The Space Campaign: Space-Power Theory Applied to Counterspace Operations

Editorial Abstract: Despite the importance of space to current and future military operations, one seldom hears discussions about the importance of establishing space superiority. Drawing on James Oberg’s elements of space power, Lieutenant Ziarnick describes an operational space-superiority targeting doctrine, offers a foundation for fighting a space campaign, and suggests the adaptation of a model widely known to air strategists.

Even though space operations receive wide recognition as an important part of present military operations and will likely play a dominant role in future conflict, one hears remarkably little discussion about achieving space superiority. Part of the reason for this apparent indifference is the common notion that we have no general theory of the relationship of space activity to both military operations and the national interest on which to base ideas. Therefore, thinking about military space either limits itself to loose generalizations based on established theory, such as that dealing with air operations, or emphasizes defeating specific systems/capabilities rather than producing a general doctrine applicable to all space systems, based upon a space perspective. James E. Oberg, however, in his book Space Power Theory, does make a notable attempt to form a coherent system for explaining space power.¹

This article describes an operational space-superiority targeting doctrine based on Oberg’s elements of space power. The proposed doctrine has immediate applicability to current space doctrine, relies on current or near-term military systems for execution, and includes sufficient flexibility to apply to any space scenario faced by a spacefaring nation. After introducing Oberg’s theory of space power, the article explores the military utility of his space-power elements and considers the effect of conflict duration on the nature of space campaigns. It also offers a foundation for fighting a space campaign, culminating in a model familiar to modern air strategists.

Oberg’s Theory of Space Power

Oberg defines space power as “the combination of technology, demographic, economic, industrial, military, national will, and other factors that contribute to the coercive and persuasive ability of a country to politically influence the actions of other states and other kinds of players, or to otherwise achieve national goals through space activity.”² From this definition, he derives a list of space-power elements—factors necessary for a nation or other entity to acquire and sustain space power—that includes facilities, technology, industry, hardware (space vehicles), economy, populace, education, tradition and intellectual climate, geography, and exclusivity of capabilities/knowledge.³ From a military standpoint, we can consider these elements essential centers of gravity for an adversary’s space efforts. However, some of the more esoteric ones do not constitute viable military targets. For the military professional, the important attackable elements consist of an enemy’s facilities, industry, hardware, economy, and—potentially—populace and exclusivity of capabilities/knowledge.

The “hardware with which to conduct space operations,” facilities include sites for manufacturing, launch (referred to here as spaceports), command and control (C²), and laboratories—all of them normally ground-based structures subject to attack and destruction by a variety of conventional means.⁴ We can also assume that they are finite in number and quite valuable to the adversary’s space power. Successful elimination of a single facility could devastate an adversary’s space capabilities, and complete destruction of a class of facilities (i.e., spaceports or C² centers) could prove fatal. We should consider facilities an attractive target for attacking an enemy’s space power because of ease of strike as well as their high utility and cost of replacement in terms of both money and time.

“Modern and efficient production facilities” for producing space equipment and other technologies with space-related applications, industry includes firms or operations that provide raw materials to facilities.⁵ That is, industry offers “support services” such as components and materials essential for the operation of space facilities, thus resembling the petroleum/oil/lubricants concept used in US strategic-bombing theory during World War II. Unfortunately, industry may not lend itself to successful attack due to the redundancy of operations (e.g., if one ore field or power plant supplying a facility element is destroyed, then another can take its place relatively easily and quickly), and crippling an enemy’s space power by means of attacks on industry may prove impractical. However, doing so may also assist friendly ground, air, or sea operations, thereby elevating the total war-fighting utility of such attacks. They may also serve to defeat an enemy through attrition, beyond their ability to degrade his space power. For these reasons, we should consider industry a space-power target.

Actual space systems such as satellites and launch boosters comprise the hardware element, whose utility to a nation’s space power is obvious. Attacking this element poses unique opportunities as well as challenges and risks. Significant technological hurdles limit antisatellite (ASAT) capabilities, and perceived political limitations make such endeavors unpopular. Furthermore, the physical destruction of satellites might cause orbiting debris that could possibly render that orbit or space itself unsuitable for operations. However, alternatives to physical destruction include attacking subsystems (blinding the satellite) or forcibly moving the system outside of acceptable parameters. Attacking space boosters does not share the risks associated with targeting satellites, and any national missile-defense capability fielded to engage ballistic missiles in the boost phase could also destroy a space booster. Hitting space-lift systems during boost can result in the complete destruction or neutralization of the payload; moreover, debris would either fail to reach orbit, burning up harmlessly in the atmosphere, or rain down on the adversary.

Their function as sources of funds and manpower for a nation’s space effort makes the economy and populace essential elements of space power. Although subject to attack, they should not be considered direct targets of space power because of ethical concerns, aside from the fact that their utility is not concentrated in a certain area. A space warrior, however, should keep in mind their possible impact on a nation’s space power in long-term conflicts.

Oberg describes the capabilities/knowledge element—the spread of technical space knowledge in the host nation—as “the most volatile aspect of power in general.”⁶ If the nation has only a small cadre of space professionals, such as engineers and scientists, they become an important target with very high utility. However, if space expertise is so widespread that enemy space systems do not rely on a small, easily targeted group of individuals, this element lessens in importance. Eliminating or incapacitating exclusivity targets warrants careful consideration in military planning since it could become a decisive factor in destroying an enemy’s ability to project space power.

These elements comprise the target list of a campaign to destroy enemy space power. Destruction or degradation of any of them could be devastating to an adversary. Identification of these targets and examination of their strengths and weaknesses allow us to develop methods for their negation.

Time Span of Space Conflict

The length of the conflict becomes a factor in a nation’s plans for defeating an enemy’s space power. By nature, space power is difficult to deploy and, under current military realities, relatively fixed. Satellite constellations that one normally needs to produce a significant military capability take years or even decades for major spacefaring nations to construct. Even single satellite systems may prove difficult for minor spacefaring nations or private companies to deploy. In low-intensity, short-duration campaigns, destroying a system without attacking the space-power infrastructure may effectively eliminate all of a nation’s space capabilities for the remainder of hostilities. However, longer engagements may allow the enemy to rebuild destroyed elements, requiring the military commander to reengage in counterspace operations. The enemy’s ability to regenerate space systems serves as the primary factor in categorizing the relative time span of a space conflict. This model considers three such durations: short, medium, and long.

In a short-duration space conflict, the enemy nation has little or no ability to regenerate space assets damaged or destroyed by physical action. Regeneration involves rebuilding a terrestrial command center or relaunching a space asset. This time span can vary, depending on the maturity of the adversary’s space power. For example, Russia could restore a destroyed ground station in less time than could a nation like North Korea, which might not be able to launch a replacement space asset at all. In a space conflict of short duration, the utility of attacking the ground or space nodes of active space systems increases since one can achieve space superiority by this means alone. Attacking support structures such as industry or spaceports is pointless since these elements would be of no use to the opponent’s space power during the conflict. Striking the enemy’s space power fast and early in order to produce maximum results makes the establishment of space superiority relatively easy. By eliminating the effectiveness of the adversary’s space systems immediately in the short-duration space conflict, one can forgo attacks designed to severely damage his space infrastructure. However, when an enemy has the ability to regenerate space assets, the conflict becomes more complex.

A medium-duration conflict gives a nation limited ability to regenerate space assets—for example, rebuilding a ground station, reconnecting with debilitated space nodes, and perhaps even replenishing satellites to some extent. Thus, simply destroying a ground station may not permanently (at least for the duration of the conflict) eliminate the targeted space capability, so one must turn to attacking space nodes or continuously allocating resources to attack ground stations as they become operational. Also, a spaceport may become a worthwhile target during this time span. In other words, in a conflict of medium duration, one must use more permanent means to disable enemy space systems while targeting infrastructure that the enemy might use to quickly replenish lost assets.

In a long-duration space conflict—the most advanced and complex of the space-superiority scenarios—an enemy has enough time to replace any and all space systems destroyed. Therefore, permanently destroying a space capability is unlikely, and achieving space superiority becomes a function of delaying or disabling the enemy’s space power as long as possible with as little effort as possible. In this scenario, all elements of space power are effective targets because the conflict is likely to last long enough for the adversary to feel all effects. Whereas during the short- and medium-term time spans, one focuses on attacking current space systems, the long-term conflict requires destruction of both the enemy’s space systems and space infrastructure. Thus, counterspace operations become more numerous and must be strategically planned to balance the needs of air, land, and sea superiority.

Assumptions and Beliefs

The model offered here operates on a number of fundamental assumptions. First, space power is and will remain a major factor in deciding military conflict and will become the decisive factor in the future. Second, a nation’s space power should be a primary target in any engagement. Third, one should attack space power by targeting its elements as defined by Oberg. Fourth, political and economic factors will determine the counterspace methods used and the effects desired. Fifth, counterspace doctrine should adapt to any situation and should maintain effectiveness. Sixth, counterspace operations should be characterized by their political, economic, military, physical, and temporal effects.

Targets and Methods of
Engagement

Regardless of the type or length of an engagement, attacking the elements of space power is essential to effective counterspace operations. Military commanders have a number of options available for directing force against the variety of targets presented by these elements. The two primary categories of attacks—physical and informational—concentrate on the space system and the data it provides, respectively.

Physical attack, the most common form of military operation, involves inflicting actual damage in order to degrade or destroy the target. Because effects are usually permanent (unless the enemy can rebuild) and normally involve loss of property and, more importantly, loss of life, political factors come into play. Physical attacks can negatively affect public opinion both domestically and internationally, can escalate a situation beyond the intended purpose, and can cause unrest as television broadcasts images of bodies and carnage worldwide. However, once a system is destroyed, it could take the enemy weeks, months, or even years to rebuild and restore his lost capabilities, making physical attack an attractive military option. Commanders charged with adapting counterspace operations to function in all possible scenarios must carefully consider this method of attack because of its volatility. Due to the unique qualities of space power, information operations avoid the pitfalls of physical attack yet still deny the enemy his space capabilities.

Information attack (IA) can fulfill offensive-counterspace goals without causing destruction of property or casualties, thereby lessening concern about escalation or adverse international opinion. IA takes many forms, including jamming the communications link between a satellite and its ground station, sending a confusing signal to a hostile satellite, or infecting a ground station with a computer virus to impair its ability to process telemetry (satellite data). However, because IA usually produces only temporary effects, its utility depends upon continuous application (e.g., constantly broadcasting electronic jamming signals to assure impairment of a space system). Since it does not cause physical destruction, an enemy can normally recover quickly (within days) from a virus attack or some other isolated assault. Furthermore, the enemy can defeat IA by destroying signal jammers or boosting his own signal to negate the signal (antijam). An adversary can also restore services denied by IA once he determines how to counter the attack, a situation that could prove disastrous to friendly military operations if it occurs at a critical time. IA operations, therefore, have diminished military utility because one successful application does not guarantee a permanent effect on a nation’s space power, as would destruction of an enemy command center. A successful space-superiority campaign must unite physical attack and IA operations to destroy any opposing space capability. Thus, we must match the unique characteristics of the space-power elements to the strengths and weaknesses of each attack option, enhancing the former and limiting the latter.

Two subcategories of facilities—satellite C² sites (including remote tracking antennas) and spaceports—are terrestrially based and, therefore, targetable by traditional weaponry. Destruction of C² facilities, essential to space operations, would eliminate an active space system. Destroying an enemy spaceport, however, which allows a nation to replenish or expand its space assets, will not eliminate current in-orbit capabilities but will ensure that the enemy cannot augment his space systems if they come under attack. Therefore, targeting C² facilities is a form of space-force attack, while targeting space lift is a form of logistical assault or interdiction. One can easily conduct either type of attack by using terrestrial weapons systems with conventional tactics. In essence, a space facility is just another building—like any other strategic target.

Facilities offer an attractive target to a contemporary space-control campaign because they are rare, fixed, and susceptible to conventional engagement. These circumstances, however, will likely change in the near future. New space-lift capabilities such as single-stage-to-orbit, reusable, aircraft-like launch systems could make traditional spaceports obsolete and eliminate the need for isolating these systems from populated areas. Such technologies might also preclude spaceport latitude as a factor for determining inclination insertion limits. Eventually, these facilities will likely be located throughout a nation, decreasing the importance of individual spaceports. Also, research into light, mobile ground stations for satellites could make easy ground-link targets a thing of the past. Therefore, a space-control campaign based on eliminating ground elements or facilities may be feasible today but will encounter serious difficulties tomorrow.

IA operations permit a variety of attacks on facilities. One can strike a computer system with a virus or computer-network attack, perhaps disabling the entire facility for an extended time, and electronic jamming of the communications node can terminate the utility of the space asset. Because the facility is stationary, unlike spaceborne assets not in geosynchronous orbit, a jamming system would not have to retarget it continually in order to produce the desired effect. Unfortunately, IA operations share the limitations of physical attack in that ground facilities may become less important as technology evolves.

Attacking industrial support of a nation’s space power affects its space effort indirectly. Whereas attacks on facilities or hardware can eliminate systems directly, attacking industry has an effect only in a long-duration space campaign in which the regeneration of space assets comes into play. Because a swift space campaign is not well served by attacking industry, a space planner should not commit forces for this purpose if they could be used against facilities or hardware. Industry is important to the planner because of its strategic and long-term campaign implications as well as its potential as a by-product of an air campaign.

Space operations rely on chemicals (propellants, coatings, etc.), electrical equipment (circuit boards, silicon, semiconductors, etc.), and many other resources. Thus, attacks on virtually any industrial center could have a detrimental effect on the space efforts of a particular country.

Hardware attacks entail targeting space systems either in use or on the ground. Currently, even though options for physical attack on active space systems are very limited, such a course of action can still prove useful. In fact, for many reasons this option represents a very desirable way to eliminate space capability. First, space segments are generally more difficult to replace or repair than are link or ground segments. Second, attacking space systems generally does not put lives at risk, as would an assault against an occupied ground station. Possible objections include political lack of will and the effect of space debris. Although direct-ascent, kinetic ASAT weapons may be the easiest to deploy and use, they will produce a great deal of debris. Directed-energy weapons, either ground- or space-based, may be more practical since energy can target onboard computer systems by imparting enough radiation to cause electronic systems to fail without physical damage to the satellite or by causing terminal damage without explosive action. Attacking spaceborne hardware with proper ASAT systems can sidestep the issue of space debris.

Attacking hardware with IA operations can also produce results. Jamming satellites in orbit renders them useless for the duration of the jamming. Geostationary satellites remain in the same position with respect to a position on Earth, so targeting is relatively easy and jamming can take place continuously from the same location. However, the extreme distance of the geostationary belt from Earth might create complications with power requirements, not to mention the fact that jamming may inadvertently have an effect on other satellites near the target. Targeting satellites in other orbits closer to Earth introduces the problem of targeting a moving object. Also, jamming from one area on Earth can affect a space object over its line of sight (e.g., preventing a reconnaissance satellite from collecting useful intelligence over a specific area) but cannot disable a satellite indefinitely.

Another IA attack option involves transmitting false orders to a hostile satellite that will either disable or destroy it. One can tailor this type of attack to almost any purpose—for example, “turning off” a satellite for the duration of hostilities or ordering it to expend its reserves of fuel. However, this option—usually available in only a few instances—can prove extremely difficult to conduct successfully.

Obviously, one can compromise an enemy’s space systems by incapacitating the personnel responsible for operating them. If, for example, only a very few space professionals run a secret space program in a Third World country, destroying that capability (and perhaps all of that nation’s space power) may be as easy as killing them, taking them prisoner, or otherwise denying their ability to command the system. Physically attacking a manned C² facility may also affect the exclusivity element. Even though the enemy might rebuild it, he cannot as easily replace the chief scientist or seasoned operators lost in the assault. Although one can target this element with aerial/space bombardment or ground assault, using special operations forces focused on eliminating important human players in an adversary’s space forces may prove very effective in quick campaigns against an unsophisticated opponent.

Again, the effect of an exclusivity attack is directly related to the sophistication of the adversary’s space program. Advanced nations that frequently use space assets have considerable knowledge of space and technical matters. Exclusivity assaults on the United States, Russia, or other nations with substantial space programs would prove largely futile because their programs do not rely on a select few personnel. Because any technical manager or engineer can be replaced with someone equally competent, the loss of a few people—even exceptionally gifted ones—will have little or no effect on the space program.

A recent, tragic accident in Brazil, however, reinforces the fact that the loss of qualified personnel can prove disastrous to a small, fledgling space effort. On 22 August 2003—mere days before launch—a Brazilian VLS-1 V03 rocket exploded on the pad due to a booster-engine malfunction, killing 21 engineers and technicians. Physicist Francisco Conde notes that “Brazil’s space program . . . lost its professional elite” and that 18 of the 21 people killed had over 20 years of experience.⁷ The destruction of two satellites, a booster rocket, and the launch facility was a serious setback, but the loss of so many space professionals has caused many to wonder if Brazil’s space efforts will ever recover. At the least, the accident set back that country four years or more. Clearly, space professionals are of inestimable value to small space efforts, making exclusivity a vitally important element of space power and thus a prime target.

Considering the possible time spans of space conflict, multiple space-power targets, and various methods of attack available, one can wage a space campaign in a variety of ways. Even though no country has ever initiated direct military action to systematically destroy another’s space capability, when it does occur, the issues raised in this article will likely become factors in the process. That is, some methods of attacking space-power elements are better than others, depending upon the length of the conflict (fig. 1).⁸ One can then make use of the concepts explored so far to develop a space-campaign strategy.

Figure 1. Effectiveness of attacking elements of space power. Attacking fielded systems is of key importance in a conflict of short duration. As duration increases, IA loses its utility, so the emphasis shifts to attacking the enemy’s ability to field replacements for destroyed systems. In a long-duration conflict, attacking hardware, facilities, and exclusivity is effective only if the adversary’s ability to replace them is also attacked.

A Space-Campaign Strategy

At the beginning of any military campaign that contests space superiority, one must eliminate the enemy’s space abilities as quickly as possible—specifically, by directly attacking the nodes (hardware and facilities elements) of his operational space systems. However, if an exclusivity target exists, it becomes the most important target to the space campaign because eliminating it will have a quick and decisive effect on the enemy’s space power. These opportunities, however, may never present themselves.

The decision to attack either hardware or facilities with greater zeal depends upon the particulars of the campaign. If it involves a third-party remote-sensing system, such as a “neutral” satellite selling imagery to the enemy, physical attacks on the satellite, its personnel, or its ground station will likely be out of the question, making IA attacks the best course of action. For a projected combat operation of only a few days, IA operations against space systems owned by the enemy could produce all the desired results for space superiority and would be especially attractive in terms of tactical flexibility. However, physical attacks on the elements of space power produce permanent results for the short-duration campaign. Attacks on hardware do not put lives at risk, and this particular element is more difficult to replace than a facility. However, attacks on facilities require only traditional weapons and are almost as effective at destroying space power as hardware attacks. Before choosing, one must understand that the enemy can replace facilities such as C² complexes with mobile units or new fixed positions, given the time and resources, while he would have difficulty replacing hardware, which is also vulnerable to interdiction during preparation or launch. When the enemy’s hardware and facilities are sufficiently damaged to destroy the usefulness of his space systems, the short-duration space campaign ends in victory. In a medium- or long-duration space conflict, the emphasis shifts from eliminating the enemy’s space assets to eliminating his ability to rebuild them, which is essential to the establishment of space superiority.

One cannot rely on destroying each new fielded system as it comes online—that is simply too difficult. Therefore, enemy spaceports may become important targets. If the opposition has no spare satellites or launch-on-demand capability, then destroying spaceports may not be necessary for short-duration space superiority. For a medium-duration space conflict, however, spaceports become a top priority because even if the adversary has spare satellites and available rockets, they are useless without a launch facility, which is easily targeted, easily reattacked, and difficult to replace. Their destruction can lead to victory in the medium-duration campaign.

After defeating the fielded space systems in a long-duration campaign, friendly forces should then shift their primary focus to disabling the industry and economy of the adversary to restrict or eliminate his ability to replace lost hardware and facilities. Attacks on chemical plants, heavy industry, electrical-component manufacturing, and other concerns can cripple the enemy’s ability to rebuild satellites, rockets, C² platforms, and spaceports. Without damaging the industry and economy elements of space power, friendly forces would experience a constant drain of materiel and personnel by employing them to destroy newly fielded space systems. Furthermore, the enemy might produce some small space capability in the interim while a new system is targeted and destroyed. The only way to achieve space superiority is to eliminate the enemy’s ability to do anything in space, and that entails destroying his industrial base. Attacking the economy and populace elements might also disrupt a space program, but doing so would make inefficient use of resources dedicated to winning the space campaign. Also, ethical considerations regarding people and their means of survival (food, water, sanitation, etc.) make these elements the least desirable targets of the space campaign.

Graphically, one may depict a space campaign directed against the elements of space power as six concentric circles, similar to the model for John Warden’s five-ring theory (fig. 2).⁹ The exclusivity element occupies the inner circle—the position of most importance—followed by hardware, which should be attacked if exclusivity is too diffused, and the facilities element. These three rings, representing fielded space power and encompassing the space-forces zone, are the primary targets of the short-duration campaign and the first targets of any campaign. The industry ring—which, along with economy and populace, is part of the foundation component—is extremely important because it determines the difference between short-, medium-, and long-duration space campaigns. The four inner rings—exclusivity, hardware, facilities, and industry—embody the main target groups of interest to the space-campaign planner, whereas the outer rings—economy and populace—are not targets of choice. This model, together with the options for attacking the elements of space power, provide a strategic, theoretical base for planning a successful space-superiority campaign.

Figure 2. Space-campaign targeting model.

Figure 2. Space-campaign targeting model. Inner rings are the most effective targets. As a space campaign increases in duration, targets further away from the center become more important. (Adapted from Col John A. Warden III, “The Enemy as a System,” Airpower Journal 9, no. 1 [Spring 1995]: 47.)

For the United States, space superiority is not a given now—nor will it be in the future. Civilian and military leadership must take steps to ensure that it becomes a national objective of the highest priority. When an adversary seeks to contest that superiority, it will fall to the US military to understand the elements of his space power and the ways of dealing with them. Perhaps the strategies outlined here will assist those who are called to defend our space superiority in the future.

1. James E. Oberg, Space Power Theory (Colorado Springs, CO: US Air Force Academy, [1999]).

4. Ibid. Oberg includes laboratories as part of the technology element, but for simplicity’s sake, this article considers them facilities.

7. Stan Lehman, “Brazil’s Space Dreams Are Now in Limbo,” SPACE.com, 20 October 2003, http://www.space. com/missionlaunches/brazil_future_031020.html.

8. Figure 1’s graphical representation has no mathematical basis. It reflects only the author’s opinion regarding the relative effectiveness of attacking the elements of space power.

9. I am heavily indebted to Colonel Warden and Maj Jay Billups, 34th Education Squadron, USAFA, for providing me with the inspiration to adapt a similar ring concept to a space campaign.

2d Lt Brent D. Ziarnick (USAFA) is a satellite vehicle officer with the 2d Space Operations Squadron (GPS), Schriever AFB, Colorado. Previously, Lieutenant Ziarnick underwent Officer Space Prerequisite Training and Initial Qualification Training at Vandenberg AFB, California.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.