combat would be too costly in terms of “customers” and “products.” It just made no sense; any MBA could see that.

Edward Luttwak argued back in 1996 that, given the military’s reluctance to risk casualties, the nation needed to redirect defense spending toward unmanned weapons systems.\textsuperscript{45} Similar arguments directly led to cancellation of the Air Force’s F-22 fighter in 1998. Once the “man-in-the-loop” premise was broken, the rationale for a separate air service collapsed. Thus, the Air Force became the first of the military services to be disestablished and combined into the Unified Armed Forces in 2007.

Even in the twenty-first century, however, circumstances at times required sending people into harm’s way.\textsuperscript{46} Eventually, the Pentagon’s aversion to fighting compelled the ultimate form of outsourcing: hazardous, unpopular operations were contracted out to the newly formed Violence Applications International Corporation (VAIC).\textsuperscript{47} For years, VAIC and its stable of retirees did the military’s dirty work, thereby allowing the armed forces the opportunity to deepen their involvement in popular domestic activities and trendy overseas enterprises. But when the Second Gulf War broke out in 2010 and the Iranian X Armored Corps began crushing everything in its path, VAIC defaulted on its contract as its employees scattered. Corporate loyalty, it seems, has its limits.

The Rise of Postmodern Militarism

At the same time the military’s post-cold-war politicization was on the rise, the public’s understanding of and resistance to military influence was declining radically. Traditionally, the American people had been wary of a professional military. The Founding Fathers, for instance, were well aware that it could be a source of tyranny.\textsuperscript{58} Eschewing standing armies, they framed a constitution that contemplated a national defense that principally relied on militias of citizen-soldiers.\textsuperscript{59}

Benevolent antimilitarism became a time-honored American virtue.\textsuperscript{50} When conflicts called millions into uniform and peacetime conscription gave millions more firsthand experience with service life, the American people had few illusions about the military. With the end of the draft, however, memories of the less attractive aspects of military service faded into nostalgia.

The youthful civilian elites who assumed power in the 1990s were wholly innocent of any genuine understanding of the powerful imperatives intrinsic to the armed forces. Moreover, these elites were not antimilitary, despite what many people in uniform believed at the time.\textsuperscript{51} Of course, few of them considered military people their social or intellectual equals; rather, they viewed the armed forces with the kind of pretentious cordiality usually reserved for faithful servants. What they did appreciate was the military’s extraordinary competence, and they reveled in the notion that it could do their bidding.

In actuality, both the elites and the public were in the embrace of “postmodern militarism.”\textsuperscript{52} One writer back in 1994 described this phenomenon as follows:

Postmodern militarism is not marked by overt military dominance or even a societal embrace of martial values. Rather, it is characterized by a
growing willingness of an increasingly militarily-naive society to charge those in uniform with responsibilities that a democracy ought to leave to civilians. It is a product of America’s deep frustration and disgust with elected government’s inability to work effectively, or to even labor honestly. The reason the military’s approval rating far exceeds that of every other institution in American society—including, significantly, the ones expected to exercise civilian control—is quite simple: it gets good things done.


That question was never answered; the national discussion we needed in the 1990s never took place. This was especially unfortunate because the civilian institutions that were supposed to control the military were weakening. Congress’s partisanship made it vulnerable to manipulation by politically astute military operatives who became expert at playing congressional factions against each other. The executive branch didn’t fare much better. At the beginning of the Clinton administration, for example, there were numerous reports of open contempt by military personnel for their commander in chief. Although many observers believed that the initial hostility later dissipated, the uproar that followed an attempt by President Clinton’s lawyers to delay a lawsuit by characterizing him as a member of the armed forces illustrated his continued vulnerability. Moreover, analysts still asserted in 1996 that Clinton had not yet been able to “command” the Pentagon.

Instead, the military had become, as one commentator put it, “the most powerful individual actor in Washington politics.” Part of the reason lay with the fact that the executive and legislative branches both labored under the shadow of Vietnam. Writing in May 1996, A. J. Bacevich of Johns Hopkins University observed that thirty years later, now elected to positions of prominence, those who evaded service now truckle and fawn to demonstrate the depth of their regard for men in uniform. . . . The military itself is only too happy to play along. The moral leverage embedded in “the troops” . . . provides the Pentagon with enormous political clout. Senior military leaders do not hesitate to exploit that clout for their own purposes.

Among military leaders, the CJCS is most senior. By the mid-1990s it was clear, as Defense News contended, that the chairman’s “rising clout threaten[ed] civilian leaders.” After the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act dramatically increased the power of the CJCS, the charge of politicization was levied at every chairman. Admiral Crowe was a self-described “political animal,” and General Powell was similarly characterized. Further, General Shalikashvili was accused of partisanship when he challenged the views of then-Republican presidential candidate Pat Buchanan and later voiced opposition to the Defend America Act, a cornerstone of Republican Robert Dole’s presidential campaign.

The highly politicized office of the CJCS wasn’t converted into the all-powerful Military Plenipotentiary until 2005, but we were already slipping toward that change in the 1990s. Although prohibited by law from acting as a commander, the chairman engaged in the command-like function of directing adherence to joint doctrine. Likewise, the Joint Staff behaved as if it were the military’s senior headquarters, even though US law denied it executive power and prohibited it from functioning as a general staff. This consolidation of enormous authority would prove catastrophic in 2012.

All of this constituted the first inkling of a tendency within the armed forces to consider themselves above the law. Allegedly, frustration with the “restrictions of American democracy” led some officers to break the law during the
Iran-Contra affair. Later, troubling reports circu-
lated of marines ignoring laws that interfered with 
what they viewed as their “domestic peacekeeping mission” during the Los Angeles 
riots of 1992. The investigation of a crash of a 
CT-43 in April 1996 revealed a similar lack of discipline. It found that senior Air Force com-
manders were ignoring orders.

Officers, however, had little to fear from the 
military justice system. By 1996 it was broken. To be sure, part of the fault lay with vainglorious 
lawyers who continually tinkered with it until it 
became one of the most bureaucratic and defen-
dant-oriented criminal justice systems in the 
world. We were left with a system incapable of 
handling the kinds of complex, high-profile cases 
that can affect civil-military relations. Consider, 
for example, that despite literally hundreds of 
witnesses, the Tailhook scandal of 1991 resulted in 
not a single conviction. Likewise, military 
courts held no one accountable for the “friendly-
fire” shootdown in April 1994 of two US Army 
helicopters in Northern Iraq, which cost 26 lives.

Worst of all was the handling of the case of an 
Air Force major general who in 1993 publicly de-
nounced President Clinton as a “gay loving, pot 
smoking, draft dodging womanizer.” This 
egregious violation of Article 88 of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice’s proscription against 
the use of contemptuous language toward the 
commander in chief merely resulted in nonjudi-
cial punishment, an administrative action re-
served by law for “minor offenses.” Given that 
precedent, little wonder that a malignancy I call 
“neopraetorianism” arose.

The Emergence of Neopraetorianism

One of the greatest paradoxes of civil-military 
relations in the 1990s was that a disdain for 
American society grew within the ranks despite 
the military’s popularity and political “clout.” 
That alienation created a gap between the armed

forces and the society they served. Of course, the 
military had always been a “separate society” with 
unique customs and organization. Its war-fight-
ning mission required that. This gap emerged be-
cause the military regarded itself as a higher caste, 
fundamentally at odds with civil society.

As early as 1991, journalist David Wood re-
ported that military personnel tended to “view 
the chaotic civilian world with suspicion and 
sometimes hostility.” A Los Angeles Times ar-
ticle of 1996 noted a similar trend, quoting one 
service member’s description of civilians as 
“thieves, bureaucrats, no self-reliance, no in-
tegrity . . . substandard.” A Harvard study of 
May 1996, as well as one by a Naval War College 
student that same month, warned that civil-mili-
tary relations were threatened by the military’s 
increasingly jaundiced view of civilians and its 
narcissistic assessment of itself.

Emerging from this growing antipathy within 
the military was neopraetorianism, which arises 
when the armed forces perceive themselves not 
only as the protectors of what is right in civil 
society but also as the self-appointed, unelected 
makers and implementers of the same. It is abet-
ted by officers infatuated with the idea that they are 
national ombudsmen with unlimited portfolios, 
rather than military leaders with finite responsi-
bilities. Paralleling the public’s corporate igno-
rance of military affairs, neopraetorianism is 
marked by the military’s flawed notion of its own 
cultural superiority and its seeming inability to 
grasp the merits of civil society.

Like so many problems we faced in the 
twenty-first century, one manifestation of neo-
praetorianism evolved from a bona fide patriot’s 
well-meaning idea. In 1996, the commandant of 
the Marine Corps, appalled by what he perceived 
as a disintegration of values, “made morality a 
major theme in his first year in the top post.” In 
doing so, he embraced a then-popular thesis of the 
political right that sought the “restoration” of an 
idealistically “moral” America—an America that, 
in the opinion of one expert, “never existed and 
never will.”

Commenting on Marine Corps recruits, the
commandant insisted that “there has got to be a transformation of [a] young man or woman from what they are in society” (emphasis added). Of course, this was a cruel insult to the parents who raised these men and women, especially at a time when the other services were bragging about enlisting the highest quality recruits ever. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the armed forces inculcate new troops with military skills as well as an acceptance of the authoritarianism, bellicosity, and anti-individualism necessary for survival in combat. But the commandant’s agenda wasn’t that limited. He sought to instill recruits with the values he decided were “important for the Nation” (emphasis added). His goal was not just a better marine; rather, the general declared that he wanted his “legacy for the Corps to be literally a transformed American.” He added that he was “going to go to unbelievable lengths to do that.”

Where did we go wrong? Unfortunately, subsequent generals corrupted the commandant’s concept for their own purposes. We learned that regardless of the propriety of setting values for its members, a professional military is not charged to do so for society at large. We found that when active duty generals arrogate the prerogative to tell the country which values it should embrace and use their vast resources to impose them upon the nation, then something is deeply askew in the country’s civil-military relations.

In fact, we learned at last year’s coup trials that most of the plotters wanted to remake the nation in the armed forces’ image. History can teach us something here. In his book Modern Tyrants (1994), Daniel Chirot argued that “Hitler’s appeal to a disoriented German population, beset not only by financial and political chaos, but also by open manifestations of new cultural tastes and sexual mores, was that he would bring back traditional order, a simple comprehensible culture, and a clear public morality.” Chirot also noted that “military men in particular are prone to [the] delusion” that their nation’s problems can be solved by the imposition of martial values. The lesson is that generals should not be commanders in the nation’s culture wars. The military should not attempt to remake society in its own image.

The military’s self-concept also fostered neopraetorianism. Inexplicably, people in uniform seemed oblivious to their own world. Sure, the military enjoyed low crime rates, but why shouldn’t it? Unlike civil society, it had the luxury of both selecting its members and casting out even minor offenders. Moreover, it could relentlessly scrutinize its members’ personal lives and subject them to urinalysis testing, DNA examinations, and sometimes the pseudoscience of polygraphs.

Life on America’s secluded military bases was idyllic, thanks, ironically, to the society we criticized so much. Many installations resembled the ultimate Marxist paradise: neat, rent-free homes; free utilities; subsidized shopping and day care; extensive, cost-free recreational facilities; and even government-furnished preachers. The healthcare system, for all its faults, still outstripped the system available to most civilians at a similar price. Important aspects of the compensation system were a welfare queen’s dream. Need a bigger house? Just have another child. Want more money? Find a mate. All of this was supported by a huge panoply of government-funded social services that helped control problems like alcohol and child abuse.

The military looked at civil society and saw only chaos, crime, and moral decay. True, these are the unfortunate by-products of personal freedom and aggressive individualism. But freedom and individualism produced the economic boom that fueled the nation’s resurgent military machine. The genius of American capitalism is its recognition that the pursuit of individual self-interest in an atmosphere of free competition ultimately can lead to the common good. A fiercely entrepreneurial spirit may be disastrous on the battlefield, where a premium is placed on unity of purpose, but it is an enormously important source of innovation and progress amid the Darwinian complexities of most other human undertakings.

Before we looked too askance at civil society, we should have understood the basically undemocratic and authoritarian nature of military life. Officers find comfort in a hierarchical organization in which military rank unambiguously defines their privileged place and the chain of command gives clear definition, authority, and fi-
nality to decision making. They are perplexed by the egalitarianism of civil society and uncomfortable with the uncertainty and deliberate chaos of the democratic process. They view intellectual pluralism as divisive and debilitating instead of creative and stimulating, and political consensus-building as either chicanery or nefarious compromise rather than a productively inclusive technique. “Democracy is not,” as General Powell accurately observed, “an easy form of government for military professionals.”

The neopraetorians never understood that their society was a Potemkin village that depended upon the largess of civil society—the society upon which they heaped contempt and which they presumed to lecture about values. The despotic, albeit kindly, socialism of the armed forces may suit the peculiar needs of a professional military, but it is hardly a model for a free society. Instead of following the path of neopraetorianism, we should have built a new framework for civil-military relations, one I call the “New American Model.”

The New American Model of Civil-Military Relations

The New American Model appreciates the fact that effective civilian control of the military, as Dr Richard Kohn concluded, emphasizes process, and that process can and should evolve over time. That said, the model nevertheless recognizes the utility of clearly delineated rules. Accordingly, it attempts to complement its theoretical architecture with practical, specific guidance whenever possible.

The New American Model honors Huntington’s concept of objective military control and insists that the military’s energy and resources be focused on external war-fighting functions. The model also finds persuasive the research of Dr Michael Desch, which suggests that civil-military relations prosper under these circumstances. Civilian government agencies or commercial enterprises should perform nontraditional missions that really need to be accomplished.

The centerpiece of the New American Model is the principle that effective civilian control of a large, professional military in a democracy requires pervasive transparency—especially during peacetime. Necessary oversight can occur only when the military’s thought and action are made plain to the society it serves. The model has faith in the people’s wisdom and, therefore, completely rejects the idea that “military and national security issues are just too complex [for the general public], and can be understood only by a select few.”

Unfortunately, opaqueness—not transparency—was the paradigm in the 1990s. As yet another legacy of the Vietnam War, the politicized US military of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries became ever more deeply engaged in “perception management.” Convinced that hostile reporters harmed the war effort in Southeast Asia, buoyed by favorable public reaction to its domination of the press during the First Gulf War, and determined to capitalize on the media’s negative public image; the armed forces came to regard the media and information more generally as something to be manipulated for the military’s own purposes.

The military devoted enormous energy to learning how to manipulate the media. As a measure of how far the armed forces were willing to go, consider the following statement by a military instructor in 1993: “Learning to deal with reporters is just as important as learning to kill the enemy” (emphasis added). “Spin control” was critical as well. An Army instructor, for instance, insisted that soldiers tell not just any story, but a “positive Army story” (emphasis added). The New American Model, however, rejects “spin doctoring.” It contends that “in a democracy the military should be controlled by public opinion, not the other way around.”

The Army, in particular, aggressively sought to maintain spin control. It imposed, for example, the so-called Ricks rule in 1996 to counter
frank, but politically incorrect, comments by its troops in Bosnia. Ultimately, discouraging candor proved to be counterproductive. A participant in an Army survey of 1996 glumly reported that “telling the truth ends careers quicker than making stupid mistakes or getting caught doing something wrong.”

Ironically, the Army’s success at suppressing the media during the First Gulf War planted the seed of its own demise. With the public uneducated about the Army’s capabilities, the Army was reduced to only four active divisions and followed the Air Force into disestablishment in early 2007.

In any event, the transparency the model calls for cannot exist when security classifications are overused. Secrecy, as the New York Times noted on the 25th anniversary of its publication of the Pentagon Papers, can be used to hide “bloat, error and corruption in the military.”

In the mid-1990s, the overclassification problem arose with respect to the military’s burgeoning involvement in information warfare, particularly the offensive variety. Military leaders coyly declined to discuss the topic, citing high security classifications. Indeed, the subject was so grotesquely overclassified that even within the armed forces and the civilian defense establishment, few people knew any of the particulars.

In the beginning, we all knew the reason for much of this overclassification: “rice bowls.” Information warfare was one of the few areas in which military budgets were increasing, and by controlling access to these programs, organizations could control the associated funding. Furthermore, by restricting traditional “operators” from this information, members of lower-status intelligence and communications career fields could engage in Walter Mitty–like delusions and call themselves “warriors,” albeit information warriors.

No one disputed the need to classify some technical aspects of information warfare. However, given its openly stated aim—to “convince, confuse, or deceive enemy decision makers” (emphasis added)—it should have been clear that the armed forces were acquiring a capability with tremendous potential to influence the domestic political process. When our military schools began discussing the use of advanced information technology to “morph” false images of enemy political leaders to mislead their publics, for instance, we should have realized the dangerous potential of this and similar technologies. The New American Model asserts that the public needs to know and approve the “who” and “what” of information warfare, leaving only the “how” secret.

The New American Model also maintains that a vibrant, knowledgeable, and inquisitive press is a vital safeguard of civilian control. Indeed, with the power of formal government structures diminished, the media became the most effective means of civilian control by the late 1990s. Thus, national leaders did not help matters when they placed part of the blame for Adm Jeremy Boorda’s suicide on “the relentless glare of the media.”

Addressing the perils of opaqueness does not complete the New American Model’s architecture for the military’s involvement in political discourse. One can find the template for that construct in Yehuda Ben-Meir’s Civil-Military Relations in Israel. In this book, Ben-Meir conceived of five possible roles for military officers in political affairs:

1. Advisory: making their professional expertise available to civilians.
2. Representative: advocating the military’s interests in intergovernmental councils.
3. Executive: implementing government decisions.
5. Substantive: attempting to overturn the government’s military or national security policy by engaging in overt political activity.

Ben-Meir believed that the first three roles are commensurate with the principles of civilian control, while the fifth is a direct challenge to it. He considered the advocacy role a “gray area,” however, since it may lead to attempts to convince the public of the wisdom of military policies that conflict with those of the government. The trick,
he wrote, is not to undermine the military’s repre-
sentative role but constrain it enough so that it
does not lead to exaggerated advocacy.117

The New American Model agrees with much of Ben-Meir’s proposal. It further agrees that the
military has no role to play in the electoral proc-
cess beyond voting.118 Indeed, I recommend that
flag officers be prohibited from holding any pub-
lic office for at least five years after retirement.
This requirement would reduce the temptation to
engage in partisan activities to curry political fa-
vor. The model also recognizes, however, that even “advisory” discussions of national security
matters can be viewed as partisan.

Indeed, military personnel who speak out on
any issue probably could not avoid charge s of parti-
sanship. Nevertheless, the New American Model
values transparency enough to tolerate such al-
legations and urges apolitical candor as the best
mitigation. The model believes that the military
has information, expertise, and unique insights
that should be made available to the public.
“Generals must be free,” Tom Donnelly asserts,
“to explain what military means may reasonably
accomplish.”119 That requires candor. Of course, as
another writer put it, “candor must be used in uni-
son with common sense, sound judgment, self-discipline, loyalty and other traits.”120

Candor is always appropriate in the private
councils of government. The model explicity re-
jects the kind of “political correctness,” for ex-
ample, that reportedly led Admiral Boorda to
abandon the nomination of Adm Stanley Arthur
as commander in chief of US Pacific Command
simply because Arthur agreed that a female pilot
was no longer qualified to fly.121 Political cor-
rectness can greatly undermine civil-military re-
lations because it replaces sound, apolitical
judgment with opportunistic and often self-serv-
ing pandering to popular fashion.

Candor also requires a keen sense of account-
ability on the part of military officers. Too often,
as Bacevich noted, military officers use their po-
itical popularity to “pass off to others the responsi-
bility for failure.”122 This occurred, according to
Bacevich, when former secretary of defense Les
Aspin—unpopular among senior military lead-
ers—was fired following the Ranger raid in So-
malia in 1993, which claimed the lives of 18 US
soldiers.123 The military allowed the public to
think that Aspin’s refusal to deploy additional ar-
mor caused the disaster, when actually it was
much more a failure of doctrine and planning by
an arrogantly overconfident special operations
community.124

We nearly saw a repeat of this scenario fol-
lowing the Khobar Towers bombing. Demands
arose for the resignation of Secretary of Defense
William Perry when an Air Force general implied
that failing to obtain Saudi approval to move the
perimeter fence caused the tragedy.125 Like the
Ranger raid, however, the tragedy was much
more attributable to a failure of military judg-
ment concerning the nature of the threat than any
ineptitude by civilian leaders.126

To ensure accountability, the New American
Model calls for a reinvigorated military justice
system. Administrative actions,127 with their pro-
propensity toward politicization and the stench of
backroom deals, are no substitute for a public ju-
dicial process. In the context of civil-military re-
lations, the system needs to be reformed to
reserve its most severe punishments not for peo-
ple who try their best and fail,128 but for those
who seek to avoid responsibility for their actions.

The model recognizes that the most difficult
issue is determining when candor should be ex-
pressed publicly. Several key factors are in-
volved:

1. Candor can never be used to defy or subvert
direct orders. Obedience to lawful orders
must be instantaneous. Parenthetically, un-
lawful orders must be ruthlessly exposed.

2. Candor can never be an excuse for disre-
spectful behavior.

3. Candor must never be used to replace the
strength of an idea with the power of an of-
ficer’s rank or position.

4. There is a fundamental and critical differ-
ence between candidly expressing one’s
views and using government resources to
try to implement them. The order to imple-
A decision must be properly authorized in accordance with approved policy. Thus, public candor is often best expressed prior to a decision being made.

All this having been said, the model starts with a strong presumption that civil-military relations are best served by transparency, and that frequently means public candor. Against this backdrop, the model urges consideration of two inverse relationships for weighing the appropriateness of public candor in a given situation.

The first is largely common sense. It generally holds that an inverse relationship exists between the presumption that public discourse is appropriate on the one hand and the rank and position of the speaker on the other. Thus, fewer restrictions should be placed on the First Amendment activities of junior personnel. Conversely, a four-star commander is obliged to be more circumspect. These relationships go back to the fundamental tenet of the New American Model: military officers must not employ the power of their rank or position to lend undeserved strength to their views.

The second holds that an inverse relationship usually exists between the presumption that public candor is appropriate and the proximity to and effect on ongoing operations, especially those involving combat. This would mean, for instance, that public criticism of a battle plan immediately before its execution would be inappropriate. Of course, the two relationships can overlap. Senior field commanders, for example, must not debate the orders of their commander in chief during combat—the very reason that General MacArthur ran afoul of President Truman.129

As a further illustration, consider the case of an Army colonel who was disciplined during the early stages of the Bosnia deployment of 1995—a noncombat situation—for allowing a reporter to quote him concerning his views that Croats were racist and that the deployment’s political objectives could not be achieved within the one-year time frame set by the Clinton administration.130 Applying the New American Model to that incident, the colonel’s public remark about the Croats was inappropriate, given the time and place it was made. His views on the one-year time frame, however, were appropriate because they represent the kind of candid judgment the American public needs from its military leaders.

Accordingly, the New American Model does not maintain that the military should be public cheerleaders for the politics of the president or the president’s party. This notion is wholly distinct from the question of following lawful orders. With respect to such orders, obedience must be, as already noted, instantaneous and complete. That clearly understood, we must appreciate the Constitution’s contemplation that civilian control be a shared responsibility of the executive and legislative branches.131 The loyalty the armed forces owe their commander in chief does not extend to using the military’s prestige—not to mention its physical power—to support any political party.

The New American Model embodies other important aspects. It recognizes the need to address the public’s increasing naiveté about military affairs. It does not, however, argue for a return to the draft. Militarily, it would not make sense. Prof John Keegan noted, for instance, that the performance of Iraq’s conscripts during the First Gulf War demonstrated that draftees merely “clutter up” the modern battlefield.132 Thus, any increase in the public’s awareness of military affairs would be outweighed by the costs involved.

What might be helpful, however, is a comprehensive high-school-level or college-level program on the armed forces in general and civil-military relations more specifically.133 We also need to teach civil-military relations as part of our professional military education, which could be supplemented by the publication of books and articles by military officers for the general public.134 The model also does not see increased reliance on the Guard and Reserve as the solution to the problems of civil-military relations. Although the Guard and Reserve sometimes can support greater civilian control (turning most aspects of information warfare over to part-time soldiers,
for example), the fact remains that modern war fighting—especially ground-maneuver warfare—is too difficult for anyone other than a full-time soldier to master. Consequently, military needs will dictate that most combat power remain in the active duty force. Moreover, further integration of the Guard’s—and, to a lesser extent, the Reserve’s—unabashed politicization into the regular military would not serve the cause of civil-military relations.

The model does, however, support limiting those so-called quality-of-life initiatives that encourage military personnel to remain ensconced on their bases. Translating those benefits into pay increases will encourage greater utilization of civilian facilities, with the concomitant benefit of reducing the military’s growing alienation from the society it is supposed to serve.

Conclusion

As I hope you’ve come to understand, the role of the military in American society was at a crossroads in 1996. If we could go back in time, we could spend our school year discussing how we might address these issues. Despite what happened in 2012, the profession of arms is still a most noble calling. But for us, we lost our honor. If only we had another chance. If only we could go back in time. If only.

Notes


3. According to Rear Adm Henry E. Eccles, “civil-military relations can be seen as the interaction of a group of related systems and subsystems—social, economic, political, military, and information. . . . The relations between these systems are dynamic: each system strives to maintain its equilibrium and to control its destiny as it adapts to the actions and changes of the associated system.” Henry E. Eccles, Military Power in a Free Society (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1979), 125.


5. No universally accepted definition of civilian control of the military exists, but it is generally thought to include the notion that the political and civilian interests are subordinated to those determined by the military. The purpose of civilian control is to ensure that military interests are subordinated to those determined by civilian authority. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military,” Wake Forest Law Review 29 (1994): 341, 343–44.


20. See Rick Maze, “Do Military Officers and Politics Mix?”
Navy Times, 8 July 1996, 10. According to Maze, “Hundreds of military officers [are] participating in a loose-knit fellowship program.”

21. Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House, directed four military officers serving in a congressional fellowship program to produce a military-style report on why the Republicans nearly lost a June vote on their balanced budget plan.” Rep Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.) complained that “the use of military officers for partisan political activity is, in my view, totally improper.” Ibid. See also “Were Military Aides Used Politically?” Washington Times, 12 May 1996, 5.


27. See Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War, 16 June 1995.


30. Cf. Paul H. Appleby, “Civilian Control of a Department of National Defense,” in Civil-Military Relationships in American Life, 63. (“When the country comes to any severe internal crisis, it is not uncommon for socially-conscious citizens to give thought—even to make plans—about a military takeover of the country to preserve order, to avert revolution, and to serve other like purposes.”)

31. See, for example, Joyce Price, “Black Copters over Pittsburgh? It’s Just an Exercise,” Washington Times, 6 June 1996, 1 (de­scribing US Army Special Forces “urban warfare training” conducted in a number of US cities, including Pittsburgh, Detroit, Los Angeles, Dallas, and Miami).


35. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger announced the following rules at a luncheon on in 1984:

1. Commit only if our or our allies’ vital interests are at stake.
2. If we commit, do so with all the resources necessary to win.
3. Go in only with clear political and military objectives.
4. Be ready to change the commitment if the objectives change, since wars rarely stand still.
5. Only take on commitments that can gain the support of the American people and Congress.
6. Commit U.S. forces only as a last resort.


38. See, for example, Chris Black, “US Options Seen Fewer as Military Arrows Risk,” Boston Globe, 23 July 1995, 12.


41. See, for example, Bruce Brocka and M. Suzanne Brocka, Quality Management: Implementing the Best Ideas of the Masters (Homewood, Ill.: Business One Irwin, 1992).

42. Cf. Headquarters USAF/CCE subject, subject: Key Issue Update, 15 July 1996, 4. (“The CT-43 mishap starkly pointed out the critical importance of complying with higher headquarters directives. Unfortunately, the change from Air Force regulations to instructions combined with quality initiatives may have given some people the wrong impression about compliance with AFI[s] [emphasis added].”)


48. The framers were influenced by the excesses of Oliver Crom­well’s new model army as well as first-hand experiences with British regulars who were used to suppress growing dissatisfaction with Eng­lish rule prior to the Revolution. See generally, Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians and the Insurrec­tionary Theory of the Second Amendment,” Tennessee Law Review 62 (1995): 643–646–53.


50. Harry G. Summers, Jr., “A Tale of 2 Presidents: Call It Po­litic Justice,” Air Force Times, 8 November 1993, 62. (“Suspicion of the military is no sin. Americans have a long and proud history of anti­tumorism, and civilian control of the military is one of the founda­tions of American democracy.”)


56. See, for example, Mary McGrotry, “Clinton’s Duty to Command the Pentagon,” Washington Post, 21 April 1996.
57. Pfaff, 15.
61. See, for example, Kohn, “Out of Control,” 3.
64. See 10 US Code 155(e). (“The Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority.”)
67. See Ricks, 21–22.
69. See, for example, Keith Hutcheson, “The Discipline Crisis,” Armed Forces Journal, March 1996, 40.
70. See David Hackworth, “Rancor in the Ranks: The Troops vs. the President,” Newsweek, 28 June 1993.
73. According to Ben-Meir, the traditional concept of praetorian­ism “refers to the military’s tendency to intervene in the affairs of state. The term is borrowed from the Roman guard that made and un­made emperors” (page 192). It was initially discussed by Amos Perlmutter in The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977). Perlmutter contends that the client of the professional soldier is clearly the state and, hence, the nation. Praetorian symptoms may occur in the professional soldier, but only when leaders of the military establishment “dis­cover” that there is a “contradiction” between the “state” to which they have pledged loyalty, and the “regime” that has taken over.
As quoted in Ben-Meir, 13. A cardinal feature of neopraetorianism is that the contradiction is not so much in reference to any regime; rather, it is between the military’s assessment of appropriate societal values and organization and that which it perceives as existing in society as a whole.
75. See generally, Ricks, 11–13.
78. See, for example, Ricks, 11–13; and Callard, 46.
80. See, for example, Patricia Edmonds and Ann Oldenberg, “Chasing the Values Vote,” USA Today, 5A (discussing “why Americans are more upset about values than at any [other] time in modern history”).
It doesn’t take you long to figure out, reading . . . evangelical Christian writers, that the obsession with public order, public mo­rality, codes, rules, consensus, and sin are American political ideas, religious in origin but not in current application. The Chris­tianity of the evangelical right is deeply rooted in a political nos­talgia, a drive to restore an America seemingly lost. Of course, of what this America has been lost to is reality; it never existed and never will, but since the combined landslide votes cast for Richard Nixon and George Wallace in 1968, this never-America has been the central idea driving our political life. (Pages 64, 68)
84. General Krulak Warns,” 10.
85. Ibid.
86. See “Marines Plan Values Training,” 6.
88. Ibid.
89. Heavy drinkers in the military outnumber civilians by more than 50 percent, a ratio that has remained unchanged for over 15 years despite extensive substance-abuse programs. See Nolan Walters, “To­day, a Good Soldier Is a Sober Soldier, in the Military’s Eyes,” Phila­delphia Inquirer, 26 June 1996, B1.
91. Charles E. Merriam explains that the military principle and the democratic principle stand in direct opposition to each other. The military hierarchy involves authority from the top down, while the democratic systems are based on the consent of the governed from the grass roots up. The military principle develops the idea of discipline and unquestioning obedi­ence. Democratic political society is based upon the consent of the governed, freely given.
Citing Quincy Wright in “Security without Militarism: Preserving Ci-

94. Professor Huntington restated his concept of objective civilian control in the February 1996 issue of Current. Specifically, he said that objective civilian control involves

1) a high level of military professionalism and recognition by military officers of the limits of their professional competence; 2) the effective subordination of the military to the civilian political leaders who make the basic decisions on foreign and military policy; 3) the recognition and acceptance by that leadership of an area of professional competence and autonomy for the military; and 4) as a result, the minimization of military intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military.


95. Desch, 67, 69.
96. Cf. Prof Eliot A. Cohen. “Civilian control also means making sure that in an age of rapid technological change, the services remain intellectually open, that thinkers do not suffer for taking time out to reflect on their profession and speak out about it” (emphasis added). Eliot A. Cohen, “Beyond ‘Bottom Up,’” National Review, 15 November 1993, 40, 43.
97. See Roger Charles, “It’s a War for Soul of U.S. Military,” Baltimore Sun, 2 June 1996, 1F.
100. See, for example, James Fallows, “Why Americans Hate the Media,” Atlantic, February 1996, 45.
102. See Callard, 120.
103. Ibid.
107. Despite an executive order aimed at reducing the amount of classified material, the US government’s $2 billion secrecy system was, by 1996, classifying over 6 million documents annually. See Martin Faga Describes Work of Government Secrecy Commission,” National Security Law Newsletter, April 1996, 7, 11.
109. “Rice bowl” is a military colloquialism that indicates inflexible allegiance to a project motivated by personal interest.
111. See Shalikashvili, 28.
114. Cf. Moskos, Reporting War, 11. (“Dan Rather, located in Bosnia, asked an Army commander, ‘What is your greatest fear?’” The commander replied, “Saying the wrong thing to the media."
115. See Ben-Meir, 25.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. See, for example, “Navy Personnel in San Diego Barred from Parade Events,” Baltimore Sun, 8 August 1996, 10 (reporting how military rules prohibiting participation in partisan political activities will severely limit activities by naval personnel at the Republican National Convention in San Diego).
119. The context is as follows:

Most importantly, the long-term health of the American civil-military relationship will depend on a recognition of the dual nature of war. Battle field means give war its grammar, said Clauswitz, but politics supplies the logic, the ends. Thus, generals must be free to explain what military means may reasonably accomplish. (Emphasis added)

123. Ibid.
126. See John Mintz and R. Jeffrey Smith, “Military Underestimated Terrorists; Perry Says,” Washington Post, 10 July 1996, 1. See also David H. Hackworth, “Sa'di Blast Shows What’s Wrong,” Air Force Times, 12 August 1996, 54 (arguing that “military leaders are again circling the wagons as they go into an it-wasn’t-my-fault-mode and pass the buck”).
Official manuals, by the nature of their compilation, are merely registers of prevailing practice, not the log-books of a scientific study of war.

—B. H. Liddell Hart, 1944