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Document created: 1 September 06
Air & Space Power Journal - Fall 2006

Lt Col Rob Spalding, USAF*

AFTER SITTING THROUGH my fifth Red Flag debrief, listening to MiG 1 say “color pod 7 white from pod 25,” I sadly realized that Red Flag represented the bygone era of my youth. I thought back to my days as a young post–Desert Storm Air Force pilot in these same seats, learning the skills that would keep me alive and help me kill the “bad guys.” Back then, Red Flag made sense to me. Now I struggle to balance the exercise against the lessons I’ve learned:

After 9/11 our nation’s leaders realized that the biggest danger we faced was from asymmetric threats. Criminals at an economic disadvantage resort to whatever means are available to push their agenda. Additionally, rogue nations use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as their trump card. Our leadership’s answer has been to take down the terrorists and then address the rogue nations.

True to form, the Air Force has responded with unprecedented victories in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet much remains to be done, and the Air Force’s characteristic efficiency has recently lagged. Fortunately, a new weapon system has emerged as the combatant commanders’ favorite: the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle. The Predator is successful because of its persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

Red Flag should have predicted Predator’s rise to fame. An exercise properly oriented to the current conflict would have pointed out the inadequacy of other weapon systems to the task at hand. Instead, the Air Force has used Red Flag to develop missions that extend the usefulness of fighters. I can’t help likening this to cavalry officers who looked for ways to preserve the horse in spite of the overwhelming evidence that tanks were the wave of the future.

Red Flag needs to be organized to better prepare us for future threats as well as provide a joint learning environment to develop new ideas/tactics to counter those threats. There are two possibilities for future conflict with vastly different target lists and threats: the peer competitor and the global war on terrorism (GWOT). As a result, Red Flag should evolve into a two-tiered exercise.

Scenario one would introduce a peer competitor with modern weapon systems and vast resources. This situation requires a kick-down-the-door exercise that emphasizes the use of B-2s/F-22s with ground/airborne special operations forces (SOF) to take down a modern IADS in preparation for a ground invasion. This scenario would emphasize the ability to counter WMDs delivered by cruise or tactical ballistic missiles and other threats posed by a powerful nation-state. This could be a two-week exercise that allows less-capable weapon systems to participate as the threat picture diminishes and ground forces begin their main thrust.

Scenario two would pose a GWOT-type environment against an ill-equipped terrorist-type foe embedded in a somewhat complicit populace. The threat level would consist of man-portable antiaircraft weapons and light antiaircraft artillery. This situation would require heavy use of the Predator/AC-130 gunship combination, ground/airborne SOF, and conventional Army and Marine forces. It would emphasize countering WMDs delivered by unconventional means, and the goal would be restoring law and order after a ground invasion while adapting to progressively more-creative terrorist tactics.

The B-2/F-22 combination provides a powerful one-two punch for success in scenario one, but scenario two presents overwhelming challenges for current Air Force weapon systems. The Predator is well suited for scenario two, but it is limited by the need for high bandwidth. In addition, the strength of our military lies in decentralized execution. The tendency for higher-level scrutiny at the tactical level seems to accompany direct Predator feeds and dilutes this strength.

Finite Predator orbits and continuous requests for air support by ground forces during a scenario-two exercise would overwhelm current Air Force architecture. Therefore, canceling an upcoming forecast weapon system such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) might seem to be an extreme measure, but a properly imagined Red Flag would make it a clear necessity. The JSF, like the Army’s Crusader, gives us too much of a capability we already have (survivability—B-2/F-22) and not enough of a capability we really need (persistence—Predator).

A weapon system is also needed which merges the strengths of the Predator with the strength of decentralized execution. Since it would be built for the GWOT scenario, survivability is not a large concern; thus, cost could be minimized. A manned airframe similar to the Predator, when combined with current sniper-pod technology and either the Hellfire missile or small-diameter bomb, would provide the persistent reconnaissance and lethality required. Terminating the JSF program would help pay for the acquisition of this new asset.

The fact that defense budgets are always constrained necessitates tough decisions. Exercises like Red Flag should help us make these choices by providing properly scripted scenarios that could be analyzed for future force-structure requirements. Col H. L. Gilster analyzed Vietnam War operations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail to highlight the fallacy of purchasing F-105s when AC-130s were needed.¹ One can only imagine the same result if the JSF competed against a Predator-like weapon system in a GWOT scenario two.

Some will argue that Red Flag still successfully prepares aircrews for worst-case scenarios. What it does not provide, and what we need, is the capability to exercise jointly across the full spectrum of future scenarios. Red Flag also fails to teach and exercise a coherent strategy for defeating symmetric and asymmetric adversaries. Finally, it perpetuates a fighter-centric mind-set which prevents the Air Force from transforming into an organization that will be successful in any current/future environment. In short, in its current incarnation, Red Flag is obsolete

*Colonel Spalding is an intelligence officer within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Prisoner of War / Missing Personnel Office, Washington, DC.

1. See Col Herman L. Gilster, “The Commando Hunt V Interdiction Campaign: A Case Study in Constrained Optimization,” Air University Review 29, no. 2 (January–February 1978), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ASPJ/airchronicles/aureview/1978/jan-feb/gilster.html (accessed 8 May 2006).

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University

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