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Aerospace Power Journal - Spring 2002

Protecting the Homeland Air Force

Roles in Homeland Security

Lt Col Steven M. Rinaldi, USAF
Lt Col Donald H. Leathem, USAF
Col Timothy Kaufman, USAF, Retired

Editorial Abstract: In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, many airmen wonder how aerospace power can contribute to improving homeland security. This piece defines the problem and recommends actions the Air Force should take to enhance its role in defending the US homeland.

The highest priority of the U.S. military is to defend the Nation from all enemies. . . . Defending the United States, which is the critical base of operations for U.S. defense activities worldwide, will be a crucial element of DOD’s transformation efforts.

 - Quadrennial Defense Review Report,
30 September 2001

THE TRAGIC EVENTS of 11 September 2001 galvanized government and public focus on the defense and security of the American homeland. Unquestionably, the US military has always defended the homeland and provided for national security. However, until the September terrorist attacks, the military had primarily looked outward, beyond the borders, to defend the nation. Times have changed.

This article discusses the most pressing issues associated with homeland security (HLS). It examines a taxonomy for HLS- homeland defense (HLD) and civil support. Given the impossibility of continuously defending our nation’s vulnerabilities to all possible threats, it advocates a capabilities-based approach to HLS and surveys applicable supporting Air Force capabilities. The article also discusses the principal Air Force policy issues and concludes with recommendations and a plan for progress. Developing and executing a comprehensive plan for HLS will be a long-term undertaking for the Air Force- and, more broadly, for the Department of Defense (DOD) and the US government- so it is crucial that an informed national-level debate commence now.

New Concerns

DOD and the services must evaluate their HLS roles and missions in light of new threats that cannot be deterred by traditional methods. These new threats will require greater time and perseverance to defend against than most Americans are used to enduring. Threats may be initiated from within our borders and involve increasingly destructive weapons designed to inflict mass casualties. Any evaluation of this situation must be done in the context of national laws, policies, and other agencies’ roles, missions, and capabilities.1 There may be public and governmental pressure- and expectations- for DOD to “do something” or take on new lead federal agency (LFA) roles, given the military’s ability to react to crises rapidly. DOD should avoid expanding its roles if the expertise, capabilities, and jurisdiction lie in other federal, state, or local agencies and organizations. Critical infrastructure protection, both physical and cyber, is an excellent example of the complexity and difficulty one faces in attempting to separate military missions from civil-agency responsibilities.2 DOD may have limited capabilities compared to other organizations to respond to specific scenarios or crises. Nevertheless, DOD should be prepared to use its unique capabilities to undertake new or expanded HLS missions whenever the nation supports greater military involvement.

HLS missions must be put in the context of DOD’s ability to execute its war-fighting missions. Units and capabilities with primary war-fighting missions could be dual-tasked to support HLS missions, thereby adding some level of risk to DOD’s ability to conduct deployed combat operations successfully. A severe terrorist attack in the continental United States (CONUS) might require substantial military capabilities (fighters for combat air patrols, airlift assets, airborne warning and control system [AWACS] aircraft, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance [ISR] assets, medical and logistical support, etc.) thereby draining resources for deployed combat operations. Force-sizing constructs and risk metrics must account for HLS missions and associated resource requirements. These constructs will not only have to balance HLS and war-fighting needs and resources, but also the mix of active duty, Guard, and Reserve forces. DOD organi-zational structures may also need review to determine the most effective organizational construct to fight new threats. The current unified command structure is centered on regional combatant commander (CINC) responsibilities, and a different approach may be required to fight a new, global war on terrorism.

The ability of US forces to deploy in the face of asymmetric homeland attacks is a further concern. Severe attacks on airports or seaports of embarkation, major military facilities, or other crucial assets could affect DOD’s ability to deploy. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report notes that the United States is the critical base of operations for US defense activities worldwide and that its defense is a crucial element of defense transformation.3 Delays in deployment or an inability to deploy could increase risk in combat operations and constrain options available to the president or secretary of defense (SECDEF). Force protection at home has become a growth industry.

Successful responses to homeland attacks depend critically upon accurate, timely attribution. While domestic law-enforcement agencies (principally the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]) are responsible for attribution of domestic attacks, DOD has significant capabilities that could support attribution. In certain cases, such as missile-launch warning/attack characterization, DOD has the only national assets capable of attribution. Consequently, DOD has a role to play- but this role must be carefully weighed against existing national laws and policies restraining DOD participation in domestic law enforcement and intelligence gathering. Where warranted, DOD should consider increasing its role in attribution in close cooperation with law-enforcement agencies and with potential legislative and policy changes.

Finally, an increased DOD emphasis on HLS may have potential impacts on civil liberties. The administration, Congress, and DOD must evaluate any increased military involvement with law enforcement or intelligence gathering and sharing in the current legal framework. Changes to the framework, such as exemptions to the Posse Comitatus Act or perceived or real infringements upon civil liberties, will likely meet stiff resistance.

Defining Homeland Security

In February 2001, the Air Staff proposed a set of HLS definitions. It suggested that homeland security is an umbrella term, encompassing the totality of efforts aimed toward protecting the homeland. HLS represents the combined efforts of government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and the private sector to protect US territory through deterrence, prevention, preemption, and defense against attacks, as well as the management of the consequences of and the response to such attacks. DOD’s role within HLS has two components--HLD and domestic support operations (DSO)--which refer to primarily military missions and missions supporting other LFAs, respectively. Figure 1 depicts the overall construct.

Figure 1. Homeland Security Construct

HLD is a subset of HLS operations where DOD is designated by lawful authority as the LFA- military missions to deter, prevent, defeat, or respond to aggression targeted at US territory.

DSO refers to those activities and measures taken by DOD to foster mutual assistance and support between DOD and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies. DSO is also frequently referred to as civil support.

HLS is a subset of national security. Defense of US territory inherently includes protection of the population, institutions, and infrastructure located on US territory. HLS encompasses the use of American military capabilities on their own or in cooperation with civil authorities to accomplish national objectives within US territory, such as the land, sea, and aerospace defense of the United States. HLS must include roles and missions to protect the United States from new, nontraditional, or asymmetric threats that may be largely immune to traditional means of national defense, such as missile defense, protection from weapons of mass destruction, critical infrastructure protection, and counterterrorism. These threats can occur within CONUS or in tandem with operations outside the United States.

Several subtle yet crucial points must be highlighted.4 First, the key distinction between HLD and DSO is whether or not DOD is the LFA as designated by a lawful authority. This distinction has important command and control (C2), interagency coordination, and resource-allocation implications. Second, the HLD definition does not differentiate between the source of the attacks (i.e., inside or outside the United States).5 Consequently, these definitions do not imply that DOD should emphasize its historical, external focus at the expense of an “inward look.” In fact, aerospace operations conducted under Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle- US and allied action against the Taliban and the air defense of key US cities- demonstrate the simultaneity of these missions. Defense against attacks originating inside the United States raises critical policy questions, including interagency cooperation, roles, and missions; Posse Comitatus; use of military ISR assets to gather information on American citizens; rules of engagement;6 and the potential for serious collateral damage on American soil.

Under this HLS construct, a number of mission areas under HLD and DSO are immediately apparent (fig. 2). Several mission areas, such as critical infrastructure protection, could fall under HLD or DSO, depending upon the scenario. Importantly, DOD participation in and roles during an HLS event will vary during different phases of an attack- the Air Force could be directly engaged in preventing an ongoing attack (HLD) as the LFA, yet support the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in consequence management activities in its aftermath.

Figure 2. Homeland Security Mission Areas

Figure 2. Homeland Security Mission Areas

Given the changed nature of the threat, the vast number of potential homeland targets, and the wide variety of delivery means available to adversaries, it is clearly impossible to protect all vulnerabilities from every threat. Even with vastly improved intelligence, it will remain difficult to determine a priori the exact nature and timing of an attack on the homeland. Consequently, capabilities-based planning and programming for HLS hold substantial advantages over the more traditional threat-based planning and programming. When it is possible to eliminate or reduce vulnerabilities, the LFA should implement steps to do so.7 Thus, a general approach should marry existing or planned capabilities with vulnerability remediation, flexible concept of operations (CONOPS), system architectures, and organizational constructs. A capabilities-based HLS approach fits well with the capabilities-based strategy and transformation directed by the SECDEF in his 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report.

The Air Force has many capabilities that contribute to the mission areas outlined above. Our service has primary roles in air, space, and missile defense; nuclear deterrence, retaliation, and preemption; and ISR. Moreover, it has developed extensive capabilities in each of these areas. Expeditionary orientation through the Air Force’s expeditionary aerospace forces (EAF) construct has led to the fielding of capabilities that could play substantial roles in domestic crises (table 1). Furthermore, the Air Force surgeon general has developed expeditionary medical teams with the capabilities to support war fighting that can be readily tailored and deployed to domestic disaster scenes. Table 1 lists representative capabilities that could be employed during homeland attacks.

Table 1
Representative Air Force HLS Capabilities

Command and control

 Search and rescue

Crisis and deliberate planning

Fire-fighting assistance

Rapid, flexible airlift

Security-police assistance

Intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance 

Crowd control

Computer network defense 

Decontamination

Medical operations

Explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) teams

Engineering support

Mortuary affairs

Several remarks about a capabilities-based approach are prudent. First, those capabilities employed during a homeland attack will be highly scenario-dependent. For example, though mobilized and deployed, few Air Force medical assets were used in New York City following the World Trade Center attack. Given the severe level of devastation and limited number of survivors with injuries, local hospitals were able to handle the wounded. However, had that attack overwhelmed the New York City health care system and state resources, local authorities or the governor could have requested extensive federal military medical support. Second, the Air Force should make its capabilities widely known to the interagency community and senior policy makers. Lack of understanding of Air Force capabilities could lead to unrealistic expectations for military support- or worse, could overlook potentially vital support from the Air Force. Finally, the Air Force should look “outside the box” to determine if existing capabilities could be applied in innovative ways to support HLS. This is the essence of an HLS transformation- can the Air Force couple existing or improved capabilities to new CONOPS and organizational constructs to provide greatly improved security for the homeland at affordable costs and acceptable levels of risk?

Evolving Policies, New Issues

Now we turn to the principal HLS policy issues facing the Air Force. Current policy for civil support maintains that war-fighting missions have priority over DSO except as otherwise directed by the president or the SECDEF. Furthermore, the Air Force does not directly provide resources for DSO, unless otherwise directed. One notable exception to this rule is direct Air National Guard participation in and support of civil-support teams. This guidance could become blurred if the Air Force is directed to provide more resources and capabilities to civil-support missions than currently tasked. In addition, the Air Force could indirectly provide additional resources to DSO by developing and fielding capabilities applicable to both expeditionary war fighting and civil support, such as the medical community’s small portable expeditionary aeromedical rapid response (SPEARR), expeditionary medical support (EMEDS), and critical-care air transport teams (CCATT) capabilities. With the current heavy emphasis on HLS, the Air Force will face numerous policy issues.

Air Force HLS Roles
and Missions

What roles and missions should the Air Force undertake to support HLS? In the near term, existing Air Force capabilities could drive new or expanded missions. Nevertheless, the Air Force must be prepared to develop and fund new capabilities should it be directed to undertake new or nontraditional missions. If other services or agencies have the requisite capabilities or expertise to fulfill such missions, the Air Force should consider deferring to those organizations (or at a minimum, working closely with them). The Air Force will need to carefully balance its expeditionary war fighting outside the continental United States (OCONUS) with HLS missions, especially with respect to force structure requirements and concurrent operational risk.

There are several closely related subsidiary issues:

• Under what conditions will the Air Force (or DOD in general) have the LFA role? This question will have to be answered in the interagency community, which should “test” lead-agency roles in experimentation and exercises, and modify them based upon lessons learned. As noted above, LFA roles will change, depending upon the particular phase of an attack or domestic crisis.

• What are the C2 implications of these missions? To be effective, C2 architectures for HLS must include interagency participation. C2 must be thoroughly tested during interagency experimentation and exercises. Ideally, C2 architectures would enhance interagency cooperation, situational awareness, and information sharing.

• What are the appropriate CONOPS, organizational structures, technologies, and required new or additional resources? New or expanded missions will drive changes in these areas that could have serious resource implications. For example, substantially expanding combat air patrols over US cities could drain fighter and AWACS resources required for war fighting.

• What requirements-definition process will be used, and what priorities will these requirements receive? This issue drives to the heart of the resource-allocation question for war-fighting missions versus HLS missions. The senior Air Force leadership will have to determine the appropriate balance based upon guidance from the White House and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The Air Force must closely consider both short- and long-term implications of new missions upon the force structure. For example, if the president or the SECDEF extends combat air patrols over US cities indefinitely, then the Air Force must evaluate the effects upon the long-term fighter force structure vis-à-vis more traditional war-fighting missions.

Concurrent War-Fighting/
HLS Roles

What are the concurrent war-fighting/HLS roles for Air Force capabilities? As noted above, numerous Air Force capabilities can support both war-fighting and HLS missions. As the Air Force undertakes new or expanded HLS roles and missions, it must examine how dual tasking will affect mission-accomplishment risk. Furthermore, the Air Force should carefully examine if concurrency has any implications for the EAF construct. Will the aerospace expeditionary forces (AEF) need to be organized or resourced differently to accommodate force-structure allocations to HLS?

Ensuring Power Projection

What measures should the Air Force undertake to ensure its ability to project power, given the potential for asymmetric attacks upon the homeland? This issue is closely related to the previous issue of dual tasking and concurrent risk. The US homeland must remain a secure base from which the Air Force can globally project power to defend vital interests. However, ensuring the protection of US facilities and infrastructure used for power projection will require resources and force structure. Here again, the Air Force must balance its homeland mission against power projection- with a focus this time on ensuring the availability of assets required to project power globally, such as military bases and associated infrastructure, national critical infrastructures, and information assets. The personnel, logistics, maintenance, and deployment information systems and databases are particularly critical for power projection abroad. The Air Force must devote the resources necessary to enhance and protect those portions of the infrastructure that enable the deployment of war-fighting hardware, weapon systems, and personnel.

Air Force HLS Capabilities

What postures or capabilities can the Air Force contribute to the deterrence of attacks on the homeland? Many new adversaries and threats are not deterred by traditional military means. The military instrument of national power may have to be used in innovative ways in conjunction with other instruments of power to deter new threats. New declaratory policies to counter terrorism, such as reserving the right to preemptively attack states that directly or indirectly sponsor terrorist activities and demonstrating the will to do so, may deter some state sponsorship. Well-exercised and demonstrated C2, planning, and crisis- and consequence-management capabilities may also contribute to deterrence. The Air Force should examine its capabilities and core competencies to determine those deterrent roles it can undertake, particularly in preemption, attribution, and retaliation.

Force-Structure Impacts

What force-sizing construct should the Air Force use for HLS? New HLS roles and missions will have force-structure impacts. The force-sizing construct is particularly sensitive to the degree of concurrent risk that senior policy makers are willing to accept. Driving down concurrent risk would imply dedicating force structure exclusively to HLS along with the required resources. Determining an appropriate force-sizing construct will require balancing war-fighting and HLS missions, determining appropriate roles for the active duty, Guard, and Reserve components, and ensuring the ability to project power from the homeland while keeping risks at acceptable levels. The recent Quadrennial Defense Review Report listed homeland defense as the number-one priority in the list of national security tasks. Allocating additional resources to contributing mission areas would seem to be consistent with that priority.

Organizing for War-Fighting
and HLS Missions

How should the Air Force organize itself to best support its war-fighting requirements and HLS missions? The Air Force developed and implemented the EAF construct as its organizational framework. Ideally, HLS missions will integrate into the EAF construct with little modification and become part of “normal” EAF operations. However, the 10 AEFs may require additional resources to reduce the risk associated with concurrent HLS and expeditionary war-fighting missions and to ensure the ability to project power during or after a homeland attack. Furthermore, the 10 AEFs are not equally capable today, which implies that homeland crises may present a greater or lesser degree of risk, depending upon which AEFs are on call. Additional resources might reduce stresses on the AEFs and low-density/high-demand (LD/ HD) assets such as ISR platforms. If the Air Force undertakes new HLS missions, such as expanded use of ISR for domestic surveillance, then already scarce LD/HD assets might not be available. The Air Force should examine how to best resolve these operational issues within the EAF construct, without “breaking” any AEFs, thereby ensuring the Air Force’s ability to fulfill its HLS and war-fighting missions.

Recommendations

First, the Air Force must develop HLS force-sizing criteria based upon defined roles and missions and then apportion forces to specific, key HLS missions according to established priorities. This apportionment could be the key to avoiding dual- and triple-tasking of some resources.8 Barring additional and specifically earmarked resources, the Air Force will have to carefully examine resource prioritization and allocations between HLS and more traditional war-fighting missions- and adjust the existing balance as necessary. Without sufficient personnel and materiel to cover new, apportioned missions, the risk of failure will likely be higher. This is particularly true for LD/HD assets and other critically manned fields. Concurrently, policies that prohibit providing resources to sustain civil-support missions (unless otherwise directed) should be loosened or rescinded, given the emerging need to directly resource new missions. This new force structure must be thoroughly tested in experimentation, exercises, and war games and adjusted as necessary to ensure the best mix of forces for deployed and domestic operations.

Second, the Air Force must maintain HLS as an integrated Total Force responsibility. The active duty, Guard, and Reserve components each bring capabilities and special expertise to HLS. The Guard and Reserve, for example, are already forward deployed in communities spanning the nation and frequently have close ties with local first responders. However, HLS should not be the primary mission of the Guard and Reserve. These components have vital, integral missions in deployed war-fighting operations. Breaking the Total Force construct into separate war-fighting and HLS components could introduce additional risk into deployed and domestic operations or lead to expensive and unnecessary duplication of capabilities.

Third, the Air Force (in conjunction with the other services, Joint Staff, and OSD) should advocate a broad-based, intelligence-sharing program with other federal departments and agencies. HLS is inherently an interagency mission cutting across the totality of the federal government. A broad interagency common-operational picture (COP) is essential for the prevention and deterrence of future attacks and is crucial for crisis and consequence management. When it is possible and appropriate, the Air Force should integrate its ISR assets and processes into the COP. This may require changes in national policies or laws such as Posse Comitatus. Any such changes, though, must be balanced with appropriate oversight and controls, given the strong resistance the use of military assets for domestic intelligence purposes would likely draw. Furthermore, the COP will require dissemination controls to ensure the protection of law enforcement’s case-sensitive information, intelligence sources and methods, and privacy rights.

Finally, the Air Force must fully engage the other services, the Joint Staff, OSD, and the interagency community on HLS issues. Air Force programs must necessarily integrate tightly into DOD and interagency programs. Engagement is more than just attending interagency meetings; the Air Force must commit to total interoperability, including C2 architectures, communications, exercises and experimentation, CONOPS, technologies, and so forth. The Air Force must broaden its HLS perspectives to the interagency community and ensure tight integration of its programs with those in other key agencies.

Conclusions

Homeland security has moved to the forefront of governmental and military affairs following the tragic attacks on 11 September 2001. While the Air Force has always defended the homeland, it has substantial capabilities to bring to the fight against new threats to national security. As it does so, the Air Force will confront numerous key policy issues, including its proper HLS roles and missions, force sizing considerations, the mix of active Air Force/Air National Guard/Air Force Reserve forces, and resource allocation priorities.

The new threats directed at the United States have placed a difficult set of problems squarely before the Air Force. The service will likely face new missions and functions in an already resource-constrained environment. If resources are shifted to HLS, the Air Force will confront tough apportionment choices, such as reducing the risk of asymmetric attacks on the homeland while possibly increasing the level of risk of deployed operations. The service must balance emerging HLS roles among the active duty, Guard, and Reserve components, capitalizing on the inherent strengths of each. It will have to develop new CONOPS for domestic missions and forge operational relationships with other nondefense federal agencies and entities. In addition, it remains crucial for the Air Force to maintain its ability to rapidly project power from CONUS- even in the face of massive, asymmetric attacks on the homeland. This capability could spell the difference between victory and defeat during deployed operations.

Given the need for new organizational constructs, CONOPS, and technologies to address the threats to the United States, homeland security will be the forcing function for the next Air Force transformation. As the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the ongoing terrorist threats so clearly illustrate, ignoring the call for this transformation will place the nation’s security and survival at risk.

Notes

1. For example, the Federal Response Plan explicitly delineates federal department and agency responsibilities for the delivery of federal assistance following major disasters or emergencies declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 United States Code 5121 and following). Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) assigns LFA responsibilities to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Emergency Management Agency for crisis and consequence management, respectively. Other PDDs and executive orders delineate additional agency missions and functions.

2. The private-sector owners and operators of critical infrastructures have major roles and responsibilities to secure their assets- DOD can contribute to infrastructure protection, but of and by itself cannot, and should not, protect all of these infrastructures.

3. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001, on-line, Internet, 1 February 2002, available from "http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf".

4. At this writing, DOD has not yet finalized a set of definitions. Others have proposed similar constructs and definitions but do not make the two crucial points in the paragraph. In the summer of 2001, the Joint Staff proposed that HLD be defined as “the defense of U.S. territory, population, and infrastructure against direct attacks. These missions include: the defense of the land, aerospace, and maritime approaches to the U.S.; threat reduction, deterrence and preemption; missile defense; and countering large-scale terrorist activity” (emphasis in original). This definition does not make the critical distinction that HLD missions are those for which DOD is the LFA. Also, it leaves open to interpretation whether attacks in other locations, such as Khobar Towers, US embassies in Africa, and the USS Cole, are included in this mission set. While the Quadrennial Defense Review Report does not specifically define HLS, it does state that “the United States will maintain sufficient military forces to protect the U.S. domestic population, its territory, and its critical defense related infrastructure against attacks emanating from outside U.S. borders, as appropriate under U.S. law” (emphasis added). While similar to the Air Force definition, this statement explicitly excludes attacks originating inside US territory, whether of military, terrorist, or other origin.

5. Conceivably, foreign attacks could originate from within US borders. The 11 September hijackings and the follow-on anthrax attacks (if linked to foreign sponsors) are two cases in point. A foreign cyber attack launched from American computers is an additional example.

6. This issue was dramatically highlighted in the rules of engagement undertaken following the 11 September hijackings. If a hijacked aircraft were preparing to attack American targets, Air Force pilots could be placed in the uncomfortable position of downing airliners and killing American citizens.

7. Clearly, much of the responsibility for eliminating vulnerabilities falls outside of DOD- all government agencies, the private sector, and even private citizens have roles to play.

8. Local-community first responders who are also Guard personnel with a specialty applicable to both war-fighting and civil-support missions could find themselves triple-tasked during concurrent homeland and overseas crises.


The outcome of a battle depends not upon numbers, but upon
the united hearts of those who fight.

––Attributed to Kusunoki Masashige, 1294–1336


Contributor

Lt Col Steven M. Rinaldi (BS, University of Oklahoma; MS, School of Advanced Airpower Studies; MS and PhD, Air Force Institute of Technology) is chief, Modernization and Technology Issues Branch, Joint Issues Division, Air Force Quadrennial Defense Review, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, D.C. He previously served as the military liaison officer in the White House Office of Science and Technology. Prior to that he managed international cooperative research programs with France, Italy, and Russia at Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command; served as an exchange engineering-officer at Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France; and as the chief of the Advanced Resonator Section at the Air Force Weapons Laboratory. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Defense Language Institute, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College.

Lt Col Donald H. Leathem (BSEE, Duke University; MSE, Boston University) is a staff officer in the Programming and Budgeting Division, Air Force Quadrennial Defense Review, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, D.C. He previously served as the program manager for Sensor Systems at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Prior to that he was the Sacramento Air Logistics Center’s chief of systems integration in Colorado Springs, Colorado, for the CINC Mobile Alternate Headquarters supporting USCINCSPACE/CINCNORAD and USCINCSTRAT’s survivable command and control missions. Other assignments include serving as the command lead for USCINCSPACE’s Space Command Center; test manager for the Space Defense Operations Center in Chey-enne Mountain, Colorado; program manager for the Antiradiation Missile Decoy program; and test engineer for the Peace Sentinel program that provided AWACS and KE-3 tankers to Saudi Arabia. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Defense Systems Management College.

Col Timothy Kaufman, USAF, retired (BA, Du-quesne University; MPA, University of Oklahoma), is an associate with Booz Allen Hamilton, providing on-site support to the Air Force Quadrennial Defense Review, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, D.C. He previously served as the vice wing commander of the 82d Training Wing, Sheppard AFB, Texas. Prior to that he worked in the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs as a deputy director of the office of International Security and Peacekeeping Operations. Other assignments included serving as commander of the 436th Operations Group, Dover AFB, Dela-ware, and commander of the 305th Air Refueling Squadron, Grissom AFB, Indiana. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces.


Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.


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