Adding Less-Lethal Arrows to the Quiver for Counterinsurgency Air Operations

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Adding Less-Lethal Arrows to the Quiver
for Counterinsurgency Air Operations

The conflict in Iraq has enabled the war fighter to improve, and in some cases rewrite, many counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics, techniques, and procedures and has illustrated some gaps in our COIN capabilities. In this article, I explain one of those gaps in our weapons inventory and address how we resolved it to give Airmen two more weapons for supporting COIN operations. This discussion is as much about what we added to our inventory as how we added it.

In mid-2007, the war fighter identified a need for a kinetic effect to engage insurgents in urban areas during troops-in-contact engagements (a close air support [CAS] type of mission) while keeping noncombatant casualties to a minimum and allowing strikes near culturally significant or historical objects or sites.¹ Insurgents use such places as sanctuaries, negating the CAS kinetic option for certain target areas. The following description of how coalition forces identified and filled a COIN weapons-capability gap offers important lessons learned that validate the importance of having Airmen involved in planning and executing ground operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The discussion also reinforces the need for Airmen to continue their tradition of being innovative and agile as we improve our future combat capabilities across the spectrum of conflict.

The Air Force has been involved across the spectrum of conflict in the Iraqi theater of operations for 18 years now. High-intensity strategic bombing campaigns took center stage during the opening weeks of Operation Desert Storm and the opening days of the “shock and awe” campaign that toppled Saddam Hussein. During this period, the Air Force also spent years patrolling the skies over Iraq enforcing the no-fly zones, providing humanitarian aid, and occasionally showcasing its precision-engagement capabilities when confronted with hostile intent according to the rules of engagement as part of Operations Southern Watch and Northern Watch.

The one constant throughout this period has been our air supremacy over the skies of Iraq. Not since 1991 have US service personnel had to wonder if the aircraft flying over them in Iraq are friendly or not. We cannot take this for granted, nor should we overlook it since controlling the skies factors into all air operations that currently support the conflict in Iraq. Future conflicts, even future COIN operations, may not allow us the same luxury, so we must remain prepared to fight to achieve control of the skies and thus allow freedom of action on the ground. Today in Iraq, our airpower is just as overwhelming and dominating—but in different ways due to the nature of the conflict.

We can best categorize the conflict after our invasion of Iraq in 2003 as irregular warfare (IW), which Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3, Irregular Warfare, defines as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”² This type of warfare has unique characteristics that require a different approach and associated strategies than the ones we trained in for traditional warfare. IW is characterized according to the activities required to conduct it. At its core lie insurgency and COIN.

Traditionally the military has been reluctant to maintain its IW doctrine—particularly true since the end of the Vietnam War. Prior to December 2006, the Army had not published a manual devoted exclusively to COIN for 20 years. The Marine Corps had not published one for 25 years.³ Until 2007 the Air Force lacked official IW guidelines or doctrine except for the area of foreign internal defense. We relegated IW doctrine to the bottom of our priorities or even overlooked it for many reasons, including the following:

These reasons reflect a mind-set that focused more on previous, successful force-on-force conflicts within the military’s comfort zone than on less-than-successful, messy, complex conflicts outside that zone. The US military has a mixed track record in this arena in Southeast Asia, Latin American, and Africa. This myopic focus is now a thing of the past.

Since late 2003, the conflict in Iraq has highlighted this type of warfare and resulted in definitive actions. The Army and Marine Corps codeveloped Field Manual (FM) 3-24 and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, in December 2006, and the Air Force subsequently released AFDD 2-3 to help shape how the Air Force organizes, trains, equips, and sustains its forces for this type of warfare. This is all good and will ensure that future Airmen are ready for the challenges associated with IW operations and related activities, including COIN, support to COIN, counterterrorism, shaping and deterring, and support to insurgency.⁵

The Air Force currently supports COIN operations, just as it does all types of warfare, through 17 key operational functions.⁶ For example, since the overthrow of Saddam and the cessation of “major combat operations,” we have made extensive use of counterland; information operations; combat support; command and control; airlift; air refueling; special operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); personnel-recovery operations; navigation and positioning; and weather services. However, due to the nature and characteristics of COIN operations, some functions are more relevant than others and are taking center stage. In fact we steadily increased the number of ISR and CAS sorties in 2007. For example, ISR missions by unmanned aerial vehicles in Iraq surged by nearly a third in the first six months of 2007 in conjunction with the troop buildup.⁷ The number of CAS missions also grew by 30–40 percent in the spring of 2007.⁸ During this time, we also increased the number of bombs dropped. In the first six months of that year, Air Force and Navy aircraft released 437 bombs and missiles in the Iraqi theater of operations, a more than fivefold increase over the 86 used in the same period in 2006 and three times more than in the second half of 2006.⁹

With the dramatic increase in unmanned aerial vehicles and the use of conventional fighters equipped with Remotely Operated Video Enhancement Receiver (ROVER) capability, the Iraqi theater of operations is seeing the evolution of new missions, currently called armed overwatch and nontraditional ISR. ROVER capability enables ground commanders and joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC) to see real-time video of the battlespace from the aircraft’s perspective, thereby providing critical battlefield situational awareness and targeting capability.¹⁰ Traditional CAS and armed reconnaissance missions have been supplemented by the armed-overwatch mission.¹¹ As opposed to armed reconnaissance, armed overwatch concerns itself with persistent surveillance and long dwell times—a sort of unblinking eye over the battlefield, coupled with the capability to engage lethally, when and if required. Although the MQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicle is the current all-star for this type of mission, it will soon share this honor with the MQ-9 Reaper, its larger, faster, and more lethal derivative. Platforms other than the known, dedicated ISR platforms conduct nontraditional ISR—in Iraq, these are usually conventional fighters equipped with ROVER capability, which enables them to share their full-motion video with associated ground commanders. All fighter squadrons in Iraq were equipped with ROVER capability in the fall of 2007.¹² This video capability is the new gold standard for actionable situational awareness for ground commanders and their JTACs. This offers just one example of how the current conflict in Iraq is rewriting tactics, techniques, and procedures for airpower employment as we bring new technology into the Iraqi theater of operations and the conflict evolves.

Although most COIN operations emphasize nonkinetic functions, kinetic operations have their place, commensurate with the joint force commander’s objectives, as recent increases in CAS missions demonstrate. Some of these missions have been preplanned strikes, but most have come as a result of troops-in-contact encounters with insurgents or during armed-overwatch missions that have caught insurgents emplacing improvised explosive devices (IED).

Economy of force, a principle of war, is very appropriate during a discussion of kinetic COIN operations. According to the latest draft of AFDD 1, “Air Force Basic Doctrine,” “economy of force is defined as the judicious employment and distribution of forces. . . . Although this principle suggests the use of overwhelming force in one sense it also recommends guarding against the ‘overkill’ inherent in the use of excessive force. This is particularly relevant when excessive force can destroy the gaining and maintaining of legitimacy and support for an operation.”¹³ FM 3‑24/MCWP 3-33.5 addresses the potential for times when overwhelming force is necessary, such as destroying or intimidating an opponent or reassuring a population. But the commander must also use appropriate and measured levels of force. This entails applying “force precisely so that it accomplishes the mission without causing unnecessary loss of life, suffering,” or physical property damage.¹⁴ For ground forces, this means using escalation-of-force procedures to minimize potential loss of life and collateral damage (CD).¹⁵ Combined air and space operations center (CAOC) air planners, aircrews, and JTACs have their own such procedures and a corresponding weapons inventory that they can employ to minimize the potential of noncombatant casualties and the destruction of noncombatant buildings and personal property. In COIN operations, minimizing CD becomes even more of an effects multiplier during the process of trying to win the hearts and minds of the population. Any egregious CD incident will have tremendous implications for the insurgents’ strategic information operations, due to the associated political fallout.

What is the right amount of force to use to ensure that we do not alienate the very noncombatant population we are trying to influence? In other words, how do we minimize CD, thereby depriving our enemies—the insurgents—of material for their own information-operations media campaign to sway the population against the host government and counterinsurgents? In Iraq the insurgents have quickly mastered both public media channels and Internet venues—for example, their use of a school as a site from which to launch rockets to draw a retaliatory strike that kills or wounds schoolchildren. If that occurs, they display those killed or wounded as innocent victims or even fabricate the aftermath to discredit the host government and counterinsurgents.

To determine the right amount of force, one must start with the law of armed conflict, which the Airman is duty-bound to observe. Among other things, the law establishes a framework for ensuring the use of lawful means of warfare. Military necessity, a basic legal principle of the law of armed conflict, states that “attacks must be limited to military objectives.” It “permits the application of only that degree of regulated force, not otherwise prohibited by the laws of war, required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with the least expenditure of life, time and physical resources.”¹⁶ The next principle, proportionality, means that “military operations must take into consideration the extent of civilian destruction and probable casualties that will result and, to the extent consistent with the necessities of the military situation, seek to avoid or minimize such casualties and destruction. Civilian losses must be proportionate to the military advantages sought.”¹⁷ In any case, the Airman must not intentionally attack civilians or employ weapons that would cause excessive CD.

The next question that we must answer after considering the law of armed conflict specifically deals with the desired effects from the use of force. By effect I mean the desired outcomes, events, or consequences resulting from the use of force. It is not enough simply to talk about the direct effects since the second- and third-order effects of any action conducted in the battlespace may override the direct effects. AFDD 1 says that Air Force operational functions are tied to achieving specific effects.¹⁸ The tactical effects of CAS can also have significant operational and strategic effects, based on what I call a CD-effects multiplier. Any CD will result in what we might call an exponential-multiplier effect, whereby the number of casualties or the amount and significance of property damaged determine the strike’s operational or strategic negative effects. The greater the number of civilian casualties/deaths or extent of damage to civilian infrastructure (water, electricity, oil refinery, transportation, etc.) or historical/religious/cultural structures, the greater the damage to the COIN effort since this negatively affects the noncombatant population—the very people the counterinsurgents are trying to influence and win over.

Air Force Doctrine Center Handout (AFDCH) 10-01, Air and Space Commander’s Handbook for the JFACC [Joint Force Air Component Commander] discusses effects-based principles, three of which are very applicable to COIN activities. The handbook recommends considering “the full range of outcomes, events, and consequences—not only direct (physical) but also indirect (including psychological and parallel systemwide) effects.”¹⁹ The second principle notes that we should “seek to affect behavior, not just cause physical change (even attrition is really about getting the enemy units to break or surrender).”²⁰ The third principle—a very critical one, especially in COIN operations—requires us to “determine ways of measuring all desired effects and objectives.”²¹ Without an appropriate measure of effectiveness, determining whether the activity produced the desired effect becomes very difficult.²² Battle damage assessments as well as the aircrew and JTAC postmission reports complete the measure-of-effectiveness feedback loop that we use to determine achievement of the desired effect. This measure becomes even more significant for nonkinetic and low-CD weapons, designed to have the effect of minimizing physical damage and modifying behavior. Examples of nonkinetic methods include show of force (SOF) or show of presence (SOP) sorties.²³ Effects of these types of sorties are not easily quantifiable. For example, we used SOF sorties during the Iraqi elections to influence both the civilian population and insurgents through a series of ground-force and airpower operations.²⁴ In this case, we had no way of definitively quantifying the increased number of voters as a result of these sorties, but they did enable the Iraqis to hold a successful election with only minor disturbances.

For these sorties to be effective, the population and insurgents needed to know that coalition forces had both the capability and intent to engage. Equally important, the population and insurgents had to be vulnerable (i.e., outmatched in firepower and lacking defensive measures against the aircraft). In addition, the population should know that airpower supported the ground forces. To encourage the population to get out and vote, a visible presence of ground forces highlighted the SOP sorties flown at medium altitudes near polling locations. To discourage insurgents or extremists, fighter aircraft flew SOF sorties near suspected trouble areas at lower altitudes to demonstrate the coalition forces’ resolve to intervene if problems developed.

In summary, the military finds itself in a balancing act in COIN operations—trying to win over the local noncombatant population, the true center of gravity for this type of warfare, while simultaneously defeating the insurgents. Unfortunately these two actions occur in the same physical space shared by both groups—especially in an urban setting. “The object of war is to impose one’s will on the enemy by destroying his will” (also known as coercion) “or capability to resist” (also known as denial).²⁵ In COIN, when troops are in contact with insurgents, the object is exactly the same, but at the tactical level. At the same time, however, coalition forces must prevent CD so as not to alienate or lose the support of the noncombatant population. During COIN operations, noncombatant casualties and destruction of civilian objects can take on a strategic significance that insurgents can exploit, setting back months of building rapport and forging trusting relationships with the resident population. Due to this balancing act, low-CD weapons are very critical in fighting a COIN. In fact, one of the paradoxes of COIN from FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 warns that sometimes the more force one uses, the less effective one becomes.²⁶ Our current low-CD weapons inventory does not fully reflect these realities.

For a long time, we have sought ways to increase the lethality of air-dropped weapons. This quest continues but is joined by parallel efforts to minimize lethality in certain cases. With the advent of the global positioning system and its corresponding precision capabilities, we do not always need increased lethality to achieve the desired weapons effects. The current inventory of air-dropped weapons does in fact include some of these low-CD weapons that Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft can drop to achieve precisely tailored effects.

The Air Force has some kinetic lethal weapons that have proven successful in the current Iraqi COIN operations. First, the guided bomb unit (GBU)-39/B Small-Diameter Bomb (SDB) achieved initial operational capability on the F-15E in the fall of 2006.²⁷ Developed by Boeing, this bomb has been characterized as “the next generation of low-cost and low-CD precision strike weapon for employment from fighters, bombers and [unmanned aerial vehicles].”²⁸ An extended-range, all-weather, day-and-night, 250-pound-class guided munition, it relies on a global positioning system / inertial navigation system to self-navigate to the desired impact point.

Next, we used inert weapons during Northern Watch and Southern Watch to strike targets that threatened our aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones. Specifically, the coalition used a precision, inert GBU-12—a 500-pound, concrete-filled, laser-guided munition—to destroy selected targets without the blast effects of a live weapon.²⁹ The coalition employed them against threats that displayed hostile intent but were near schools or civilian structures, doing so to destroy active surface-to-air radar sites while limiting CD. Additionally, we had used the inert and live air-to-ground missile (AGM)-114 Hellfire—a 100-pound-class, laser-guided precision missile—to minimize CD effects.³⁰ The inert version can penetrate targets without the associated blast effects of a live warhead. Another low-CD missile carried by Air Force aircraft—the AGM-65 Maverick, a tactical, air-to-surface guided missile—has a variant with a smaller 125-pound, antiarmor, shaped-charge warhead that comes with electro-optical/television guidance (AGM-65A or B) or imaging infrared guidance (AGM-65D). In 2007 the Air Force started using the AGM-65E laser-guided Maverick, which features a larger 300-pound, penetrating, blast-fragmentation warhead (previously used exclusively by Navy and Marine Corps aircraft).³¹

The Navy and Marine Corps introduced their own specific low-CD weapon in May 2007: the bomb live unit (BLU)-126/B Low Collateral Damage Bomb, identical to the 500-pound-class BLU-111/B but containing about 16 percent less explosive mass and producing a reduced fragmentation pattern and blast radius.³² This weapon uses the same precision-guidance kits as the BLU-111/B, including those for Paveway II laser-guided bombs (designated GBU-51/B) and the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits (designated GBU-38 [v] 4/B).

Does any potential exist for an even lower-CD-type weapon for specific target sets? In the future, a variant of the SDB will be available: the Focused Lethality Munition (FLM), now in development to further decrease CD, will replace the steel casing of the SDB with a composite carbon-fiber casing and will include a new dense-metal explosive fill.³³ This “multiphased blast explosive” fill is denser than that of the original SDB and gives a slightly larger blast, but with reduced CD since the casing produces no fragmentation.³⁴ It creates the overall effect of a blast-only weapon with reduced lethality. The ongoing FLM test program will demonstrate that the weapon has the same accuracy as the SDB and then undergo a three-phase military-utility assessment.³⁵ The program office will deliver 50 residual weapons to US Central Command (USCENTCOM) for such an assessment upon completion of the joint capabilities technology demonstration in the spring of 2008. If USCENTCOM considers the assessment results favorable, the current plan calls for producing 450 more FLM weapons over the next four years.³⁶

In 2007 the war fighter needed a kinetic effect that fell between the nonkinetic SOF and SOP sorties and the lowest CD weapon in our inventory. The regularly used nonkinetic SOF and SOP sorties prove effective when we employ them properly in deterrent and preemptive roles. However, we needed something more when they did not produce the desired effects in a troops-in-contact engagement. The joint war fighter needed a capability to threaten insurgents directly in the urban setting. At a minimum, this weapon should have the effect of forcing the insurgents to abandon their covered positions, creating chaos, and enabling our troops to gain or retake the initiative. This “shock effect” weapon would have to reduce the fragmentary pattern more than that of current low-CD weapons to minimize physical damage and noncombatant casualties.

The war fighter needed this capability very quickly for crucial upcoming operations—that is, a weapon that we could quickly bring into the theater, as well as one already familiar to the logistics personnel who would store and transport it, the aircrews who would employ it, and the maintenance personnel who would build and load it onto the aircraft. In other words, this weapon ideally would require only minimum training for the Airmen involved.

The Army war fighter, together with the Airmen in Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), identified this need. These Airmen—air planners, JTACs, and air liaison officers—assigned to the expeditionary air support operations group, are in a position to directly influence and advise Army battalion, brigade, division, and corps leadership on how airpower can support ground maneuver. At the same time, they provide feedback to the combined force air and space component commander and his staff on current issues and upcoming operations.

CAOC staff members and their Army and Air Force counterparts at Headquarters MNC-I identified this problem during one of the weekly synchronization video teleconferences. These Airmen were also aware of the inert GBU-12s used in Northern Watch and Southern Watch, mentioned earlier. The question now became whether we could use inert GBU-38 JDAMs in a similar manner to drive insurgents out of their urban sanctuaries during troops-in-contact engagements with coalition forces.

The Department of Defense has developed a process to handle just this type of problem experienced by combatant command (COCOM) war fighters. In the past, the acquisition community delivered equipment and services to a COCOM involved in an ongoing operation, using a very restrictive, cumbersome, and inefficient process. This resulted in establishment of a joint rapid acquisition cell (JRAC), part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, that reported to the secretary of defense through the undersecretary of defense comptroller and the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics. The JRAC monitors, coordinates, and facilitates meeting the COCOM’s urgent, operationally driven needs via the joint urgent operational need (JUON) process.³⁷

A JUON that cannot be satisfied in an appropriate time frame by a service/defense agency process goes to the COCOM for certification and prioritization. The COCOM either rejects or certifies and prioritizes it, forwarding the certified JUON to the Joint Staff and JRAC simultaneously. With a Joint Staff recommendation, the JRAC designates or declines the JUON as an immediate war fighter need within 14 days of submission to the cell.³⁸ The JRAC tracks this need and facilitates its resolution. This process ensures that the need gets timely attention, undergoes cross-checking against all the services to determine whether a similar solution is either already available or being worked, and confirms the availability of current-year funding.

In this particular case, the joint team felt that a two-pronged approach would help resolve the need in time for upcoming operations. Therefore Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) submitted a JUON to USCENTCOM. Simultaneously, the MNC-I commander sent a personal memo to the combined force air and space component commander—the supporting commander and dual-hatted as the Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) commander—requesting the inert weapons. The previous use of inert GBU-12s with their concrete warheads against low-CD-type targets had set an unofficial precedent and became an important consideration in allaying some of the concerns in this case. Additionally, as a result of the weekly synchronization video teleconferences between MNC-I air planners, air liaison officers, and the CAOC staff, the participants knew that inert weapons were already in-theater and could be quickly delivered to the appropriate bases.

To initially research the feasibility of employing inert JDAMs, the Air Armament Center’s Seek Eagle and JDAM Joint Program Offices at Eglin AFB, Florida, were asked to comment on any carriage, release, and accuracy concerns. They were very helpful and pointed out a few factors to consider in using the inert JDAM for this particular purpose. Their foremost concern was that the inert-warhead fill process produces inconsistent mass properties and weights that do not match the corresponding live version and can thus affect the JDAM’s performance.³⁹ Thankfully, they found that these variances are not a significant factor for the 500-pound GBU-38 JDAM. The same could not be said for the 2,000-pound GBU-31 JDAM version, which does have large variances that dramatically affect its accuracy. Furthermore, they confirmed that, compared to the live version, these inert concrete warheads generally do not fragment much, a very important factor when trying to limit CD. Lastly, previous experience with inert GBU-12s showed a tendency of inert concrete bombs to broach or skip at shallow impact angles—but the JDAM enables the operator to plan high-impact angles that minimize risk.⁴⁰ This preliminary information revealed no significant problems with carriage, release, or accuracy.

USCENTCOM adjudicated the JUON and determined that CENTAF should examine it. Based on the specific requirements and effects desired, the CENTAF staff agreed that the inert GBU-38 JDAM would meet the needs of the JUON and deliver the effect sought by the war fighter.

The CENTAF and USCENTCOM staff working the JUON also discovered that the Navy was just taking delivery of the first of its low-CD GBU-51/Bs and GBU-38 (v) 4/Bs in the Iraqi theater of operations. However, no Air Force aircraft had been certified to carry and release these weapons. In an effort to provide the joint war fighter more flexibility when striking low-CD target areas, the CENTAF commander directed the CAOC and CENTAF staff to investigate the possibility of certifying some Air Force aircraft. After staff discussions with the Navy on weapon availability and with the Seek Eagle office regarding carriage and release certifications, the CENTAF commander decided to proceed with analysis and testing to certify carriage and release from Air Force F-16s and A-10s. Both aircraft soon received flight clearances to carry and employ the weapons. As a result, the ground commander and his JTACs would have yet another option to deliver the effects of these particular low-CD weapons from Air Force aircraft.

The MNC-I commander’s personal memo also resulted in some immediate actions. The combined force air and space component commander responded positively to the memo after examining the feasibility and suitability of the inert JDAM. This munition had a pattern of minimum fragmentation; the ordnance was already located in-theater; and the logistics and maintenance personnel, as well as the aircrews, were all familiar with the weapon’s transportation, maintenance, carriage, and delivery procedures since we regularly use it for testing and training purposes.

Airlifters flew the inert GBU-38 JDAMs to Balad Air Base for immediate carriage as an option available for JTACs. The next day, F-16 fighters flew with the inert JDAMs, and the JTACs received briefings on the additional weapon available for their use. They now had a shock effect available to them for the surge operations of summer 2007, when insurgents engaged their soldiers in the urban CD setting and when Hellfire, strafing, or nonkinetic SOF options were inappropriate due to concerns about fragmentation pattern or ineffectiveness.

Lessons learned during this process apply in any future case in which the joint war fighter wishes to add an effect to the airpower repertoire. First, the quicker we can identify a need, the better, so that requirements processes can run their course, ensuring evaluation of all possible avenues. In this particular case, the ground force commander needed an effect for troops in contact in the urban setting during upcoming operations, so expediency became an overriding concern. Second, one should use all available resources early on to determine which potential options have merit and which don’t, thereby avoiding the wasting of time or resources pursuing dead ends. The Airmen originating the request did their homework to expedite the process. By contacting the Seek Eagle and JDAM Joint Program Offices early in the process, they saved a great deal of time by ensuring the absence of showstoppers before sending the personal memo. Next, the importance of having Airmen not only at the tactical but also at the operational (division and MNC-I) and strategic (MNF-I) levels ensured that we were asking the right questions regarding the desired effects, thereby enabling airpower to become more proficient in integrating with the Army’s unique, time-sensitive requirements. These embedded Airmen are a conduit for Army planners and leaders as well as their JTACs on the front lines. This organizational structure guarantees that the planning for upcoming operations can apply the appropriate means to meet the objectives requested by the ground unit from the standpoints of both effectiveness and efficiency. Another lesson learned involves assuming nothing, no matter how obvious it may seem. The fact that the inert and live JDAM versions do have differences in mass properties and weight that can affect accuracies is not intuitively obvious, especially since we employ the inert weapons routinely on training sorties.

In addition, there are two very important reasons to educate the appropriate Army decision makers and JTACs once we have fielded a new capability—particularly in a fluid combat environment. First, this “expectation management” ensures that on-scene commanders realize they have another weapon they can employ and lets them know what they can expect in the way of effects. Second, it gives the ground commander and JTACs an awareness of any limitation, which guards against misuse of the new capability. Obviously, we do not want to employ limited resources against targets unless they will produce the desired results.

One other valuable lesson learned regarding combat experimentation arose after the inert GBU-38s flew in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. MNC-I leadership wanted to try using the inert JDAMs as a counter to IEDs along roads. In theory the weapon would have detonated the IED and would not have caused much further damage to the roads, since it had no explosive warhead. This would have made road repair quick and relatively inexpensive, compared to the repair required had we used a live warhead. Since this addressed a high-priority need to defeat roadside IEDs, the Air Force agreed to the experiment despite weaponeering analysis that showed a very slim probability of success. Unfortunately, after a number of unsuccessful tests, we stopped the experimentation.

Despite this lack of success, there will be other legitimate times when we will need experimentation in combat to produce a specific effect against a specific target, particularly if the stakes are high—for example, if we were trying to quickly find a way to defeat a newly evolved tactic responsible for coalition casualties, as was the case here. However, this experimentation should proceed only after appropriate leadership has made a conscious decision after consulting a designed evaluation plan that incorporates measures of effectiveness and designed feedback mechanisms, including means of documenting the test conditions prior to and after the event. Otherwise, the results would prove suspect, and the findings would make no conclusive determinations. Employing inert JDAMs on “suspected” or “historically known” IED locations without certain knowledge of the presence of a device or its exact location is no way to conduct field experimentation.

Effective COIN operations require reexamination of some previously employed tactics, techniques, and procedures and the types of weapons used in conjunction with them. With the help of Airmen assigned to the expeditionary air support operations group, Army planners identified a required effect between nonkinetic SOF and the weapon with the lowest CD in our inventory. The Air Force filled the gap quickly with the inert JDAM, making it immediately available for surge combat operations during the summer of 2007. Additionally, as a result of this effort, Air Force F-16 and A-10 fighters were certified to employ the Navy’s low-CD GBU-51/Bs and GBU-38 (v) 4/Bs until the next-generation low-CD weapon, the FLM, becomes available. Both the inert JDAM and Navy’s Low Collateral Damage Bomb give joint war fighters added flexibility when they need effects associated with a low-CD weapon. This ordnance will allow access to targets formerly restricted by CD limitations and make airpower more effective and lethal in COIN operations. The Airmen fighting today in Iraq and Afghanistan are continuing the fine traditions of agility and innovation, ensuring that airpower remains responsive to the needs of the joint war fighter throughout the spectrum of conflict, including COIN operations.

1. For a definition of kinetic, see Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.9, Targeting, 8 June 2006, 115, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/ AFDD_Page_HTML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd2-1-%209.pdf.

2. AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare, 1 August 2007, 1, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD _Page_HTML/ Doctrine_Docs/afdd2-3.pdf.

3. Field Manual (FM) 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, December 2006, foreword, http://www.fas.org/ irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf.

4. IW should never be military-centric due to the nature of the conflict. Since we are trying to influence a host population and either support the constitutional government or usher in another form of governmental organization, all elements of national power come into play, including some or all of the following: political, diplomatic, economic, informational, paramilitary, and civic actions.

6. AFDD 1, “Air Force Basic Doctrine,” topline coordination draft, version 3, 19 June 2007, 37, lists the 17 operational functions as strategic attack; counterair; counterspace; counterland; countersea; information operations; combat support; command and control; airlift; air refueling; spacelift; special operations; intelligence; surveillance and reconnaissance; personnel-recovery operations; navigation and positioning; and weather services.

7. Lolita C. Baldor, “Military Branches Fight for Control of Drones,” Oakland Tribune, 6 July 2007, http://find articles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4176/is_20070706/ai_n19359009.

8. Charles J. Hanley, “U.S. Doubles Air Attacks in Iraq,” Boston.com, 5 June 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2007/06/05/ us_doubles _air_attacks_in_iraq.

9. Charles J. Hanley, “Air Force Quietly Building Iraq Presence,” ABC News, 14 July 2007, 1, http://abcnews.go .com/International/wireStory?id=3378044.

10. SSgt Amanda Savannah, “Battlefield Technology Key to Atlantic Strike V,” Air Force Link, 19 April 2007, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id= 123049599. “ROVER can receive video and telemetry data from manned aircraft [and] unmanned aerial vehicles . . . to display [full-motion video] on a laptop or television monitor. The receive-only terminal can receive most Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance video from C, L, and KU Band frequencies.” Ibid.

11. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 17 October 2007), defines the term armed reconnaissance as “a mission with the primary purpose of locating and attacking targets of opportunity, i.e., enemy materiel, personnel, and facilities, in assigned general areas or along assigned ground communications routes, and not for the purpose of attacking specific briefed targets” (44).

14. FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, 1-25. I added physical property damage since any damage to noncombatants’ personal property also has an effect on efforts to persuade the local population that everything was done to minimize CD.

15. Ibid. According to JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, collateral damage is “unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. Such damage is not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall military advantage anticipated from the attack” (93).

16. See “The Law of Armed Conflict,” http://milcom.jag.af.mil/ch15/loac.doc. Military objectives are those “objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization . . . offers a definite military advantage.” “Civilian objects are such objects as places of worship, schools, hospitals, and dwellings. [These] objects can lose their protected status if they are used to make an effective contribution to military action.” Ibid.

19. Air Force Doctrine Center Handout (AFDCH) 10-01, Air and Space Commander’s Handbook for the JFACC, 27 June 2005, 67.

22. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, defines the term measure of effectiveness as “a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE” (335).

23. SOF sorties are low-altitude flybys or dry-weapon deliveries that may or may not include expending flares. SOP sorties are used as reinforcement or reassurance. Normally we use both types for preemptive purposes in a deterrent role for the purpose of altering behavior. In the case of noncombatants, they provide a sense of security; for insurgents/extremists, they demonstrate a sense of vulnerability or a form of intimidation.

24. Lt Gen Robert J. Elder Jr., “Effects-Based Operations: A Command Philosophy,” Air and Space Power Journal 21, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 14, http://www.airpower.maxwell .af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/spr07/spr07.pdf.

25. Col Phillip S. Meilinger, “Air Strategy: Targeting for Effect,” Aerospace Power Journal 13, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 56, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj99/win99/meiling.pdf.

27. TSgt Russell Wicke, “ACC Declares Small Diameter Bomb Initially Operational,” Air Force Link, 5 October 2006, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123028580.

29. Dr. Thomas R. Searle, “Making Airpower Effective against Guerillas,” Air and Space Journal 18, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 19, http://www.airpower.maxwell. af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj04/fal04/Fal04.pdf. Inert GBU-12s had limited success in curtailing CD during Northern Watch due to bombs ricocheting and skipping far from their intended target.

30. Vago Muradian, “An Interview with Gen. T. Michael ‘Buzz’ Moseley,” Defense News, 22 May 2006, 1, http://integrator.hanscom.af.mil/2006/May/ 05252006/ 05252006-08.htm.

31. Jack Gillum, “Air Force Mulls Maverick,” Arizona Daily Star, 22 August 2007, 1; and “AGM-65 Maverick Guided Missile,” United States Navy Fact File, 28 August 2007, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2200&tid=500&ct=2.

32. The BLU-111/B penetrator is a thermally coated, forged-steel-casing warhead—a more accurately toleranced variant of the MK-82 500-pound general-purpose bomb. See also “BLU-111/B,” GloralSecurity.org, http://www.global security.org/military/systems/munitions/blu-111.htm; “NAVAIR Delivers Low Collateral Damage Bomb,” news release, 11 May 2007, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, http://www.nawcwd.navy.mil/nawcwd/news/ 2007/2007-05_low_collateral_damage_bomb.htm; and Lt Col James Auclair, Air Force Seek Eagle office, to author, personal communication, 4 August 2007.

33. SSgt Ryan Hansen, “Small Diameter Bomb Timeline Remains on Schedule,” Air Armament Center Public Affairs, 22 March 2006, http://www.afmc.af.mil/ news/story.asp?id=123017916.

34. Maj Heidi Cornell, Precision Strike Weapons Program Element monitor, to author, personal communication, 26 August 2007.

35. Maj Heidi Cornell, Precision Strike Weapons Program Element monitor, to author, personal communication, 27 August 2007. The three-phase military-utility assessment consists of ground tests (static live fire), three weaponeering workshops, and live flight tests.

37. For detailed coverage of the JUON process, see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3470.1, Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) in the Year of Execution, 15 July 2005 (current as of 9 July 2007). For the JRAC, see Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD) (AT&L), briefing, subject: Overview to NDIA [National Defense Industrial Association] Central Florida Chapter Defense Forum, 21 March 2007. A JUON is “a COCOM-certified and prioritized urgent operational need, outside DOD 5000/military processes, requiring a DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities) solution that, if left unfilled, will seriously endanger personnel and/or pose a major threat to ongoing operations.” OUSD (AT&L) briefing, slide 13.

38. CJCSI 3470.1, Rapid Validation and Resourcing, defines an immediate warfighter need as “a subset of JUONs . . . [having] a materiel or logistics solution that must be resolved in 120 days or less” (GL-1).

39. Dr. Louis R. Cerrato, 678th Armament Systems Squadron/EN, JDAM office, to author, personal communication, 14 June 2007. The method of filling the warhead produces this phenomenon. The live warheads are filled vertically, and the inert, cement warheads are filled horizontally, resulting in different mass properties. Additionally, warhead weight also tends to vary more for the inerts, which tend to be lighter than their live counterparts.

40. Broaching occurs when a weapon hits the ground or target and continues downrange, similar to a ricocheting bullet or a stone skipping on water.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University

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