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Air
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| Editorial Abstract: Leaders responsible for making decisions about space acquisition have recently confronted two critical problems with this process: increases in program costs and schedule slips. Mr. Lee addresses three additional factors that will affect the competitiveness of space acquisition in the information age: accommodating technological change, reducing system complexity, and basing the acquisition process on a plug-and-play strategy. |
Space is unforgiving; thousands of good decisions can be undone by a single engineering flaw or workmanship error, and these flaws and errors can result in catastrophe.
—Defense Science Board
The current satellite-acquisition process is broken. Space-acquisition decision makers recently made policy changes in the hope of solving two critical problems: increases in program costs and schedule slips. Their primary change accelerated the decision to build, test, and launch the satellite system. Although this change improved management oversight, the process remains flawed and needs overhauling to reduce cost overruns and schedule problems. The current acquisition process could significantly improve by using common satellite components and by addressing the overall process as a “system of systems” featuring a “plug and play” strategy similar to today’s personal-computing environment.
In 2003 the Defense Science Board (DSB)/ Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (AFSAB) task force and the General Accounting Office (GAO) published reports critical of the space-acquisition process.1 Both reports expressed concerns about system-cost overruns and schedule slippages, especially in two vital space systems: the advanced extremely high frequency (AEHF) military-communication program and the space-based infrared systems (SBIRS) early-warning satellite program. Combined, both programs are more than $8 billion over budget. Both reports cite several underlying factors for these programmatic issues and provide viable solutions; however, neither confronts the fundamental issue, which mandates a revamped space-acquisition process. The current acquisition method increases program oversight and compresses decision milestones at the beginning of a program, but it does not exploit principal concepts from other information-age technologies. The current initiative to redefine transformation also provides an opportunity to change the process of satellite acquisition.
Operating in space requires highly robust, autonomous systems. Space does not offer the natural protections found within Earth’s atmosphere, thus forcing systems to function in extreme—both hot and cold—temperatures while combating greater radiation exposure. Mechanical failures considered minor in terrestrially based equipment can prove catastrophic in space because we cannot service the system hardware. Unfortunately, we must balance both system protection and redundancy with operational capability to meet the constricted weight limits required for spaceflight. By way of comparison, the military strategic and tactical relay system (MILSTAR)—our heaviest communication satellite—weighs 10,500 pounds while the F-15E’s maximum takeoff weight is 81,000 pounds. Another obstacle to fielding a reliable space system involves minimizing the traditionally high failure rates associated with “bleeding-edge” (the phase beyond “leading-edge”) technology developed for many satellite systems.
By its very nature, military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) provide an asymmetric advantage to US military forces and, as with other Department of Defense (DOD) space programs, can benefit from transformation initiatives. Satellite communications also figure prominently in the Quadrennial Defense Review’s operational goals as an information-technology backbone for command and control, especially in areas where more traditional infrastructure does not exist (e.g., landlines and line-of-sight communications). Recent reviews by the DSB joint task force and GAO highlighted several shortfalls with ongoing space-system acquisitions that include the AEHF program, SBIRS, the future imaging architecture (FIA), and the evolved expendable launch vehicle (EELV). Although the observations from these reviews are insightful, many of them focus on symptomatic issues rather than the core acquisition problem.
The DOD’s recent space-acquisition track record has been spotty at best. Originally envisioned in 1998 as a $2.8 billion, five-satellite buy with the first launch projected for 2006, the AEHF program has grown to $5.6 billion with a two-year launch delay for the first satellite.2 Costs for SBIRS High almost doubled—from $2.4 to $4 billion—before the program restructured; estimates now approach $8 billion.3 The DSB report states that SBIRS “could be considered a case study for how not to execute a space program.”4 FIA capabilities have been significantly scaled back, program cost has increased from $6 to $10 billion, and production has slipped by more than a year.5 These examples underscore the need for transformation initiatives not based exclusively on technology. In these cases, procurement “doctrine” and “concept of acquisition” qualify as transformation candidates.
Transformation is not new. A major milestone in air and space transformation began the day Orville and Wilbur Wright began designing their Flyer. The F/A-22 Raptor, B-2 Spirit, and C-17 Globemaster III evolved from that fateful endeavor. However, transformation has become more complex with the advent of the integrated circuit in the late 1950s and the Atanasoff-Berry digital computer in the late 1930s, both intrinsic elements in the information age. Further complications occurred on 11 September 2001, when an asymmetric attack took place on US soil. Currently, developing and fielding a weapon system can take longer than a decade; consequently, the transformation strategy initiated earlier this year will reach steady state within the next 15 to 20 years. During this transition, we must provide for today’s national security while we develop capabilities that assure our future.
Both the Air Force’s and the DOD’s transformation strategies6 use as their foundation the six critical operational goals described in the Quadrennial Defense Review’s report of 30 September 2001, with military satellite systems playing a role in each of them: (1) protecting the American homeland while defending forces abroad, allies, and friendly bases of operation; an additional objective involves deterring the threat from and defeating the delivery means for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons; (2) “assuring information systems in the face of attack and conducting effective information operations”; (3) “projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access or area-denial environments”; (4) “denying enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement”; (5) “enhancing the capability and survivability of space systems”; and (6) benefiting from “information technology and innovative concepts to develop interoperable joint C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance].”7 These goals help focus transformation efforts, ensuring that US military superiority—at a minimum—is maintained in an asymmetric, nonlinear strategic environment.
The DSB/AFSAB joint task force and the GAO reports, published in May 2003 and September 2003, respectively, highlight shortfalls in the DOD’s space-system acquisition process. The task force, which analyzed three space programs—SBIRS, FIA, and EELV—was charged with assessing the nation’s dependence on space, recommending improvements to space acquisition, and looking at underlying causes for increases in system costs and schedule slippages. It found that the nation is “critically and increasingly dependent upon space systems.”8 Moreover, many capabilities—early warning, weather, communications, navigation, imagery intelligence, and launch—have replacement programs under way. The task force also notes five key issues that increase program cost, suggesting that any one of them could have a significantly negative impact on a program’s success.
The first cause of program growth and delays involves using cost instead of mission success as the primary driver in space-system development. The task-force report concludes that managing quality and doing things right the first time can contain program cost. Second, unrealistically low cost estimates lead to dubious budgets and unexecutable programs. The task force found that one could predict a 50 to 100 percent growth in cost for most programs. Third, according to the report, the space-acquisition process lacks a disciplined management process to vet requirements—especially critical in a time when the user base and corresponding requirements have grown considerably. Fourth, the task force attributes the government’s inability to lead and manage the acquisition process, in part, to the acquisition-reform environment of the 1990s that weakened accountability and management effectiveness. Finally, the report cites industry’s failure to implement proven practices in some programs.9
Another key observation regarding space acquisition deals with the industrial base’s long-term prognosis. Although the prime contract workforce can adequately support planned space programs in the near term, second- and third-tier contractors are experiencing problems with low demand for their components. In the long term, significant concerns exist with a large retirement-eligible workforce and a relatively smaller replacement pool.
The report of the DSB task force provides several recommendations that blunt those factors affecting program cost and schedule. These include realigning the measure of success from cost to mission capability, reformulating cost estimates to an 80/20 ratio (i.e., estimating program cost so that it has an 80 percent chance of coming in under budget), tightening the requirements process, revamping government leadership, and reestablishing organic-engineering capability.10
The GAO used its experience from the past 20 years to assess space acquisition, finding that the majority of the programs reviewed experienced cost increases and schedule slips and concluding that those problems were “largely rooted in a failure to match the customer’s needs with the developer’s resources . . . when starting program development.” Its report also states that the DOD’s new space policy may increase awareness about the gaps between requirements and resources but that the policy’s effectiveness will depend largely on how that information is used. The GAO’s basic premise maintains that the DOD advances leading-edge technology as part of system acquisition but should separate the technology and product-development processes to reduce program risk. The report also notes that every acquisition program should undergo evaluation at three critical decision points to ensure success: (1) before product development, when user needs and available resources—technical and engineering knowledge, time, and funding—must match; (2) midway through development, at which point the product’s design must remain stable and prove its ability to meet requirements; and (3) prior to production, when the developer must provide assurance of reliable production within cost and schedule.11
The GAO believes that in most programs, user requirements will eventually match system resources but that programs balanced at these decision points will have a better chance of delivering a product on time and within budget. To achieve that balance between requirements and resources, users may have to reduce their expectations if the technology associated with a specific resource is not mature and must be deferred in the ongoing production-development cycle.
The DOD disagreed with the GAO’s position on separating technology and program development, stating that a more deliberate process would delay acquisition programs. In its updated space-acquisition process, the DOD provides more senior-level oversight and, contrary to the GAO’s recommendation, accelerates key decision points—committing earlier in the acquisition process to accommodate technology-development times. The fact that technology appears to be the key driver in space-system acquisition presents an interesting paradox: any technical advantage a program gains is lost before launch of the first satellite. In 1965 Dr. Gordon Moore made a prediction about integrated circuits that eventually came to be known as Moore’s Law: the number of transistors in an integrated circuit will double every of couple years.12 That prediction has held true and will probably continue to apply in the foreseeable future.
Using Moore’s Law as a technology standard, one finds that a system with a 10-year development cycle and a design “freeze” at the five-year point would fall at least one generation behind technologically before the first launch. If that same program produces six satellites, each with a 10-year mean mission duration, the technology used to develop those satellites could lag another four to six generations before a newer system replaces any of those satellites (fig. 1).
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Figure 1. Development timeline for computer central processing unit (CPU). This figure overlays a generic satellite-development program on actual computer CPU fielding dates. In this example, the generic program has components that are five generations behind technology when a replacement system begins fielding. (Adapted from “Moore’s Law,” Intel, 2003, http:// www.intel.com/research/silicon/mooreslaw.htm.) |
Three recently published regulations that reflect current transformation initiatives will play key roles in shaping future MILSATCOM acquisitions. First, the DOD’s newest acquisition regulation simplifies the acquisition process, emphasizing an evolutionary approach.13 Second, the Joint Staff’s Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) revamps the requirements-generation process, using a capabilities-based approach that focuses on shortfalls and redundancies, assesses shortfall risks and priorities, and recommends the best approach to mitigate those deficiencies.14 Third, the DOD’s space executive agent acquisition policy emphasizes guiding principles that endured over the first 50 years of space. Those principles include mission success, management accountability, realistic cost estimates, a stable environment, and disciplined process—issues identified by the recent DSB/AFSAB task force as affecting current space-system acquisitions.15 That policy also contrasts small-quantity space programs, using those disparities as a basis for accelerating the decision to build, test, and launch the satellite system.
The reports of the joint task force and GAO focus on the causes that drive satellite-system cost and schedule slips. Both highlight user requirements as an issue—the DSB/AFSAB addresses uncontrolled requirements growth while the GAO examines the disparity between requirements and proven technology. The task force’s other findings are also symptomatic of a deeper acquisition problem. Those findings include unrealistic cost estimates, the government’s ability to lead, and the use of program cost as a success metric. The Defense Space Acquisition Board, mandated in the guidance of the DOD’s space-system acquisition process, provides a good start for resolving issues.16 However, in the current environment, more control may exacerbate acquisition problems if we do not introduce more stability into the process. Similarly, the Joint Staff’s JCIDS capabilities process will have little effect if a program cannot rein in costs.
Both the DSB/AFSAB and GAO provide excellent recommendations to help contain costs and schedule; furthermore, recent DOD refinements to the acquisition and requirements-generation processes will improve space acquisition. However, current strategy does not provide an optimal foundation to build upon and will require constant supervision to function properly. The key to success lies with a stable acquisition model that can easily accommodate transformation. Current space strategy focuses on low-quantity buys that produce up to 25 satellites, but the average program usually procures six satellites.17 Within current strategic communications, new programs are revolutionary by necessity. The AEHF program—MILSTAR’s successor—does not use any of its predecessor’s hardware; in today’s environment, that makes sense considering the time that has elapsed between the two programs. However, a revolutionary process increases program complexity and managerial responsibility because there is no starting point to build upon—a situation contrary to evolutionary development, which does have a foundation.
The myriad issues associated with space-system acquisition are well documented, but potential solutions do not have similar fidelity. The underlying issue in many papers appears to be program risk and the resulting uncontrolled cost increases. Although one might argue that space-related acquisitions are unique and that successes from other programs are not transferable, the current acquisition process remains broken. For that reason, as a means of reducing billion-dollar cost overruns, we must evaluate solutions that have worked in similar areas. Regardless of the solution, we should concentrate on methods that transform the current process into a better setting that permits management of risk. Such solutions include revamping the roles and responsibilities of the program office and using standardized, common components as well as plug-and-play architecture—prominent techniques in information-age computing.
In an optimal environment, the best acquisition process would allow ample time and funding to develop emerging technology while minimizing program risk. Additionally, resources would be readily available to produce highly qualified managers and engineers. Unfortunately, today’s environment is not optimal. Constraints and conflicts associated with schedules, funding, and resources will always be an issue. However, we can make changes to the current acquisition process that will minimize risk yet nurture an atmosphere that allows managers to oversee their acquisition programs more easily. Changing the current process would also allow implementation of a framework that assists the acquisition community with system development. The proposed process addresses the most problematic issue with space acquisition—technology development. It is not feasible to expand the timelines associated with technology development in a satellite’s highly compressed acquisition schedule. This method attacks the development problem from a different angle, narrowing the focus on core capabilities and reducing the technological “leap” required to field a system. It reduces an acquisition program’s complexity, permitting a program manager to spend more time on a critical issue without increasing the time allotted in the overall procurement schedule.
Although individual space-system acquisitions are small scale, we can realize several benefits by addressing the overall process as a system of systems using a plug-and-play strategy. Managing space acquisition as a larger-scale system that emphasizes a common-component baseline not only benefits from economy of scale, but also adds more stability to the process. A properly controlled process will naturally resolve the issues highlighted by the DSB and GAO because it does not “force” a specific fix, which will have a higher propensity for failure. A successful program will minimize distractions, allowing management to concentrate on the critical paths that contain system components most sensitive to cost and schedule. Addressing space as a system of systems establishes a broad foundation with a process that allows the acquisition community to separate technology drivers from established capability. But it goes a step further. Standardizing common components—such as system platform, power distribution, satellite control, heating and cooling, and cryptography—helps stabilize an acquisition program. The cost and schedule for developing basic satellite functions become known quantities, thereby reducing the number of issues that a program manager must consider.
Establishing a plug-and-play strategy creates a structured design process by default. Plug and play—the micro (versus macro) aspect within a system of systems—uses a system-of-subsystems approach. Any subsystem developer will have to conform to a common set of standards that includes interface specifications, power limitations, and volume constraints. The advantages to this approach resemble those in personal computing. Like a PC user, a space-system program manager can integrate technology during the satellite-production phase as that technology emerges, adding components to improve or add capability. Thus, one can target technological advances without having to “buy” an entire system. For example, a PC user can increase memory or upgrade processors, replace other components (e.g., hard or CD drives, video or sound cards, and monitors), or add new capabilities (e.g., DVD drives and common-access card readers) without replacing the basic system. By the same token, the space community could develop “bare bone” configurations (built with standard, modularized “housekeeping” essentials such as control infrastructure, power, stabilization, cooling, etc.) that would serve as the foundation for any new system.
A further refinement to this acquisition approach would establish a satellite-support office responsible for developing and procuring the basic satellite “shell” for the “production” programs. This strategy allows a production program manager to focus on the satellite’s core mission components (e.g., communications, intelligence, and early warning). The basic satellite design is not “one size fits all.” On the contrary, this concept resembles the EELV program in that a basic set of resources exists to support common attributes. In the launch program, booster configuration depends upon payload weight and orbital parameters. Similar capability would reside in the support office—tailoring basic satellite configurations to mission, payload weight and volume, and orbital parameters. As in other long-term programs, at times the standard configuration may not support emerging capability. Creating a program office accountable for basic satellite functions, however, can minimize those occurrences and ensure a more orderly transition if emerging capability outpaces support infrastructure. Analogous to the EELV concept, the support office would provide a satellite shell, using a building-block approach with off-the-shelf components for many mission types.
Requirements that exceed current capability will signal the need for greater corresponding support. For example, if a new mission requires more power than is available, the support office can develop that new component while the production office concurrently builds new communications capability. This concept allows the production manager to focus on a system’s mission capabilities while the support manager oversees the peripheral needs common to all satellite programs. Other programs with similar power requirements benefit, saving the time and resources needed to develop comparable, redundant support capability.
Although the nexus of this concept shifts acquisition to a common plug-and-play system, another change assimilates the DOD’s evolutionary acquisition paradigm, thus reducing the technology paradox by modifying a system with updated technology during its life. Currently, many satellites are upgraded with software, but the proposed approach makes hardware upgrades more feasible as well. Plug and play allows for a more adaptable and, in turn, more flexible acquisition process. Using that flexibility, a program manager can “evolve” technology during system development. Specifically, instead of pursuing immature technology at the outset, the program can use more mature technology during initial system development. As technology matures, one can integrate it into satellites prior to launch. This concept may increase initial program cost by keeping satellite production lines open past the traditional production phase, but in the long run, it could significantly lower major cost overruns as well as program risk by utilizing more current, stable technology.
This proposal offers a framework that will naturally redress the concerns presented in the reports of the joint task force and GAO. However, this solution—like any other comprehensive alternative—will cost more to implement and maintain than will recent proposals, but in the long term, expenditures should prove significantly less than those generated by shortfalls encountered in existing programs. Until we achieve steady state, we will have to devote additional time to the process. We can minimize such phase-in time if we implement the process by using concurrent and consecutive satellite programs.
Both the DSB/AFSAB and GAO studies point to the requirements-generation process as a major concern. Traditionally, we develop a communications-satellite initiative from the ground up and do not use technology from previous efforts. A process that addresses a space system as a group of components reduces the number of unknowns in requirements generation by providing a basic satellite platform to build upon, allowing the acquisition community to concentrate solely on operational capabilities. As an ongoing process, performance requirements become more stable because users do not develop a system that must stay viable for the next 20 years—rather, the system evolves as the next satellite in the production line is manufactured. Compared to the current process and its resulting technology paradox, the proposed process reduces the technology gap from multiple generations to a generation or two. With plug and play, users assure themselves of capabilities commensurate with the technological time frame during which the system will operate.
In a fiscally constrained environment, cost remains the dominant factor. However, after the establishment of cost parameters, mission success should become the first and foremost concern. Once a sound program experiences a significant cost issue, recovery is difficult. Several cascading factors come into play—especially in a small-quantity program with little idle time. Any near-term funding shortfall will affect the overall schedule, and such schedule slips disrupt future funding. At this point, the total program cost probably exceeds the projected shortfall and the original estimates. On the outside, the program’s viability may become suspect, and, in turn, vulnerable to budget cuts—a situation that brings about an exponential cost increase and a corresponding schedule slip. Mission success then becomes secondary to cost containment. The proposed alternative reduces unknown costs at the start, allowing the community to realistically capture costs associated with the basic satellite because those components exist. An evolutionary-design approach also reduces cost estimates for future technology because the technology gap from the most recent satellite amounts to only years instead of decades. After the process attains steady state, one can reduce the overall system costs even further as future generations not only build on basic satellite capability, but also use previous mission capability. Furthermore, the fact that this process dovetails with the JCIDS allows developers to logically correlate capability shortfalls with satellite design.
Ensuring that a program manager remains in place through a system’s acquisition cycle also becomes an issue, especially in an environment requiring personnel movement for career success. The best solution entails retaining a static management team from system conceptualization through production; however, several factors could affect that strategy. To achieve program success, we must simplify the acquisition process to assure a seamless transition in the event management changes. Dividing a system’s acquisition into support and production program offices reduces the volume of data that one must relay in a move, and using a building-block approach provides a structured syllabus that logically presents that information to an incoming manager.
This process also provides residual benefits that help resolve other concerns of the joint task force, whose report identifies industry’s failure to implement proven practices and provides a long-term prognosis for space’s industrial base. The report highlights solid leadership and sound management processes—in both government and industry—as attributes of a successful space program. Although leadership qualities depend upon the particular individuals, one can implement management processes that cultivate program success. The proposed plug-and-play process could help promote program success by cultivating an atmosphere for applying best business practices by reducing a highly complex issue into its fundamental, more manageable components.
The DSB/AFSAB also assesses the industrial base as adequate for the near term but expresses concerns about the future. Primary issues include the modest demand for lower-tier components, the loss of the experience base to retirement, and the relatively small pool of engineering professionals to serve as a replacement. These matters lie beyond a restructured acquisition process; nevertheless, the simplicity of the process presented here can help mitigate concerns associated with a dwindling industrial base and an inexperienced engineering pool. Use of common components in basic satellite platforms by the commercial sector would help sustain constant demand from the industrial base. Moreover, the structure associated with a plug-and-play environment could help reduce the learning curve for new engineers, who could focus on distinct, specialized areas and expand as needed rather than learn a complete system all at once.
This proposed process also has the potential to provide a capability inconceivable today: on-orbit maintenance in the geosynchronous region.18 Satellite programs are becoming increasingly expensive; indeed, systems such as the AEHF program exceed $1 billion per satellite. Today, system repairs require hands-on fixes similar to those performed during the space-shuttle mission that corrected the Hubble telescope’s “vision,” but we could use robotic technology to maintain or upgrade satellites that utilize modularized plug-and-play components.
The recent transformation initiative is the cornerstone for several changes within the DOD. A more responsive acquisition strategy and a capabilities-based requirements-generation process are critical tools for the quickly evolving environment characteristic of the information age. Key issues affecting the acquisition of space systems include technology and its current procurement process. Other than the personality-driven issues (i.e., leadership, management, and recruiting), all remaining concerns defined by both the DSB/AFSAB task force and GAO are affected by technology and acquisition strategy. Technology and procurement issues force decisions on highly complex programs that have not matured sufficiently to assess risk properly. One can measure the results in terms of funding shortfalls that have doubled or tripled the original program costs. To put these shortfalls in perspective, one need only note that the additional funding currently required for the AEHF program and SBIRS is enough to fund 50 F/A-22s.
This article has addressed three factors that we must consider if space acquisition is to remain competitive in the information age. First, future systems must readily accommodate technological advances. For example, integrated circuits in the 1970s had 30,000 transistors; 300,000 in the 1980s; and 42 million in the 1990s. The technology gap created during the life cycle of a system fielded in the 1970s and 1980s seems minor compared to the one today with transistor counts approaching 100 million and doubling every couple of years. To lower risk and maintain state-of-the-art capability, acquisition programs should not pursue technology that is generations away from maturity and then freeze the system design prior to fielding. Rather, we should use current technology and upgrade individual systems prior to launch.
Second, we must reduce system complexity. Restructuring space acquisition into a program office responsible for the basic satellite shell and corresponding offices for mission capability allows a “production” program manager to focus on a satellite’s mission-related components. Splitting space programs into these distinct areas not only lessens system complexity, but also reduces the issues a production manager must consider.
Finally, to easily exploit technological advances and reduce system complexity, we must base the acquisition process on a plug-and-play strategy, using modular components. This strategy—used successfully in the personal-computing environment—provides a framework for effortlessly upgrading components or adding capability without redesigning an entire system.
Space-based systems are key force enablers that give us the asymmetric advantage which underpins the transformation process. Nevertheless, we must make significant changes in the acquisition process if space is to remain a viable contributor. Three major space programs have more than doubled in cost—from $11.2 to $23 billion—since their inception. These unforeseen increases are indicative of a broken acquisition system. However, robust solutions do not mature quickly. Reform of space-system acquisition will span generations, as does transformation. The time is right to develop a solid foundation. Myriad space-based capabilities now find themselves in transition—the ideal time to exploit economies of scale. The Air Force’s mission is to fly and fight; anything else constitutes support. In today’s fiscally constrained environment, support functions such as spaced-based capabilities will have difficulty competing with the primary needs of war fighters. This is especially true when there is no legitimacy associated with cost and schedule and when program shortfalls amount to billions of dollars.
Notes
1. The Defense Science Board includes experts from the civilian sector who advise the secretary of defense on scientific, technical, manufacturing, acquisition process, and other matters of special interest to the Department of Defense. Similarly, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board counsels Air Force senior leadership on science and technology for continued air and space dominance. Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs (Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, May 2003), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/ space.pdf (hereafter DSB/AFSAB report); and United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives: Defense Acquisitions, Improvements Needed in Space Systems Acquisition Management Policy (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, September 2003), http:// www.fas.org/spp/military/gao/gao-03-1073.pdf (hereafter GAO report).
2. GAO report, 8.
3. Ibid. The Air Force manages SBIRS-High and SBIRS-Low—the two components of SBIRS. In 2000 the new Missile Defense Agency took over SBIRS-Low, which became the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) in 2002. The STSS focuses on missile defense while SBIRS-High concentrates on missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace characterization. Jeremy Singer, “Air Force Says New SBIRS High Problems Are Manageable,” Space News, 20 October 2003.
4. DSB/AFSAB report, 6.
5. Douglas Jehl, “Boeing Lags in Building Spy Satellites,” New York Times, 4 December 2003.
6. The Air Force defines transformation as “a process by which the military achieves and maintains asymmetric advantage through changes in operational concepts, organizational structure, and/or technologies that significantly improve warfighting capabilities or ability to meet the demands of a changing security environment.” Air Force Policy Directive 10-23, Operational Innovation Program, 20 June 2003, 9.
7. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001, 30, http://www.defenselink. mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf.
8. DSB/AFSAB report, 12.
9. Ibid. 2–4.
10. Ibid., 5, 14. In cost-estimating terminology, an 80/20 ratio refers to the point at which a program has an 80 percent chance of being under budget and a 20 percent chance of being over budget. The task force believed that the contracts using contractor proposals to establish cost estimates were more likely to have a 20/80 ratio. Additionally, the task force recommended a 20–25 percent management reserve for development programs that would not be used for new requirements.
11. GAO report, 6–7.
12. For a more detailed discussion as well as Dr. Moore’s original paper, see “Moore’s Law,” Intel, 2003, http://www.intel.com/research/silicon/mooreslaw.htm.
13. Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 12 May 2003.
14. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01C, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, 24 June 2003.
15. National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01, Guidance for DOD Space Acquisition Process, 6 October 2003.
16. Ibid., 6. The DOD Space Milestone Decision Authority convenes the Defense Space Acquisition Board at each key decision point, inviting the appropriate representatives to provide advice.
17. GAO report, 25.
18. Mr. James Fitzgerald, support contractor, MILSTAR System Sustainment Office, interview by the author, 14 November 2003.
Contributor
Douglas E. Lee (USAFA; MS, Air Force Institute of Technology) is a military defense analyst with the Airpower Research Institute, College of Air and Space Doctrine, Research and Education, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Before retiring as an Air Force lieutenant colonel in 1999, he served as chief of the Operational Communications Branch, US Strategic Command; chief of the Space Branch, Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency; operations research analyst with US Southern Command; and ballistic missile trajectory engineer with Strategic Air Command. Mr. Lee is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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