Document created: 21 February 01
Published Aerospace
Power Journal - Spring 2001
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Capt Robert Dietrick, USAF*
DR. DANIEL MORTENSEN makes an interesting observation in his article “An Ethos of Casualty Sensitivity” that “American casualty sensitivity long predates Vietnam.”1 Unfortunately, this observation completely misses the point of the recent writings of Dr. Jeffrey Record and Maj Charles Hyde.2 Recognizing that the casualty-sensitivity problem has existed for a longer period of time is not the same as showing that it is a benign factor in shaping future American policy.
According to Clausewitz, “If one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand.”3 This concept, taken to an extreme, has been partially blamed for the frontal assaults and associated heavy casualties of the First World War. In Strategy, B. H. Liddell Hart rebukes Clausewitz for this and similar statements and argues for indirect attacks or an attack by the path of least expectation. Liddell Hart warns, “To move along the line of natural expectation consolidates the opponent’s balance and thus increases his resisting power. In war, as in wrestling, the attempt to throw the opponent without loosening his balance results in self-exhaustion, increasing in disproportionate ratio to the effective strain put upon him.”4 This is where the two classical writers and the recent writings converge.
Dr. Record quotes Gen Henry Shelton, the most senior American military officer, as saying, “The well-being of our people must remain our first priority.”5 Similarly, Major Hyde identifies self-protection as the foremost objective of an American brigade in Kosovo.6 One may argue that these statements and objectives do not represent actual policy constraints; however, even if they do not represent actual policy, they create a deadly perception. By establishing the perception, true or untrue, that the United States will not accept casualties, American policy makers have dramatically reduced the number of available military options. This reduction of options translates to a convergence of military aims or a direct approach in military conflict. In short, the American military has become extremely predictable.
Think about it. What could be more predictable than the current American military? Anyone even remotely familiar with America’s recent campaigns should realize that any future campaign will begin with standoff cruise-missile attacks aimed at disrupting command and control (C2) networks and air defenses. These attacks will be followed by additional strikes with stealthy aircraft against remaining air-defense assets, C2 centers, and the power grid. Furthermore, these attacks will always begin at night. Is this the indirect approach or attack by the path of least expectation favored by Liddell Hart and early air-war advocates?
Then again, why change if this approach has worked so well in the past? Perhaps the key is “the past.” Liddell Hart recognized that under certain circumstances, even a simplistic frontal assault would be successful: “Success by such a method only becomes possible through an immense margin of superior strength.”7 Undoubtedly, Clausewitz also recognized that under certain situations, two opponents could be so hopelessly mismatched that even while restrained, the mightier would triumph. Again, why change? Why is being predictable such a potentially dangerous thing?
Consider the French following the First World War. As Germany began rearmament, the French constructed the Maginot Line, based on experiences gained from the previous war. Indeed, had such a fortified line existed in 1914, French casualties would have been much lower, since the French defensive position would have been simplified. This was the purpose of the line in 1940. Contrary to popular history, the French never really expected the Germans to strike directly at the Maginot Line. This fortified defense was hastily built and designed merely to reduce the number of troops required to hold the flank and to channel the German attack to the north, through Belgium. After all, that was where the Germans attacked in 1914.
To counter this expected attack, the French and British deployed their best troops and most mobile formations opposite Northern Belgium. The plan was simple. After the Germans invaded Belgium, the French and British would rush in and prevent the Germans from turning the northern flank along the coast. Unfortunately for the French, German general Heinz Guderian expected this response and devised the actual invasion plan. The Germans began with little more than a feint against Belgium and the Netherlands and awaited the Allied response. After the Allies were committed to Northern Belgium, Guderian struck at the hinge between the mobile forces and the Maginot Line. With a mobile force approximately one-tenth that of the combined Allied army, Guderian shattered the Allied forces and ensured the surrender of France in only six weeks with a minimal number of casualties. This is the power of the indirect approach.
Serbia had little chance against the vast military resources of the United States but still held out longer against a limited and highly predictable military effort than did the French in 1940. In part, this must be partially due to the ability to prepare for the expected assault or aerial siege favored by the United States. What might other opponents accomplish against such a predictable siege? If I had to face an American aerial siege, I would attempt to decentralize my C2 and make it as mobile as possible. The same would apply to my air defenses. At a national level, I would devote nearly all of my resources to countering cruise-missile strikes and stealthy aircraft. I would decentralize my power grid, place critical elements underground, and add more redundancy with smaller, more numerous power-generation plants. In short, I would consolidate my balance, increase my resisting power, and devote my resources to frustrating my opponent long enough to undermine the popular support for his military action. Record asks a rhetorical question, “Does it [casualty aversion] not encourage enemies to adopt the simple strategy of filling as many American body bags as possible?”8 The resounding answer is an unequivocal yes.
Still, could the use of ground forces have altered the conflict against Serbia and provided a better postwar situation? According to Mortensen, “it certainly would not have served a purpose to threaten injection of ground forces. Just how long would it take to get ground forces to the slaughter site? Nothing could have stopped the horrible ethnic killings in short order.”9 Again, Mortensen seems to consider only the direct approach—the least effective one. Prior to the start of the aerial siege, the deployment of ground forces to Hungary or Romania, threatening Belgrade, could have been decisive even without the use of force.
With hostile ground forces poised to occupy Belgrade, Serbia would have been psychologically dislocated. The threat, although direct against Belgrade, is indirect against Kosovo. Slobodan Milosevic would have had a difficult time pursuing his policies in Kosovo while leaving the capital vulnerable and running the risk of his own capture and imprisonment. The mere threat of this action might have been sufficient to achieve US political aims at zero cost in lives, equipment, and even munitions. In the event that Milosevic proceeded anyway, either the ethnic cleansing would have occurred at a slower rate, with greater force deployed to the defense of Belgrade, or a quick NATO ground victory would have been possible with the continued deployment of Serbian forces to Kosovo. Milosevic would have been unbalanced and on the horns of a dilemma.
Of course, there are two significant obstacles to this scenario of response. First, permission to stage offensive ground forces to Hungary or Romania would have been required. Second, in order to avert armed conflict, the threat of ground invasion would have to be credible. I won’t address the first obstacle since it is not particularly relevant to this argument but is a matter for the politicians. As for the credibility of an imminent ground invasion, I think the credibility would have been sorely lacking. Since Milosevic apparently did not place much credibility in the threat of an aerial siege, why would he have believed that the United States would risk ground forces and casualties to achieve its political aims?
Record jokingly suggests the virtual elimination of American ground forces due to their vulnerability and the fear of suffering casualties if they’re employed.10 I have another suggestion—the elimination of our nuclear arsenal. If our credibility is lacking, even in terms of suffering a couple of hundred casualties, how can we make a credible threat of nuclear annihilation that would result in the total destruction of our own society? On a more serious note, I would urge American military leadership to end the talk of bloodless victories and, at least on a public note, believe in T. R. Fehrenbach’s concept that “the real function of an army is to fight and that a soldier’s [or airman’s] destiny—which few escape—is to suffer, and if need be, to die.”11 Only with senior leadership openly committed to risking American casualties might credibility, with respect to the use of any type of force, be restored to the United States.
*Captain Dietrick has held various positions in systems acquisition, base-level supply, and fuels management. Currently, he is the deputy chief of engineering, Cruise Missile Product Group, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma.
Tinker AFB, Oklahoma
Notes
1. Dr. Daniel R. Mortensen, “An Ethos of Casualty Sensitivity,” Aerospace Power Journal 14, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 116.
2. Dr. Jeffrey Record, “Force-Protection Fetishism: Sources, Consquences, and (?) Solutions,” Aerospace Power Journal 14, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 4–11; and Maj Charles K. Hyde, “Casualty Aversion: Implications for Policy Makers and Senior Military Officers,” Aerospace Power Journal 14, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 17–27.
3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75–76.
4. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Decisive Wars of History, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1967), 25.
5. Record, 5.
6. Hyde, 26.
7. Liddell Hart, 25.
8. Record, 10.
9. Mortensen, 116–17.
10. Record, 5–6.
11. T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History, 1st Brassey’s ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s 1994), 66.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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