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Document created: 1 March 06
Air & Space Power Journal - Spring 2006
Maj Ronald F. Stuewe Jr., USAF
|Editorial Abstract: Despite its undeniable power, today’s US Air Force is not optimized for “small wars”—those involving nonstate entities or nonregular forces as enemy combatants. In this article, Major Stuewe analyzes a historical example of Great Britain’s involvement in the Malayan Emergency of 1948–60 within the conceptual framework of an insurgent-conflict model. Given this example, he revisits the Air Force’s current distinctive capabilities for improved conduct of small-war operations.|
The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan (AFTFP), first published by the Air Force’s Future Concepts and Transformation Division in November 2003 and updated in late 2004, documents the ongoing transformational efforts of the service, a process “by which the military achieves and maintains asymmetric advantage through changes in operational concepts, organizational structure, and/or technologies that significantly improve warfighting capabilities or ability to meet the demands of a changing security environment.”1 According to this definition, the Air Force has engaged in the transformational process for decades, and its current activities are merely a continuation of this transformation.2
Continued reliance on the asymmetric technological advantage of the Air Force has a pernicious side as well. Danger manifests itself in competent adversaries who realize “they cannot survive in the environment our technical capabilities have created. Ironically, the interplay of our superior military capabilities with the recognition of this fact by our adversaries will ensure the character of future wars will be such that our ‘asymmetric’ technological advantages will be substantially diminished.”3 This danger, coupled with the Air Force’s parochial desire to claim hegemonic rights as the technology service, is rapidly diminishing its efficacy to conduct operations successfully in what will likely become the dominant form of conflict in the immediate future: small wars.
The term small wars does not reflect recent attempts to categorize warfare. Rather, it originated in the late nineteenth century to describe “any conflict against nonregular forces such as guerrillas, bandits, rebellious tribes, or insurgents of various stripes.”4 The term does not refer to the size or scope of the war; instead, it refers to the political and diplomatic context in which the war is fought. Because small wars involve nonstate entities and nonregular forces, one must distinguish between those conflicts and wars, regardless of scale, waged against a state’s regular armed forces.5 The danger to the Air Force of the future lies in the fact that developing a technology-centered force designed to fight large, interstate conflicts, by definition, creates a suboptimal force for waging small wars.
This is certainly not to say that the Air Force of the future cannot successfully wage small wars. This article attempts to prove that the key to improving the effectiveness of the Air Force in this arena lies in understanding the true nature of small wars. It begins by taking one step back to analyze the small-war context through the lens of Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf’s classic model of insurgencies. The second section applies this model to the famous counterinsurgency effort undertaken by Great Britain during the Malayan Emergency by focusing specifically on the successes and failures of airpower as they relate to that model. Finally, it broadly organizes and retools the Air Force’s current distinctive capabilities within this framework to provide the service the means of taking two steps forward, having acquired an understanding of the operational necessities to engage successfully in both small and large wars.
In 1970 researchers Leites and Wolf of the RAND Corporation published Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts, which aimed to provide generalization and theory on the concept of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The most enlightening of these theories was the development of a model to depict an insurgent movement as a system (see fig.). Although specifically dealing with insurgencies, this system model aptly falls under the rubric of small wars as defined previously. Indeed, the protracted and combined sociopolitical-military nature of insurgencies represents the version of small wars most vexing to airpower.6 This model also provides a strategy to defeat insurgencies based on their implicit vulnerabilities. Leites and Wolf derive four primary methods of counterinsurgency. Before analyzing them, however, one must understand the system model itself.
Figure. Leites and Wolf’s insurgency as a system. (Reprinted from Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts [Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970], 35.)
To attain overall effectiveness, insurgent movements “require that certain inputs—obtained from either internal or external sources—be converted into certain outputs, or activities.”7 These inputs most often come from the internal (endogenous) environment, examples of which include raw recruits from the population and foodstuffs. External (exogenous) inputs can range from financing to weapons and publicity. Insurgents obtain these inputs by using a combination of persuasive and coercive measures.
The raw inputs then enter a conversion mechanism that entails production functions such as training, equipping, and supplying the insurgency. The effectiveness of the system often-times depends on the degree of organization at this level. Developed systems, highlighted in the discussion of Malaya, may have individual branches dedicated to “personnel, financial, and logistic matters, as well as intelligence, communications, and operations.”8 Ultimately, the conversion mechanism produces the outputs of the system.
Outputs from nonregular forces may be as familiar as sabotage, terrorist activities, public demonstrations, and small-scale military attacks. Less obvious outputs include administrative and governmental jurisdiction functions such as village-aid projects, education, training, and formation of other organizational programs.9 Importantly, the Leites and Wolf framework reveals four methods to counter the advance of the insurgent system. It is possible to influence each of these methods, to some degree, by the use of airpower.
The first method reduces available resources by controlling the number of both exogenous and endogenous inputs and the cost of acquiring them. Controlling this logistical aspect ostensibly should reside with police or ground forces, but the interdiction capability of airpower may prove appropriate for input denial. The second reduces the efficiency of the production processes. Nonregular training camps—traditional static targets—obviously represent a potential target for airpower. Many other targets in small wars, however, are not suitable for “attacking” with conventional weapons and crosshairs. Examples of nonlethal production denial include defoliation, food denial or destruction, and harassing fires.
The traditional counterforce role of military action, Leites and Wolf’s third method of countering the system, targets opposing “forces . . . directly. This is the traditional military task; it is best understood, most familiar, and most typically preferred by the military.”10 As such, it is the method most apropos for airpower. Again, however, it does not necessarily require tritonal or depleted uranium. Instead, indirect means of reducing nonregular forces will likely become more important in small wars than in larger ones.11 Indirect counterforce means such as psychological operations (PSYOP), surveillance, and intelligence fall into such a category.
Finally, the fourth method involves increasing the capacity to absorb the actions of nonregulars. This includes passive measures such as population evacuation and relocation as well as active defense measures. Perhaps even more than in the direct counterforce role, airpower can prove most beneficial in the active defense role. Leites and Wolf explain that
this active defensive role may be enhanced, in addition, through aerial patrols that maintain round-the-clock surveillance and can apply a heavy concentration of ready firepower in the event of a guerrilla attack. Small aircraft with long loiter times and enough weaponry to -counter a light or moderately heavy guerrilla attack effectively may be an important component in this type of active defense system. The main purpose of such an aerial police would be to provide both the symbol and the reality of [the authority’s] presence and protection.12
The Leites and Wolf model of insurgency provides a general framework for understanding the nature of small wars. The system presented here forms the “engine” that drives production of the organization’s outputs. Although Leites and Wolf provide several possible applications of airpower to affect this engine, one can profitably analyze the framework within the context of a historical example of a small war in which airpower played an important, albeit supporting, role in the overall success of the campaign.
Great Britain waged the Malayan Emergency from 1948 until 1960 in response to an uprising by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). After initial setbacks, the British implemented a vast array of civil and military programs tied together in an overall strategic plan, part of which included the Briggs Plan—a massive -undertaking to separate the MCP from the population, highlighted by the resettlement of 400,000–500,000 Chinese squatters into “new villages.”13 Despite strong advancements early in the emergency, the MCP saw the momentum shift away from its favor under the pressure of the Briggs Plan until July 1960, when the emergency officially concluded.
The British experience in Malaya stands as a modern example of a successful counter-insurgency effort in small wars. As such, it has undergone extensive analysis to determine how another Western power effectively dealt with a potent insurgency. Understandably, the experience of the British has become more relevant following our own experiences in Vietnam.14
This is certainly not to say that the British solution represents the textbook answer to counterinsurgencies in small wars; nor does it represent the only example of airpower in small wars.15 In fact the Malayan Emergency was a unique insurgency for several reasons. First, it was “confined to the Chinese residents of Malaya, a minority of the population which was easily separated from the ethnic Malays who constituted the majority.”16 Second, the British enjoyed a political-administrative structure that allowed the combining of military and civilian units within the same organization. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Chinese insurgents lacked any external support. Within the context of this article, however, the Malayan Emergency provides insight into the possible imaginative uses of a small but flexible air component to support the larger political-military effort in a small war.17 More specifically, the efforts of airpower in Malaya fall within the four methods of countering Leites and Wolf’s system model.
The Malay Peninsula spanned over 50,000 square miles—roughly the size of the state of Florida—two-thirds of it engulfed by nearly impenetrable triple-canopy jungle. The Royal Air Force (RAF) operated from six major airfields, only one of them suitable for supporting medium bombers. The RAF aircraft represented a mix of World War II–vintage propeller-driven aircraft such as Spitfires and Lincoln bombers, modern jet aircraft such as de Havilland Vampires and Canberra jet bombers, rotary-wing aircraft, and light and medium transport aircraft. Despite the vast array of types, there were never more than 15 RAF squadrons in Malaya.18
Many factors concerning the Malayan Emergency reduced the RAF’s ability to conduct input denial—Leites and Wolf’s first method of limiting the advance of insurgents. Adverse weather, terrain, and the Malay Peninsula’s dense foliage limited the effectiveness of airpower in the classic interdiction role. The most limiting factor for interdiction, however, was the elusiveness of the MCP guerrillas—if one could find them at all. Witness, for example, the futile attempts by the British to interdict the Tens Fook Loong and Number 3 Independent Platoon. Despite accurate intelligence of the enemy location, over 709,000 pounds of ordnance dropped by RAF aircraft over the course of multiple missions in 1956 produced only four enemy casualties.19
Attacking the production process of the Leites and Wolf system proved more effective than interdiction, primarily due to airpower’s contribution to defoliation during the massive food-denial campaign of the Briggs Plan. Even without aerial spraying, airpower contributed to these efforts by observing clearings in the jungle that served as telltale signs of the guerrillas’ cultivation sites. Harassing fires also disrupted the production process but came at the expense of the traditional counterforce method of airpower—Leites and Wolf’s third component. Evidence suggests that “air strikes were responsible for less than 10 percent of all enemy dead. . . . But air attacks did keep the enemy moving and unsettled and increased the number of successful contacts with ground forces.” According to Lt Gen Sir Harold Briggs, “Offensive air support play[ed] a very vital role in the main object of the Security Forces, namely the destruction of bandit morale and the increasing of the morale of the civil population.”20
The direct means of counterforce operations met with limited success for airpower in Malaya, but the indirect means were vital. The British conducted PSYOP by employing leaflets as well as voice recordings broadcast from airplanes. Upwards of 70 percent of surrendering MCP guerrillas claimed that these “voice flights” played some role in shaping their decision.21 Aerial reconnaissance also proved effective: “It found 155 confirmed and 77 possible guerrilla camps as well as 313 cultivated sites, 31 recultivations, 194 clearings of probably terrorist origin, and21 [friendly] farms under enemy control over a six-month period in 1955.”22
The fourth and final method of countering the system involved using airpower for active defense. Leites and Wolf’s idea of “extending the presence and protection” of aerial police constituted perhaps the most instrumental offering of airpower in Malaya. Dr. James S. Corum and Col Wray R. Johnson, USAF, retired, explain: “Thus, by extending the presence and protection of the government to remote areas, the military quickly made the Malayan country-side an inhospitable place for the [enemy]. It was in support of this effort, rather than by direct offensive action, that the RAF proved invaluable.”23 The aerial police force in Malaya manifested itself not only in Leites and Wolf’s vision of a small attack plane, but also in the ubiquitous tactical light and medium cargo aircraft of the air-transport units. With supporting roles of transport, supply drops, medical evacuations, and even command and control, air supply became indispensable.24
Thus, airpower played a supporting but vital role in the overall success of the British in the Malayan Emergency. Key to this success was the imaginative and oftentimes unorthodox operational and tactical application of airpower to support the political and military aims of the overall strategy. Although one can explain these operations within Leites and Wolf’s system model, one can also do so in terms of the contemporary roles of airpower. Thus, “the order of importance of RAF operations overall was generally assessed to be air supply and transport, photoreconnaissance, close air support, long-range strikes against targets beyond the reach of units on the ground, and communications.”25 Looking at airpower in terms of these historic roles, rooted in the analytical system model, now allows us to take two steps forward to help develop the Air Force of the future. We can do so not simply by relying on individual technologies but by reevaluating the transformational capabilities listed in the AFTFP of 2004 under the six distinctive capabilities defined in the Air Force vision.
The six Air Force distinctive capabilities—air and space superiority, rapid global mobility, information superiority, precision engagement, global attack, and agile combat support—do not necessarily represent doctrine per se; rather, they act as enablers of doctrine. They are the basic areas of expertise that the Air Force brings to any activity across the spectrum of military operations, whether acting as a single service or in conjunction with other services in joint operations.26 The AFTFP of 2004 utilizes these distinctive capabilities to organize 16 transformational capabilities that the Air Force either cannot attain today or must significantly improve in the future.
The AFTFP further quantifies these transformational capabilities within the Air Force’s contemporary core competency of “technology-to-warfighter,” defined as “translating vision into operational capabilities in order to prevail in conflict and avert technological surprise.”27 The AFTFP attempts to structure this flow correctly from vision to strategy and effects, and then down to concept and capabilities, but the Air Force may have an institutional proclivity to reverse this flow, based on technological advances. As historian Richard P. Hallion once warned, “Because the Air Force as a service is wedded . . . to technology, there is always the danger that technology will make one’s doctrine obsolete [and] will replace doctrine as the determinant of the future course of the Air Force.”28
The remaining portion of this section applies these six distinctive capabilities as a general framework, using the Leites and Wolf system in tandem with the successful British involvement in Malaya. This analysis shows on a broad scale how the operational level of airpower in general, and the Air Force in particular, can support overall strategy within the political, diplomatic, and military context of small wars. The capabilities appear in rough order of importance relative to small wars.
Most often regarded as freedom to attack, air and space superiority—defined as the ability to control what moves through the air and space to ensure freedom of action—also involves freedom from attack. This distinctive capability is an overarching principle in that it allows successful conduct of the remaining five capabilities. Most technological advances within air superiority predominantly apply to large wars. The most significant threat to air superiority in small wars, however, comes from the ubiquitous ground threats of relatively inexpensive small arms and shoulder-fired missiles. Defeating, or at least diminishing, the pervasiveness of these weapons remains perhaps the paramount issue for airpower. Without some relative measure of air superiority from these weapons, the remaining five distinctive capabilities of the Air Force in small wars are greatly diminished.
Air Force doctrine defines rapid global mobility as “the timely movement, positioning, and sustainment of military forces and capabilities through air and space, across the range of military operations.”29 Although the definition remains accurate, in the setting of small wars, the function of mobility will often seem less global and increasingly regional. Regarding the supporting role of the Air Force in small wars, as exemplified in Malaya, the regional-mobility aspect of supplying, resupplying, and supporting fielded forces—whether military or political—can become the determining factor in the campaign’s overall strategy.
Information superiority refers to the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information while denying an adversary the ability to do the same.30 Simply stated, small wars are—first and foremost—information wars.31 Similar to air superiority, information superiority deals with gaining control of its specific realm and fully exploiting its informational capabilities to full advantage. As such, information superiority specifically deals with the indirect application of the traditional counterforce role of the military in Leites and Wolf’s system. Advantages in PSYOP, surveillance, and intelligence fall within this rubric and will essentially serve as the dominant aspect of the counterforce application of airpower. Maintaining informational advantages will even surpass direct application of traditional firepower.
When firepower becomes necessary, however, the Air Force must fully utilize precision engagement. Most often associated with accurate kinetic weapons, precision engagement must nevertheless embody multiple aspects within the political and diplomatic context of small wars. In the traditional sense, precision engagement utilizes the most technologically advanced weapon system in the application of military force. In small wars, however, this capability could entail the close analysis of political or military initiatives or even traditional airlift. To use a Malay example, the British often made pinpoint, low-technology tactical-airlift drops through holes as small as 10 yards across in a triple-canopy jungle consisting of trees over 200 feet high.32 Perhaps more than any other Air Force distinctive capability, precision engagement exemplifies the necessity to decouple capability from technology.
Up to this juncture, the distinctive capabilities of the Air Force generally adapt to the framework of small wars. The capability of global attack, however, embodies the line of departure from the transformational Air Force, dedicated to high-intensity war, to the necessities of small war. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, explains this departure by describing global attack operations: “The Air Force, with its growing space forces, its intercontinental ballistic missiles, and its fleet of multirole bombers and attack aircraft supported by a large tanker fleet, is ideally suited to such operations. Our service is able to rapidly project power over global distances and maintain a virtually indefinite ‘presence’ over an adversary.”33 Such a capability is likely vital in prosecuting large wars, but high-budget items such as ballistic missiles, transcontinental bombers, and supporting tanker fleets represent, at best, an adverse cost-to-benefit ratio, given the protracted and politically sensitive nature of small wars.
The transformational concept of global attack, much like the concept of global mobility, needs to be regionalized in the context of small wars. The term global is somewhat misleading since it aggrandizes the distance traveled by the implement of airpower. In small wars, however, the imperative distance one must consider with regard to attacks is that of the desired target relative to the political and military situation on the ground. Given the diplomatic and asymmetric context of small wars, any negative effects of an attack mission conducted by airpower can have strategic-level impact. Simply put, “There is a political price to pay when airpower in the form of air strikes is used.”34 Thus, one must weigh any attack mission, whether conducted by the most technologically advanced or most antiquated airpower platform, in terms of the potential negative strategic effects it may induce.
The final distinctive capability, agile combat support, traditionally deals with the elements of forward base support, infrastructure, and mobility for deployments. Regardless of the conflict’s scale, successfully supporting fielded forces remains a critical enabling necessity. In terms of Air Force support in small wars, however, the phrase agile combat support best exemplifies the supporting role that airpower plays. Although many Air Force people truly believe that airpower alone can defeat or stalemate enemy ground forces, in the political and diplomatic context of small wars, employing airpower exclusively is ineffective at best and—as the British learned from their air control doctrine during the interwar years prior to Malaya—can prove extremely detrimental.35
Technological advance is certainly nothing to shy away from. The establishment of the Air Force as an independent branch of the military testifies to the fundamental importance of technology to the service. Revolutionary shifts in technology involving jet engines, radar, and space technology have kept the Air Force in a nearly perpetual state of transformation. The danger, however, resides in the voracious desire to embrace technology—an embracement that should neither outstretch capability nor supplant doctrine. Similarly, technological advances do not, in and of themselves, necessitate compatibility with all manner of warfare.
Small wars are conflicts in which the political and diplomatic context—not the military disposition of the combatants—acts as the determining factor. From a technological standpoint, the paradox of small wars is that the more asymmetric our military capabilities become, the less advantage they afford us against an adversary disposed to use his asymmetric strengths. Such is the conundrum facing the contemporary transformational Air Force: does embracing technological advances specifically optimized for large-scale war necessarily limit the effectiveness of airpower in supporting small wars? Most likely the answer is yes—but to a degree. The solution, however, is not to inhibit technological advances but to understand how such capabilities do and do not fit within the analytical framework as well as the political and diplomatic milieu of small wars. Only by taking one step back to fully understand the contextual basis of this form of conflict can the Air Force of the future take two steps forward to become the most effective fighting force possible, regardless of the nature of the conflict.
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1. US Department of the Air Force, The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan (Washington, DC: Headquarters USAF/XPXC, Future Concepts and Transformation Division, November 2003), ii, http://www.af.mil/library/posture/AF_TRANS_FLIGHT_PLAN-2003.pdf.
2. Christopher Bolkcom, Air Force Transformation, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 25 January 2005), 2, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS20859.pdf.
3. US Marine Corps, “Small Wars,” draft (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, n.d.), 10.
4. James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 6.
5. Ibid., 7.
6. Airpower has supported both sides of the insurgency coin. Examples of airpower support to insurgents include the insertion and resupply of Jedburg teams from the World War II Office of Strategic Services in occupied France; the 1045th Observation, Training, and Evaluation Group’s covert missions into Tibet for insertion and resupply of guerrillas trained by the Central Intelligence Agency; and the support rendered by Operation 32, Air Studies Branch to Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observations Group’s long-range infiltration of agents and propaganda operations during the Vietnam War. Larry E. Cable accurately recounts the need of external support, such as air support: “The American guerrilla was all too much like the astronaut, who, whether in his capsule or walking in his moon suit, was dependent completely upon a complicated life support system for viability.” Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counter-insurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 147.
7. Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970), 32.
8. David Willard Parsons, “Towards the Proper Application of Air Power in Low-Intensity Conflict” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1993), 63.
9. Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 34.
10. Ibid., 81.
11. Ibid., 82.
12. Ibid., 83.
13. R. W. Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1972), 19.
14. Ibid., iii.
15. The Marine Corps Small Wars Center of Excellence currently lists 407 current and previous small wars. See the center’s Web site at http://www.smallwars.-quantico.usmc.mil/sw_today.asp (accessed 23 May 2005).
16. Cable, Conflict of Myths, 71.
17. Komer, Malayan Emergency in Retrospect, 52.
18. Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 193.
19. Jay Gordon Simpson, “Not by Bombs Alone: Lessons from Malaya,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1999, 95.
21. Komer, Malayan Emergency in Retrospect, 75.
22. Simpson, “Not by Bombs Alone,” 97.
23. Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 191.
24. Komer, Malayan Emergency in Retrospect, 52
25. Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 195.
26. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, 76, https://www.doctrine.af.mil.
27. US Department of the Air Force, U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, 49.
28. Richard P. Hallion, “Doctrine, Technology, and Air Warfare: A Late Twentieth-Century Perspective,” Airpower Journal 1, no. 2 (Fall 1987): 16–17, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ASPJ/airchronicles/apj/apj87/hallion.html .
29. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 80.
30. Ibid., 78.
31. US Marine Corps, “Small Wars,” 53.
32. Simpson, “Not by Bombs Alone,” 96.
33. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 79.
34. Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 430.
35. See ibid., especially chap. 2, “Colonial Air Control,” 51–86. The authors make an effective case that although the idea of controlling a country by airpower is attractive to Airmen and those who are casualty averse, the history of air control reveals little to support the idea of police or peacekeeping by airpower alone. The few cases in which it proved effective were “the most minor kinds of tribal police operations” (85). Otherwise, some contingent of ground troops was necessary for peacekeeping operations. See also Capt David W. Parsons, “British Air Control: A Model for the Application of Air Power in Low-Intensity Conflict?” Airpower Journal 8, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 28–39, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ASPJ/airchronicles/apj/apj94/parsons.html.
|Maj Ronald F. Stuewe Jr. (USAFA) is an Intermediate Development Education student in the Defense Analysis, Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He previously served as chief of flight safety for the 57th Wing and as an instructor at the USAF Weapons School at Nellis AFB, Nevada. He has also completed operational assignments with the 25th Fighter Squadron, Osan AB, Republic of Korea; the 74th Fighter Squadron, Pope AFB, North Carolina; and the 55th Fighter Squadron, Shaw AFB, South Carolina. Major Stuewe, a senior pilot with 2,000 hours in the A/OA-10 aircraft, is a distinguished graduate of Squadron Officer School and a graduate of the USAF Weapons School and Air Command and Staff College.|
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University
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