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Air & Space Power Journal - Summer 2008

Improving the Effectiveness of Joint Close Air Support

Maj Michael H. Johnson, USMC*

The term close air support (CAS) evokes scenes from the movie Platoon, in which a ground commander exhorts aircraft to "drop all remaining on my pos[ition]" to avoid being overrun by enemy forces. The mission has evolved into much more. Arguably the most difficult mission flown by aircraft on today's battlefield, CAS has remained at the heart of airpower debates for decades.¹ It requires the highest level of integration with ground forces, indirect fires, and other assets; furthermore, in most cases, CAS demands the greatest precision due to the proximity of friendly forces.² Finally, it has the highest potential for negative ramifications if something goes wrong, such as fratricide, civilian deaths, or the overrunning of ground forces.

The global war on terror has elevated the importance of CAS. Ground forces increasingly rely on the effects that airpower provides. The percentage of missions classified as CAS was small during Operation Desert Storm (6 percent) and Operation Allied Force (0) (because of the absence of terminal attack controllers on the ground in Kosovo).³ In Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, this percentage increased drastically. During Operation Anaconda, nearly all such missions supported ground forces in the Shah-e-Kot Valley.⁴ During the push to Baghdad in 2003, 75 percent of Navy and Marine air involvement consisted of CAS missions.⁵ According to the US Central Command Air Forces report entitled Operation Iraqi Freedom-By the Numbers, 79 percent of targets struck during the campaign fell under the kill-box interdiction/CAS category.⁶ In current Iraqi Freedom operations, almost all air missions require positive control to engage ground targets.

Recent combat operations have become increasingly joint in nature-for example, Air Force F-16 multirole fighters and Army AH-64 Apache helicopters provide CAS for Marine battalions, Marine AH-1 Cobra helicopters support Army brigades, and Navy F/A-18 multirole fighters support special forces. This increased joint interaction, coupled with service differences in the approach to doctrine and training, has decreased the effectiveness of CAS.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support, lists eight conditions for effective CAS: (1) effective training and proficiency, (2) planning and integration, (3) command, control, and communications, (4) air superiority, (5) target marking and acquisition, (6) streamlined and flexible procedures, (7) appropriate ordnance, and (8) favorable weather.⁷ Doctrine and training affect all of these except air superiority and favorable weather. This article addresses ways to improve CAS effectiveness by focusing on doctrine and training.

Close Air Support Doctrine

CAS has its roots in the early decades of the twentieth century. The advent of the airplane quickly led to its application in strafing and bombing on the battlefields of Europe in World War I. Marine aviators developed an early form of CAS in the Nicaraguan civil war of 1927.⁸ Principles guiding these early uses of airpower in support of ground troops gradually matured through World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam War into the doctrine we have today.

Service viewpoints on CAS diverged after World War II. Many Air Force proponents considered strategic bombing the primary role of airpower and viewed CAS as "a maximum waste of firepower."⁹ The Army looked at airpower in terms of supporting a ground campaign. These perspectives continue within the two services in some form to the present day.

The underlying tension regarding the differing viewpoints on CAS affected interservice relationships and aircraft procurement throughout the 1960s. The Johnson-McConnell agreement of 1966 further delineated the Air Force's role as the sole provider of fixed-wing CAS to the Army while recognizing that Army helicopter missions included fire support.¹⁰ Subsequently, in 1975 a letter outlined the Air Force's and Army's understanding of the use of airpower, shaping the latter's doctrinal stance on CAS.¹¹ Army leaders first used the term direct aerial fire support to describe helicopter CAS and attached a definition that would not antagonize the Air Force: "fire delivered by aerial vehicles organic to ground forces against surface targets and in support of land operations."¹² This evolved into "close in fire support" and, currently, "close combat attack."¹³

Viewing CAS through a much different lens, the Marine Corps approaches warfare by stressing combined-arms fires and aviation fires as integral parts of the overall plan. In 1935 the Corps established aviation as an independent section "primarily for the support of Fleet Marine Forces in landing operations and in support of troop activities in the field."¹⁴ The Marine Air Ground Task Force construct includes an aviation element to provide fire support. This air-ground approach endured due to the use of a historically lighter force, with aviation fires providing the required support. Additionally, Marine aviation historically has focused on the tactical level. Having no strategic bombers, the Marine Corps has avoided the debate within the Air Force on the most efficient application of airpower. However, this contributes to problems with joint integration as Marine leadership constantly wrestles over the right mix of providing aircraft for a joint air campaign while maintaining the direct-support capability of Marine aviation.

JP 3-09.3 governs CAS procedures. Many current CAS debates deal with different services' approaches to CAS and their understanding of the doctrine. Service parochialism also significantly motivates the differing viewpoints. The argument of whether or not CAS constitutes an effective use of airpower lies beyond the scope of this article. The underlying debate, however, drives the Army's and Air Force's mind-set and each service's approach to the mission.

Helicopter development provided Army ground commanders with an organic air platform to deliver fire support.¹⁵ The Army viewed this as critical due to its perception of a lack of support from the Air Force, whose focus remained on strategic bombing. This development, unfortunately, also involved the use of semantics and wordsmithing to avoid "encroaching" on the Air Force's responsibility of providing CAS to the Army. Over the years, this tit for tat resulted in an almost superstitious avoidance of using the term within Army circles or implying that Army aviation performed the mission. A letter from the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff to the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in September 1975 defined the role of the attack helicopter as "integral to the Army ground maneuver unit and an extension of organic firepower." The two services agreed that "the attack helicopter does not perform CAS but is intended to complement Air Force CAS capabilities."¹⁶ Army helicopters do conduct CAS but under the guise of calling it something else. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-04.111, Aviation Brigades, defines close combat attack (CCA) as "a hasty or deliberate attack in support of units engaged in close combat. During CCA, armed helicopters engage enemy units with direct fires that impact near friendly forces. . . . CCA is coordinated and directed by a team, platoon, or company-level ground unit using standardized CCA procedures in unit [standard operating procedures]."¹⁷

Compare the CCA definition with the current joint definition of CAS: "air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces."¹⁸ CCA even goes so far as utilizing the joint CAS nine-line briefing format but calling it the "close combat attack briefing."¹⁹

Prior to Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, Army helicopter units generally supported only Army ground units; thus, this doctrinal approach did not influence joint operations. Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11), however, Army attack helicopters have provided fire support for special forces and Marine ground units. The Army encountered problems since its pilots were not well versed in CAS procedures.²⁰ Based on this doctrinal issue, the service made adjustments to procedures for command and control (C2) and forward air control (FAC) when AH-64s supported Marine units.²¹

Within the Air Force, one finds a persistent perception that CAS is a lower-priority mission or a less effective use of airpower than interdiction or strategic bombardment.²² Current Air Force doctrine perpetuates this perception: "CAS applications must be weighed against other, potentially more effective, uses for CAS-capable assets such as [air interdiction] or even strategic attack."²³ This approach inhibits effectiveness since units spend less time training for CAS. Historically, this did not present a major problem because A-10 aircraft provided the preponderance of CAS sorties and because their pilots were generally well versed in CAS procedures. Technology and an increase in CAS taskings have changed this drastically during Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Advances in weapons and sensors now enable many different aircraft to perform the CAS mission, including B-52 and B-1 bombers. This shift to CAS support from other aircraft can result in the mission's utilization of aircrew members with little or no understanding of the ground scheme of maneuver or the intricacies of an integrated fire-support plan. In these situations, one commonly sees the "bomb on coordinate" mentality; that is, the aircrew focuses on target coordinates for delivery of a precision-guided munition (PGM), missing the importance of an assigned final-­attack heading or a time on target-both critical pieces to the ground unit or controller.²⁴

One must also consider doctrinal differences concerning fire support coordination measures. Discussion of fire support coordination line (FSCL) emplacement lies outside the scope of this article; however, it does affect the effectiveness of CAS. Nowhere does the joint CAS publication state that CAS is tied to a specific fire support coordination measure. In fact, it says that the FSCL "does not divide an area of operations by defining a boundary between close and deep areas or create a zone for CAS."²⁵ Misunderstanding of this basic premise places undue restrictions on aviation fires and unnecessarily requires CAS control for missions meeting the definition of interdiction. Understanding what CAS is and is not still varies within the branches.²⁶ For example, briefings given at the Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) Conference of 2004 described Scud missile-hunting missions in the western desert of Iraq during Iraqi Freedom as CAS.²⁷ Confusion over the difference among CAS, interdiction, and terminal guidance operations has also led to recommendations to call operations something else, such as battlefield air interdiction or ground-aided precision strike.²⁸

Current CAS doctrine also falls short by focusing almost exclusively on fixed-wing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). A total of six pages in the current joint CAS publication covers rotary-wing CAS employment, control points, tactics, and weapons. One can attribute this imbalance, in part, to the fact that the Army does not conduct CAS or FAC (airborne) (FAC[A]) missions. However, Marine attack helicopters routinely execute them. During Anaconda, Marine AH-1 Cobra helicopters did not perform FAC(A) or strike coordination and reconnaissance due to a lack of understanding within the joint task force's chain of command concerning their capabilities.²⁹ One cannot blame this problem on the Army commanders, whose exposure to rotary-wing attack aviation in most cases was limited to AH-64s, which do not routinely perform those missions. Such a lack of knowledge regarding helicopter capabilities leads to inefficient employment of these assets.³⁰ The problem also affects training since service FAC(A)s (except those in the Marine Corps) rarely control helicopters during FAC(A) training.³¹

Moreover, technology has a dramatic effect on doctrine, which cannot keep pace with advancements. More frequent use of PGMs affects the execution of CAS missions. The increased standoff and delivery ranges of PGMs require that ground commanders have a higher level of confidence in both their air controller and the CAS platform.

Video feeds such as those from the remotely operated video-enhanced receiver allow joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC) to use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and aircraft sensors to aid in targeting.³² JTACs no longer must see the target with their eyes in order to engage it, and in many cases, they may be several kilometers from the target. Unfortunately, this situation can lead to micromanagement of tactical attacks because commanders now have a bird's-eye view of an engagement and feel the need to step in rather than let the tactical operators execute the mission.³³ The fact that UAV usage also outpaces the ability to define doctrine and TTPs for CAS missions has many ramifications for CAS, including clearance of fires, UAV control authority, airspace deconfliction, and target handoff.

Many of these doctrinal problems affect training as well. CAS training varies from service to service and conflict to conflict. Standardization has improved for terminal attack controllers, but many areas in the training of CAS aircrews still need improvement.

Close Air Support Training

All members of the military have heard the oft-repeated expression "train like you fight, and fight like you train." Nowhere is this more important than in CAS. Nevertheless, aircrews and controllers often improvise during execution due to a lack of practice or training in CAS procedures. Recent years have seen the incorporation of several standardization initiatives, but most of them focus on terminal controllers. Unfortunately, because aircrew standardization varies among services and units, we still have hurdles to negotiate in CAS training before effectiveness improves.

The first obstacle involves a paucity of joint training, highlighted by the General Accounting Office's report of 2003 on military readiness as one of four main areas for improvement.³⁴ Recent initiatives such as the Joint National Training Capability by Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) are attempting to address the problem.³⁵ Although such efforts represent a good first step, service-specific taskings and a lack of central oversight and authority remain problems. Training requirements as well as high operational tempo often force units to forgo joint training in lieu of higher-priority service taskings. Additionally, even though JFCOM facilitates joint training and can provide funding incentives for exercises, it holds no authority to compel units to participate. This problem occurs even within the Marine Corps, which generally performs air-ground integration well. The fact that Marine ground units tend to train with Marine aircraft because they are familiar with each other inhibits controllers and aircrews from becoming more knowledgeable about joint air assets.³⁶

The failure of some units to emphasize CAS training raises another hurdle. Instead, they concentrate on other missions, such as air-to-air engagements or interdiction, despite their low probability of occurrence-especially in current Iraqi operations.³⁷ True, units must maintain proficiency and competency in all taskings and missions, but they should not neglect training in one of the most likely areas of employment in-theater.

The fluidity of operations also contributes to training issues. During the Iraqi ground campaign in 2003, the diverting of many sorties after they became airborne to provide CAS precluded effective pre-mission planning and integration.³⁸ It also perpetuated the notion of CAS as a pickup mission that we can execute on the fly and that consequently requires little emphasis during training.

Other external requirements also affect training. Army restructuring places greater demands on the Air Force for terminal attack controllers and calls for more training sorties with the same amount of aviation support.³⁹ The Marines face a similar situation with the stand-up of the single-seat FAC(A) program within fixed-wing units.⁴⁰

Furthermore, technology can inhibit CAS training. In many cases, CAS aircrews and controllers develop ad hoc TTPs. Failure to capture TTPs at a central point for dissemination leads to varying degrees of proficiency and different procedures amongst units. In some cases, shortages of systems such as advanced targeting pods limit aircrew training prior to deployment, leading to less effective application in-theater.⁴¹

The doctrine and training issues outlined above do not usually prevent forces from receiving CAS. The world leader in applying military power, the United States concedes nothing in the conduct of that mission; regardless, implementation of the following recommendations will increase effectiveness across all services and make CAS truly joint.

Doctrinal Recommendations

The following recommendations focus on first correcting deficiencies in CAS doctrine. In some cases, they require a dramatic shift by services in their approach to CAS. This is necessary, however, to facilitate subsequent improvements in CAS training.

Encourage Air Force and Army Headquarters to
Acknowledge That Army Attack Aviation Performs CAS

Airpower employment continues to evolve long after the two services agreed that attack helicopters "do not perform CAS."⁴² To perpetuate such a myopic view is reprehensible. Both services agree that the Army relies on external support for fixed-wing CAS, the preponderance of which comes from the Air Force, based on historical precedent and agreements. The attack helicopter is a viable CAS platform, as demonstrated for over 35 years by the Marine Corps and by the Army in recent operations in Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. This fact does not threaten either service's mission sets or support. Army attack aviation can still perform as maneuver elements and conduct other required missions. This proposal merely formalizes what already occurs. Acknowledgement that the Army does CAS is crucial since Army aviation actively provides CAS to Army, Marine, and special forces units in Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom; hence, pilots need training to become familiar with CAS procedures. A Casey-Moseley agreement similar to Johnson-McConnell or the one between Gen David C. Jones, Air Force chief of staff, and Gen Frederick C. Weyand, Army chief of staff, in 1975 would reaffirm the Air Force's commitment to providing fixed-wing CAS for the Army while acknowledging the latter's attack-aviation role in CAS and FAC(A).⁴³

Stand Up an Army FAC(A) Program

An Army rotary-wing FAC(A) program offers many advantages. Trained to operate under standardized procedures outlined in the Joint FAC(A) Memorandum of Agreement, FAC(A)s provide Army commanders increased capability to control aerial fires. In some cases, this capability could ease the requirement for additional JTACs as units restructure under the brigade concept. Army attack aviation has practiced many FAC(A) functions for years under the joint air attack team concept.⁴⁴ In Vietnam, controllers routinely flew in Army helicopters. More recently in Iraq, terminal attack controllers flew in the right seat of OH-58 scout helicopters of the 101st Airborne Division.⁴⁵ Marine AH-1 Cobra and UH-1 Huey helicopters already function as rotary-wing FAC(A)s.

Proof of concept training for this idea occurred in January 2006, when four US Army AH-64D Apache pilots from the 1st Battalion, 227th Attack Regiment received FAC(A) academic training, spending two weeks flying rotary-wing FAC(A) missions with Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 (MAWTS-1), which provides tactical standardization and advanced-level training for all Marine Corps aviators. AH-1W FAC(A) instructors flew in AH-64D aircraft, offering live-fire FAC(A) instruction. The proof of concept affirmed the AH-64 as a viable and capable platform for FAC(A) and showed that senior Army attack pilots could proficiently conduct FAC(A) following the training.⁴⁶ Although we must address support issues to stand up a FAC(A) program, we should base our decision on honest analysis of the increased capability that it would provide-not on traditional missions within the services.

Many requirements are already in place to implement the program. The Joint FAC(A) Memorandum of Agreement outlines certification standards and requirements. We could quickly incorporate rotary-wing FAC(A) TTPs already established and used by Marine helicopters into Army doctrine and publications.⁴⁷ Furthermore, by leveraging MAWTS-1 FAC(A) instructors under a "train the trainer" concept to stand up an initial cadre of Army FAC(A) instructors, we could conduct initial training of Army pilots.

Encourage the Services to Place Greater
Emphasis on the Close Air Support Mission

Emphasis on the CAS mission has improved since 9/11; however, the advent of advanced sensors and PGMs thrust many platforms into the CAS role without a solid understanding of or exposure to CAS doctrine. Units that have recently begun employing their platforms in the CAS role are most affected. Increased doctrinal emphasis on the mission by service headquarters will expand unit awareness of CAS doctrine and TTPs, thereby increasing standardization and effectiveness.⁴⁸

Change the Services' Doctrinal Approach to Fire
Support Coordination and Close Air Support

Such change requires education and discussion of CAS employment procedures and doctrine within each service's C2 structure. Personnel manning the battlefield coordination detachment, air support operations center, or direct air support center must thoroughly understand what CAS is and is not, as well as how management of fire support coordination measures and fires critically affects CAS. Education and discussion must include ground commanders at all echelons. Their understanding of CAS employment principles also drives the effectiveness of air-delivered fires.⁴⁹

Expand Detail in Close Air Support Doctrine on
Helicopter Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Expansion of Army attack aviation into CAS and FAC(A) roles will increase the utilization of rotary-wing CAS. Knowledge of helicopter CAS TTPs varies greatly within fixed-wing units and the services. Marine fixed-wing pilots generally know the most about helicopters due to habitual unit relationships within the Marine Air Ground Task Force construct. We must make a concerted effort to incorporate more information and TTPs regarding helicopter operations into doctrine.

Promote Better Understanding of Close Air Support Control
Types and FAC(A) Utilization by Ground Commanders

Continued education and inclusion of ground commanders in JCAS will greatly improve that process. Offering a CAS "primer" as part of the services' commanders' courses would better familiarize incoming commanders with JCAS and FAC(A) TTPs.⁵⁰ Increased integration of ground officers into forums such as the JCAS and Joint FAC(A) conferences would also prove beneficial since their participation at these two conferences is usually limited. Most participants come from aviation or terminal controller backgrounds.

Update Close Air Support Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures to Reflect Current Technology

Finally, CAS doctrine must catch up to technology. We must filter and codify the combat expertise of CAS aircrew members and controllers into JCAS doctrine. Moreover, we must implement a detailed expansion of TTPs on PGM targeting and delivery, usage of video feeds, and UAV integration. Additionally, we must discuss the UAV role in CAS, possibly including joint fires observer and/or FAC(A) training for UAV operators. Incorporation of the latest information into JP 3-09.3 will ensure that a baseline level of knowledge reaches all controllers and aircrews rather than remaining at a unit or service level.

Training Recommendations

Commanders and units must constantly emphasize training that routinely exercises CAS tactics, techniques, and procedures. Successful CAS training will result in safe and effective CAS employment.

-Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-23.1, Close Air Support, 8 September 2007

Doctrinal changes will have little effect unless they are accompanied by improvements in training. Joint training does occur to varying degrees, but on an ad hoc basis and often through the buddy system via telephone conversations or e-mail between squadrons. Although this may succeed in meeting the squadron's training requirements, it is an informal method, and neither squadron receives credit for joint training.

Establish a Joint Training Requirement

Deciding to levy an additional requirement on units would not sit well with them due to current operations tempo and deployment cycles, but it would increase joint interaction between units. We should take a commonsense approach to minimize the impact on overburdened units-for example, aligning units to joint-training opportunities reasonably near their home stations. We should also consider joint-tasking requirements a key factor in determining unit participation. Moreover, this training should count towards service-specific predeployment training requirements.

This recommendation requires expansion of the Integrated Training Initiative sponsored by the Air Force, which does include joint-training opportunities.⁵¹ We need to increase participation from the other services, however, to offset the initiative's focus on Air Force units. Expansion of the initiative to include alignment of units to joint exercises, based on mission requirements and deployment cycles, would enhance the effectiveness of units conducting JCAS operations. It would also meet the increased requirements for training CAS controllers and FAC(A) aircrew members. Aligning units based on training requirements allows a more efficient use of aviation assets during training.

Increase Joint Interaction among
the Services' Weapons Schools

Joint interaction at the services' weapons schools has improved in recent years, but participation is often limited to high-demand/low-density platforms such as the Airborne Warning and Control System, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, or EA-6B Prowler. We should increase participation by JCAS aircraft and should include conferences on tactics and lessons learned. Granted, the JCAS and joint FAC(A) conferences represent excellent forums for discussing TTPs and lessons learned, but, ideally, we should strive for greater interaction at tactical forums such as the Air Force Weapons and Tactics Conference.⁵² Platforms from all services would benefit from many CAS/FAC(A) lessons learned and TTPs at such a conference.

Services also benefit from the cross training of CAS and FAC(A) subject-matter experts. Familiarization flights with another service's CAS or FAC(A) platforms would work to everyone's advantage.⁵³ Such joint interaction enables greater understanding of the employment TTPs of different platforms, sensors, and weapons, which leads to more efficient execution the next time the two platforms or units work together.

Establish a Close Air Support Mission-Essential Task
List for All Aircraft Performing the Mission

This task list should mirror those lists established for JTAC and Joint FAC(A) training.⁵⁴ Such a list would increase the effectiveness of CAS assets by outlining expectations of the platforms. The JTAC and Joint FAC(A) memorandums of agreement outline much of this standardization. Service and platform CAS experts can modify those existing standards to define aircraft-specific requirements, including those of UAVs. Leveraging CAS syllabi from similar fixed- and rotary-wing platforms will provide information for units expanding or creating a CAS training syllabus.

Elevate the Importance of Close Air
Support Training in the Air Force

In the past, concerns arose regarding whether aircraft had the capability to perform the CAS mission. Targeting pods and precision weapons now allow many different aircraft to acquire and engage targets in support of this mission, but CAS training has not advanced with these capabilities. Until we assign CAS training the same importance as air interdiction or strategic attack, units will view it as a secondary mission and attach less significance to it.⁵⁵ Many platforms have missions that focus on areas beyond CAS, but we need some baseline of standardized training if we want them to perform effectively in the CAS role.

Incorporate Close Air Support Training into
Syllabi for Training in Army Attack Aviation

An increase in training must accompany acceptance of CAS as a rotary-wing mission. Training syllabi for Army AH-64 Apache and OH-58 Kiowa pilots should incorporate CAS academics and flight training. Stand-up of a FAC(A) program also requires more training. Marine AH-1W and UH-1N syllabi can undergo review with an eye towards developing a satisfactory syllabus to sufficiently prepare Apache and Kiowa pilots in CAS and FAC(A) TTPs.⁵⁶

Create an Army Weapons School

Currently, Army aviation standardization resides at Fort Rucker, Alabama, with the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, while the Directorate of Training and Doctrine handles doctrinal literature and standardization of tactical operations.⁵⁷ The Army has no weapons-and-tactics course that confers advanced training on pilots. These "patch wearers" in the other services are considered the subject-matter experts on weapons and tactics for their respective platforms.⁵⁸ The Army has a wealth of knowledge and experience in its aviation corps, but the absence of a weapons school prevents the service from effectively harnessing and institutionalizing this knowledge.

The proposed Army Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron (AAWTS) could pattern itself after a construct similar to that of MAWTS-1, the Marine Corps weapons school. The Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization would handle flight standardization and training for units and pilots, while the AAWTS would assume responsibility for tactical standardization and advanced-level training. This would encompass functions similar to those of MAWTS-1, including advanced training such as FAC(A), production of tactical publications, doctrine input, and test and evaluation of emerging technology or procedures.

The Army's Yuma Proving Ground complex in Arizona would serve as an ideal location for the AAWTS. It provides access to several aviation-training ranges and is centrally located, near the Air Force's Fighter Weapons School at Nellis AFB in Las Vegas, Nevada; Luke AFB in Phoenix, Arizona; the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twenty-Nine Palms, California; and MAWTS-1 in Yuma, Arizona. This location promotes synergy by increasing joint interaction for all services. The AAWTS instructor courses would allow access to Army helicopters and aircrew members for joint training during Marine Weapons and Tactics Instructor courses or Air Force Weapons School courses. The benefits of standing up an AAWTS reach beyond Army aviation and would positively affect all services.

Conclusions

Close air support is good for your morale; it's really, really bad for the enemy's. I think the confidence of the 0311 [rifleman] that's behind the mortar hole, with RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] [bouncing] off sandbags-I think it's good for him when a five hundred pound bomb drops in the vicinity of where he was just taking fire. It's certainly good at the company level, and it's certainly good at the battalion level, as in, "We're in control here; we can take this over at any time we want to." HUMINT [human intelligence] reports [showed that] it was devastating, absolutely devastating to them.

-Interview with FACs of the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, 5 June 2004

Most of the issues outlined in this article are not new. A review of CAS literature over the last 30 years reveals many recurring topics. The question then becomes, what is the impetus for resolving these matters? The answer lies in the conflict we face in the global war on terror and the realities of limited resources. To become more effective, the services must embrace the reality of JCAS.

Approaching CAS from a systems standpoint, we have made improvements in many areas. Technology allows us to utilize air assets in the CAS role in ways we could not have imagined 20 years ago. Standardization of terminal attack controllers and updates to doctrine have enabled us to apply those technologies more effectively during missions. The last areas that we must address involve the aircrew members and units that perform the mission. Applying the outlined doctrine and training recommendations completes that step. Ideally, a day will come when support to the JTAC will be uniform, regardless of the platform or service providing it.

*This article is derived from the author's 2007 Air Command and Staff College thesis, which received the Commandant's Award for Research Excellence as the top paper for academic year 2007.

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Notes

1. Lt Col James D. Reed, "Army's Transformation Impact on Close Air Support Terminal Attack Control," Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2006), 8. Reed states that the joint terminal attack controller's mission "is highly demanding and often complex." Ibid.

2. David A. Deptula and Sigfred J. Dahl, "Transforming Joint Air-Ground Operations for 21st Century Battle­space," Field Artillery, July-August 2003, 4. Deptula and Dahl note that "it takes advanced situational awareness and weapons systems knowledge to both 'rack-and-stack' multiple flights of attack aircraft and choose the correct delivery system and ordnance for desired effects." Ibid.

3. Rebecca Grant, "The Clash about CAS," Air Force Magazine 86, no. 1 (January 2003): 56 ("Stretching the Definition"), http://www.afa.org/magazine/jan2003/0103cas.pdf.

4. Ibid.

5. Arthur P. Brill Jr., "Close Air Support: More Improvement Is Needed," Sea Power, November 2003, 1, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3738/is_200311/ai_n 9311629/pg_1.

6. Operation Iraqi Freedom-By the Numbers (Shaw AFB, SC: Assessment and Analysis Division, US Central Command Air Forces, 30 April 2003), 5, http://www.au.af .mil/au/awc/awcgate/af/oifcentaf.pdf.

7. Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), 3 September 2003 (incorporating change 1, 2 September 2005), I-6, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_09 _3ch1.pdf.

8. Robert L. Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1952), 25.

9. Douglas N. Campbell, The Warthog and the Close Air Support Debate (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 39.

10. The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions, comp. and ed. Richard I. Wolf (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987), 379.

11. Ibid., 403.

12. Benjamin F. Cooling, ed., Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1990), 455.

13. For the former term, see Maj Rhett B. Lawing, "American Armed Forces' Service Culture Impact on Close Air Support," Chronicles Online Journal, 18 December 2006, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ cc/lawing.html.

14. Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation, 32.

15. J. Kristopher Keener, The Helicopter Innovation in United States Army Aviation (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program, 2001), 13, http://web.mit.edu/SSP/Publications/working _papers/wp_01-1.pdf.

16. United States Air Force: Basic Documents, 403.

17. Field Manual (FM) 3-04.111, Aviation Brigades, August 2003, Q-15, http://www.globalsecurity.org /military/library/policy/army/fm/3-04-111/fm3-04-111.pdf.

18. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), I-1.

19. FM 3-04.111, Aviation Brigades, Q-16.

20. Lt Col Jim Adams, operations officer, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 (MAWTS-1), discussion with the author, March 2005. Colonel Adams served as aircraft maintenance officer for Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266, the Aviation Combat Element for the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, which conducted combat operations in support of Enduring Freedom in the Tarin Kowt region of Afghanistan, April-July 2004. During these operations, AH-64s were tasked to support Marine Expeditionary Unit operations on several occasions.

21. Maj Michael D. Grice, "AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopters: Integrating the AH-64 into the MAGTF Battle­space," Marine Corps Gazette 91, no. 3 (March 2007): 27-30.

22. Lawing, "American Armed Forces' Service Culture," 3.

23. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.3, Counterland Operations, 11 September 2006, 34, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd2-1-3.pdf.

24. Author's experience as a forward air controller and forward air controller (airborne) instructor at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1.

25. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), III-22.

26. Deptula and Dahl, "Transforming Joint Air-Ground Operations," 4.

27. The author's experience while attending the JCAS conference in 2004.

28. Lt Col Eric E. Theisen, Ground-Aided Precision Strike: Heavy Bomber Activity in Operation Enduring Freedom, Maxwell Paper no. 31 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2003), 1.

29. Author's experience as flight lead during Anaconda with AH-1W detachment from HMM-166, the aviation combat element for the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, attached to the 10th Mountain Division, 4-26 March 2002.

30. Ibid.

31. Author's discussions with service FAC(A) representatives during the Joint FAC(A) Conference in Yuma, AZ, December 2005.

32. That system receives camera images from nearby aircraft and UAVs, integrating them with other US positioning and targeting software and thus enabling the JTAC to view the target from the aircraft-sensor perspective.

33. Excerpt from briefing, Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA)-773, MAWTS-1, subject: Lessons Learned, May 2005. HMLA-773 deployed in support of Enduring Freedom from October 2003 until March 2005.

34. Report to the Ranking Minority Members, Subcommittees on Total Force and Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Military Readiness Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground Forces (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 2003), 2.

35. "Joint National Training Capability (JNTC)," United States Joint Forces Command (Norfolk, VA: USJFC, 2003), http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jntc.htm.

36. Author's experience while serving as AH-1W division operations officer during Weapons and Tactics Instructor courses and Desert Talon exercises at MAWTS-1, June 2004-June 2005.

37. Author's discussions with F/A-18 instructors, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1, during revisions to manual on training and readiness, 2005.

38. Michael D. Millen, "Improving Detailed Integration in Close Air Support Planning and Execution" (thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2004), 50.

39. Reed, "Army's Transformation Impact," 1.

40. Previously, two-seat F/A-18D aircraft were the only fixed-wing aircraft in the Marine Corps inventory that conducted the FAC(A) mission. In 2005 the Corps added the FAC(A) mission to the single-seat AV-8B and F/A-18C manuals on training and readiness.

41. Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, "VMA Operations: Quick Look Report," 16 February 2007, 2, https://www.mccll.usmc.mil/document_repository/IORs/VMA%20513%20Quick%20Look%207_0.pdf. AV-8B pilots from VMA-513 expressed the need for more predeployment training on procedures for employing their targeting pods to detect potential improvised explosive devices.

42. United States Air Force: Basic Documents, 403.

43. The Casey-Moseley agreement is named after Gen George W. Casey Jr., the current Army chief of staff, and Gen T. Michael Moseley, the current Air Force chief of staff. See United States Air Force: Basic Documents, 405.

44. FM 90-21, JAAT Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Attack Team Operations, 1998. JAAT operations are defined as coordinated attacks by rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, normally supported by artillery or naval surface fire support.

45. Bruce Pirnie et al., Beyond Close Air Support: Forging a New Air-Ground Partnership (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 72, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/ RAND_MG301.pdf.

46. Author's opinion, based on his experience as the rotary-wing FAC(A) subject-matter expert for MAWTS-1 and the performance of the pilots and aircraft in conducting the FAC(A) mission.

47. NTTP 3-22.3-AH1W, Combat Aircraft Fundamentals, AH-1W (U), 2005. Chap. 11 of this tactical manual covers rotary-wing FAC(A) TTPs for Marine Corps AH-1W and UH-1N helicopters.

48. None of the Air Force-sponsored research topics for 2006-7 dealt with CAS. The list of topics from the Combined Arms Center for Army Command and General Staff College and the School for Advanced Military Studies for 2006-7 included "Air-Ground Integration in Counterinsurgency Operations."

49. L. Ross Roberts, Ground Truth: The Implications of Joint Interdependence for Air and Ground Operations, Occasional Paper no. 52 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, 2006), 16. Roberts notes that during the first five days of operations in Iraqi Freedom, the V Corps commander hesitated to open kill boxes short of the FSCL for fixed-wing interdiction even though there were no friendly forces in those boxes. Ibid.

50. Each service has a program designed to provide information to prospective commanders. The Marine Corps Commanders' Program provides information and a course of instruction to enhance their performance as commanders. See http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/mcu/catalog/ 21cdrprog.pdf.

51. United States Air Force Air Combat Command, "Integrated Training Initiative," https://totn.acc.af.mil/xoya/int_training_conf. The Integrated Training Initiative-a single-source forum for combining tactics, training, and scheduling from all weapons systems from all joint and multinational services-consists of both this scheduling Web site and a quarterly conference held the third week in the second month of the quarter. The Integrated Training Conference attains training efficiency through a "bottom-up" strategy of comparing/linking schedules from all fighter; bomber; command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; combat search and rescue; tanker; distributed mission operations; air defense artillery; and other assets. In this process, areas of commonality are identified and subsequently "synchronized" into a single training event.

52. United States Air Force Air Combat Command, "Weapons and Tactics Conference," http://www.acc.af .mil/library/weaponsandtactics.asp. An annual two-week event that focuses on joint war fighting, the Combat Air Forces Weapons and Tactics Conference brings together hundreds of war fighters from the combat air forces to discuss current issues, look at future issues, and provide solutions for the joint employment of forces. New technology is a key area. Although mostly Air Force personnel attend, the conference has seen an increase in participation from the Army, Navy, and Marines.

53. As an instructor at MAWTS-1, the author flew in AH-64D, F/A-18D, F-16DG, and AH-6M aircraft, an experience that gave him invaluable insight into serving as a CAS and FAC(A) instructor in the AH-1W.

54. Joint mission-essential task lists, developed for units performing specific missions, are derived from the universal joint task list outlined in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04D, Universal Joint Task List, 1 August 2005.

55. Air Force pilot, interview by the author, November 2006. The pilot admitted to having never read the JCAS publication but acknowledged that his platform conducted CAS, albeit not as a primary mission.

56. Manuals on training and readiness outline the academic and flight-training requirements for Marine AH-1W and UH-1N pilots who perform CAS. See http://www .tecom.usmc.mil/atb/Training%20and%Readiness.htm.

57. "Fort Rucker, Alabama: Command and Directorates," http://www.united-publishers.com/rucker/command .html#des.

58. After attending the Air Force Weapons School or the Marine Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course, graduates receive a patch to wear on their flight suits signifying that they have completed the course.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University

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