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Published: 1 June 2009
Air & Space Power Journal - Summer 2009
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Although America needs two air forces, it is buying neither. Lately the US Air Force has been caught aloft in uncertain skies and has lost its way. Its message certainly does not resonate with the civilian leadership or Congress.1 Even Airmen have started to doubt their worth to the nation. The service has answered with a Madison Avenue–styled ad campaign, engaging everyone in furious debate.
A better method may involve trying to understand what is precipitating the doubt and then composing a rebuttal—if indeed the Air Force is important to the future health and prosperity of our nation. I believe that it is, and I think I understand people’s confusion regarding airpower. By trying to do all things well, the Air Force has lost sight of what it was created to do best.
This article focuses narrowly on conventional combat airpower, mentioning neither space nor cyberspace. Incorporating the variables associated with each of those functions would complicate the airpower analysis. Nor does it discuss nuclear operations since they differ from conventional combat airpower and thus would require an independent analysis. I also exclude strategic airlift, tanker support, and special operations. Just as no one disputes that special operations are part of the combat air forces, so would no one question the requirement for a special-operations component within the Air Force.
One might argue that the US military already has too many combat air forces. Given the fact that each of the other services (Army, Navy, and Marine Corps) has one, it might seem that having an independent air force amounts to overkill.2 However, those other services’ air forces have not been able to meet all of the nation’s airpower requirements—witness the Air Force’s heavy involvement in seven continuous years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. This fact, coupled with the Air Force’s simultaneous maintenance of worldwide strategic commitments, demonstrates why we need an independent air force.
One solution to the nation’s dilemma that instantly comes to mind entails merely increasing the capability of the air forces already resident in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Indeed, the Army has argued strenuously for just this option.3 On the surface, this seems a tantalizingly easy solution; however, many factors absent from the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan demand an independent air force. In the end, soldiers are adept on land, airmen are adept in the sky, and the nation will be better served by an autonomous air force fully engaged in the irregular fight than by a larger air component within the ground forces.
Some individuals believe that the nature of warfare has changed forever. Thomas Barnett, for example, argues that the end of the Cold War ushered in a new era of conflict among peoples, not nations.4 Others agree that we need to better prepare for irregular war and accept more risk when confronting potential peer competitors.5 During any war, however, it is natural to think that the character of the present struggle reflects that of future wars.
Can a lone superpower afford to dismiss the threat of a peer competitor, even if it seems a remote possibility? Can an independent air force that merely augments combat capabilities already present in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps and that provides support in the form of airlift as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance be expected to defend against this possibility?
Assuming that we cannot dismiss threats from peer competitors, let us look at a superpower’s requirement for an independent air force. Can we field a single air force that can meet any contingency on a spectrum bounded by the peer competitor at one end and the urban guerrilla at the other? What type of aircraft should form the core of that air force?
Since the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed a transformation of the Air Force that involved dismantling a service that had as its core platform the heavy bomber and creating a new one around the versatile F-16. We are now on the verge of replacing that platform with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which, despite its modern wizardry, merely improves a similar capability. The Air Force seems intent on having a multirole fighter aircraft as its institutional core.6 Can an independent service with such a core platform meet any contingency on the combat spectrum? I argue that it cannot. In fact, America’s defense requires two air forces, and the aircraft that form each one’s core differ in form, function, and use. Air Force no. 1, the peer-competitor force, is characterized by such terms as strategic capability, deterrence, long range, stealth technology, static precision, high technology, speed, B-2, F-22, and centralized control.7 Air Force no. 2, the irregular-warfare force, is characterized by such terms as tactical capability, persuasion, persistence, stealth effects, dynamic precision, low technology, slowness, A-10, Predator, Reaper, and decentralized control. The following discussion contrasts each air force’s requirements, term by term.
Ask some Airmen what “strategic airpower” means, and their answer will be “nukes.”8 Such a connection between the terms strategic airpower and nuclear was a perversion of the original airpower theorists’ ideas about airpower, brought on by necessities of the Cold War. The enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons made up for the inaccuracy of the bomber’s ordnance-delivery system. By the time the Berlin Wall came down, Airmen had forgotten that strategic meant long-range airpower, long before “nukes” came around.
Meaning more than just long range, strategic implies having the capacity to create strategic effects—something that few forces in America’s arsenal can do. Fewer still can do so anywhere on the earth within mere hours. Only one type of aircraft is strategic in this sense: the bomber. To be fair, at any given time, all aircraft can be considered strategic, depending on their current mission. The bomber, however, remains the only aircraft that is strategic at its core.
On the other hand, we can consider any aircraft tactical, even when its mission calls for achieving a strategic objective. Although tactical has sometimes become synonymous with fighter, given today’s technology, any combat aircraft can create tactical effects. Bombers have demonstrated this fact for years over the skies of Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, an independent air force capable of producing tactical effects is not limited to any specific type of combat aircraft.
Most nations are content to shape their own regional environment, but a superpower must shape the global environment. Airpower theorists such as Gen Billy Mitchell considered the airplane revolutionary because of its ability to create strategic effects. Knowing that officers in a terrestrial service would fail to grasp this concept, he lobbied for an independent air force. If Mitchell’s argument remains valid, a nation that seeks to create strategic effects beyond its regional environment must have such an air force that is strategic at its core. Therefore, any superpower’s independent air force must have the bomber as its core aircraft—the platform characteristic of Air Force no. 1.9
The F-22 is also crucial to Air Force no. 1—but not as our service has sought to use it (as a bomb dropper). We would do better to utilize it as offensive-counterair support to penetrating bombers, as well as defensive counterair for high-value airborne assets. Other F-22 missions might include suppression or destruction of enemy air defenses. Although it drops bombs quite capably, that is not what it was primarily designed to do. We have misused aircraft in past wars—witness our interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the Vietnam War.10 No doubt the F-105 jet could perform that mission, but analysis identified the AC-130 gunship as much more efficient because of its long persistence, heavy payload, and slow speed.
Deterrence and nuclear capability also became synonymous during the Cold War, but they are distinct ideas. The ability to deter need not mean mutually assured destruction.11 Rather, it can give a tyrant clear indication of our ability to create effects detrimental to his rule. Many times, airpower has done just that: during Operation El Dorado Canyon, when President Reagan sought to deter Libyan leader Mu‘ammar Gadhafi; Operation Desert Fox, when President Clinton sought to deter Saddam Hussein; and Operation Allied Force, when President Clinton sought to deter the Serbians. Each time, the Department of Defense relied heavily on the bomber.
An independent air force must have the core capability of deterrence, yet it must also be able to persuade. It can do so by working in concert with sister services and allies alike. Because a superpower’s financial resources may enable it to procure advanced aircraft and weapons beyond the means of its allies, that superpower must develop a range of capabilities suitable to any level of conflict, allowing it to provide those countries more affordable equipment and training. This interaction also establishes goodwill that lessens the risk of conflict. Typically, a developing nation’s main combat platform is a cheap tactical aircraft. Thus, if a superpower requires an independent air force capable of persuasion, that air force must field such an aircraft.
Useful strategic aircraft must have good range among their key traits; indeed, one would have difficulty deterring a distant enemy with aircraft not made to cross oceans. Range becomes more important than speed or stealth during attempts to deter. Obviously, speed or stealth may allow entrance to the enemy’s domain, but that foe has nothing to worry about if aircraft cannot reach his region. Air Force no. 2 requires persistence rather than long range. Larger aircraft with more efficient engines feature both range and persistence.
In our current inventory, only bombers and unmanned aerial vehicles have both of these attributes.12 Close to the fight, we could attain tactical persistence with a lightly armed, propeller-driven aircraft such as an AT-6, a platform less technologically sophisticated than a bomber. An air force capable of providing dedicated support to ground forces during an irregular war could use such an aircraft.
The idea of stealth conjures up images of sophisticated technologies and large defense programs, but this need not be the case. Both air forces must be able to produce stealth effects. Only Air Force no. 1 requires stealth technology to do so because only that air force must penetrate an integrated air defense system (IADS).
Aircraft from Air Force no. 2, on the other hand, can produce stealth effects by loitering high enough so that an irregular foe can neither see nor hear them—a daily occurrence in Iraq and Afghanistan. By understanding the necessity of producing stealth effects, we can save precious defense dollars by fielding simpler aircraft, which could form the backbone of Air Force no. 2.
A peer competitor will have precious, immobile infrastructure that we can attack and destroy with static-precision weapons accurate against stationary targets. Thus, Air Force no. 1 requires static precision. Irregular war, however, which involves constant motion and takes place among the populace, carries the potential for substantial collateral damage. For this reason, Air Force no. 2 requires dynamic precision weapons of low destructive power that can be controlled throughout their flight.13
For all of the reasons already mentioned, Air Force no. 1—an expensive asset absolutely necessary for a global power such as the United States—must be high tech. Without this “silver bullet,” belligerents would spout their rhetoric more easily. It is no accident that North Korea is keenly aware of a B-2’s arrival in the Pacific theater.
Air Force no. 2, however, which relies on dynamic weapons, synchronized sensors, and constant communication, can get by with low-tech platforms. The aircraft themselves merely need to loiter for a long time, hardly a technical challenge today. Air Force no. 2 doesn’t need high tech, which, in fact, hinders the mission. The less technically complex the aircraft, the easier it is to fix and the less logistical support it requires. Air Force no. 2 must have platforms that can take a daily beating yet rely on little maintenance or fuel to remain airborne. “Silver bullets” are wholly unsuited for this environment.
Until air superiority is established, Air Force no. 1 needs speed. It must enter and leave the dragon’s lair before the dragon notices it has even been there. Speed refers to the capability to penetrate and exit an IADS. Thus, the aircraft must be fast.
Air Force no. 2 needs fast response. This response, however, comes from the speed of communications and the weapons employed. Police forces discovered long ago that they did not need faster cars since radio waves travel faster than any automobile. The same holds true for airpower during an irregular war. As long as Air Force no. 2 remains tied to ground forces, its speed comes from communications and the weapons employed. Thus, the aircraft themselves can be slow.
Each of these aircraft carries within its design the implicit explanation of the air force to which it belongs: B-2 and F-22 to no. 1, and A-10, Predator, and Reaper to no. 2. Conspicuously absent is the JSF, which does not fit into either because it has neither the range required for Air Force no. 1 nor the persistence required for Air Force no. 2.14
We once considered centralized control the key doctrinal tenet of airpower, but Airmen are starting to understand that the proper degree of centralization depends on the situation. Centralized control works for Air Force no. 1 engaged in a national- or theater-level fight but not for Air Force no. 2 engaged in a highly localized fight.15 Some people have noted that Army and Marine Corps captains are linchpins to the counterinsurgency effort in Iraq.16 Their services give them broad mission orders and allow them to adjust their approach, based on the locality. Centralized control in irregular warfare prevents the Air Force from similarly capitalizing on the creativity of its young officers.
If budget realities force us to choose between the two air forces, without question, America needs Air Force no. 1, whose core must be the next-generation bomber. We should also buy more F-22s, which we currently do not have in sufficient quantity to provide adequate support for such a force. To pay the costs, the Air Force can either significantly reduce or eliminate the JSF program. More suited to the other services, that aircraft will also find a home with the regional air forces of our allies. Since aircraft required for irregular warfare are relatively inexpensive, we would then be able to afford enough platforms to build Air Force no. 2—specifically, the Predator, Reaper, and a new combat version of the T-6 to replace the aging A-10. Organizationally (assuming we decide to fund no. 2), the Air Force should move that component towards decentralized control for irregular warfare.17 The Air Force’s new doctrine for irregular warfare recognizes this necessity, yet the service remains encumbered by its own legacy.18
If the Air Force does not want to buy Air Force no. 2, it could simply build more bombers. Since those aircraft are suited to both types of conflict, the Air Force would not have to train pilots for both bombers and light tactical aircraft; nevertheless, it could still handle both types of scenarios. Since we can never be sure about the kind of war we will fight, this course of action would give the same flexibility to the war fighter but at less cost to the Air Force in terms of personnel and infrastructure.
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
*The author is an Air War College student at Maxwell AFB, Alabama
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Notes
1. See Peter Spiegel, “Military Doesn’t Back Soldiers Enough, Gates Says,” Los Angeles Times, 22 April 2008, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/iraq/complete/la-na-gates22apr22,1,701682.story.
2. I do not include the Coast Guard here, focusing instead on the combat air forces.
3. Roxana Tiron, “Air Force, Army Clash Again on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” Hill, 30 October 2007, http://thehill.com/business--lobby/air-force-army-clash-again-on-unmanned-aerial-vehicles-2007-10-30.html (accessed 17 April 2008).
4. See Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004).
5. “We will have no global peer competitor and will remain unmatched in traditional military capability.” The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 2005), 5, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2005/d20050408strategy.pdf. See also Brian G. Watson, Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win Decisively: The Case for Greater Stabilization Capacity in the Modular Force (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, August 2005), http://www.strategic studiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB621.pdf.
6. The Quadrennial Defense Review notes that
the Air Force has set a goal of increasing its long-range strike capabilities by 50% and the penetrating component of long-range strike by a factor of five by 2025. Approximately 45% of the future long-range strike force will be unmanned. The capacity for joint air forces to conduct global conventional strikes against time-sensitive targets will also be increased. . . .
[The Department of Defense will] develop a new land-based, penetrating long-range strike capability to be fielded by 2018 while modernizing the current bomber force.
Quadrennial Defense Review Report
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), 46, http://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2006.pdf. Yet, the Air Force’s budget submission for fiscal year 2009 does not allocate any money for a new long-range strike aircraft. See Procurement Programs (P-1): Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year 2009 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2008), http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/fy2009_p1.pdf.7. These terms are not meant to be mutually exclusive. For instance, in some cases we will need aspects of Air Force no. 1 in an irregular environment; however, Air Force no. 2 can fulfill most requirements of an irregular conflict. Global Hawk, for example, is useful across the spectrum of conflict.
8. The author did not conduct a survey but nevertheless makes this claim because Air Force officers who reviewed this article assumed that strategic airpower meant nuclear weapons. Though not prima facie evidence of the correctness of this assumption, it does indicate that the association of the two terms is alive and well with at least some Air Force personnel. Perhaps a future study could examine the prevalence of this association within the Air Force.
9. Although some individuals may claim that fighters have become modern-era bombers because they have flown the majority of conventional-bombing missions since the end of the Cold War, this may have been the case because the Air Force has sought to procure ever-increasing numbers of fighters during that period. In this article, the term bomber refers to an aircraft with range and a payload at least equivalent to that of the current B-2, B-1, or B-52.
10. See Col Herman L. Gilster, “The Commando Hunt V Interdiction Campaign: A Case Study in Constrained Optimization,” Air University Review 29, no. 2 (January–February 1978): 21–37, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1978/jan-feb/gilster.html (accessed 8 May 2006).
11. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 42–54, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85204-p0/keir-a-lieber-daryl-g-press/the-rise-of-u-s-nuclear-primacy.html.
12. Some people may disagree, saying that fighters can provide similar persistence with refueling, but one has to question whether this makes sense, given the current high price of fuel. Efficiency becomes even more important during irregular warfare, due to the length of time required to conduct operations.
13. The new terms static precision and dynamic precision clarify the requirements of the two air forces. The former refers to the ability to precisely destroy immobile targets. The latter refers to the ability to destroy mobile targets.
14. See “Developing an Affordable Fighter for the Future,” RAND Research Brief (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997), http://rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB35-1/index1.html. The JSF may provide some capabilities that the Air Force can leverage, but by buying 1,763 of them, the service is actually building its institution around the multirole fighter because it will fly most conventional combat missions. Such reliance also unduly increases the burden on an already overtaxed tanker force. Not only could bomber or unmanned aircraft, which provide 10 times the range and endurance of the JSF, diminish the tanker workload but also they could carry out the mission from more distant, secure bases that possess a better logistics infrastructure. Finally, because JSF pilots would fill most combat air force (CAF) staff positions, a JSF-centric view would likely develop at the staff level and resonate throughout the CAF. This would culminate in a staff viewpoint myopically focused on what fighter aircraft can do for the war fighter, rather than what the Air Force could do for the war fighter if given the right equipment.
15. “Air Force planners may have to adapt and develop creative C2 [command and control] relationships to facilitate successful mission accomplishment and optimize the tenet of centralized control/decentralized execution. Due to the localized nature of most [irregular warfare] enemies and specifically insurgencies, decentralized execution is vital to the successful integration of airpower.” Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3, Irregular Warfare, 1 June 2007, 66, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/AFDCPrivateWeb /AFDD_Page_HTML/Doctrine _Docs/afdd2-3.pdf. This statement may have been a compromise between those who advocate decentralized control in irregular warfare and those who continue to favor centralized control, regardless of the situation. From the author’s own experience in Iraq, permitting local ground commanders to exercise tactical control in irregular warfare can yield synergy because it allows assigned Airmen to become intimately familiar with the “human” terrain not readily visible from the air. To compensate, the Air Force has increased the number of joint terminal attack controllers, but the Airman in the cockpit still must spend precious time becoming oriented to the human terrain once on orbit. Because this orientation is never complete, it is difficult for the Airman to become a thinking (and creative) addition to the team. After all, during a sortie, an airborne Airman must operate in many local environments, each with its own unique and unfamiliar “human” terrain.
16. See Michael Kamber, “Sovereigns of All They’re Assigned, Captains Have Many Missions to Oversee,” New York Times, 21 March 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/world/middleeast/21captain.html? ref=world.
17. Perhaps the Air Force could adapt US Marine Corps doctrine for air support to ground forces.
18. See AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare, 66.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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