EUROPE WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES?

Prospects for European Defense Cooperation after the 1996 European Union Intergovernmental Conference

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EUROPE IS STILL organized for the cold war. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains the key security institution, and the United States is still deeply involved in European defense activities. In 1991, however, a framework for change was approved at the NATO summit in Rome and the European Community (EC) summit in Maastricht that pointed to a less military and more political role for NATO and toward greater defense involvement by exclusively European organizations such as the EC—now known as the European Union (EU)—and the Western European Union (WEU). This article provides a brief history of autonomous European defense efforts and focuses on the next big opportunity for
institutional change in Europe, the 1996 EU intergovernmental conference (IGC). While conventional wisdom suggests that the conference will bring about only modest modifications to existing arrangements, more significant advances are possible. The Euro-Atlantic unity forged by the cold war is now a distant memory, and American interest in European problems is flagging despite NATO’s recent vitality and the current US political and military commitment to Bosnia. Western Europe’s developing ties with the former Soviet bloc and increasing recognition of common interests encourage a new look at Europe’s security architecture. “Maastricht II,” as the upcoming IGC is sometimes called, could be the break from past arrangements that some scholars and political leaders have been predicting ever since the cold war ended.¹

**Cold War Stepchild**

Following World War II, the threat of a Soviet or communist takeover of Western Europe led to an unprecedented degree of American engagement in European affairs. In defense matters, the US commitment took form in the NATO alliance of countries from Europe and North America. The nuclear weapons and deployed conventional forces of the United States helped to establish a tense but remarkably peaceful stalemate with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. While Europeans welcomed the new transatlantic relationship, many of them also believed that their countries should pursue more exclusively European arrangements that might lead to a united Europe and perhaps recapture the “peace of Charlemagne.” Hence proposals for autonomous European security and defense cooperation—meaning independent of NATO and the United States—have been periodic factors in Europe’s institutional development.

In 1948, France, Great Britain, and the three Benelux countries signed the Brussels Treaty and made a 50-year commitment to mutual defense. Although a strong alliance on paper, the agreement’s more immediate purpose was to encourage US participation in Europe’s defense—indeed, NATO followed shortly thereafter. The European Defense Community (EDC) plan of the early 1950s was a much more ambitious initiative toward a united Europe. Proposed as a way to rearm western Germany without alarming the rest of Europe, the EDC was to be a European army composed of national forces integrated at low unit levels and controlled by a supranational European political community. In the end, France would not give up control of its army and triggered the abandonment of the plan in 1954. With American leadership anxious for military help in central Europe, the European allies allowed Germany to rearm within a NATO framework; to express European solidarity, they created the WEU alliance.² The WEU used the strong Brussels Treaty as its legitimizing document, but ended up as a much looser and weaker organization than the EDC would have been. Its military functions were subordinate to NATO, and it never became a very important part of the European unity movement. By the early 1970s, WEU activity had virtually come to an end.

The European Community, founded in 1957, was a much more successful integration experiment. Based on the supranational European Coal and Steel Community, the EC’s founding members decided to concentrate on economic issues and to keep security and defense outside the organization’s original charter.³ The exclusion of security and defense issues was an understandable reaction to the EDC debacle. However, the pursuit of influence—whether economic or political—was always part of the EC agenda and suggests why the organization was so often central to designs for European security and defense cooperation separate from NATO.⁴ During the Fouchet debates of the early 1960s, for example, French president Charles de Gaulle pushed unsuccessfully for an EC-member defense authority to help counter US military and political influence in Europe. His continued displeasure with US predominance and policies prompted him to withdraw France from NATO’s military functions in 1966.

Later in the 1960s, Europe’s growing economic strength and collective unhappiness with US security and monetary policies encouraged EC members to coordinate on additional issues. To facilitate common foreign policy positions,
European Political Cooperation (EPC) emerged and developed into an extensive set of intergovernmental meetings and information-sharing processes. The EPC languished in the 1970s, along with other integration efforts, as Europe struggled with a prolonged economic recession and with a general pessimism about its future. Enthusiasm for Europe was rekindled during the next great crisis in US-European relations—the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) dispute over deployment of Soviet and US intermediate-range missiles to Europe in the late 1970s and early 1980s. European official and public concern over US handling of this and other issues encouraged various initiatives—such as the Gen-scher-Colombo and Spinelli proposals—that explicitly called for defense cooperation among EC countries. When these proved too forward-looking for several EC members, France shifted the initiative to the moribund WEU and, in 1984, effected the organization’s revival.

**The EC/EU failure in Yugoslavia was symptomatic of the ineffectiveness of the common foreign and security policy process.**

European defense cooperation received an added boost from the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in the mid-1980s and from the US/Soviet Reykjavik summit between presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. The United States seemed ready to move away from a nuclear deterrent strategy that had provided decades of reasonable peace in Europe and toward an untested theory of space-based defense. European displeasure was reflected in the Hague Declaration of 1987 that committed WEU mem- bers to move toward a more European context for security and defense. At the same time, France and Germany decided to create a multinational military unit outside of NATO: the 4,000-man Franco-German Brigade.

**Rome and Maastricht**

The European defense cooperation became a big issue again as the cold war was ending. In the late 1980s, the Single European Act, which streamlined EC procedures, and the “Europe 1992” project, which reduced EC nontariff barriers to trade, were part of a growing momentum for European integration that had developed just as the Soviet bloc began to fall apart. The WEU also showed signs of life when it conducted actual military missions with mine-clearing and surveillance operations during the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War. Integration enthusiasts seized the opportunity and pushed vigorously for increased EC-WEU competence in security and defense affairs. NATO advocates opposed this expansion of European activity, however, and hoped to keep the alliance as the primary European defense organization into the post-cold-war period with an expanded political role, an out-of-area mission, and perhaps a reengaged France.

The two sides found a middle ground eventually, but only after surprisingly divisive bargaining. At their Rome summit in November 1991, NATO members approved significant force reductions and announced a more pacific new strategy that, nonetheless, continued the alliance’s central role in Europe. The reorganized structure included a new Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), a British-commanded multinational force with about 70,000 troops but without the explicit out-of-area mission for which it was so obviously designed. NATO gained a new political role with an Eastern liaison mission and creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), composed of representatives from the alliance and the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. These initiatives committed the alliance to working with its former foes on a wide range of political-military issues such as defense planning and civil-military relations. The Rome summit, however, failed to induce France to rejoin NATO’s military side, although French representatives had helped author the new alliance strategy. In a key concession to France and other enthusiasts of autonomous European defense, the allies sanctioned the creation of autonomous European military structures outside of NATO.
and endorsed the WEU as the “European pillar of the alliance.”

At Maastricht a month later, the EC leadership agreed to change their organization into a European “union.” The new framework would have three pillars: the first including those functions and institutions developed under the Treaty of Rome (the old EC), but with an added commitment to economic and monetary union (EMU) by 1999; the second, an intergovernmental pillar for a common foreign and security policy (CFSP); and the third, another intergovernmental pillar—this one for judicial and internal affairs (such as asylum and immigration policy) and for cooperation against organized crime. To appease British domestic opposition to European integration, Great Britain was given opt-outs from EMU and from a separate social charter.

The common foreign and security policy was a further development of EPC and was created to define common positions for European interaction with other world actors. Virtually all the issues a sovereign state might face in the international arena were listed as possible areas of CFSP competence, including nonproliferation, arms control, UN peacekeeping operations, humanitarian interventions, and relations with the Soviet Union and North America. The Maastricht Treaty affirmed that “the common foreign and security policy [would] include all questions related to the security of the European Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.”

For the first time, defense was established as a goal of the signatories of the Treaty of Rome. Also at Maastricht, WEU members declared that their organization would function as the “defense component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.” The WEU was clearly leaning toward the EU and not NATO because full membership in the WEU was open only to EU members, leaving out non-EU NATO countries like Turkey and Norway.

**European Union Blues**

The brightest hopes of European enthusiasts quickly faded. In one of the few scheduled public decisions on further integration, the Danish electorate rejected the Maastricht Treaty in May 1992. After a year of painstaking renegotiation, the Danes finally approved the treaty in a second plebiscite but only after their government had obtained opt-outs similar to those granted to Great Britain in the original bargaining. An even greater shock to Europe was the monetary crisis of September 1992. International currency traders gambled that, if faced with intense selling pressure, the British pound and the Italian lira could not be maintained within the parity bands of the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM). They guessed right, and both currencies were soon forced out of the ERM, foreshadowing enormous difficulties ahead in establishing a single European currency.

But Europe’s most severe crisis was certainly the ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia—the first real war in Europe since World War II. When fighting broke out in mid-1991, the EC took a leading role and negotiated agreements that temporarily reduced the level of violence. These efforts began to unravel as EC members debated the various political options and how deeply to get involved. The EC’s mediation role ended in early 1992 with the decision of its members to formally recognize Slovenia and Croatia as sovereign states, thereby alienating Serbian leaders and populations throughout Yugoslavia. The United Nations assumed institutional leadership in the region; later, NATO took over.

The EC/EU failure in Yugoslavia was symptomatic of the ineffectiveness of the common foreign and security policy process. As an intergovernmental process, CFSP was subject to the problems of consensus where a single determined member could prevent common action by the entire group. Greece, for example, held up EU recognition of Macedonia over a name squabble. CFSP also had little in the way of analysis capability and had no easy way to enforce its decisions with coercive action.

With about 120 foreign policy declarations since its inception, CFSP has developed positions on crises from Haiti to Rwanda, sent observers to monitor elections in Russia and South Africa, and (with the WEU) helped police the Bosnian town of Mostar. It has had little impact on the big
questions facing Europe, however, such as what to do about the former Yugoslavia. The recent EU expansion (adding Austria, Finland, and Sweden on 1 January 1995) has increased the number of traditionally neutral members to four (with Ireland), making foreign policy coordination potentially even more difficult. (See table 1.) On the positive side, EU experience with security and defense issues has substantially broadened, and the habit of European cooperation in foreign affairs has certainly deepened.

NATO Revived

Compared to the EU, NATO has enjoyed a virtual renaissance. NATO’s role in Bosnia came about after EU and UN failure, but also following a 1992 decision to allow NATO to act as a surrogate for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)—the region’s nascent collective security organization. In other words, NATO members finally gave their organization the authority to conduct out-of-area missions. On the political front, NATO’s Eastern liaison function grew into the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994—a halfway house toward full NATO membership for Central/Eastern European countries and a promising mechanism for increased engagement with Russia. Of historical significance is France’s December 1995 decision to rejoin some of NATO’s military apparatus.

The NATO Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) initiative may also have far-reaching consequences. Endorsed at the January 1994 alliance summit, the CJTF is based on the US joint task force concept and would modify alliance procedures so that military units, staffs, and equipment could be separated from the integrated command and force structure to meet anticipated post-cold-war requirements more effectively. CJTF missions might include peacekeeping and peacetime contingency operations such as humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and minor crisis intervention. Participation would be optional and driven by national interest and domestic political considerations. For situations considered vital to Europe but not to the United States, Europe-only forces such as the European Corps (a further development of the Franco-German Brigade) might deploy from NATO bases with NATO equipment—but under WEU operational control. Thus CJTF is closely linked to autonomous European defense issues and to discussions anticipated at the upcoming IGC.

NATO’s possible enlargement to include countries of the former Soviet bloc would bring profound changes as well, transforming the character of the alliance and its role in Europe. Some policymakers believe that NATO’s plans must be in place before the EU can decide on its own enlargement scheme, either at the 1996 IGC or at some other venue. According to Alexandra von dra, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Czech Republic, “NATO first” is based on the belief that Central Europe can be “anchored and stabilized” only with the assistance of the United States.

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Table 1

European Security Organizations

More Western European Union
The WEU also has been changing. Like NATO, it has added membership categories and now has agreements with non-EU NATO countries, non-NATO EU countries, and with countries from the former Soviet bloc. It has expanded its functions, such as taking over public relations, long-range planning, and some technical issues from NATO’s EUROGROUP. With its Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), the WEU has taken over the European arms procurement coordination function of the Independent European Program Group (now disbanded). For more efficient coordination with other important international actors, the WEU changed its headquarters from London and joined NATO and the EU in Brussels.

In June 1992, WEU members approved the Petersberg Declaration that listed the types of missions the WEU could pursue on its own. These included “humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” These missions would obviously complement anticipated NATO CJTF operations and are good examples of the types of missions that Europe could pursue routinely without US support. The WEU is also working with a number of European multinational military organizations like the European Corps on how each might participate under the WEU aegis as so-called “forces answerable to the WEU (FAWEU).” Operationally, the WEU has added to its maritime experiences in the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars by engaging in activities in and around the former Yugoslavia, by helping to enforce the arms embargo on the Adriatic Sea and the Danube River, and by working with the EU in Mostar.

**Major Players**

For all of this, the WEU’s contribution to European security and defense is still quite small. With only 120 people at its headquarters, it is bureaucratically dwarfed by the thousands of diplomats and officials at NATO and the EU. Nonetheless, the WEU has become a convenient way for Europe to examine new security and defense ideas and, occasionally, to take action independent of NATO, but without the bureaucratic and neutrality problems of the EU. As they go into the 1996 IGC, the major countries of Europe must decide on the role the WEU should play in Europe’s future security architecture.

**Great Britain**

British leaders have had a difficult time with European integration ever since they failed to join the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. Although probably convinced that Britain’s future lies inexorably with continental Europe and the EU, Prime Minister John Major has supported only a minimum European agenda because of the vehement opposition to integration from portions of his Conservative party. But unlike domestically sensitive issues, such as monetary and social policy, security and defense concerns have allowed Major some maneuvering room.

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British policymakers are acutely aware of the American pullback from Europe and have been pursuing practical alternatives elsewhere. For example, Great Britain has begun to conduct a surprising amount of defense activity with France. In 1993, the Anglo-French Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine was established to coordinate nuclear policy. The two countries have moved toward a combined air operations command and now conduct joint exercises between the British Field Army and the French Rapid Action Force (FAR). British and French forces also participated actively in the United Nations phase of military operations in
Bosnia—in stark contrast to US noninvolvement. The joint activity has systemic components as well: both countries have worldwide interests and capabilities, and, when they act together, they also form a credible political counterweight to a united Germany.

In the Maastricht negotiations, British leaders accepted substantial movement toward European defense cooperation in exchange for concessions elsewhere (the EMU and social charter opt-outs). If pushed toward autonomous defense cooperation by the rest of Europe, Great Britain would prefer the intergovernmental WEU to the more supranational EU. In March 1995, Major proposed that, in addition to the Petersberg missions, the WEU should assume more of the basic defense functions of NATO and should be able to conduct every military operation “short of full-scale war.” But British enthusiasm for the WEU is measured, and Great Britain would undoubtedly support NATO as long as the United States remains actively engaged. The British army is committed to its NATO ARRC command role and has not joined the predominantly French and German European Corps. Recent disputes over armament procurement, such as the British purchase of American Apache helicopters instead of European Tigers, have reinforced the view in Europe that Great Britain is still a stalking-horse for US interests. British defense minister Malcolm Rifkind (now foreign minister) recently reaffirmed his country’s transatlantic orientation, arguing that “we must not undermine NATO by pretending that its core tasks are going to be transferred to a European body.”

France

France recently acted like Great Britain in its skepticism toward European integration. Jacques Chirac became president in May 1995 with a Gaullist legacy of independence and an administration unfettered by the universalist appeal of European unity. The close Franco-German entente of the 1980s and early 1990s and the intimate personal relationship between French president François Mitterrand and German chancellor Helmut Kohl have ended or been replaced by interest-based coordination. France has created specific concern among integration enthusiasts because of its difficulty in reaching EMU convergence criteria and its resistance to “open-border” commitments with Germany and the Benelux countries. German Social Democratic Party (SPD) official Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul declared that Chirac’s nationalist tone was designed to court anti-European sentiment on the far right and was a threat to Franco-German relations.

Yet Chirac probably supports European integration for the same reasons as his predecessors: to anchor Germany within a dense institutional framework, to increase France’s world voice through leadership in the larger EU grouping, and to invigorate France’s domestic economy. French officials have been coordinating more closely with Germany but still have not revealed how they want European security and defense efforts to develop. They are clearly reluctant to surrender much more sovereignty to the supranational institutions of the EU, but would undoubtedly support more intergovernmental cooperation on defense issues—perhaps through some sort of EU variable geometry with a military option.

Germany

Unlike France, Germany has not been silent on what it wants from the IGC. They have been disappointed with progress on the current EU agenda as well and urgently want reform. At Maastricht, Germany acceded to EMU and to giving up its valued deutsche mark in exchange for progress on European political union (EPU). While EMU has moved forward, however haltingly, political union projects such as CFSP have faltered. With enlargement of the EU a virtual certainty, German officials believe it essential to restructure EU institutions and to rationalize EU procedures such as voting, rotating presidencies, and the EU Commission’s national assignments. Moreover, Germany’s influence within the union, regardless of future enlargement, is not commensurate with its population or its economic and po-
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Political importance since unification. Clearly, German officials want this to change.

Their campaign began in September 1994 when Christian Democratic Union (CDU) official Karl Lamers revealed a “hard-core” plan that would move Europe forward with at least two speeds: one made up of those countries that wanted more “Europe” and could meet EMU convergence criteria and the other made up of those countries that did not. Although modified in subsequent declarations, a multispeed Europe is probably still the essential German view. On foreign policy, Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU leader in the Bundestag) proposed that all foreign policy decisions—except those with direct military implications—should be subject to majority vote among EU members, thus effectively doing away with the consensus rule. Where commitment of armed forces is required, countries would be able to opt out of the action but could not stop a majority from pursuing their military goals. An other variation was introduced by Werner Hoyer (a deputy foreign minister and Germany’s designated representative to the upcoming IGC) that called for the gradual integration of the WEU into the EU and for the appointment of a European leader to be both head of the EU Council of Ministers and secretary-general of the WEU—thereby creating a de facto foreign minister for Europe as a whole. The new position would be supported by an enhanced CFSP bureaucracy that would act more like the US National Security Council than a mere secretariat.

While Hoyer’s ideas are fairly extreme and will not be the end product of the IGC, they reveal Germany’s strong public commitment to European unity. At the same time, German officials at the tactical level seem willing to use the threat of a more independent and assertive Germany as a lever to get their favored changes made in the EU.

European Union Reflection Group

Formal discussions on Maastricht II have begun. Following a string of summits and ministerial meetings, the EU established a “Reflection Group” in June 1995 and tasked it with making recommendations for the IGC. The group was composed of representatives from the EU Commission, the European Parliament, and from each of the 15 member countries. Carlos Westendorp, the group’s leader, wanted to focus on fulfilling the issues that Maastricht had already begun—including CFSP, the EU-WEU linkage, and internal security procedures—and on preparing EU institutions for possible enlargement. Other group members wanted to go beyond this modest agenda to explore more far-reaching changes to the EU.

History does not often favor attempts at European cooperation.

The Reflection Group’s final report was reviewed at the EU Madrid summit in December 1995 and contained generally minimalist expectations. According to Westendorp, the report supports actions to make the EU more relevant to its citizens, such as improving internal security and promoting European values, and measures to make EU institutions more efficient, such as supporting more majority voting. On CFSP, the report suggested that a planning and analysis unit and a central leadership position be created to help give the EU a higher profile. The group’s input will now be meshed with proposals from the WEU and, more importantly, from the major European powers. In a sign of more collaboration, France and Germany declared their joint dissatisfaction with the report’s low expectations and have pushed for a more ambitious agenda. The IGC began immediately following the 29 March 1996 EU summit in Turin, Italy, but its completion date has not been established. While Westendorp stated that the work could be done by late 1996, almost everyone else believes the IGC will continue until well after the British general election in spring 1997. With the British Labor Party ahead in the polls and more clearly committed to the EU than Major’s Conserva-
tives, integration enthusiasts will no doubt find a way to delay the outcome.  

**Europe’s Future and Ours**

Some years ago, Luc Reychler at the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium detailed what a European security and defense arrangement might look like. The EU Council of Ministers would assume responsibility for European foreign affairs and would establish an EU security council. There would be a yearly European security assessment, a European arms control and disarmament agency, a European defense budget, a European nuclear planning group, and European control over nuclear forces—including US nuclear weapons in Europe.  

Other diplomats have added that the EU Commission should have a predominant role in CFSP to make it more efficient and that the European Parliament should be granted a supervisory function to improve democratic accountability.

More recently, Dutch defense minister Joris Voorhoeve noted that the “expectation that the European Union will soon become a strong international factor is wrong for the foreseeable future.” And indeed, Europe has been going through one of its periodic bouts of skepticism, where elite enthusiasm for integration—now reified by the Maastricht Treaty—outpaces objective realities and public opinion. Moreover, with imperatives for NATO to play a major role in Bosnia and with the importance attached to NATO expansion by both NATO and the EU advocates, little enthusiasm exists for an immediate transfer of defense responsibility from NATO to the EU and/or WEU. Nonetheless, I believe that important reform will occur at the IGC that will make the exclusively European organizations a more realistic alternative to NATO.

German diplomats no doubt will succeed in obtaining EU administrative reform to prepare for new members and to reflect Germany’s greater weight since unification. The IGC may well decide that majority voting of some sort will be the normal means of decision making for CFSP. In the bargaining, European integration advocates’ demands for a larger security and defense role for the EU Commission and the Parliament will no doubt be given up. Administrative reform may also find a way to enhance the rotating CFSP presidency and to make it a more plausible focus for decision making on foreign policy. Changes might include a robust advisory council and a visible permanent secretary on the model of the British civil service.

The EU might gain some minor military role of its own, such as taking on some of the WEU Petersberg missions. More importantly, Europeans will have to address the Brussels Treaty. Its 1998 expiration was an important incentive for scheduling the IGC in 1996 in the first place. Integration enthusiasts had hoped the EU would assume all of the WEU’s defense functions. This will not happen at this IGC, at least not for the EU membership as a whole. The year 1998 is an ambiguous deadline because the WEU will not just disappear if its members fail to take new measures. Article 12 of the treaty requires specific action to terminate participation:

> It [the Brussels Treaty] shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification [1948] and shall thereafter remain in force for fifty years.

> After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the High Contracting parties shall have the right to cease to be a party thereto provided that he shall have previously given one year’s notice of denunciation to the Belgian Government.

From a narrow legal viewpoint, little will change after 1998 if the treaty is not extended. Security issues are always much more political than legal, however, because allies and polities must be convinced of a nation’s defense commitments. Hence, WEU members will likely renegotiate at least those portions of the treaty dealing with expiration.

The WEU will continue its role as the “defense component” of the EU and, through NATO’s CJTF, should increase its ability to carry out limited missions. Its compact membership and focused charter will keep the WEU a useful instrument for European defense cooperation; the EU will have difficulty enough integrating new members into its broad economic and political agenda without taking on significant defense obligations. The EU will increase its linkages with
the WEU, however, and may gain the right to direct WEU military action—although the WEU will probably retain its “right of initiative.” According to Horst Holthoff, the WEU’s deputy secretary-general, the EU and WEU will not join their institutions at the 1996 IGC but will achieve a merger “through cooperation . . . which no European state will be able to escape in the long run.”

Maastricht II will be affected by other developments not on the formal agenda, such as final plans for EMU and the discussions beginning on changes to the EU Common Agricultural Policy. While the United States is not a member of the EU or WEU, its actions and interests will also resonate throughout the upcoming debates. American positions on CJTF and NATO expansion will significantly affect EU-WEU defense possibilities; the US military deployment to Bosnia as part of NATO’s peacekeeping force will parallel the IGC and could easily become a test of Euro-Atlantic solidarity. American officials should do what they can to encourage a successful conclusion to the conference, even at the expense of future US influence in Europe. History does not often favor attempts at European cooperation.

Notes

1. Some neorealist international relations scholars emphasized that European and North American cooperation on defense issues occurred only because of the common Soviet threat. Others have argued that Europe’s prosperity makes it unnecessary and unwise for the United States to spend large amounts on European defense. With the threat removed, NATO should come apart. For a neorealist view, see John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15 (Summer 1990): 5-56. For the views of a political economist, see David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

2. Germany and Italy joined the WEU in 1954, Spain and Portugal in 1988, and Greece in 1992, bringing current membership to 10.

3. The WEU’s predecessor, the European Economic Community, the predecessor of the EC. Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark joined in 1973; Greece in 1981; Spain and Portugal in 1986; and Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995. Norwegian voters rejected entry in both 1972 and 1994.

4. “Peace, prosperity, and power” is a common way to explain the motivations for European unity. See Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1992), 380.

5. A host of disputes separated the NATO allies in the early years of the Reagan administration, including the proper response to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, martial law in Poland, and the construction of the Siberian-Western European natural gas pipeline.

6. Denmark, Greece, and Ireland opposed EC defense obligations in the early 1980s; Ireland and Denmark still do.

7. See “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” par. 52, and NATO’s 1991 Rome Declaration (the Rome summit communiqué), paras. 6, 7, 8.


9. WEU Maastricht Declaration, par. 2. For more complete coverage of the development of European defense cooperation and the Rome and Maastricht summit negotiations in particular, see Alexander Moens and Christopher Anstis, eds., Disconcerted Europe: The Search for a New Security Architecture (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

10. Irish voters also had a referendum and easily approved the treaty.


14. Non-EU NATO countries Turkey, Norway, and Iceland are “associate members”; non-NATO EU countries Austria, Finland, and Sweden and EU-member Denmark are “observers”; and several former Soviet-bloc countries are “associate partners.”


27. The Brussels Treaty, as amended on 23 October 1954, article 12.
28. Some WEU Assembly members argue that the treaty would be void after 1998 if not renewed.

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