A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War?: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space

Editorial Abstract: How will the military use space? This question has been studied for over 40 years, most recently by the 2000 Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization. Colonel Hyten assesses current US space policy and makes recommendations aimed at keeping inevitable space conflicts from exploding into full-fledged space warfare, while still protecting the nation’s interests in this most important medium.

IN MANY WAYS, the future of the United States is tied to the development of space. Given the many issues facing this development and the potential for conflict, one would expect widespread and vigorous debate on the subject. Such is not the case, however. Even though debate has begun within limited political and military circles, no one has addressed space in any real depth on a national level.

During the 1970s and 1980s, in the midst of an active Soviet space threat, the debate was loud and vigorous, involving not only leading military officers, presidents, and congressmen, but also many members of the scientific and academic communities. Significantly, the national media gave close attention to this discussion. Today, however, the debate lacks any such national attention and committed involvement, as evidenced by the lack of response to a major speech delivered at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in November 1998 by Sen. Bob Smith (R-N.H.), then the chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In this address, he proposed in very strong terms the need for space weapons and perhaps even a separate space force to develop and operate these weapons.¹

Media response to these bold and radical proposals was almost nonexistent. For many weeks, the only media coverage to be found was in primarily defense-related periodicals such as Inside the Air Force.² The first mainstream American newspaper that even mentioned this speech was the Washington Times in an editorial by James Hackett on 11 January 1999 (nearly two months after the speech).³ Senator Smith, however, continued to press his ideas in the Senate, and Congress passed legislation, included in the Defense Authorization Bill for fiscal year 2000, which established a special Space Commission to evaluate many of these proposals.⁴ Still, the general public has largely ignored the issue.

The Space Commission

Formally called the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, the Space Commission began its work in the summer of 2000 and issued its report on 11 January 2001. Donald Rumsfeld chaired the commission until President George W. Bush nominated him to serve as secretary of defense as the commission was finalizing its report, which recommended numerous actions by the executive branch of government and specifically by the Department of Defense (DOD). Due to congressional interest, the report likely would have spurred some changes in any administration, but due in great part to the position and leadership of Secretary Rumsfeld, DOD has pursued many of the commission’s findings. Changes did not occur immediately, and many of the recommendations and initiatives have still not taken effect; nonetheless, significant change is under way.

All of national-security space has undergone reorganization within DOD. The most significant change has been the naming of a single military service—the Air Force—as DOD’s executive agent for space. Peter B. Teets, undersecretary of the Air Force, now has direct responsibility for all national-security space, including the National Reconnaissance Office. For the first time, one person has the authority to lead and direct all US national-security space activities. The executive agent is also responsible for establishing a virtual major-force program for space that will clearly identify, for the first time, the true magnitude of the resources expended on national-security space efforts.

One of the most important aspects of the Space Commission’s report, however, is the clear and logical way it describes how essential space has become to all aspects of our existence. It explains the importance of the civil, commercial, defense, and intelligence space sectors in detail—as well as US vulnerabilities. In some of its more vivid language, the report points out that with the growing commercial and national-security use of space, US assets in space and on the ground offer many potentially vulnerable targets.⁵ In discussing the future, the commission concludes that “history is replete with instances in which warning signs were ignored and change resisted until an external, ‘improbable’ event forced resistant bureaucracies to take action. The question is whether the US will be wise enough to act responsibly and soon enough to reduce US space vulnerability. Or whether, as in the past, a disabling attack against the country and its people—a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’—will be the only event to galvanize the nation and cause the US government to act. We are on notice, but we have not noticed.”⁶

The events of 11 September 2001 add to the importance of these words. Once again the United States experienced an improbable event—and responded. The nation will pursue the war on terrorism for a long time to come, but it must also continue to understand and work to protect its other potential vulnerabilities. The Space Commission pointed out that threats to US space systems could arise under a variety of conditions “in peacetime, as a terrorist act.”⁷

In more normal times, the report of the Space Commission, combined with an active and involved secretary of defense keen on implementing many of its recommendations, would spawn active, public debate. However, many of the critical issues necessary to define the path of this nation in space are still not being addressed in any significant way in public. In light of the notable changes currently taking place in both the substance and management of national-security space, now is the critical time for just such a debate.

“To best prepare for the future, we have to energize our thinking too.”

Unfortunately, the limited public discourse thus far seems to focus on two very strong, opposing positions: the need for space weapons versus the need to maintain space as a sanctuary. But the focus should be on choices that can help define the future of this nation, and the world, in space. Many aspects of conflict in space, certainly in the near term, can be assuaged without requiring the controversial development and use of space weapons—or even military intervention in space. To do so, however, requires the aggressive implementation of other instruments of national power—specifically, of an economic and political nature. Like public debate on space, this has yet to occur.

Gen Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, observed in early 1999, “Just as we can’t expect to successfully fight the next war with the equipment of the last war, we surely won’t see victory in the next war using the policies of the last war. To best prepare for the future, we have to energize our thinking too. We need the national debate on the existing policies and open questions affecting military capabilities and possibilities in space. And we need resolution of that debate sooner rather than later.”⁸ Over three years later, however, we still lack both resolution and debate.

In the past few years, some significant steps have taken place, although they were not well publicized or noticed by the public at large. In the national-security strategy of December 1999, President Bill Clinton for the first time declared the unimpeded access to and use of space a vital national interest of the United States.⁹ Shortly thereafter, the Space Commission described the nation’s interests in detail. Despite such progress, the United States still lacks a coherent, long-term space vision. Although the current national space policy (1996) provides top-level guidance for each of the nation’s space sectors—civil, commercial, intelligence, and military—it does not fully integrate the US space program or provide a long-term vision. If conflict in space were not inevitable or already occurring, such a stance would be appropriate.¹⁰ These divergent approaches, however, make it difficult to deal with the foreseeable conflicts of the future.

Conflict

The pressures on space are enormous—from both an economic and a military perspective. Even one of these pressures is severe enough to create conflict. Combined, they create the risk of war—either on Earth, in space, or both. On the economic front, conflict has already occurred due to crowding in geostationary orbits and through saturation of the available radio spectrum.¹¹ On the military front, the United States has managed to avoid clashes because of the effective monopoly it would exert on the use of space during conflict.

In the year 2000, the commercial space industry alone generated over $80 billion in worldwide revenue.¹² Conflicts in this arena are beginning to grow as crowding increases due to the finite number of unoccupied geostationary slots and the limited amount of unallocated spectrum. Militarily, one cannot imagine the United States allowing an enemy either to threaten US space capabilities or use space systems to put Americans at risk. Space systems could become a significant part of any future military conflict involving the United States.

The military leadership is fully convinced that the United States will need weapons to deal with space-related conflict.¹³ Although other nations and many Americans who see such a plan as disastrous have called for the United States to negotiate both bilateral and multilateral treaties, currently none are under consideration. The Clinton administration determined that the current limits on placing weapons of mass destruction in space were sufficient and did not consider negotiations regarding the peaceful uses of outer space in the best interest of the nation.¹⁴ The Bush administration has not modified this position—at least publicly. In short, national space policy remains confusing.

The issue of antisatellite (ASAT) weapons provides an interesting example of the United States sending mixed signals to the international community. In the fall of 1997, the Clinton administration allowed the testing of the US Army’s mid-infrared advanced chemical laser (MIRACL) against an orbiting Air Force satellite, the stated objective of which involved collecting “data that will help us improve computer models used in planning protection measures for U.S. satellite systems.”¹⁵ Despite the fact that this decision to test a high-powered laser against a space object came under heavy criticism from Presi-dent Boris Yeltsin of Russia, some members of the US Congress, and many people in the scientific community, all of whom viewed it as an ASAT test, the administration allowed it to proceed. Almost at the same time, President Clinton used his line-item veto to implement policy for the first time (an action since ruled unconstitutional) when he vetoed three programs with the potential for exploring space-weapon technology—the Clementine II microsatellite program, the Army’s kinetic- energy ASAT system, and the military space plane. The administration argued that (1) the MIRACL test was not an ASAT demonstration, (2) one could achieve space control without weapons,¹⁶ and (3) the United States did not need the three programs for its future defense. Understandably, the media and much of the world concluded that the Clinton administration did not have a clear policy for space control.¹⁷

This lack of clarity remains a problem. During a press conference on 8 May 2001 to announce implementation of the Space Commission’s report, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld fielded a question about putting weapons in space:

This excerpt shows that the national space policy is very broad, allowing any number of responses. But the actions of the United States have not been consistent—and national debate still has not occurred. Thus, the vision for the future of the United States in space remains unclear.

Usually, ships of war and ships of commerce look quite different, but in space, satellites of war and satellites of commerce may be one and the same.

Similarly, concerning the commercial aspects of space, neither Congress nor recent administrations have dealt effectively with the growth of space business and its impact on national security. Even though Congress, after much delay, passed the Commercial Space Act in 1998, it did not fully resolve the critical issue of remote sensing (imagery). Matters regarding commercial imagery satellites (e.g., Space Imaging’s Ikonos) with one-meter (or better) resolution remain confusing at best.¹⁹ During the ongoing Afghanistan conflict, the US government initially decided to buy up all satellite imagery of the area of interest from Space Imaging for about $2 million per month. Shortly thereafter, the government discontinued these purchases but did not provide the media clear reasons for doing so.²⁰

Neither has anyone fully addressed the true impact of global satellite communications from constellations such as Iridium and Globalstar. Again, the commercial sector has the potential for affecting national security—not only of the United States but of other countries as well. Every new step that exploits the benefits of space has tremendous reverberations throughout society. No one can make effective decisions regarding commercial, civil, and military space systems without considering their full impact.

The “Commons” of Space

Space has been described as both a frontier for exploration/exploitation and a fuel for the economy, but perhaps a more accurate descriptor is the term commons—an area for use by the community as a whole. In a legal sense, it also refers to an area open to use by one nation without interference from another. As a frontier, space is a commons because of its availability to any nation with the desire and wherewithal to explore it. As a fuel, it is a commons because no national restrictions exist regarding its exploitation. That is, the use of space, as both a frontier and a fuel, is open to the community of nations as a whole and is not restricted to any single nation. Therefore, one must deal with areas of conflict such as geostationary spacing or spectrum allocations from the viewpoint of the commons, as well as that of an individual nation.

The international nature of the space commons makes dealing with space conflict difficult. In the absence of a coherent national strategy, the US military, as a minority player in space, has problems developing the means to deal with space issues as they relate to national security. In reality, it is a national problem that the executive branch must address by integrating all the elements of US power into a coherent policy.

As a commons, space demands continued engagement in the international arena. One must continually explore and update laws, treaties, and agreements to allow for effective growth while minimizing conflict. The United Nations (UN) International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is well positioned to negotiate many of these multinational issues. As is the case with the commons of the sea, however, disagreements and conflicts will continue to occur whenever one nation achieves a distinct advantage and other nations want to challenge that advantage. Exploration of the sea gave rise to new international laws, treaties concerning fishing rights and defense, and a new legal framework—all of which served to resolve conflict. When these measures did not work, however, nations defended their rights to the seas with military power.

At sea, however, strategic military advantages and economic advantages are more easily discernable. Usually, ships of war and ships of commerce look quite different, but in space, satellites of war and satellites of commerce may be one and the same. Similarly, the national response to a threat from a ship of war is clear, but such a response to a satellite that has both military and commercial uses (“dual uses”) is not so clear. The twenty-first century in space will be driven by dual-use technologies, which will greatly affect future conflict. To maintain an advantage in space, the nation must pursue ways to deal with these technologies effectively. Again, the military cannot do it alone.

The UN offers opportunities to advance US interests in dealing with dual-use technologies. These include such forums as the Conference on Disarmament and other UN committees that look at commerce and outer space. Possibilities exist for exploring negotiated agreements for controlling these kinds of systems and technologies. Perhaps more likely, however, are opportunities for negotiating international “rules of the road” for space that can better define the operating framework.²¹ Like other nations of the world, the United States will always have the right to defend itself from attack—which should remain the driving principle behind US operations in space. Engaging other nations within the structure of the UN makes progress possible—at least in terms of defining some of the additional laws and agreements necessary to operate in the commons of space.

One should not view the UN and other arenas for peaceful negotiations as a panacea. The current competitive advantage enjoyed by the United States gives it the opportunity to continue to develop the commons of space commercially and to serve as the leading provider of space services around the world—from telecommunications, to navigation, to remote sensing, to anything produced by space industry in the coming years. It is essential that the US government not take any action or implement regulations that would encourage other nations to develop a particular space market. This requirement raises continuing conflicts with national-security interests, once again stressing the need for an integrated approach from the US government.

Every nation, the United States included, has its own unique national-security interests in space. As the world’s most space-dependent nation, the United States must prepare itself to respond to threats to its national interests should negotiations fail. These threats might involve attacking—directly or indirectly—space systems, denying commercial space capabilities, threatening forces/citizens with space weap-ons, or using international space capabilities in some fashion. Political and economic means could effectively control certain of these threats while others might require military intervention, possibly consisting of nonlethal action (e.g., jamming), lethal action confined to terrestrial targets, or, ultimately, lethal action against targets in space. Most likely, the United States would respond to a purely commercial conflict through nonlethal means, using lethal space weapons only when foreign space systems threatened American lives or property. Each of these threats is significantly different, and the nation must consider each one as it develops a strategy for the twenty-first century.

Recommendations

As a critical element of the future, space will play an essential role in allowing for economic growth and enhancing national security. In order to take full advantage of this future, however, the United States must integrate all of its elements of national power into an effective national strategy. The following recommendations are designed to help develop such a strategy and respond to these challenges.

The Space Commission’s top recommendations concerning organization and management recognize the critical leadership role of the president in “developing a long term strategy for sustaining the nation’s role as the leading space-faring nation.” It also suggested the creation of two organizational constructs to advise the president on space matters—a Presidential Space Advisory Group to provide independent advice and a Senior Interagency Group within the National Security Council—as well as the establishment of a closer relationship between the secretary of defense and the director for central intelligence.²² Although the secretary and director have certainly developed a much closer relationship regarding national-security space, the two recommended groups have not been implemented.

The original National Space Council (disbanded in 1992) effectively integrated different elements of the executive branch and helped develop coherent strategies. Since the vice president chaired the council, it had the authority it needed to make tough decisions. We should charter a similar body with the power and authority to make critical policy recommendations to the president. It should include senior representatives from all the affected segments of the government, including DOD, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the National Security Council. The space council should first define the nation’s overarching space policy and include a clear vision for the next century. This vision must call for more than a simple commitment to “the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes.”²³

The Space Commission attempted to produce these results by recommending the formation of both an advisory and interagency group, mentioned above. These organizations have yet to receive the charter and visibility necessary to adequately address the complex issues involving space. Combining these efforts into a National Space Council would give them the necessary standing in the government to function successfully.

The current national space policy is out of date. The issues that need attention are so complicated that only a national body within the executive branch, such as a National Space Council, could possibly consolidate the various positions and integrate the policy. The new policy must effectively encompass all the instruments of national power, allowing continued economic expansion and pursuit of vigorous research and exploration, while at the same time protecting US national security.

On paper, the National Science and Technology Council is still “the principal forum” for resolving issues related to national space policy.²⁴ Unfortunately, very few of the critical decisions regarding the future of space are issues of science and technology. Rather, they cross the boundaries of many agencies in government, affecting everything from national security to economic prosperity. Addressing these issues in the context of science and technology gives them the wrong focus.

In March 2001, a Space Policy Coordinating Committee was established under the National Security Council, including senior-level representatives from all federal departments and agencies. Although the committee intended to issue a report in six to nine months, only sporadic activity has occurred.²⁵ We still need an integrated national strategy documented in a new national space policy.

Recently, however, promising efforts appear to be addressing these needs. In May 2002, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, the national security advisor, announced plans to conduct a thorough review of US space policy, stating that “many of the national policies governing our space program have been in place for several years, during which time there have been a number of changes and developments.” She then requested that departments and agencies consider by January 2003 whether existing policies should be revised, consolidated, or eliminated. The Space Policy Coordinating Committee is expected to lead this effort with support from throughout the government.²⁶

The nation must effectively utilize all of its instruments of power as it moves forward in space—an effort that requires new direction. For that reason, a new national space policy is essential. The remaining recommendations address the political, military, and economic aspects of this problem.

Through international agreements, the United States can move forward in a number of areas, most significantly in further defining the international norms for behavior in space—“the rules of the road.” The US position on space has remained consistent for many years. Specifically, the United States does not claim any sovereign right to space, rejects any nation’s claim to such sovereignty, and promotes the availability of space for use by all humanity. At the same time, this country considers the use of space a vital national interest—one that Americans are willing to protect if called upon to do so.

During any negotiations in which it might participate, the United States should be careful to preserve its current strategic advantage, taking no action that would lessen the precision or effectiveness of US military forces. For example, if an enemy denied Global Positioning System (GPS) signals to our precision weapons, should the United States attack to prevent this denial or simply revert to older, less precise weapons—with the resulting increase in collateral (civilian) damage? Preserving this strategic advantage should be a guiding principle for future US initiatives.

Potential enemies (nations, groups, or individuals) need to understand that if they use space systems to target, exploit, or attack US citizens or resources, the United States will respond. In addition to taking political or economic actions, this country could attack ground assets, communication links, or, if necessary, space assets as well. But this does not mean that negotiations leading to either informal understanding or formal agreements cannot prove beneficial to both the United States and the international community. Opportunities exist to further define the commons of space, the legal framework for operating in space, and the conditions that would allow a nation to defend itself.

Just as all military campaigns today rely on operational plans to achieve air superiority, so should they include plans to achieve space superiority. The nation’s political and military leaders must recognize that without space superiority, American forces will operate under greater risk in a theater of operations. Space-superiority plans should specify the appropriate application of both nonlethal and lethal force in the particular medium to ensure the availability of space for US and allied forces and to deny it to enemy forces.

Like air or maritime superiority, space superiority does not exist all the time. Rather, military forces must establish it during a specific conflict and maintain it only for the duration of that conflict. Space superiority differs from the air and maritime versions because of the unique physical characteristics involved. In a conflict, one can achieve air and maritime superiority over the limited geographic area (e.g., air superiority over the Persian Gulf or maritime superiority in the Mediterranean Sea). Space presents a more complicated problem. Orbiting space systems have the potential to affect an enormous portion of the globe; therefore, one must evaluate space superiority from the perspective of all of space, not just a limited theater of operations.

The United States does not claim any sovereign right to space, rejects any nation’s claim to such sovereignty, and promotes the availability of space for use by all humanity.

Thus, in its efforts to achieve space superiority, even for the limited duration of some future conflict, the United States must consider the overall impact of its actions on the commons of space. If the United States impinges upon the commons, establishing superiority for the duration of a conflict, part of the exit strategy must include the return of full access to all nations. This requires two approaches: (1) development of a complete spectrum of military options (nonlethal to lethal) and (2) development of doctrine and concepts of operation employing the military option that best achieves the desired effect with minimum impact upon the commons.

As history has demonstrated, concentrating on political means without properly preparing to use military force often results in failure. For that reason, the United States should aggressively pursue programs that will give future decision makers options to deny, disrupt, degrade, and, if necessary, destroy space systems that could threaten US interests in the twenty-first century. For the time being, this country can achieve space superiority without deploying weapons in space and without the use of weapons that create permanent effects on the commons of space.

In 1999 Dr. John J. Hamre, then deputy secretary of defense, testified before Congress that DOD initiatives for space control emphasized the temporary denial of space to an enemy rather than the destruction of space systems: “We want our space jamming capabili-ties to be localized and temporary. . . . For example, we would want to jam a global positioning system signal around an air base that might be under attack, but we would not want to shut down the whole system.” He acknowledged, however, that a great deal of research and development remained before we could field such a capability.²⁷ That year, however, the Air Force began pursuing space-control technology efforts and just recently initiated acquisition programs to develop capabilities for countercommunications as well as counter-surveillance and counterreconnaissance with temporary/reversible effects.

One may handle future threats in space by means of a progressive pattern of responses that focus on denial and disruption but do not degrade or destroy. However, if peaceful negotiations fail and military planners cannot develop terrestrial means to ensure space superiority, the only alternative may entail the deployment of some types of space-based weapons. The United States must be ready to respond to this scenario.

The United States needs a full spectrum of capabilities to give decision makers options for resolving conflict at the lowest level pos-sible. Full preparation requires developing and testing the critical systems and technologies necessary to field such capabilities. Failure to do so could leave the United States vulnerable to surprises from other nations. On many occasions, Gen John L. Piotrowski, former commander of United States Space Command, has observed that the United States can’t afford to find itself in second place in terms of space weapons.²⁸

The military also needs to develop more fully the doctrine necessary to operate and use space-control capabilities. Because the concept of space superiority is still relatively new to mili-tary planners, significant work still needs to be done on effectively and efficiently achieving it. Understandable concepts and doctrine will allow military leaders to give political leaders sound advice on how to achieve space control across the spectrum of conflict.

We also need to pursue better methods for characterizing potential attacks and defending current space assets—for example, improved situational-awareness capabilities for space to ensure better knowledge of future activities there. We also need better ways of confirming disruptions to or attacks upon satellites. An anomalous event that affects a satellite can have many causes: the harsh space environment, onboard system problems, or hostile action. The correct response depends upon knowing the specific cause. Today’s satellites are relatively incapable of confirming an attack; to maintain our advantage in space control, we must remedy that deficiency.

The United States should use space-based weapons only as a last resort but should not consider such use an unthinkable option. American leaders have long believed this and have used military force when the situation demanded. Certainly, one would prefer to control the future through peaceful agreements that are in the mutual interests of the parties involved. At the same time, the United States must prepare itself to deal with a wide spectrum of potential conflicts in space by developing and testing a number of military capabilities—up to and including space-based weapons, preferably those with temporary/reversible effects.

This criticism is based on Senator Smith’s perception of Air Force budget decisions on space in the mid-1990s. He and others in Congress believe that the space threat is growing and that DOD should respond accordingly. A study by the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board in 1998 indirectly explained the very reasons why this perception developed and proposed an aggressive increase in Air Force space funding for the coming decade. Interestingly, it also showed the actual Air Force space budget for the previous five years (fig. 1). Note that actual Air Force expenditures on space declined slightly or stayed fairly level during the period—the data to which Senator Smith referred in his criticism of the Air Force’s investment in space. The senator believed that the Air Force had ample opportunity to step up to the future but failed to meet this obligation.

Figure 1. Air Force Space Budget for Fiscal Years 1994 through 1998

Figure 1. Air Force Space Budget for Fiscal Years 1994 through 1998 (Derived from data provided in J. Borky et al., Report on a Space Roadmap for the 21st Century Aerospace Force [Washington, D.C.: USAF Scientific Advisory Board, November 1998], 35–36)

In April 2002, the Congressional Research Service completed an analysis of the nation’s space program, pointing out that tracking DOD’s space budget proved very difficult since it is not reported as a single line item in the budget.³⁰ Interestingly, the Congressional Research Service quotes the trade press as saying that DOD’s budget request for unclassified space activities is $7.8 billion.³¹ Since the Air Force executes a significant portion of the unclassified space budget (an average of 83 percent, according to the General Accounting Office),³² it appears that the Air Force budget request for 2003 is somewhere around $6.5 billion. A comparison with the Air Force budget included in the Scientific Advisory Board report of 1998 (less than $5 billion) suggests that the Air Force has stepped up to an increased level of support for space, at least to some extent. However, further analysis at the program level provides additional insight.

In early 1999, the Air Force was under fire for deciding to delay for about two years both the high and low portions of the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), the new missile-warning satellite programs. It did so for a number of reasons—technical, programmatic, and funding. Many members of Congress interpreted this action as another instance of the Air Force’s failure to support space. The publication Inside the Air Force reported that key members of Congress were “concerned about the Air Force’s practice of using the SBIRS program . . . to pay its bills.”³³ Sen. John Warner (R-Va.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, called on Defense Secretary William Cohen to cease making any changes to the SBIRS programs until Congress had an opportunity to consider them.³⁴

Less than four years later, the Air Force again finds itself facing criticism about SBIRS—but now from a number of sources. Because of technical and programmatic problems, Congress, in the Defense Appropriations Act of 2002, denied all $94 million requested for procurement of the “high” element of SBIRS but increased funding for research, development, test, and evaluation from the requested $405 million to $445 million. In the 2003 budget, the president requested $815 million for SBIRS-High, an 83 percent increase over the 2002 request.³⁵ For a variety of reasons, ranging from earlier delays to technical and programmatic concerns, the SBIRS program is experiencing serious problems.

In the spring of 2002, due to budget overruns in excess of 25 percent, the SBIRS-High program breached the limits put in place by legislation known as the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment, thereby placing the future of the entire program at risk. In late April, Edward C. “Pete” Aldridge, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics, recertified the SBIRS-High program as essential for national security and still the best technical approach for meeting the mission. Consequently, however, DOD’s indepen-dent cost estimates judged the Air Force bud-get too low, so the service agreed to fund the program at a much higher level—another significant increase.³⁶

Essentially, a comparison of the Air Force budget over the last few years to the budgets of the mid-1990s reveals a slight increase overall, but most of it went to pay for a few expensive programs that have run into trouble. Even though little has changed in its overall space portfolio in the last decade, the Air Force has stepped up to a leadership role by supporting a number of broken programs essential to national security—such as SBIRS-High. However, if the Air Force is truly to be the executive agent for space and if space really is a vital national interest of the United States, then the Air Force must support space at a level beyond its current programs. Space can help lead the transformation of DOD—but not unless the budget transforms as well.

Senator Smith and others have proposed a separate space force or space corps to adequately support DOD’s space efforts. A strong push for such an organization will continue unless the Air Force, as executive agent in conjunction with the other services and agencies, can meet both the actual and perceived need to be a good steward of military space. The Air Force must take the lead and help transform DOD’s efforts in space, an initiative that will require an ever-increasing commitment—not only in terms of rhetoric but also a greater share of the overall DOD bud-get. It must also reestablish credibility with Congress concerning a number of space programs, including SBIRS-High, and increase its commitments to transformational initiatives (e.g., space-based radar and space control). If the Air Force and DOD fail to meet this challenge, Congress could legislate the creation of a space service well before its time and well before many of the critical policy and doctrine questions have even been addressed.

All space industries are global in nature. Navigation, weather, imagery, and communications from space—all of these capabilities were developed in the United States. The US space industry, once a free-world monopoly, now faces increasing competition from around the world. Complicating matters even further, nearly every one of these commercial developments has significant military implications. Commercial navigation, weather, imagery, and communications can help a potential enemy close the gap with the information-dominant United States.

Any US government action that prevents US companies from competing in international markets represents a threat to national security. If those companies are industry leaders and the world comes to them for a particular space service, the country at least maintains some insight and control over this service in times of conflict or crisis.

At the same time, any attempt by US companies to transfer critical technologies overseas also represents a threat to national security. Even if the technology is “only” for communications satellites, that technology still advances the state of the art overseas and allows international companies to provide improved capabilities in competition with those of the United States. In a global economy, however, no nation can isolate itself and remain competitive. The United States must trade overseas with space services; therefore, industry deserves some leeway in the exchange of technical information.

In March 1999, the State Department, in order to comply with the National Defense Authorization Act of 1999, assumed responsibility for satellite-export controls. However, according to John Holum, then the acting undersecretary of state for arms control and international affairs, the department found it extremely difficult to staff this critical function: “Congress mandated new staff . . . but there wasn’t any money provided for that.”³⁷ International customers responded negatively. Indeed, as reported by Space News, “three large satellite operators from Canada, Europe, and Asia said new U.S. technology-transfer regulations will make it difficult, and perhaps impossible, for them to purchase U.S. satellites.”³⁸ The clear implication was that these operators, previously American customers, would go to other international markets to obtain these services. Evidently, these policies have not changed during the Bush administration.

Given these circumstances, the new national space policy should allow US industry to maintain a leadership role in the space marketplace. The United States cannot afford to miss out on international opportunities because of government bureaucracy. An integrated national strategy should make such difficult and controversial issues as remote sensing and imagery resolution easier to resolve. Furthermore, the United States should be able to capture the majority of space commerce in the twenty-first century—a prospect that is good for both business and national security.

Conclusion

Space science, like nuclear science and all technology, has no conscience of its own. Whether it will become a force for good or ill depends on man, and only if the United States occupies a position of pre-eminence can we help decide whether this new ocean will be a sea of peace or a new, terrifying theater of war.

—President John F. Kennedy, 1962

The United States has an opportunity to implement a vision that will help shape the world in the twenty-first century. Space is only one of many places where this opportunity presents itself, but it is unique in many ways. Enveloping Earth and reaching to the stars, space has the ability to affect, in some way, the life of every person on this planet. Without a peer competitor, the United States has the opportunity now to take advantage of the unique attributes of space, but the nation has not yet stepped up to the challenge.

Conflict in space is inevitable. No frontier exploited or occupied by humans has ever been free from strife, but the United States has a chance to mold and shape the resolution of such conflict in the future. Opportunities exist through both formal and informal negotiations to define the commons of space and the rules of the road.

At the same time, the United States cannot afford to be caught off guard in the future—and cannot afford to allow another country to deploy a space-based weapon first. To ensure that this doesn’t happen, it must develop a robust program for an entire spectrum of space-control capabilities—deferring the decision to deploy operational, space-based weapons until a clear requirement exists.

If the United States remains strong; if space truly is a vital national interest; if we negotiate openly with the nations of the world; if we allow our industry to exploit space fully and become the unquestioned leader of the information age; and if we develop the means and methods to deal effectively with inevitable conflicts in space, perhaps the new ocean to which President Kennedy referred could remain a “sea of peace.” If, however, the United States continues without an integrated national strategy; if we fail to define a vision of space for the future; if we decide to develop space-control capabilities in a vacuum, apart from the rest of the space community; if we refuse to negotiate with other nations; or if we fail to establish a comprehensive, commercial space policy, then the ocean will undoubtedly become “a new, terrifying theater of war.”

The opportunity exists now but won’t last forever. It requires vision and decisions, national effort and debate on the issues (neither the Air Force nor any other military service can go it alone), understanding of a wide variety of very complex issues, and, most importantly, integrated national strategy. In order to exploit fully the tremendous riches and opportunities in space, the United States must be willing to combine all the instruments of national power in a concerted effort towards the realization of a future vision. If the nation prepares now, this vision has no limits. If we fail to prepare, others will define that vision—and not likely in a way the United States would prefer.

1. Sen. Bob Smith (R-N.H.), “The Challenge of Spacepower,” address to the Fletcher School/Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Annual Conference, Tufts University, 18 November 1998.

2. In addition to conducting a survey of major newspapers, magazines, and the Internet during the course of this research, the author found that the Air Force Space Command Office of the Legislative Liaison (Headquarters AFSPC/XPPL), Peterson AFB, Colo., performs an ongoing, detailed search for anything of interest to military space. This office, which publishes such articles every week in its “Legislative Update,” found no media response by the mainstream press either.

3. James Hackett, “Space Control Horizon,” Washington Times, 11 January 1999.

4. House, Conference Report on S. 1059, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 5 August 1999, H.R. 106-301, sec. 1621–30, “Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization”; and Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (Washington, D.C.: The Commission, 11 January 2001).

8. Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF, combatant commander, United States Space Command, address to the United States Air Force Warfighting Symposium, Orlando, Fla., 4 February 1999.

9. Executive Office of the President, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 1999).

10. For example, during January 1996, the United Nations International Telecommunications Union supported the Pacific Telecommunications Conference, which addressed both geostationary crowding and frequency allocations and developed a number of suggestions to alleviate these problems. Only a few months later, as reported by the United Nations itself, severe crowding in the geostationary orbital slots over Asia “led to the jamming of a communication satellite by PT Pasifik Satellite Nusantara (PSN) of Jakarta, Indonesia, in defence of an orbital position claimed by Indonesia. This incident focused global attention on a worsening problem of orbital crowding and caused the matter to be brought before the October–November 1997 World Radio- communication Conference (WRC) of the 187 member-nation [International Telecommunications Union] in Geneva.” United Nations, Highlights in Space: Progress in Space Science, Technology, Applications, International Cooperation and Space Law, 1996 (Vienna: United Nations, 1997), 38; and idem, Highlights in Space: Progress in Space Science, Technology, Applications, International Cooperation and Space Law, 1997 (Vienna: United Nations, 1998), 51. After nearly six weeks, the conference made only minor modifications to the procedures for reserving orbital slots and offered no resolution to the Indonesian jamming incident. When contacted by the author in September 1998 about the incident, Rhea McGraw, spokesperson for PSN, provided the following amplifying information: “There was (and continues to be) some confusion over ‘ownership’ of the slot at 134 degrees East. . . . Both PSN and APSTAR IA [China] claim ownership of that position. PSN did carry out testing that may have resulted in the temporary suspension of broadcasting for APSTAR; however, this was in no way intentional, was halted immediately, and has not occurred since. The [International Telecommunications Union] did not get involved in the dispute settlement process, claiming bilateral negotiations were appropriate. The discussions are ongoing, with no clear resolution in sight.” She later indicated that the PSN (Indonesian) satellite project was halted due to the monetary crisis in Asia. Indonesia, therefore, felt no immediate urgency to resolve the dilemma.

11. The frequency-crowding problem is so severe that the United States government has had to consider methods for sharing critical frequencies originally reserved for military operations. The government has done this with both the Global Positioning System (GPS, the military navigation satellite) and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP, the military weather satellite). For more information, see Office of Spectrum Management, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, A Preliminary Analysis to Determine Interference Effects to GPS from Other Radio Services. For a report on GPS issues concerning interference, see http://gps.losangeles.af. mil/interference. For a description of the DMSP problem, see In the Matter of the Application of LEO ONE USA CORPORATION, file no. 57-DDS-P/LA-94(48) (Washington, D.C.: Federal Communications Commission, 13 February 1998).

13. For example, see “Long Range Plan” (Peterson AFB, Colo.: United States Space Command, March 1998); and J. Borky et al., Report on a Space Roadmap for the 21st Century Aerospace Force (Washington, D.C.: USAF Scientific Advisory Board, November 1998).

14. According to Ambassador Robert T. Grey Jr., US permanent representative to the UN Conference on Disarmament, “We’ve got an agreement that bans the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. We think that’s enough; we don’t anticipate any other problems.” “U.S. Interests and Priorities at the CD: An Interview with U.S. Ambassador Robert T. Grey,” Arms Control Today, October 1998, 3–8.

17. Briefings, Kenneth Bacon, Pentagon spokesman, 4, 11, 18, and 25 September 1997, and 2, 9, 16, 23, and 30 October 1997; press release, Sen. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), subject: ASAT Policy and the MIRACL Test, 10 October 1997; and numerous criticisms from arms-control organizations published on the Internet. See, for example, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_11-12/index 97.asp; and Federation of American Scientists, on-line, Internet, 29 May 2002, available from http://www.fas.org.

18. United States Department of Defense, News Transcript, “Secretary Rumsfeld Outlines Space Initiatives,” 8 May 2001, on-line, Internet, 29 May 2002, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2001/t0508200 _t0508spa.html.

19. Bob Drogin, “Sale to Public of Satellite Photos Debated,” Los Angeles Times, 15 January 2000.

20. Joanna Glasner, “U.S. Ends Afghan Image Contract,” Wired News, 2002, on-line, Internet, 29 May 2002, available from http://www.spaceimaging.com/newsroom/ news/wirednews_1-18-02.htm. According to Glasner, “NIMA [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] had renewed the contract once in November but let it expire on Dec. 5. Over the past several weeks, the agency and Space Imaging discussed the possibility of extending an agreement but ultimately rejected such a plan. ‘NIMA did not renew it simply because after several months the situation had changed, and we re-evaluated,’ said Joan Mears, a spokeswoman for the agency. With a contract no longer in effect, the bulk of images shot for the Pentagon and NIMA will now be available for sale to the public, said Mark Brender, Space Imaging’s director of government affairs. However, he said the company is still negotiating with the government for rights to a small portion of the satellite data. Part of the government’s decision to end the imaging contract was probably financially motivated, said Tim Brown, an analyst at the military think tank GlobalSecurity.org. ‘It’s $2 million a month, and I believe that for the most part it was something of an experiment,’ he said. ‘The Defense Department’s not immune to wasting money.’ ”

21. The Space Commission addressed the need for rules of the road as well. See Report of the Commission, 17–18.

23. Rudi Williams, “Rumsfeld Announces Revamping of U.S. Space Program,” American Forces Information Service News Articles, 10 May 2001, on-line, Internet, 29 May 2002, available from http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/ 2001/space/05-10-01.htm.

24. The White House, Fact Sheet: National Space Policy (Washington, D.C.: National Science and Technology Council, 19 September 1996), 2, on-line, Internet, 29 May 2002, available from http://www.ostp.gov/NSTC/ html/fs/fs-5.html.

25. Office of Space Commercialization Technology Administration, US Department of Commerce, “Promoting Space Tourism,” 25 June 2001, on-line, Internet, 29 May 2002, available from http://www.ta.doc.gov/space/ library/speeches/2001-06-STA.ppt.

26. Quoted in Amy Butler, “Rice Wants President to Initiate Sweeping Space Policy Review,” Inside Defense, 14 May 2002.

27. Quoted in TSgt Timothy Hoffman, “Senate Committee Focuses on Military Space Programs, People,” Air Force News, 25 March 1999, on-line, Internet, 29 May 2002, available from http://www.af.mil/news/Mar1999/ n19990325_990499.html.

28. The author heard General Piotrowski make these kinds of remarks on numerous occasions in the 1990s. In most instances, the general was specifically referring to a space-based laser.

30. Marcia S. Smith, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Space Programs: Civil, Military, and Commercial, 9 April 2002, 8, CRS order code IB92011. Institution of the virtual major-force program for space should resolve this difficulty.

32. Defense Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Military Space Systems’ Planning and Education, GAO/NSIAD-00-81 (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, May 2000).

33. “Congress Critical of Air Force’s Decision to Put Off SBIRS High Launch,” Inside the Air Force, 29 January 1999, 8–9.

34. Sen. John Warner (R-Va.) to Secretary of Defense William Cohen, letter, subject: SBIRS Programs, 4 February 1999.

36. United States Department of Defense, News Transcript, “Under Secretary of Defense Aldridge Roundtable,” 2 May 2002, on-line, Internet, 29 May 2002, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2002/t05022002_t0502aldridge.html.

37. Warren Ferster, “Satellite Export Licensing Caught in Budget Dispute,” Space News, 29 March 1999, 1.

38. Peter B. de Selding, “Satellite Buyers Blast U.S. Rules: American Firms Face Irate Customers,” Space News, 5 April 1999, 1.

Col John E. Hyten (BA, Harvard University; MBA, Auburn University) is chief of the Space Control Division, Directorate of Space Operations and Integration, Deputy Chief of Staff/Air and Space Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force. He has served as commander of the 6th Space Operations Squadron, Offutt AFB, Nebraska; mission director of the NORAD/USSPACECOM Command Center, Cheyenne Mountain AFB, Colorado; and in a variety of operations, engineering, and staff positions on Air Force and Army space control and missile defense programs. Colonel Hyten is a distinguished graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College and attended the University of Illinois as a National Defense Fellow.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.