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Document created: 1 September 06
Air & Space Power Journal - Fall 2006

Sensor Requirements for Urban Operations

Lt Col David L. Robie, USAF

WE CAN NO longer consider urban operations an optional proficiency. The current situation in Iraq makes clear that US soldiers, sailors, and airmen must have the capabilities and tools to operate effectively in the urban environment. For example, in Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004), David Zucchino chronicles the trials, tribulations, and ultimate success of the taking of Baghdad. Other Iraqi experiences include the attempt to eliminate insurgency in Fallujah in late 2004 and more recently in Iraq’s northern provinces in the fall of 2005. Outside Iraq, the US military has engaged in numerous urban conflicts, including those in Panama and Kosovo as well as the stunning loss in Mogadishu, which emphatically changed US foreign policy in Somalia. These past and present examples not only give clear indication of the critical nature of urban capabilities but also foreshadow an even more significant role for urban operations in future conflicts.

The urban environment has become an essential responsibility in modern conflict because of significant changes arising from three current trends: the massing of people in urban areas, the increasing influence and power of these areas, and the changing face of conflict. Continual movement of the population from a rural to urban environment began with the industrial revolution and continues with the world’s urban population growing four times faster than its rural counterpart. This population movement creates a secondary effect by concentrating influence as urban areas become centers of gravity for diplomatic, informational, military (command authority), and economic power. Finally, the end of the Cold War and the new world order that has emerged in the last decade have all but eliminated the possibility of heavily armored warfare in open terrain. Future US engagements will most likely include regional conflicts, failed states, and nonstate actors. Insurgents, terrorists, and small regional states will not attempt to engage the United States in open battle since US forces enjoy an overwhelming advantage in sensing, speed, and firepower. Instead, they will choose urban terrain, where they will attempt to remove the asymmetric capabilities of the United States and try to mass their effects against “soft” civilian targets. These three factors make understanding the urban terrain an essential part of future conflict. Today, we must consider urban operations a core competency of all US military services.

Background

Understanding the urban environment’s complexity—one that exists on numerous levels—poses the greatest challenge to urban war fighters. Physically complex and extremely diverse, its terrain includes the urban canyons of major metropolitan cities, the close quarters of ancient cities, and the urban sprawl that surrounds both. The physical complexity is also multidimensional, starting from rooftops; going through numerous floors; and ending in subterranean basements, conduits, and lines of communications. Home to millions of people, each individual motivated by an intricate combination of beliefs and desires, the urban environment is also psychologically complex. These people, influenced by personal conviction, devotion to family, or the norms of a subculture, will react uniquely to events. Understanding these motivations presents significant challenges to the war fighter. Finally, the urban environment is characterized by spatial and temporal density. That is, an event of interest may involve only 10 people and last just a few minutes in a prolonged occupation of a city. The ability to discern and understand important events and to react appropriately represents yet another daunting task for the urban operator. The combination of complex structure, human interaction, and density of -information magnifies the importance of understanding this environment.

Proposed Solution

On the one hand, the Air Force’s ability to hold the ultimate high ground, potentially provide a bird’s-eye view, move unimpeded to any location, and project massive firepower with unprecedented accuracy allows urban operators to improve their understanding. On the other hand, the Air Force cannot provide sufficiently precise intelligence collection, cannot always operate unimpeded due to the threat of man-portable air defense systems, and cannot always project massive firepower in the close quarters of urban terrain. Although significant improvements in sensor technology and systems will not solve all of these problems, they will provide the war fighter with the tools to grasp the complexities of this environment. To promote, fund, and field these capabilities, the research community—led by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)—must fundamentally change the direction of current and future programs. The following recommendations will help the AFRL provide joint and coalition forces with the capabilities they need for urban operations.

Thinking urban will permit AFRL scientists and engineers to view their programs from the proper perspective and will require each program—from basic research through engineering, manufacturing, and development—to consider the contribution it makes to the urban effort. Scientists need to develop systems with sufficient precision to detect items of interest and the persistence to observe on a near-continual basis; however, sensors are not the only element of thinking urban. Due to the complexity and multilevel nature of the urban environment, three-dimensional presentation tools, such as perspective viewing, walk-/fly-through, and layered data with fusion capabilities, are a must to facilitate understanding. This precision, persistence, and three-dimensional perspective will provide urban operators not only with situational awareness but also with situational understanding.

To encourage urban thinking, the AFRL should require each sensor or system to provide an assessment of its capability in the urban environment. To complement this assessment, the lab should also make available concise metrics (such as resolution, range, transit time, coverage, etc.) for evaluating programs. The development of standard metrics will facilitate the funding and evaluation of proposed programs by means of realistic measures of comparison. Urban capabilities will arise from this process. To modify a line from the movie Field of Dreams, “If we measure it, it will come.”

Thinking integration will make possible a -network-centric enterprise solution across both sensor platforms and the military services. Because no single sensor can produce a comprehensive urban-operating picture, we must conceptualize, design, and test urban sensor systems with intrinsic network-centric warfare capabilities. The latter include transmitting data in a timely fashion via communication links in machine-to-machine format and providing tools to augment data fusion. To facilitate thinking integration, each sensor system should become a piece of the total solution, which in turn requires additional funding for the testing and integration of new sensor data into current operating pictures. Sensors designed and tested in an integrated environment will give the war fighter actionable understanding and information.

We must also integrate sensors across the services. The Air Force holds the high ground, but the Army provides the ground perspective, the Navy offers the sea-based picture, and the Marines control the littoral terrain. Each service contributes unique capabilities and perspectives to urban understanding. To realize cross-service integration, the AFRL, under the auspices of the Joint Urban Operations Office, should create a panel of scientists from across the service labs to facilitate information exchange. This panel should coordinate annual conferences and promote collaboration among the services.

Thinking across the spectrum will require the labs to look to the information spectrum and the spectrum of conflict. Due to the complicated nature of the urban environment as well as the density of information and the amount of obscuration and occlusion there, we must utilize all sensing modes (e.g., radio frequency, hyperspectral, panchromatic, infrared, seismic, acoustic, and magnetic), combined with data fusion, in order to attain a comprehensive understanding of it. The Air Force must also look at hierarchical systems that combine the capabilities of high-flying, remote, complicated, and expensive sensors with smaller, inexpensive networked sensors that use multiple spectrums.

Additionally, the labs must formulate solutions applicable across the entire spectrum of conflict. Most of the latest armed conflict in Iraq concluded within the first three months; however, security and stability operations have continued for over three years. The Air Force must continue to contribute to operations across the spectrum of conflict, from major combat to humanitarian aid. A concrete proposal to encourage such thinking would require test programs to consider at least three scenarios: full combat, security and stability operations, and humanitarian aid. By considering systems that operate across both the information spectrum and the spectrum of conflict, the labs can provide our servicemen with complete capabilities for the multiple roles they need to perform.

Thinking operationally will reinforce the importance of complete, thorough, and realistic testing of systems with regard to current and future threats. Additionally, participation in joint exercises will ensure integration and information exchange while providing the AFRL an important operational perspective.

We must evaluate full-spectrum capabilities in the urban environment with realistic test scenarios that use the best possible view of real-world inputs and the best available predictions of future conflicts/adversaries. More realistic testing will afford decision makers true understanding of the proposed system’s capabilities. Additionally, the Air Force must become involved with joint urban training exercises to the maximum extent possible. By identifying deficiencies during these exercises, the participants can combine tactics, techniques, and procedures with technology to develop new capabilities.

Conclusion

Our need for urban capabilities in a unique and challenging environment is very real. The recommendations presented here will provide a structural foundation to promote the development of such capabilities for urban operators.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University

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